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Abstract 
The research explores the transition from war to peace in the Colombian region of Meta, 
through the parallel analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
process, and of the individual combatants’ path from recruitment to reintegration. The 
overall research goal is to account for the multifaceted nature of DDR within the transition 
from war to peace and to untangle DDR implications both in the short term for the life of ex-
combatants and in the long term with regard to the implications for state formation and 
peacebuilding processes.  
The thesis is the product of complementing research components with intertwined levels of 
analysis. Conceptually, the research proposes a critical read of the DDR role in war to peace 
transition contexts. It advances an alternative understanding of war to peace transition and 
of DDR based on political economy factors to explain the complexity of war mobilization and 
demobilization.  
Secondly, through a case study, the research analyses the contemporary DDR processes in 
Meta in the 2000s, which include the collective demobilization of the paramilitary federation 
of the AUC and the individual DDR program that targeted the left-wing rebel groups of the 
FARC and of the ELN. The DDR analysis is complemented by an in-depth historical political 
economy analysis of the conflict in Meta, which traces the conflict factors that explain the 
rise of conflictive dynamics and ensuing formation of non-state armed groups in this region. 
Last, an empirical analysis addresses the relationship between employment and conflict 
through the analysis of life cycles of ex-combatants. The research approaches individuals’ 
decisions to mobilize for war and demobilize from war, within a framework of employment-
seeking behaviour. It posits that the search for employment and livelihoods needs are a 
crucial driver for joining a non-state armed group and that employment is a key feature of a 
reintegration path. 
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Introduction 
A vignette from the field. In December 2012, three months after I started this doctoral 
program, I visited the region of Meta, Colombia, for the first time. As a social development 
analyst at the World Bank, I had made repeated trips to the country in support of 
development programs to ease the country’s transition from war to peace. This time, I was 
involved in a training organized by the Colombian agency in charge of ex-combatants’ 
reintegration (Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, ACR). On the very first day, during 
a welcoming dinner for training’s participants, I sat next to Cesar,1 a 45-year old ex-
combatant from the then Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC),2 who had escaped from the group a few years prior.  
Cesar was one of those men with his back straight, intense eyes and dense moustache, his 
voice tone confident and calm. “My father was a communist, you know”, he started; to which 
I replied that mine was too. We established common ground between a professional 
revolutionary and a World Bank analyst that put us on an equal footing – the prelude of a 
frank and intense discussion. Cesar picked up that I could empathize with what he was going 
to tell me.   
From humble peasant origins, Cesar grew up in a background of rural warfare, the fight for 
land and chronic poverty. He came from and operated in the peripheral sub-region of the 
Llanos – a vast plain of tropical grasslands occupying most of the south and east of Colombia. 
Part of the Eastern Plains, the administrative region of Meta is a ‘frontier’ territory, where 
colonization and settlement are still ongoing processes today. Characterized by inhospitable 
territory, lack of infrastructure, and weak state penetration, Meta suffered from land 
exploitation by powerful elites, unequal property structure and ensuing inequality and 
armed mobilization. 
A strong communist upbringing and the death of his father drew Cesar into the FARC in the 
early 1980s. While he was a teenager, the FARC started its country-wide expansion, turning 
from a peripheral guerrilla movement into the powerful “People’s Army.” He spent the 
following nearly three decades in the group, performing military roles, but especially 
                                                        
1 Throughout this dissertation, real names of ex-combatant interviewees were changed with the purpose of 
protecting their identity. 
2 Since the November 2016 final peace agreement between the government of Colombia and the FARC, the latter 
has reconstituted itself into a political party with the same acronym FARC, now standing for Alternative 
Revolutionary Force of Common (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común). Throughout this research, I will 
refer to FARC by the old guerrilla group’s name.   
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conducting political mobilization among the peasantry. Cesar fully embraced the 
revolutionary cause and the communist ideology, which – he admitted during the interview – 
did not end with his demobilization. 
After twenty-seven years of continuous FARC membership, Cesar took advantage of the 
Colombian government’s offer to demobilize and reintegrate FARC members who opted for 
desertion. Dissecting Cesar’s decision to betray the group that had constituted his entire 
existence is the unanswered question of this thesis. From that moment on, my work was 
driven by the awareness that the factors for reintegration are not only related to the quest 
for policy solutions, but they are intrinsically rooted in the individual and organizational 
pathways of men, women and armed actors through war, and in the structural factors for 
conflict.  
Cesar’s story is the point of departure and of arrival of this research. His trajectory 
highlighted the tight relationship between an individual path through war and peace, and the 
macro contextual process of permanent war in the region and at the national level. Cesar 
came from nothing, grew up in an area of guerrilla presence, with persistent inequality and 
marginalization, and statelessness – a common story among Colombian landless peasants. 
His life trajectory between war and peace underlines the variation and the extreme 
complexity of war and peace processes, and cements the refusal for single cause 
explanations.  
I was fully absorbed by his story. After a two-hour conversation with him, I raised my head. 
Most people in the local restaurant were gone and my preconceived notions about what it 
takes for veterans to reintegrate into society were shaken, as I had learned a new level of 
complexity. Up to that point, as a practitioner in the peacebuilding business, my professional 
preoccupations concerned the identification of clear problems and the search for policy 
solutions. 
War-to-peace and DDR dilemmas. At the outset of this research I was interested in finding 
an answer to the fundamental policy question about Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR): ‘What factors account for ex-combatants’ successful reintegration into 
society?’. Policy-makers are concerned with the identification of these factors, so they can 
devise measures (i.e. policies and programs) that can contribute to successful reintegration. 
The encounter with Cesar and the progression of this research expanded my intellectual 
horizon to a more sophisticated analysis. The answers I sought laid in the exploration of the 
war to peace complexity, through political economy analysis. 
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Thus, the present research strives to understand the complexity of armed conflict at the sub-
regional level, and the implications for more contextually attuned policy responses, 
especially those that concern DDR. With this overarching goal, the research aims to provide a 
comprehensive qualitative analysis of a fragile war to peace transition in the region of Meta, 
Colombia. This is done through a multi-level (individual, structural, and organizational) and 
cross-temporal (before, during and after conflict) analysis.   
The research explores the non-linear process of transition from war to peace, firstly by 
looking at the individual paths of ex-combatants from recruitment to membership in an 
armed group to reintegration; secondly, by placing these individual trajectories within an 
organisational framework linked to their roles within rebel groups; and thirdly locating them 
within a wider structural context at the regional and national levels, including the DDR 
process. Ultimately, Cesar’s individual trajectory from recruitment into the FARC, to life in 
the group, and to desertion embodies the ambivalence and variation of structural transition 
from war to peace.3 
This research understands war-to-peace transitions, less a smooth linear movement from 
violence to order, than a convoluted, nonlinear and highly contested and conflictual process, 
in which the new rules of the game are negotiated by competing elites. Transitions can be 
understood as historical processes in which societies seek to improve their material 
condition and strengthen and/or consolidate their power against external enemies and 
internal competitors (Tilly, 1990).  
War and peace are not mutually exclusive, or binary conditions; they frequently co-exist and 
overlap. This is true both at the individual level – where the lives of the ex-combatants 
continue to be shaped by their wartime experiences, long after the signing of a peace accord. 
And at the macro level, structures and institutions shaped by war persist into the peacetime. 
As Keen (2000) reminds us, war is not (solely) the experience of violence, nor is peace 
experienced as the total absence of violence.  
The challenges associated with either building or consolidating peace in the aftermath of 
armed conflict have received increasing attention in the academic and policy communities. A 
new policy consensus in the form of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ has emerged about the need to 
promote peace through liberal democracy and market sovereignty. This can be understood 
                                                        
3 Although being aware of the potential vast scope of the process of transition, this research has also to make 
some practical decisions regarding the limitations of its scope and definitions. Without refusing the complexity of 
it, war-to-peace transition is here more narrowly adopted as the process through which countries move from the 
experience of armed conflict and lawlessness, among others, to the experience of peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
application of law, and addressing grievances that are at the core of conflict causes. 
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as a collective and prescriptive endeavour to transition countries with armed conflict and/or 
with fragility of institutions toward a standardized version of peace.  
Nonetheless, the mixed results achieved by the liberal peace model (World Bank, 2011; 
Paris, 2004; Tschirgi, 2004) and the lack of deep theorization concerning peacebuilding and 
DDR, calls for a more nuanced understanding of DDR processes, and how they relate to 
stabilization and development. This research approaches peacebuilding and DDR as 
inherently political processes, rather than technical and programmatic interventions 
(Cramer, 2006; Kriger, 2003). 
Elaborating upon the liberal peacebuilding model, Ottaway (2003) describes a triple 
transition (security, political and socio-economic) process in the aftermath of war. Security is 
often considered a precondition for successful war-to-peace transition; in turn, DDR and 
security sector reform (SSR) are seen at the core of the security transition by policy-makers. 
In particular, DDR programs have the stated goal of dismantling organized armed structures 
(rebels, illegal armed groups, regular military), proceeding to the collection of weapons, 
discharging individual combatants, and taking responsibility for ex-combatants’ reinsertion 
and reintegration into society. As such, they are at the core of any transition from war to 
peace (SIDDR, 2006).4  
The research goes beyond this policy level, and tries to expose the ambivalence and 
contestation of the transition process and of DDR. Given their operational and practical 
nature, policy responses tend not to be cognizant of either the complexity or the underlying 
politics of war to peace transitions. The policy literature on DDR views it as a technical 
project based on goals that translate into outcomes through measurable outputs. DDR 
implementers forget the political nature of post-war transition. Although DDR in Colombia 
has been the subject of numerous empirical studies,  these failed to trickle up at the policy 
level (to cite only the most recent ones: Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012; Nussio, 2012; Nussio and 
Oppenheim, 2013; Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011). In a similar vein, peacebuilding suffers 
from the same binary distinction between theory and practice – as Chapter 1 describes.  
This research aims to grapple with the complexity of war-to-peace transitions by expanding 
the analytical framework through which DDR and transition are analysed. An alternative 
approach based on political economy analysis is proposed here. Such approach entails the 
awareness of the role that wars, transition processes and also DDR, all play in the formation 
                                                        
4 “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a process that contributes to security and stability by 
disarming combatants, removing them from military structures, and socially and economically integrating them 
into society. DDR programs downsize armed forces, or disband them completely. They are usually part of other 
efforts to demilitarize (e.g. landmine removal, Security Sector Reform, etc.) and consolidate peace (e.g. justice, 
reconciliation, community-based reconstruction, etc.) When they shift resources to the social and economic 
sectors, DDR programs can also reduce poverty” (World Bank, 2009: 1).  
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and/or strengthening of state’s institutions and societies. This role is not univocal, but rather 
ambivalent and based on historical contextual factors. No definitive statements come out 
from the application of such an approach; rather the story of DDR and transition is 
complexified.  
Throughout history, DDR has repeatedly played an important role in state-citizen relations 
and in post-war social contract. In their bargaining with the state, ex-combatants use their 
leverage as both agents of violence and as primary state supporters to pursue their class 
interests, uphold their rights to citizenship and convey their demands. The variations 
through which states have treated demobilization and ex-combatants may explain different 
trajectories in state formation (Campbell, 2003).   
The research also shows the specific trajectory of war and peace in Latin America, in order to 
more broadly situate the case of Colombia and of Meta. One of the theses that is considered 
here asserts that the relatively small-scale and “limited wars” experienced in Latin America 
is the determining factor for a more limited process of state building. Total mobilization for 
war is a defining experience for state centralization and sophistication of capacity (Centeno, 
2003).    
Scope and objectives: Research focus. Thus, the expectation here is to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of DDR in Meta, Colombia through the analysis of the 
structural conflict factors in the region, the unfolding of the DDR program there, and the 
individual experiences of ex-combatants. For the purpose of this research, the term ‘ex-
combatant’ encompasses those individuals who are part and beneficiaries of the government 
sponsored DDR program. An ex-combatant is a male or female individual who was a member 
of an outlawed non-state armed group. In Colombia, these groups are defined by the state, 
which distinguishes them from drugs trafficking organizations and criminal groups. 
Although the distinction may sometimes be subtle when considering those interests, 
behaviours and operations among these groups have commonalities. Nonetheless non-state 
armed groups have an ultimate political agenda. The two main categories of non-state armed 
groups in Colombia are the right-wing paramilitaries (primarily, but not exclusively, the 
United Self Defence Forces of Colombia, in Spanish Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC); 
and the left-wing rebels of the FARC and of the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de 
Liberación Nacional, ELN). 
The research aims to disentangle some of the dilemmas related to DDR and its implications 
both for the lives of individual ex-combatants, like Cesar, as well as for long-term societal-
level peacebuilding processes.  
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The individual paths of combatants in their transition from war to peace, is examined 
through three phases of engagement: recruitment, membership to the armed group, and 
reintegration. Each of these three phases is seen through the analytical lens of ‘employment’ 
and the labor market of war/post war transition. Based on thirty-one semi-structured 
interviews with ex-combatants, this leg of the study examines the pre-, the during and the 
post-war experiences of ex-combatants. The focus is on the job experiences and/or livelihood 
strategies of ex-combatants during these three phases. As such, ex-combatants’ transition in 
and out of war mirrors the structural process of non-linear transition from war to peace. 
The central research question that seeks to capture the above goal is the following:  
How has DDR interacted with the dynamics of war and peace in Meta, Colombia? 
This can be further dissected in the following three sub-questions applied to Meta: 
 What are the key factors that explain (repeated cycles of) recruitment and war 
mobilization? 
 What are the key factors that shape the DDR process in Meta? 
 What is the variation between individual ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary combatants when 
analysing their war and employment life cycles? 
To answer this set of questions, a two-pronged investigation is carried out. First (Chapters 4-
5), there is a historical political economy analysis (PEA) of the conflict in Meta since the XIX 
century, and an analysis of the DDR processes in the 2000s. Focus is both on the collective 
demobilization of the paramilitary federation of the AUC, and on the individual DDR program 
that targeted the left-wing rebel groups of the FARC and the ELN. The DDR analysis is 
complemented by an in-depth historical PEA, which traces the factors and the rise of 
conflictive dynamics and ensuing non-state armed groups’ formation in Meta. Only by deeply 
analysing the structural factors of conflict, can the contemporary DDR processes be 
understood. 
Second (Chapters 6-8), the research explores the war-to-peace transition in Meta through 
the analysis of employment life cycles of ex-combatants from recruitment to armed group’s 
membership to demobilization and reintegration. This leg emphasizes individual, 
organizational and structural dynamics of transition. A focus on the life of ex-combatants is 
an under-explored dimension of the war-to-peace transition literature.  
An employment perspective on (ex)-combatants. The lens through which ex-combatants’ 
lives are explored is ‘employment’. The research approaches individuals’ decision to 
mobilize (or not) and demobilize within a framework of employment-seeking behaviour. It 
posits that the search for employment and livelihoods needs is a crucial driver for joining a 
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non-state armed group. The example of Cesar and of most ex-combatants is clear: they all 
had to make a living and the armed group out there provided that opportunity. In this sense, 
ex-combatants and non-state armed groups are the economic actors of an ad hoc labor 
market of war. By the same token, employment is a key feature of a reintegration path. 
This is not to subscribe to a narrow rational choice approach; individual decision making is 
located in relation to organizational and structural factors. In fact, an employment and labor 
market lens is applied to a three-level analysis of: (i) the life of combatants and their 
employment experiences (individual level); (ii) non-state armed groups’ behaviour with 
respect to recruitment strategies and career paths within the group (organizational level); 
and (iii) the political, social and economic factors and the conflict dynamics that drive men 
and women to join armed groups, to stay in them, and to demobilize and seek reinsertion 
into society (structural level).  
The labor market of war is defined by this multiple-level framework of employment and 
conflict, which combines with the three stages of war-to-peace transition – before, during, 
and after conflict. Schematically, each level can be applied to each of the three phases of the 
transition: ex-combatants, non-state armed groups, and war dynamics all experience a pre-
conflict, a during- and an after-conflict phase (see Tables I.1 and 3.1). As such, Cesar’s life can 
be divided into three stages: what he did before entering the FARC and how he got recruited, 
what he did while in the FARC, and what his reinsertion path is. In turn, Cesar and all the 
other ex-combatants provide individual, organizational and structural answers for each of 
these three phases. 
At the individual level, the research revisits the employment experiences of individual ex-
combatants. First, it analyses an ex-combatant’s life before entering the armed group. This 
phase includes the jobs he/she held before joining arms, the circumstances and the 
individual motivations and incentives for joining an armed group. Second, I report the 
individual life stories of ex-combatants within the armed group, considering the time spent 
in arms as a job experience. The objective is to unveil the different roles and ‘jobs’ held, and 
the functions performed while in arms. Third, in the after phase, ex-combatants reveal the 
circumstances of demobilization and their experience with reintegration, especially the 
challenges in terms of securing employment, and the jobs held since demobilization. In 
particular, I pay special attention to the interaction between these phases. I look at all these 
job experiences organically, as they constitute an (ad hoc) professional career.  
At the organizational level, the objective is to give some insights on the ‘human resources’ of 
armed groups. In line with the three-phase classification, I focus on: incentives for, strategies 
and patterns of recruitment (before conflict stage); on roles and tasks within the armed 
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group, and career development (during conflict stage); and on drivers of demobilization that 
refer to the armed group’s behaviour and strategies, as well as organizational patterns of 
recidivism (after conflict stage). This approach is in line with the emerging literature on 
‘rebel governance’ (see Chapter 2), which is concerned with the understanding of armed 
groups’ internal functioning and with the organizational factors that explain external 
behaviours (Arjona, 2008, 2014; Arjona et al., 2015; Mampilly, 2011; Menkhaus, 2010; 
Weinstein, 2007). 
In order to apply the employment and labor market lens to the organizational level, I make 
the following abstraction. I consider non-state armed groups as employers sui generis, or 
social actors that in order to achieve either economic goals (e.g. drug traffickers’ 
maximization of profits) or political goals (e.g. leftist guerrilla’s change in the political and 
social order) need to “employ” skilled men and women (Weinstein, 2007: 43). Such 
abstraction does not imply a treatment of armed groups as purely economic agents – far 
from it. But it allows to isolate employment factors in the analysis of armed groups’ 
formation, behaviour and strategies, and demobilization. 
Finally, at the structural level, I examine those historical political economy factors that are 
associated with employment in an armed group. First, I analyse those structural drivers of 
recruitment, including ideology, socialization and available social networks. To explain 
Cesar’s recruitment, it is not sufficient to look at his individual motives, but it is necessary to 
understand the contextual factors of war and marginalization in Meta. Second, I analyse the 
relationship between economic reintegration (with a focus on employment) and the 
challenges of current conflict and ongoing recruitment by armed groups (i.e. the recidivism 
phenomenon). Specifically, I assess the role and impact of employment on reintegration 
outcomes, and the structural factors contributing to ex-combatants going back in arms (i.e. 
recidivism). 
Employment is conceptualized broadly. First, both the (material) livelihoods implications of 
employment and the (symbolic) meaning of employment are addressed. Employment is not 
only the material act of finding and retaining a job for the purpose of economically sustaining 
the household, but the meaning of employment in terms of identity is also important. In most 
societies, merely having a job (rather than being unemployed) is a fundamental part of self-
respect, dignity and identity (Kilroy, 2012; Cramer, 2010).  
Second, employment and employment-seeking are concepts that mostly apply to industrial- 
and service-based economies in urban environments, rather than agricultural ones. Instead, 
when analysing rural societies like Meta,  employment assumes a much vaguer notion. 
Employment in rural societies often means inheriting the family’s livelihoods. For example, 
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the marginalized rural areas of Meta that are analysed here display contexts where either 
meager existence as landless peasants or membership in the FARC are the only ‘employment’ 
options (Ferro and Uribe, 2002). In fact, it is the structural inequalities around land tenure 
and those very meager existences as landless peasants that drove armed rebellion in the first 
place. Thus, it makes sense to talk about ‘employment’ only insofar we intend it more 
broadly, as a life path, which is often a set course. Through such understanding, the 
individual decision to join an armed group can be viewed to a certain extent as a natural 
consequence of pre-existing conditions of poverty, marginalization and lack of options, 
rather than a complete rupture with previous life. 
DDR implications. The analytical framework that this research applies to Meta carries 
important innovative entry points for the understanding of DDR. First, applying a longer 
timespan to the life of ex-combatants beyond the post-demobilization phase has the 
advantage of broadening the scope for understanding reintegration. The latter is 
conceptualized and applied in the research not as a standalone phase, but in interaction with 
individual and structural considerations that precede demobilization. Understanding if and 
how Cesar reintegrates into society is dependent upon understanding what led him into the 
conflict in the first place, and what his course during the war was. In turn, the understanding 
of post-war employment of ex-combatants also benefits from considering pre- and during-
conflict factors.  
Second, the DDR literature has generally not differentiated between roles performed by ex-
combatants within the armed group – a differentiation that is, instead, fully embraced by this 
research. When applied to the different roles in the armed groups, the employment lens that 
this research proposes allows for an understanding of the combatant beyond a mere agent of 
violence. Cesar, for example, emphasized his role of FARC political mobilizer, working side by 
side the peasantry.  
Such analytical framework is also useful when applied to the organizational level of armed 
groups. For example, as a hybrid organization, the paramilitaries simultaneously retained 
distinct aspects. At one moment they behaved like a private militia, at another moment they 
were a counterinsurgent army and at another moment they acted as a criminal quasi-mafia 
outfit. The implication from this hybrid nature is the diversification of individual profiles 
within the paramilitaries. In this space, the intended outcome of the research is to move 
beyond a monolithic conceptualization of armed groups and individual combatants in order 
to develop a more complex framework to understand war to peace transition dynamics. The 
understanding of the specific armed group is also functional to DDR programming. 
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Case study of Meta. This research adopts a case study approach to explain the 
aforementioned dynamics and processes. In Colombia, a country of entrenched inequalities 
and uneven state presence, the armed conflict has played out on many fronts for more than 
half a century. Its actors ranged from left-wing rebel groups to right-wing paramilitaries and 
state armed forces that often fought alongside the paramilitaries. Drug-related violence has 
been one of the engines of the conflict since the 1980s, and victims tend to be civilians caught 
in the middle. In the conflict lifetime, more than 220,000 people died, and over 6 million 
were forcibly displaced.  
There is a great deal of sub-regional variation in the dynamics of armed violence in Colombia 
(Pearce, 1990; Holmes et al., 2008; Robinson, 2013). Geographic conditions, differential 
settlement patterns, a forsaken colonization process, unequal enforcement of rule of law and 
land tenure, among others, determine ad hoc sub-regional conflict dynamics and factors. 
Colombian history has been characterized by centre versus periphery dynamics, exacerbated 
by the remoteness of Colombian frontier regions, and by endemic corruption of local elites 
and their direct involvement in the armed conflict.  
This research focuses on the administrative department of Meta,5 which is part of the 
‘frontier’ region of the Eastern Llanos (literally, “Plains”). In Colombia, colonization and 
settlements traditionally concentrated in the core provinces of the Andean Highlands 
connected by the Magdalena River to the Caribbean coastal port cities of Cartagena and 
Barranquilla, all areas characterized by temperate climates. These central regions contrast 
with the peripheral ones, the so-called ‘frontier’ regions: Eastern Llanos, Amazonia, Pacific 
Coast, La Guajira Peninsula, and the islands of San Andres and Providencia. The Eastern 
Llanos occupies around 23% of the country (see Figure I.1), but it is home to only 3.5% of 
the total Colombian population. Other than Meta, it includes the administrative departments 
of Arauca, Casanare, and Vichada (Jiménez, 2012; Rausch, 1999). 
Meta is the most populated region of the Eastern Llanos and the most connected to the 
centre of the country. Slightly larger than Austria, Meta enjoys an obvious strategic location 
as the connection between the Andean centre and the south and east of the country. Like all 
of the Eastern Llanos, Meta has been traditionally characterized by high rates of structural 
conflict over land between powerful landowners and landless peasants. Historically, as a 
marginal region traditionally outside the reach of the state, Meta has witnessed several 
                                                        
5 Administrative departments in Colombia – Departamentos, in Spanish – are the equivalent of “regions” or 
“states” in a federal system. 
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colonization waves and processes. As the research demonstrates, such colonization 
processes are highly interwoven with the conflict dynamics.6 
FIGURE I.1: MAP OF COLOMBIA  
 
Source: Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/asiescolombia/mapas.html 
[Accessed on March 24, 2017] 
Frontier regions have historically been sparsely populated and difficult to access due to 
tropical climate, inhospitable territory, poor infrastructure and communication, and diseases 
such as malaria. Consequently, state control, rule of law and governance practices differ 
markedly in such frontier regions compared to areas closer to the centre (Rausch, 1999; 
                                                        
6 In terms of economic factors and their interaction with the conflict, cattle ranching is the traditional economic 
activity around which land conflict has taken place in Meta and the Llanos in the XX century (see Chapter 4). Two 
dynamics have added more complexity to the conflict. As recently as the 1980s, a boom in drugs trafficking and 
the rise of criminal groups took place in parallel with the relative decline of traditional landowning elites. This 
process reversed the power dynamics in Meta. In addition, in the last decade, the discovery of oil reserves and 
their exploitation brought the region to the forefront of the national leadership’s agenda. Mining also represents 
an emerging economic activity. Untapped economic resources in the south and the east of Colombia have been 
seen as a material incentive for the state to put an end to the conflict with the FARC. 
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Kalmanovitz, 2010). Meta’s peripheral status and governance mechanism is summarized as 
follows: “National political elites residing in urban areas, particularly Bogotá, have effectively 
delegated the running of the countryside and other peripheral areas to local elites. The 
provincial elites are given freedom to run things as they like, and even represent themselves 
in the legislature, in exchange for political support and not challenging the centre” 
(Robinson, 2013: 44). 
Ultimately, the case study emphasizes the different forms of non-state armed groups in Meta 
and their role. Given Meta’s governance structure, armed actors have traditionally retained 
economic influence and social control over vast areas of the Llanos. Throughout the 20th 
Century, non-state armed groups in Meta and beyond assumed several incarnations: they 
took the form of private militias to protect large landowners’ interests, bandits that exploited 
state absence, structured rebel groups that mobilized around Communist ideology of justice 
and economic rights, counterinsurgent groups, and ultimately rent seeking criminal actors 
that are dedicated to drugs trafficking. Each armed group interacted in different ways with 
local elites, namely through a process of local-level bargaining that spurred temporary local 
orders. The exploration of the non-state armed groups’ trajectory in Meta is in line with the 
analytical framework proposed here that points to the variation of war and peace transition. 
Research methods. Methodologically, the present research builds on the growing literature 
on conflict and violence that uses theoretical and empirical disaggregation on multiple 
dimensions, including space, time, actors, and forms of violence. Given the wide variations of 
conflict cases and their inherent complexity, several authors agree that the understanding of 
transitional dynamics from war to peace may only be accomplished through a case study 
analysis (Barakat et al., 2002; Justino et al., 2013; Kalyvas, 2001, 2010; Kriger, 2003; 
Sambanis, 2004c; Suhrke, 2011).  
A sub-regional approach carries several benefits when compared with a national level 
analysis. The former allows for a more nuanced and context-specific understanding of 
structural societal and politico-economic conditions, and a granular account of policies, 
dynamics, and implications. A local-level lens is conducive to understanding the hybrid 
context in which DDR, in particular the social and economic reintegration aspects, takes 
place in Colombia. A sub-regional approach may also be a requirement when considering the 
wide regional variation that characterizes Colombia and its conflict dynamics, as it was 
mentioned above. Ultimately, a sub-regional analysis allows for a more direct contact with 
beneficiaries and communities (Justino, 2013; Kalyvas, 2001; Nieto Matiz, 2012). 
Fieldwork consisted of in-depth and semi-structured one-to-one interviews with key 
informants and with ex-combatants, and direct observation. Between Bogota and Meta, I 
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conducted a total of 40 interviews with key informants and experts from research centres, 
international organizations, local and national governments, and from the Colombian 
specialized agency on DDR. In terms of ex-combatants, I built a sample of 31 individuals that 
I interviewed in Meta’s provincial capital of Villavicencio and in the town of Puerto Gaitan. 
The sample is representative of the total population of ex-combatants in Meta (who are DDR 
beneficiaries) with respect to three parameters: gender, age, and armed group. Seventeen ex-
combatants were part of the FARC, thirteen belonged to the paramilitaries, and one was from 
the ELN (See Annexes 1 and 2). 
Structure of the thesis. Table I.1 schematically summarizes the main focus of the research. 
Three levels of analysis are applied to three conflict phases to produce three overarching 
topics: mobilization, war, and demobilization. Such schematization reproduces the emphasis 
of the research on the interaction between levels and phases, as continuum is a key concept 
of this research. A classification contributes to further granularity. Different methodological 
techniques are used to research each level of analysis: through a combination of political 
economy analysis and semi-structured interviews with ex-combatants and experts. 
TABLE I.1: A RESEARCH ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR AND EMPLOYMENT   
   LEVEL 
PHASE 
Individual Organizational Structural 
Before 
Conflict Mobilization and Recruitment 
During 
Conflict Membership to Non-State Armed Groups 
After    
Conflict Demobilization, Reintegration and/or Recidivism, Continuation 
 
The thesis is divided into three parts and eight chapters. 
Part I concerns the theoretical underpinnings of the research and exposes the limitations of 
the current models of understanding war-to-peace transition. It also includes the 
methodological foundations of the thesis.  
Chapter 1 discusses war to peace transition in order to situate the debate on the theory and 
practice on peacebuilding and DDR. It critically addresses the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ project 
and DDR, with ample reference to Latin America. The literature review criticizes the overly 
technical approach to peacebuilding and especially to DDR, which has entirely missed both 
the broader implications of DDR and its political dimension.    
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Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical basis for an alternative and more complex approach to 
understand war, transition from war to peace and DDR. The first section acknowledges the 
historic role that wars play in state formation processes, and it discusses other sources of 
order and authority that emerge during and after war. In the second section on DDR, I 
demonstrate how demobilization also retains a role in state formation processes. I also 
review the nature and the quality of the political settlement between the state and ex-
combatants, which is key to understand post-war order.  
Chapter 3, on the research methodology, explains how a combined macro- and micro-level 
analysis is designed and conducted. This includes a discussion on the main research 
questions, and an explanation of the research goals, components, and the related multiple 
levels of analysis. Second, the chapter reports on the main research techniques that are used: 
fieldwork phases, sampling, potential biases, and risks and mitigation. I include ethical and 
security considerations when conducting research “in” and “on” conflict settings (Goodhand, 
2000). 
Part II concerns the case study on war-to-peace transition and DDR in Meta. This portion of 
the study is based on interviews with key informants and on an extensive literature review 
in English and Spanish languages.  
Chapter 4 presents a historical political economy analysis of the conflict in Meta. The analysis 
is centered on some of the long-term drivers of the violence in Meta, including, among 
others: the quest for land and the process of colonization; and the structural institutional 
failure that left peripheral regions in a permanent state of lawlessness and/or elites capture. 
The chapter also addresses the trajectory, behaviour, strategies, and incentives of non-state 
armed groups as they are functional to contextualize the findings from the empirical part of 
the thesis.   
Chapter 5 narrows the focus on the dynamics of DDR in Meta during the 2000s. The chapter 
concerns two underlying main themes. First, how DDR and, in particular, economic 
reintegration and employment were designed and implemented in Colombia during Uribe 
(2002-2010) and Santos (2010-) presidencies. Second, Chapter 5 addresses the implications 
of DDR by providing an overview of the current security conditions in Meta, of the 
rearmament process and the formation of new non-state armed groups. 
Part III includes the empirical part, consisting of an in-depth analysis of employment life 
trajectories of ex-combatants. 
Chapter 6 concerns the dynamics and drivers of mobilization and recruitment, here analysed 
in a three-level framework: (i) individual motivations for joining an armed group; (ii) 
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structural factors that are related to conflict dynamics and which play an equally important 
part in the decision to go to war; and (iii) organizational explanations centered around the 
armed group itself, including its incentives and promises, its appeal and its strategies and 
patterns of recruitment. 
Chapter 7 analyses the employment dynamics of ex-combatants inside the armed group. 
Focus is on the diversity of roles, functions and tasks, in order to give a picture of the 
heterogeneous ‘jobs’ in armed groups. It presents the differences between FARC and AUC. 
The chapter describes the main professional roles in a non-state armed group, including: 
military duties; propaganda and political mobilization roles; and the support roles related to 
logistics, supplies, and nursing.  
Chapter 8 seeks to understand the way in which ex-combatants demobilize, find and retain 
employment after they cease to be part of an armed group, and those associated challenges. 
It focuses on the different dynamics that governed the demobilization of the FARC and the 
AUC, the dynamics and challenges of reintegration, in particular employment, and the 
security concerns related to the presence of emerging non-state armed groups and the 
phenomenon of recidivism. 
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PART I – Theoretical Framework 
and Methodology 
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1. Theories and Practices of War to 
Peace Transition 
The end of the Cold War opened up a new era in international affairs. The post-Cold War 
phase saw a predominance of a particular model of political and economic organization of 
the state – i.e. liberal market-oriented democracy. Among systemic changes, the 
international community aimed to tackle in a much more direct and intrusive way the 
problems related to development. In fragile and conflict-affected countries this new attitude 
translated into the adoption of comprehensive peacebuilding strategies, underpinned by 
market-oriented reforms and liberal democracy. Liberal peacebuilding is characterized by 
ambitious agendas and far-reaching goals, which combine the aims of (re)building states 
anew and transforming societies (Duffield, 2000; Ottaway, 2003; Richmond, 2008; Chandler, 
2010).  
On paper, a standardized approach to development reduces complex political and economic 
problems to issues of weak capacity: investing in ‘institutions’ represents, then, the magic 
formula. Capacity building and governance become state’s core concerns.7 Thus, reflecting 
this standardized global effort, the ‘peacebuilding’ project was “rendered technical” (Murray 
Li, 2007, 2011) through an emphasis on prescriptive policies – which is also recurrent in the 
literature on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) (Duffield, 2000; Jabri, 
2007). In turn, DDR emerged as part of the liberal peacebuilding process, and was designed 
to responsibly and effectively deal with armed actors.          
The mixed results achieved by this model (World Bank, 2011; Paris, 2004; Tschirgi, 2004) 
and the lack of deep theorization concerning peacebuilding and DDR, calls for a more 
nuanced understanding of the DDR process, and how it relates to stabilization and 
development. This research approaches peacebuilding and DDR as inherent to the political 
process, and not mere technical and programmatic interventions (Cramer, 2006; Kriger, 
2003). Therefore, I aim to give an alternative analytical approach based on historical political 
economy: reducing DDR to a policy issue and its implementation to a policy solution defies 
proper understanding of the conflict dynamics, the motivations behind actors’ behaviour, the 
                                                        
7 According to De Angelis (2003), “governance is a continual process of relationship management rather than the 
pursuit of discrete policy goals. […] The role of governance is not the formulation and implementation of policy 
but the promotion of frameworks through which problems can be addressed” (cited in Chandler, 2010: 72). 
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implications of DDR for the process of development and state strengthening, as well as the 
dynamics of transition from war to peace.  
What follows is a brief review of contemporary theories and practices of war to peace 
transition, the liberal peacebuilding project, and DDR. This analysis is functional to 
highlighting the argument that such models are incomplete, both for the understanding of 
war and peace, and for the actual practice of supporting peace efforts. The liberal peace 
argument is anchored on three tropes, which are presented in the introductory section. First, 
the liberal peace proposition that there is a context of ‘new wars’ supports the argument that 
there should be a ‘new peace’, in turn, enabled by technical peacebuilding operations, 
including DDR. Second, the transition between war and peace is not nuanced, but explained 
in rigid binary terms. As a result, post-war phases are treated as a blank slate that can be 
shaped at leisure through intervention. Third, building peace is a purely technical exercise, 
centred around the process of building institutions.  
The second section concerns the rise of the ‘liberal peacebuilding’ project, including some of 
the results from and the evidence of current practices and operations, with specific reference 
to Latin America. The concluding section is an analysis of DDR, how it originates from the 
liberal peace model and its role. The section highlights DDR origins and history, multiple 
dimensions, and conceptual and practical limitations. 
This discussion opens the way to Chapter 2, which considers alternative approaches to 
understanding war and peace through historical political economy analysis, including: 
processes of brokerage, political settlement, alternative forms of order and peace, and the 
‘local’. Such alternative approach is functional to a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of 
DDR.  
1.1 Conceptual Underpinnings of Liberal Peace 
A context of new wars or a new context in which wars are fought? Briefly engaging with 
the literature on ‘new’ wars is important because it contextualizes the following debate on 
state- and peacebuilding practice, and, in turn, on DDR processes. By clarifying the alleged 
rise of new types of war, I will be able to sustain the proposition that DDR is not a ‘new’ 
practice in international development and stabilization of countries, but it is a process 
inherent to state formation and that has important implications for the social contract.  
Functional to the liberal peace discourse, the ‘new wars’ thesis states that new realities in the 
international system bring a change to funding mechanisms, main actors (criminal 
organizations instead of rebel groups), goals (greed instead of grievance) and the technology 
 27
of war (Kaldor, 1999, 2013). Other authors focus on the transnational and spatial 
dimensions of armed conflicts in the new international system, which are labelled “non-
territorial network wars” (Duffield, 2000; Bauman, 2001; Gregory, 2010). By arguing that 
actors’ motivations and behaviours have shifted or that multiple dimensions overlap, new 
wars’ characterization overshadows the structural dynamics of conflict, and in turn it 
simplifies the conceptualization and practice of DDR – a characterization that this research 
refutes.  
Even though there is a recognition of a change in the way wars are funded, this distinction 
between new and old wars has been questioned  (Kalyvas, 2001; Berdal, 2003; Kriger, 2003; 
Richards, 2005). The present research argues that there has been a shift in the analysis of 
conflict, and not an observable change in the ways wars start and unfold. There is a 
constantly evolving context in which wars are fought and which affects wars themselves, 
rather than a change in structural factors and root causes for violence. In fact, a political 
economy analysis and a case study approach to causes, actors, popular support and patterns 
of violence reveal many commonalities between pre- and post-Cold War internal conflicts 
(for example, Weinstein, 2007). Kalyvas (2001) states that as old wars were not purely 
driven by ideology and just causes, seemingly new wars are not exclusively the product of 
predatory behaviours. In addition, sweeping generalizations that old conflicts enjoyed 
popular support and displayed “controlled” violence, vis-à-vis todays low popular support 
and “gratuitous” and more ferocious violence do not hold (Kalyvas, 2001; Weinstein, 2007). 
A closer examination of the motivations behind rebellion shows that these cannot be easily 
categorized of either political/ideological nature or as the result of opportunistic and rent-
seeking behaviours. New wars are not exclusively about ‘greed’, as old wars were not 
exclusively about ‘grievance’.8 Zartman (2005) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) assert 
that greed and predatory behaviours are not an end but a means: when and where guerrilla 
groups are able to establish a state-within-state situation, they eventually extract resources 
and may conceivably act in a predatory manner. However, predatory behaviours do not 
substitute political and historic grievances, but rather they integrate them by adding further 
complexity. Mainstream literature fails to recognize the multidimensionality of motives of 
elites, of local populations, and of external actors – a multidimensionality that this research 
embraces (Berdal, 2003). 
                                                        
8 The rich literature on the causes of violent conflict and critiques includes, among others: Bannon and Collier 
eds., 2003; Collier et al., 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Cramer, 2002; Di John, 2008; Djankov and Reynal-
Querol, 2007; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hirshleifer, 2001; Keen, 2001; Lujala et al., 2005; Picard, 2005; Snyder and 
Ravi, 2005; Stewart, 2002; and Arnson and Zartman eds., 2005.  
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The analysis of the role of drugs trafficking in fuelling the armed conflict in Colombia from 
the 1980s on reveals this aspect (see Chapter 4). The rents that the leftist guerrilla of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC) were able to extract from coca leaf farming were reinvested in the war effort: they 
were a means to an end, and not an end goal. In this sense, the FARC were able to use the 
increased funding available to expand their strategy and war goals (Chernick, 2005). In 
addition, the “greed” argument does not hold when considering the organizational incentives 
and the opportunity cost available to FARC recruits, for example. As Chapter 7 explains, 
FARC fighters are not paid, are exposed to huge sacrifices, and do not materially profit from 
their individual war effort. Thus, the thesis that rebel groups engage in criminal practices for 
the sake of it, does not hold when one scrutinizes the Colombian insurgency (Gutierrez 
Sanin, 2004). 
As the examination of DDR also highlights, the nature and the quality of the political 
settlement between the state and the armed group to be demobilized determine the 
dynamics and ultimately the outcome of the DDR process itself (Chapter 2). A close case-
study examination, in fact, reveals that peace and political settlements concern a whole 
range of factors that disregard and go beyond the categorization of new and old wars.     
Transition from war to peace. The debate on new wars is related to the transition between 
war and peace, and, in particular, to the post-Cold War efforts to prevent or mitigate the 
incidents of internal wars, and to facilitate post-war reconstruction. As wars are not ‘new’, 
but rather display emerging features, also transition from war to peace is not a ‘new’ process, 
but rather one anchored on historical, institutional and structural factors.  
Instead, the emergence of a field of practice on peacebuilding (led by international actors) 
after the end of the Cold War resulted in an overarching policy focus to address the physical 
and human consequences of war. Such focus targeted the immediate phase after violence 
halts, which policy makers labelled ‘post-conflict’. To this, the term ‘reconstruction’ was 
added to signal the set of actions needed to be addressed during this phase. ‘Post-conflict 
reconstruction’9 was then adopted as an overall formula for economic, social, institutional 
and security activities to be performed.10  
While politics was purposefully left out of this equation – due to obvious sovereignty 
concerns – the post-conflict reconstruction approach implied that sound policies and the 
                                                        
9 The term ‘reconstruction’ associated to the aftermath of war traces back to the American Civil War. 
Subsequently, it was embedded in the post-WWII order through the establishment of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). However, it is only after the Cold War that ‘reconstruction’ 
became an “hegemonic strategy”(Kirsch and Flint, 2011: 6).  
10 Barnett et al. (2007) compile a list of the all the terms coined and adopted by different donors and multilateral 
organizations to define their engagement to sustain peace (Barnett et al., 2007: 38-41)  
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successful implementation of programs in key areas would translate into successful war to 
peace transition processes. The original sin was to assume that the post-conflict 
reconstruction phase could move forward successfully without exploring and/or considering 
the dynamics of the war that had just ended. Post-conflict reconstruction was, therefore, 
applied as a blank slate. DDR operations – as one component of post-conflict reconstruction 
– followed a similar logic. The liberal peace approach intended the transition from war to 
peace not so much as a transition, but as an abrupt break: instead of an organic process, 
transition was reinvented into and disguised as an artificial reconstruction phase (Kirsch 
and Flint, 2011; Jackson, 2010).  
Differently, the understanding of transition that this research adopts is one that highlights 
the complexity of transition. It takes into account the linkages between war and peace, and 
the legacy that war exercises on the implementation of peace. In turn, it sheds light on the 
wider implications of DDR and supports a political economy approach to DDR analysis. The 
concept of transition encompasses the dynamic interaction of, and a constantly changing 
process between war and peace, which have to be understood in a continuum. Transition is 
not a linear phenomenon, and war and peace are not compartmentalized mutually-excluding 
phases (Bourgois, 2001; Cramer, 2006; Duffield, 2000; Muggah (ed.), 2009; Pugh, 2000; 
Richards, 2005; Sambanis, 2004; UNDP, 2008; Marc et al., 2013). In fact, “a ‘transition from 
war to peace’ is unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to 
production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability” (Keen, 2000: 
10). 11  Peacebuilding intervention needs to recognize the “inherently tumultuous 
transformation” that conflict-affected countries go through in order to develop institutions 
that address conflict non-violently (Paris, 2004: 7). 
The conceptualization of transition is also helpful to get rid of the misleading label of ‘post-
conflict’. I believe that the term ‘post-conflict’ – used in policy circles to characterize a phase 
of intervention that aims to distance the country from war and to move it toward peace12 – 
does not capture the dynamic relationship between war and peace nor the brokerage to 
move from one to the other. In addition, there is a grey area between different forms of 
violence and their phasing, which impedes us from distinguishing conflict-related violence 
and non-conflict violence. For example, in relation to the incidence of violence in the 
aftermath of war, Suhrke (2011) deems “awkward” the label of ‘post-conflict violence’: in 
                                                        
11 As “a social project among other social projects” (Richards, 2005: 5), war has to be stripped of the moral values 
that accompanies it: the depiction of war as ‘evil’ and peace as ‘good’ undermines the understanding of the causes 
of war and the processes associated with it.  
12 For example, the World Bank does not give a definition of ‘post-conflict’ countries based on whether a ceasefire 
or a peace settlement are in place; it opted, instead, to classify fragile and conflict-affected ‘situations’ based on 
countries’ performance indicators of governance and socio-economic wellbeing.  
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fact, ‘post-conflict’ should indicate a situation where highly conflicting dynamics have 
disappeared, which is rarely the case. Thus, she prefers the term ‘post-war’, and this research 
embraces this definition (Suhrke, 2011: 6; Cramer, 2006).    
Peacebuilding as a technical endeavour. The third core area of the liberal peace argument 
concerns peacebuilding as a technical (mostly externally-driven) operation to facilitate the 
transition from war to peace. One of the sources of the emergence of the peacebuilding 
initiative in the post-Cold War era has been a sudden (and for some authors only perceived) 
increase in the number of civil wars and domestic political violence (Kalyvas, 2001).13 No 
longer concerned with the equilibrium between two superpowers, the international 
community engaged with global challenges, including intra-state armed conflicts. 
Increasingly, peace and conflict scholars and practitioners shifted their attention from inter-
state conflicts to the analysis of internal conflict.  
Several approaches have been devised to understand intra-state conflict, domestic peace and 
efforts to move from war to peace. One of them concerns the post-Cold War peacebuilding 
consensus: as a (mainly) top-down global governance enterprise, peacebuilding becomes a 
state-building project due to the multi-task, multidimensional and multilevel process that it 
generates. Through a stronger focus on capacity building in all sectors, liberal peacebuilding 
aims at building a peace that is ‘self-sustained’ (Richmond, 2008, 2010). 
Overarching emphasis is therefore on institution-building as the key variable to break the 
equation between fragility and conflict onset (OECD, 2008; Ghani and Lockart, 2008). 
According to the liberal peace approach, institutions play a decisive role in managing conflict 
peacefully, meet citizens’ needs and expectations, and preventing those social and economic 
negative spirals that lead to violent conflict (World Bank, 2011). 
In turn, along side a classic concept of ‘state security’, a theory of ‘human security’ centred on 
individuals and societies rather than states arose. Challenges related to public health, 
environmental degradation, illegal trafficking, governance and institutions, poverty and 
famine, and violence and radicalization, among others, are all considered threats to human 
security. Responses envisage mixed packages of development and security solutions.14 As it 
is argued below, due to multiple political, social and economic concerns, DDR mirrors this 
security-development nexus. In fact, on the one hand, DDR has the stated goal to disable 
                                                        
13 It is of little importance here whether the 1990s increase in the number of intra-state conflict is due to the end 
of the Cold War or it is due to a steady accumulation of civil wars since the 1950s (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; 
Kalyvas, 2001). 
14 Forerunner of the new ‘human security’ concept was the 1994 Human Development Report by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which establishes the connection security-development by stating in 
the very first paragraph of the report that “the search for human security lies in development, not in arms” 
(UNDP, 1994). 
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armed actors (i.e. security). On the other hand, it pursues social and economic goals to 
enable beneficiaries (ex-combatants and, increasingly, vulnerable groups and local 
communities) to move from war to peace (i.e. development). 
After having established the core tenants of liberal peace, the next section briefly examines 
the international character of peacebuilding and some trends. More importantly, it 
introduces some considerations on the experience of peacebuilding in Latin America.  
1.2 Peacebuilding and War to Peace Transition in Latin 
America 
Rise and limitations of peacebuilding. The word ‘peacebuilding’ became mainstream after 
1992,15 when the United Nations’ Agenda for Peace defined its aim to “identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict” (UN, 1992: paragraph 21; Tschirgi, 2004).16 For the following one and half decade 
activities related to peace-making and peacebuilding skyrocketed globally. Some of the 
figures that testify this hyper activism include the following:  diplomatic interventions to 
bring wars to an end grew five times in the 1990s with respect to the 1980s; DDR operations 
increased by nine times between 1980 and 2008; and the number of countries contributing 
to UN-led peace operations more than doubled in the same period (Human Security Report, 
2011: 63). Budget, scale, mandate, and number of peacekeeping operations also dramatically 
increased after the Cold War. More recently, peacekeeping effectiveness in avoiding war 
relapse has been demonstrated: post-war contexts with a peacekeeping presence were less 
likely to return to war than cases where a peacekeeping force was not deployed (Page 
Fortna, 2008; Human Security Report, 2011: 69-71).   
In economic terms, the total amount of financial flows directed to fragile and conflict-affected 
countries17 rose by 206% between 2002 and 2014. During the same period, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) rose by 98% and it represented 32% of the total amount of 
flows. In addition, some 64% of total ODA was spent on fragile and conflict-affected 
countries between 2011 and 2014 (OECD, 2016: 106-107). 
With respect to the operational nature of peacebuilding, since 1991, there has been an 
emphasis on technical and management aspects through prescriptive approaches and 
                                                        
15 The first use of the term ‘peacebuilding’ dates back to the 1970s when Johan Galtung – the father of conflict and 
peace studies – coined the concept of ‘peacebuilding structures’ to define the causes of conflict and to support 
local initiatives of conflict resolution toward sustainable peace. 
16 This definition was complemented by the 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, which sets the ultimate goal 
of peacebuilding as “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” (Barnett et al., 2007: 37). 
17 Financial flows measured here include Official Development Assistance (ODA), Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and remittances. 
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guidelines that nevertheless were unrealistic and “defy implementation” (Ottaway, 2003: 
250-1). The literature on peacebuilding (and also the one on DDR) suffers from overly 
simplistic formulations for intervention and prescription for policies, but it is fundamentally 
unable to combine the recipes for intervention with the complex social context in which 
policies operate. What both the academic and policy literatures agree on is the fundamental 
role that ‘context’ and local dynamics – in political, social, economic and institutional terms – 
play. But it is still unclear how policy prescriptions and a framework for including a ‘local’ 
and contextual dimension can be combined – a challenge that this research takes on 
(Ottaway, 2003; Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010; Cramer, 2006; Colletta and Muggah, 2009).   
Peacebuilding becomes, then, a buzzword to identify the wide spectrum of support (mostly 
externally-driven) to conflict-affected countries toward peace consolidation and 
stabilization, ultimately to achieve a self-sustained peace and development. Main focus areas 
include: rule of law, humanitarian assistance, good governance, DDR, SSR, and economic 
reconstruction. Nevertheless, its rapid operationalization and institutionalization (in 2005 
the UN Peacebuilding Commission and related Fund were established) mask a lack of 
conceptualization and theoretical framework (Barnett et al., 2007: 52-54; Chandler, 2010; 
Duffield, 2000; Richmond, 2008).  
The literature on the efficacy of peacebuilding is contested and not unidirectional (Cramer, 
Goodhand, and Morris, 2016). Despite the aforementioned evidence on the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping operations, the record of peacebuilding intervention in the last two decades is 
not satisfactory, and the international community is seeking new avenues (World Bank, 
2011; OECD, 2008; UNDP, 2008). The practice of peacebuilding has been marked by lack of 
sufficient resources, top-down policies and lack of engagement at the local level, poor 
coordination of projects and initiatives, and poor understanding of cultural and societal 
dynamics (Marc et al., 2013). Disguised under a modern version of Wilsonianism, the belief 
in marketization and democratization produced unsuccessful outcomes (Cramer, 2006; 
Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2008). Although the end goal is deemed favourable (i.e. mature 
liberal democracies do not fight one another and are less prone to internal political 
violence), there is no successful one-size-fits-all or best-practice approach. On paper, the 
academic and policy literatures widely agree that peacebuilding has to be a context-driven 
programming, in which “balance between adaptability and replicability is one that has to be 
weighed carefully” (Marc et al., 2013, p. 149; Barron et al., 2011; World Bank, 2011). 
Experience of transition in Latin America. Given the focus of this study on Colombia, it is 
worth briefly examining the specificities of post-Cold War peacebuilding and transition to 
peace in Latin America. Mentioning some of the most significant patterns of peacebuilding, 
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highlighting commonalities across the region, and reviewing the record of peacebuilding in 
this region will help situate the case of Colombia.  
Violent conflict in Latin America during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War has 
been inextricably linked to and driven by the process of political exclusion, socio-economic 
inequalities, and lack of democratic representation (Arnson, 2012; Pearce, 2010; Koonings 
and Kruijt, 1999).18 The role of external intervention, namely the US, also needs to be 
acknowledged, despite this being beyond the research scope. With variation, some form of 
state weakness – although not pervasive – contributed to the wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Peru, and Colombia. Although other countries in the region experienced forms of 
low-level insurgency and/or separatist conflicts, these five countries experienced full blown 
internal armed conflicts (Call and Cook, 2003).   
There are some specific features that distinguish the patterns of internal conflict and 
peacebuilding in Latin America from the rest of the world. First, with the exception of Haiti 
(an outlier in the region from several points of view), armed conflict in Latin America has 
engulfed countries in middle- or lower middle-income status. This pattern differs from the 
rest of the world where so many conflicts take place in low income countries. Along similar 
vein, conflicts in the region do not occur in situations of state collapse or low capacity. 
Despite forms of weak institutions being a factor of armed conflict in the region, no country 
in Latin America has experienced the all encompassing state failure that is so prevalent in 
several conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. The third factor that distinguishes Latin 
American conflicts from those in the rest of the world concerns the scale of destruction and 
the associated human cost from war. Wars in Latin America never reached the lethality that 
conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Liberia experienced, to mention just a few (Patrick, 
2012). 
Therefore, these institutional, social and economic factors put Latin American conflict-
affected countries in a slightly different position when considering the process of transition 
from war to peace. In these countries, war to peace transition has been associated to and 
accompanied by dynamics of democratic consolidation (Azpuru, 2012).  
The case of Colombia represents an extreme manifestation of the relationship between war 
to peace transition and democracy: representative institutions and electoral competition 
have consolidated amidst internal armed conflict. Colombia has had democratic institutions 
                                                        
18 A phase-based taxonomy of violent conflicts in Latin America include two preceding phases. The first one 
concerns the violence and conflicts associated with the preservation of traditional rural elites and related social 
order in the 19th Century and first half of the 20th Century. The second phase of violent conflict is about the 
modernization of the state and the rise of mass politics. The third phase is the one described above. Some authors 
says that currently Latin America experiences a fourth phase of violence where criminal actors and motivations 
are the prevalent ones (Pearce, 2010; Koonings and Kruijt, 1999).  
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for several decades, and at the same time it used to have the longest running conflict in the 
Western hemisphere. As it is analysed in Chapter 4, the reforms and democratic openings in 
Colombia that brought representative institutions at regional and local level in the early 
1990s have been associated with increased armed conflict – especially at the local level and 
in frontier regions like Meta. At the same time, amidst an open armed conflict, the expansion 
of representative institutions – associated with society’s sophistication – acted as a driver of 
peacebuilding, especially in national-level institutions and in large urban centres like Bogota 
and Medellin.  
Despite being in conflict, during the 2000s, Colombian state and society moved into a post-
conflict phase through several means, including: the collective DDR of paramilitary forces; 
the individual DDR of rebel fighters; the transitional justice process which put emphasis on 
historical memory; the attention to and reparation toward the victims of the conflict, 
including IDPs; the mobilization of national and local level institutions toward peacebuilding. 
These specific measures were accompanied by a general process of strengthening of 
institutions and the rule of law at all levels of the state (Rettberg, 2012). All these efforts and 
achievements took place amidst a shrinking but still sizable insurgency of the FARC and 
increasing reach of criminal armed groups. 
An additional variable that the Latin American area studies on peace and conflict underline 
concerns the role of inequalities in fueling conflict. Relevant to this review is the extent to 
which peacebuilding efforts in the region have focused on addressing inequalities (of means, 
of access, and of opportunities). As inequalities were at the root of conflict dynamics in the 
region, it is worth considering the attention that inequalities received during the post-war 
phase by peacebuilding actors (Pearce, 2010).  
The liberal nature of peacebuilding with its belief in market-oriented economy was 
ideologically reluctant to take on “leftist” policies of social justice and economic disparities, 
for example. With respect to the liberal peace approach that was adopted globally as a 
mantra after the Cold War, in Latin America the liberal peace practice was rich of 
ambivalence. First, thank to its mostly middle income level and relatively stable institutions, 
Latin American countries did not experience the kind of all-encompassing international 
involvement that some of the most fragile and conflict-affected countries elsewhere went 
through, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. With the exception of Haiti, no country in the 
region has been on the verge of state collapse for the last few decades. As a result, DDR 
processes have been more domestically led and adapted to local conditions and politics. 
Second, while the end of the Cold War toned down the ideologization of armed conflicts and 
established the primacy of the liberal model, in Latin America the left-right dichotomy 
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outlived the demise of the bipolar world order. The ideological division persisted and 
assumed both national and regional dimensions. At the regional level, leftist countries have 
been pursuing models of development and cooperation alternative to the liberal ones, and 
established regional institutions that did not adhere to the liberal peace values. Because it 
fought a Marxist-based insurgency, Colombia traditionally leaned toward the right of the 
ideological spectrum, enjoying strong ties with the US (Wolff, 2015).    
Central American countries were hit hard by internal armed conflict during the 1980s and 
beyond. El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua all experienced decade-long insurgencies 
and/or sustained political violence. The end of the Cold War provided the space for these 
conflicts to be resolved. Nicaragua embarked into a transition in the late 1980s-early 1990s, 
while El Salvador and Guatemala reached peace agreements to their internal conflicts in 
1992 and 1996, respectively. Despite all of them witnessing political violence with strong 
class-based connotations, these Central American post-war cases point to a general failure at 
addressing income inequality – although Nicaragua was able to slightly lower income 
disparity in the 1990s (Boyce, 1996; Cordova Macias and Ramos, 2012; Torres-Rivas, 2012; 
McConnell, 2012; Wolff, 2015). 
The peace processes and their implementation in El Salvador and Guatemala witnessed the 
direct participation of the UN, donors and the international financial institutions. The latter 
were criticized for how they handled fiscal resources and conditionality in El Salvador. In the 
name of fiscal stability, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund refused to back 
other members of the international community (UN and donors), which pushed the 
government to mobilize domestically additional fiscal resources to pay for the peace 
implementation. In the case of Guatemala a few years later, the peace agreement 
implementation was tied closely to the multilaterals’ lending program in order to avoid the 
missteps that occurred in El Salvador. In conclusion, some authors have argued for a wider 
set of considerations around the fiscal space when implementing peace agreements: “donors 
need to pay far more attention to other key aspects of fiscal policy [besides fiscal stability]: 
the overall level of revenue and expenditure; priorities for public spending; and the 
distributional effects of both taxation and expenditure” (Boyce, 2002: 50; Goodhand, 2004; 
de Soto, 1999).  
The next section will show how DDR is a fundamental concern of war to peace transition. It 
introduces the concept and practice of DDR as a core element of the liberal peacebuilding 
project. It will also provide some examples of DDR application to both Latin American and 
non-Latin American cases.   
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1.3 DDR: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing the Transition 
Definition and evolution of DDR. The above discussion on liberal peacebuilding and its 
evolution is functional to the present section, in which I briefly introduce DDR. In fact, DDR is 
an integral part of the liberal project of state building: as such, it needs to be analysed to 
highlight its dimensions, limitations and short historical horizon. In the next chapter, an 
alternative model to approach the role of war and DDR is proposed. 
As its name evokes, DDR is born as a technical operation to deal with post-war security and 
the fate of non-state armed groups or regular army. The rise of modern DDR is concomitant 
to the rise of the liberal peace project in the aftermath of the Cold War. However, long before 
the term DDR as a standardized program was ever coined, the downsizing of a military force 
in the aftermath of war is a process that has taken place since the dawn of history (see 
Chapter 2). From a macroeconomic perspective, in the wake of conflict, one of the state’s 
main objectives is to reconvert a war economy into a peace economy, and to reintegrate 
veterans into the workforce. Reallocation of public expenditures from defence to social 
services represented the rationale for the World Bank’s initial engagement on DDR. In turn, 
the state rewards those individuals that have fought in the war for their military service 
through benefits, either in financial terms or social status. As it is discussed in Chapter 2, in 
several cases DDR has redefined the social contract.  
As far as the liberal peace project analysed above is concerned, the primary objective of a 
DDR program is to strengthen security and stability in a post-war context, in order to 
facilitate (and contribute to) the process of building the peace and enabling development 
(Box 1). Given the extreme volatility in the aftermath of war, DDR aims, first of all, at 
decreasing the number of firearms within society, and secondly at incentivizing combatants 
to disarm through the prospect of a reintegration process. The latter does not only represent 
a social and economic opportunity for the individual combatant, but also – in some cases – a 
political rehabilitation of the armed group. In such instances, an armed group lays down 
weapons in exchange for its transition into a legitimate political force.  
Since the end of the Cold War, DDR has evolved in parallel with both the evolution of 
peacebuilding and the increasing frequency of peacekeeping operations. The latter were 
conceived after World War Two with a narrow set of objectives related to the establishment 
and maintenance of ceasefires and/or buffer zones between warring parties (first 
generation). Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have evolved into 
complex and integrated missions with expanded mandates, in which peacekeeping 
progressively assumed role of policing, SSR, and also governance and development (second 
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and third generations). In terms of frequency, peacekeeping missions exponentially 
increased in number: from fifteen missions deployed between 1950-1989 to thirty-three in 
the decade 1989-1999 (UNDPKO, 2010). 
 
In turn, the practice of DDR skyrocketed after the end of the Cold War too. Since 1991, more 
than sixty DDR operations have taken place, either originating from a peace settlement, or 
with a UN Security Council mandate, or sponsored by governments and nationally owned. In 
2016, the United Nations had sixteen active peacekeeping operations, five of which have had 
support to, or implementation of, DDR programs within their mandate (the Democratic 
Republic of Congo - DRC, the Abyei region in Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, the Darfur region in Sudan, 
and Haiti).  
In addition, through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UN political 
missions without the deployment of UN troops, the UN has been supporting or participating 
in several other DDR operations – close to twenty UN agencies participate in DDR programs 
across the world. Nonetheless, these operations do not complete the record of DDR 
Box 1. DDR Definition and Phases 
As defined by the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Standards (IDDRS), DDR programs include three phases: disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration. A fourth phase – reinsertion – has been added in recent times, which takes 
place after demobilization but before reintegration. Reinsertion is not treated as a separate 
phase by the UN, for example, which embed reinsertion activities within demobilization. 
Other actors (e.g. World Bank), instead, tend to view ‘reinsertion’ separately – a practice that 
is progressively becoming more common. It should be noted that a clear-cut division of 
phases derives from the policy literature concerned with guidelines and standard operating 
procedures (UNWG, 2006). Here is how the UN defines the four phases. 
Disarmament “is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the 
civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms 
management programs.” (UN, 2005) 
Demobilization “is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed 
forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the 
processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps 
designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks).” 
(UN, 2005) 
Reinsertion “is the assistance offered to ex- combatants during demobilization but prior to 
the longer term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to 
help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional 
safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, 
employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic 
process of development, reinsertion is a short- term material and/or financial assistance to 
meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.” (UN, 2005) 
Reintegration “is the process by which ex- combatants acquire civilian status and gain 
sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic 
process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is 
part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often 
necessitates long-term external assistance.” (UN, 2005) 
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programs globally. Several operations are run by national governments (like the Colombia 
DDR of paramilitaries), and also other international organizations (i.e. the World Bank), 
regional actors (e.g. Asian Development Bank, African Union, the Organization of American 
States), and donors manage or support DDR programs across the world (Muggah, 2010).  
The chief feature of DDR is that demobilization of armed groups should take place in the 
aftermath of war, after violence has ceased. Increasingly, this sequence has been challenged 
by the practice of some conflict-affected contexts in which DDR is implemented amidst 
violent conflict. Our case of Colombia is the most relevant of this flexible approach: the DDR 
of paramilitary organizations in 2003-2006 was run and completed while the country was 
still in conflict with the guerrilla groups. Examples like the DRC and Somalia highlight a 
nascent approach (labeled by some authors as “next generation DDR”), in which DDR is 
made integral part of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations (Muggah and 
O’Donnell, 2015).  
The original rationale for embedding DDR programs within peacekeeping operations was to 
neutralize armed actors, who could be a source of instability by using force to pursue 
political goals in peacetime, and thus could potentially spoil and derail a fragile (or recently 
achieved) peace settlement. Therefore, DDR programs started off with the narrow goal of 
downsizing armed groups (military forces or rebels), and shifting resources from defence 
budget to social welfare and productive activities. As Muggah puts it, “DDR was conceived as 
a bounded activity, spatially, temporally and socially remote from other activities” (Muggah, 
2010: 11). Often labeled as ‘minimalist’ due to the circumscribed approach over security, 
with time DDR programs expanded to a ‘maximalist’ approach to programming thanks to, 
among others, the growing debate over development-security linkages (World Bank, 2003). 
Minimalist DDR programs would often not contemplate ‘reintegration’ initiatives, opting for 
the more modest goal of ‘reinsertion’ through either cash or in-kind assistance. Maximalist 
approaches, instead, not only strive to design more inclusive reintegration (multiple 
stakeholders plus veterans), but also include SSR provisions. This latest development is 
related to the expansion of liberal peacebuilding itself, which increased its ambition and 
competences – as the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate. The combined approach of 
DDR and SSR is symptomatic of this growth in scope and ambition. 
From a discrete technical program, DDR is currently intended and conceptualized as a ‘field’ 
(of study and of practice) of its own (UNWG, 2006). The evolution of DDR practice, the 
expansion of its scope and the new competences that DDR took on, and the inclusion of DDR 
within a larger state-building and peacebuilding framework widened the very definition and 
boundaries of DDR. Side-by-side with security concerns, policy-makers and planners started 
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associating DDR with larger peacebuilding and development goals, including sustainable 
livelihoods and income generation activities for former combatants, wide-scope 
reintegration measures to facilitate (re)absorption of veterans into communities of origin, 
and linkages to SSR and institution-building. In addition, DDR programs may be coordinated 
with support to vulnerable groups (e.g. women, children, IDPs, combatants with HIV-AIDS) 
and to receiving communities, and ultimately with reconciliation and measures of 
transitional justice (i.e. truth and memory initiatives, prosecutions, and reparation for 
victims).  
Nonetheless, given the overly broad scope of DDR, part of the literature and the policy 
community advocate for a clearer distinction between DDR goals and reintegration and 
peacebuilding goals. A minimalist approach to DDR asserts that ‘reintegration’ goals should 
be scaled back to ‘reinsertion’ goals – with a small ‘r’.19 According to this line of thinking, 
long-term reintegration of former combatants should be instead linked to broader 
peacebuilding strategies at the local level, including local recovery and livelihood policies, 
rehabilitation of and support to conflict-affected population, and not be part of a stand alone 
DDR program (Muggah, 2010; Gomes Porto et al., 2007). 
DDR and war to peace transition: political, security and socio-economic dimensions. 
The previous sub-section has argued that DDR policies embody the very link between 
security and development. The expansion in functions, competences and beneficiaries of 
DDR operations is also in line with the inclusion of social and economic development issues 
together with the hard security concerns of successfully disarming an army or a rebel group.  
As part of a peace settlement and/or following the end of a conflict by military means, 
successful disarmament and demobilization represent one of the first steps toward 
stabilization and through which the state gains or regains the legitimate monopoly of the use 
of force. In parallel, reintegration programs are undertaken to facilitate and resume 
peacetime political, social and economic activities for former combatants, including 
employment assistance and absorption in the workforce, acceptance and social reintegration 
in communities of origin, heal of collective and individual trauma, among others (Berdal and 
Ucko, 2009: 109; Muggah, 2009: 154). 
According to liberal peacebuilding formulation, DDR is both a first-step security-booster, and 
a core task in the post-war state-building project. Therefore, on the one hand, DDR pursues 
the short-term goal of stabilization (Colletta and Muggah, 2009); on the other hand, DDR 
serves an organic goal, and is supposed to ease the delivery of other pillars of post-war 
                                                        
19 Reinsertion entails a cash or in-kind package to help combatants getting back into civilian life: this kind of 
assistance is limited in time, targeted and does not create expectations – Box 1. 
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reconstruction: from infrastructure rehabilitation to local economic recovery (market 
integration, livelihoods and productive employment) to social development and institution 
building. Thus, DDR includes aspects of and has a stake in all the dimensions related to 
transition (i.e. security, political and socio-economic).  
There is, nevertheless, a fundamental dilemma concerning the correct balance between 
security and development in DDR operations. In fact, there are cases in which short-term 
security concerns run against political and long-term development goals. In post-civil war 
Tajikistan, there was a trade off between achieving security (i.e. stopping violence and 
pacifying the country) and the liberal tenants of peacebuilding prescribing disarmament and 
transitional justice, among others. In Tajikistan, rewarding local commanders through 
political and economic incentives was functional to stabilizing the country: reintegration was 
carried out with limited DD. According to a security lens, then, DDR in Tajikistan is deemed 
successful. Nevertheless, stability was achieved at the expense of foregoing “the 
development consequences of an entrenchment of the economic roles of civil war actors” – 
indeed, a not so desirable outcome (Torjesen and MacFarlane, 2009). In similar forms, such 
dilemma is also present in the 2003-2006 demobilization of the paramilitaries in Colombia.  
From a political standpoint, the technical literature and the practice of DDR completely 
missed the political underpinnings of DDR. DDR has broader implications beyond policy 
goals (see Chapter 2), but the liberal peacebuilding framework has reduced it to a purely 
technical endeavour. It is not about underestimating here the importance of disposing of 
light and heavy weapons, discharging and cantoning combatants, nor the quality of a 
reinsertion package, just to mention a few. The point is that a successful or failed outcome of 
DDR depends as much as on implementation requirements as on the political arrangement 
between those who demobilize and those who are demobilized. It also depends on a deep 
understanding of the motives and incentives of why a non-state armed group agrees on or is 
forced to demobilize (Keen, 2000; Kriger, 2003).  
Therefore, the newest literature strongly argues for the inclusion of political reintegration 
into DDR programs (Berdal and Ucko, 2009; Giustozzi, 2012; Kriger, 2003). Undermining 
this dimension is the equivalent of neglecting the reality that armed conflicts are political 
and denying the grievances at the core of the conflict. Some of the most successful DDR 
intervention, in fact, are those that “formed part of, and [were] geared towards supporting, a 
wider political process aimed at addressing underlying sources of armed conflict” (Muggah, 
Berdal and Torjesen, 2009: 269).  
Promising practices are underway: the theorization and implementation of interim 
stabilization measures (ISM) call for a greater flexibility in security-promotion intervention, 
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including DDR and SSR. ISM approach builds on contextualized political factors to devise 
security measures, with an eye on long-term development. It is an approach that is highly 
flexible in nature, and which does not shy away from addressing contextualized political 
incentives for actors. An example includes the temporary inclusion of former non-state 
armed groups within the security sector in order to enable ripe conditions for a political 
dialogue and avoid spoilers (Colletta and Muggah, 2009; Giustozzi, 2008; Lamb and Dye, 
2009). 
In this sense, liberal peace proponents advocate to address DDR in conjunction with SSR, as 
the reform of security services has not only obvious implications in terms of security, but 
important ramifications both in terms of governance and at the political level. In fact, SSR is 
an additional example of the ambitious and all-encompassing goals of liberal peace. The 
management and reform of security actors is considered and measured against good 
governance benchmarks of transparency, accountability, institution-building, rule of law and 
also shared representation. SSR is therefore conceptualized and implemented within the 
state-building project (Garrasi, Kuttner and Wam, 2009; Greene, 2008; Jackson, 2010; Sedra, 
2010; Lamb and Dye, 2009).  
Jackson (2010) provides a comprehensive definition of SSR scope: “SSR seeks to enhance the 
performance and accountability of police, military and intelligence organizations […]. SSR 
moves far beyond narrow technical definitions of security institutions and follows a more 
ambitious agenda of reconstructing or strengthening a state’s ability to govern the security 
sector in a way that serves the population as a whole rather than the narrow political elite” 
(Ibid, 124). Additional dimensions that link SSR to liberal peace goals concern human 
security and the willingness to “democratize” security actors. On the one hand, as mentioned 
above, the reform of security actors should follow similar principles of institution-building 
and governance that are anchored on transparency and accountability of actors. On the other 
hand, SSR contributes to the transformation of the state-society relations through both the 
institutionalization of human rights and the adoption of an expanded notion of human 
security, alongside the classical concept of state security. This pattern is evident in the cases 
of the conflicts in Central America. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, the end of the 
conflicts were accompanied by efforts and commitments to downsize and “democratize” 
security forces (McConnell, 2012; Torres-Rivas, 2012; Cordova Macias and Ramos, 2012). 
With respect to the social and economic dimensions of DDR, the tasks are daunting: from a 
macroeconomic perspective, one of the state’s main objectives is to reconvert a war economy 
into a peace economy by reducing military spending, progressively reconverting the heavy 
industrial production to civilian use, and reabsorbing veterans into the work force (Colletta 
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et al., 2004; Tajima, 2009). Goodhand (2004) disaggregates the war economy into three sub-
categories (“combat”, “shadow”, and “coping” economies) – a taxonomy that is functional to 
further nuancing the economic dimension of the war-to-peace transition. Each of these 
realms experiences a specific transition from war to peacetime economy. 
“Combat economy” refers to the mobilization and production of resources for military usage. 
During transition, there is a macroeconomic re-adjustment of government spending that 
concerns the reduction of military expenditures in favour of social ones. Added to this, there 
is also the reconversion of the military industrial complex to civilian use. “Shadow economy” 
concerns the economic activities that take place outside the purview of the state during 
wartime. The transition of shadow economies from war to peace is less prescriptive than the 
combat economy as this involves incentives and interests of groups and elites. The political 
economy of shadow economy is not so obvious as there will not only be winners in the 
transition to peace, but also losers – i.e. those that profited during wartime and may not have 
matching interests in the peacetime economy. “Coping economy” refers to the set of efforts 
that the population engages in to sustain livelihoods during the time of war. Households may 
be subject to shortages and/or disruption of basic services, food rationing, and conscription, 
among others. During transition from war to peace, people’s adaptation mechanism may be 
disrupted: thus, the coping economy needs to be careful assessed during transition. DDR 
raises specific concerns that relate to all three combat, shadow and coping economies, both 
at the macro and micro levels (Goodhand, 2004). 
At the micro level, the transition from war to peace for individual ex-combatants is about 
their social and economic reintegration, which is mainly concerned with the welfare of the 
individual ex-combatant and his/her process of returning to be a productive member of 
society. This process encompasses multiple aspects related to economic welfare, livelihoods 
and employment, and the relationship between veterans, the community where they 
reintegrate (or integrate for the first time) and society at large (International Alert, 2010). 
These aspects also entail family reunion and dealing with the practical and emotional 
legacies of war (Nussio, 2012). Nonetheless, reintegration is broad in scope, has a long-term 
horizon and it is difficult to measure. In response, policy-makers adopted the more practical 
goal of ‘reinsertion’, which entails a concrete package of economic and social benefits 
available to ex-combatants to begin their reintegration process. 
Main concerns include the degree of acceptance of former combatants into receiving 
communities, the ideological and practical ties to the former rebel group and its power 
structure, as well as allegiance to the state and the political system. In a seminal study on 
reintegration in Sierra Leone, Weinstein and Humphreys (2005) explored the circumstances 
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that either favoured or impeded ex-combatants from being accepted back in their family 
and/or community. The authors found that those ex-combatants that belonged to individual 
units responsible for atrocities were less likely to be accepted than those who belonged to 
units that were not responsible for atrocities (Weinstein and Humphreys, 2005). 
This finding has a methodological implication: if the wartime behaviour of armed groups 
determines (or, at least, contributes to) the acceptability of ex-combatants into communities, 
it implies that to understand reintegration (and to design DDR intervention) it is not 
sufficient to just analyse the post-war environment. What is needed is, instead, a broader 
lens that connects war and peace, and that looks integrally at the process of transition. This 
consideration – as it is analysed in Chapter 2 – emphasizes the limitations of the post-conflict 
liberal peace project.  
The design of social reintegration activities through the following three overlapping aspects 
makes a step forward in connecting reintegration to the broader process of transition. First, 
psychosocial assistance concerns both the psychological and social care for former 
combatants and victims in order to heal individual and collective trauma. Second, 
transitional justice includes those attempts to deal with the legacy and trauma of war, 
through the establishment of justice and reparations mechanisms, and truth and memory 
initiatives. Last, community development: support for former combatants should be coupled 
with community development programs of recovery in receiving areas, in order to enhance 
social and community cohesion and mitigate potential resentment toward veterans. Each of 
these three aspects has to extensively refer to wartime conditions in order to produce a 
successful outcome (Annan and Patel, 2009).  
At the micro level, the implementation of economic reintegration includes those initiatives 
aimed at reintegrating combatants into the working force and the productive economy, and 
facilitating their sustainable livelihoods. Activities include vocational trainings and life skills, 
public work and community service, access to finance, land and the job market, and 
provision of income generation assistance (Tajima, 2009; International Alert, 2010).  
A common challenge to the reintegration process is that reintegration often takes place in 
contexts with high social and economic vulnerability, which couple with weak institutions 
and physical destruction caused by the war. In response, some DDR practices strive to 
implement programs with a wider targeting that include other conflict-affected groups, like 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, women, indigenous communities, and the 
poor. Such holistic mechanism not only addresses recovery at the community level, but may 
also address feelings and perceptions of exclusion and disenfranchisement, thus serving a 
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wider purpose of reconciliation (Annan and Patel, 2009; Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011; 
Duclos, 2012).  
One more dimension that has been ignored by the technical literature concerns the variation 
of circumstances under which DDR takes place. A fundamental difference marks those cases 
where DDR, especially reintegration, occurs spontaneously from those necessitating 
intervention (state- or externally-driven). There are cases where demobilization has been 
forced upon a defeated enemy, either through repression and annihilation (as the fate of the 
republican forces after the Spanish civil war), or selectively (as in the case of Sri Lanka’s 
Tamil separatists where rank and file combatants were reintegrated while mid-rank 
commanders were held in internment camps). 
In conclusion, when addressing social and economic issues of veterans, a political economy 
perspective of the conflict drivers is paramount to capture the multiple levels in which DDR 
takes place. Micro-level research gives important insights into why individuals join armed 
groups. Among others, armed groups provide important social structures, networks and 
safety nets to individual members and their family: including both tangible (i.e. economic) 
and intangible benefits, such as the heightened social status that derives from being part of a 
violent group. This dimension is either downplayed or not well understood by reintegration 
programs: DDR brings the simple assumption that providing cash or in-kind assistance and 
vocational training may suffice to allure former combatants in the program itself (Justino, 
2013: 15-16). Likewise, there is an urgent need for DDR to understand and engage with 
social networks and informal economies, including illicit trafficking (Marriage, 2009: 136; 
Colletta and Cullen, 2000). 
DDR in Central America. A brief mention of the record of DDR in Central America is in 
order. As mentioned above, this region suffered from persistent violent conflicts up to the 
end of the Cold War. Then, it turned into one of the first laboratories for DDR globally. In fact, 
the very first UN mission with a DDR component was the UN Observer Group in Central 
America (ONUCA) in 1989-92 mandated to monitor and verify the regional peace agreement. 
In 1990, ONUCA carried out the disarmament of the Nicaraguan Resistance, resulting in the 
demobilization of 2,759 fighters based in Honduras and 19,614 fighters in Nicaraguan 
territory (UNDPKO). A number of shortcomings and limitations in scope and mandate 
triggered the adoption of a more formalized program of DDR in the early 1990s.  
Post-war El Salvador and Guatemala were two of the first few examples of DDR technical 
programs as such, together with Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia. In El Salvador, over 
40,000 ex-combatants from both regular army and the rebels were demobilized and 
reinserted between 1992-93 through the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). The 
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demobilization also included a “land for arms” program to provide employment 
opportunities and land distribution to ex-combatants (UNDPKOb; De Rouen and Heo, 2007; 
BICC, 1997). In Guatemala, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 1997 
supported the DDR of 2,928 combatants of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity 
Group (URNG), as well as the more daunting task of downsizing state security services 
(UNDPKOc; Torres-Rivas, 2012). 
Although these early DDR operations were functional to avoiding a relapse into armed 
conflict in all countries in the region, they nonetheless had mixed results when assessing the 
reintegration of ex-combatants. Scores of ex-combatants did not find their place back into 
civilian life. Since the early 2000s, some Central American countries witnessed skyrocketing 
levels of interpersonal violence and homicide rates, a fact that is not imputable to ex-
combatants but that signals the complexity and transformation of violent conflict besides 
DDR dynamics. 
Data and evidence of effectiveness. To conclude, it is important to make some 
considerations on data and evidence of effectiveness of DDR. A widely debated issue around 
DDR programs concerns the measures of effectiveness and the establishment of appropriate 
criteria of success. The growing heterogeneity of DDR processes, coupled with complex and 
highly context-specific settings, led in many cases to difficulty in establishing clear, realistic 
and measurable reintegration’s goals and outcomes. To date, scholars, practitioners and 
policy-makers have been engaged in a debate over gaps and dilemmas in DDR theory and 
practice, and struggle to provide options and viable solutions. Consensus has been reached 
over the need for an evidence-based approach rather than a prescriptive one, for more 
attention to context-driven factors, and for better metrics of success and evaluation 
(Muggah, 2010; Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Colletta and Muggah, 2009). More 
importantly, some scholars advocate the need to ‘unpack’ and clearly define reintegration in 
terms of its components and scope, as well as its indicators of success and expected 
outcomes. This effort would enable measurement of effectiveness, carrying out evaluations, 
and establishment of a clear link between immediate outputs and long-term outcomes 
(Muggah, 2009: 89-92).  
Kriger (2003) directs her main criticism toward the evaluations of peacebuilding operations 
in war to peace transition contexts. Almost all the criteria for success/failure of a post-war 
phase miss the domestic political dynamics, and focus instead on “subjective and arbitrary 
criteria” as measures of success (Kriger, 2003: 6). “The divorce of these measure of success 
from the history and politics of wars and settlements must also jeopardize the validity of 
evaluations of transitions. The dichotomy between war and peace which underpins studies 
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of transition can only be sustained by ignoring evidence” (Kriger, 2003: 12). In fact, the 
results from a case study analysis of a post-war country usually do not match with the 
peacebuilding technical evaluation. The case of Zimbabwe, for example, is deemed as a 
success by almost all standards of peacebuilding, but the outcome is more complicated than 
that and a more nuanced analysis is needed for evaluating DDR outcome. In turn, the author 
criticizes the evaluation of DDR programs exclusively based on security, social and economic 
outcomes, without paying any attention to the political implications that the policies toward 
veterans generate (Kriger, 2003: 8-15). In a similar fashion, Keen (2000) maintains that the 
evaluation of demobilization and reintegration policies for veterans should be done in 
conjunction with the rest of peacebuilding assistance (Keen, 2000: 16). 
There is also a quantitative literature that looks at the effectiveness of reintegration 
provisions. For example, in their seminal examination of the DDR in Sierra Leone, Weinstein 
and Humphreys (2005) looked at both former combatants who were DDR beneficiaries and 
those former combatants that did not participate in a DDR program. Surprisingly, they did 
not find a different rate of reintegration into society between the two groups, thus 
suggesting that the DDR program did not have any impact on reintegration outcomes at the 
individual level. This finding gives further validity to the methodology this research adopted, 
which is based on a multiple-level framework of analysis (individual, organizational, and 
structural). By addressing these levels separately and in their interaction, I am able to better 
crystallize the different dimensions of a DDR process. For the Sierra Leone example, the DDR 
program may had been ineffective at the individual level in facilitating ex-combatants 
reinsertion into society; but, in theory, it could have simultaneously achieved different goals, 
including: contributing to security and stabilization (structural), favouring the transition of 
the rebel group into a political party (organizational), and helping to frame the conflict 
grievances from war means to a peaceful resolution mechanism (structural).   
CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced some of the current intellectual and practical dilemmas with respect 
to two interrelated topics. The first concerns the transition from war to peace and its 
conceptualization. It posits that wars have political, social and economic characters, which 
transcend the historical moment and the specific temporal and spatial features. It refutes the 
claim that a new type of war has arisen since the end of the Cold War, when in fact what is 
‘new’ is the richer analytical framework to understand conflict. Whereas new conflict factors 
and emerging dynamics may influence the start, unfolding, continuation and end of armed 
conflict, it is necessary to examine those through the lenses of political, social and economic 
dynamics – all of which are inherent to any conflict. In similar fashion, the chapter and the 
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research state that the transition process from war to peace is not a linear one. And that its 
phases are not clear cut.  
Second, with ample reference to Latin America, the chapter has introduced the concept and 
practice of both peacebuilding and DDR, as endeavours that follow the halt of armed 
hostilities. In the eyes of funders and implementers, peacebuilding and DDR are meant to 
operationalize this transition, and to favour its smooth course. Unsatisfactory results have 
led to a reappraisal of what peacebuilding intervention can really achieve, and especially to 
what extent standardized formulas and policies can work. The literature review also 
criticizes the overly technical approach to peacebuilding and especially to DDR, which has 
entirely missed the political dimension. A more nuanced understanding of the political 
economy of conflict is necessary to a successful DDR process, beyond counting the number of 
discharged combatants and designing reinsertion packages. 
 48
 
2. Towards an Alternative Approach on 
War, Peace and DDR 
After explaining how transition from war to peace has been operationalized through an 
encompassing liberal peacebuilding project, and exposing the limitations of the literature 
and practice on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), it is now important 
to put the basis for an alternative approach to understand transition and DDR. This 
alternative approach is based on political economy analysis and on a comprehensive 
understanding of war and war to peace transition related to historical political, institutional, 
social and economic dynamics. 
As an introduction, I discuss the main critiques to the liberal peacebuilding model, which 
provides the rationale to introduce alternative models. Next, to understand contemporary 
wars and provide possible solutions for peace, it is imperative to assess the historic role that 
wars have had since the formation of modern states. This framework of analysis provides 
insights on current armed conflicts’ potential role as a state builder mechanism, as well as 
the role of non-state armed groups in this process. These considerations lead the way to 
discussing alternative forms of order and peace, and the nature and functions of rebel 
governance. 
Moving to DDR, I demonstrate how both mobilization for war and demobilization retain a 
role in state formation processes. I also review the nature and the quality of the political 
settlement between the state and veterans, which is key to understand post-war stability and 
order. 
2.1 A Historical Political Economy Approach to War and Post-
War Transition 
CRITIQUES TO LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING AND HYBRID PEACE 
Having accounted for the theoretical underpinnings and the evolution of liberal 
peacebuilding and DDR, it is now critical to briefly discuss the main critiques to the liberal 
model and to introduce some considerations on so-called hybrid forms of peace. Such 
critiques are, then, functional to introducing alternative approaches to understanding war to 
peace transition and DDR. 
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As it was mentioned in Chapter 1, contemporary peacebuilding is vast and comprehensive in 
its thematic areas, and as such it conflates with state building. As a (mainly) top-down global 
governance enterprise, peacebuilding becomes a state-building project due to the multi-task 
and multidimensional process that it generates. “A new “paradigm” of reconstruction has 
emerged, one which combines the traditional forms of peacekeeping, mediation, and 
negotiation, with the broad array of tasks necessary to construct, reconstruct, or even 
develop the infrastructures, institutions, and political, economic, and social fabric of post-
conflict states.” Again, DDR is perceived as one of the key elements of such paradigm (Mac 
Ginty and Richmond, 2007: 491). 
An important set of critiques asserts that democracy and market oriented economy are 
potentially good outcomes, but they are unobtainable in a context of state failure. “The self-
image of the west is being projected where it cannot work”, admits Chandler (2010: 40). 
Cramer (2006) laments the emergence of a standard model of reconstruction, through the 
devise of peacebuilding policies that reproduce Western values and practices (e.g. rule of 
law, elections etc.) to contexts that are not necessarily able to embrace them. Liberal 
peacebuilding policies may even produce unintentional consequences in terms of renewed 
conflict, heightened tensions and/or elite predation, resulting ultimately as 
counterproductive. Naïve liberal assumptions of introducing market-oriented reforms in a 
war-shattered country have been put forward at the expense of ad hoc targeted intervention 
(Cramer, 2006: 250-251; Keohane, 2002; Krasner, 2004, 2005; Paris, 2004; Snyder, 2000; 
Zakaria, 2003). 
One more set of critiques argues that liberal peace may be fundamentally unable to deal with 
the more intangible issues regarding peace implementation. “While the liberal peace model 
is effective in securing the quantifiable aspects of peace (the number of housing units 
reconstructed, the number of former combatants processed and the like) it is less effective in 
managing the affective dimension of peace – reconciliation, trust, inter-communal respect” 
(Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2007: 496). The distinction between tangible and intangible 
aspects of peacebuilding is crucial for the understanding of reintegration policies for ex-
combatants. As it is analysed in Chapter 8, reintegration entails a combination of both 
material incentives and non-material ones, related to self-perception, identity, and 
acceptance by society.   
Cramer (2006) sums up by arguing that peacebuilding policies endanger development and 
stability when three sets of considerations are ignored: (a) Peacebuilding is an inherent 
endogenous political process, not a mere technical and programmatic endeavor; thus, 
domestic political dynamics should be central to peacebuilding (Kriger, 2003). (b) Economic 
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policies should not be based on ideological and pre-cooked blueprints, but rather on the 
specific contexts in place. Cramer (2006) identifies ‘debt’, as the critical issue around which 
peacebuilding liberal policies of structural adjustment and market-oriented measures are 
introduced to post-conflict countries. Loans and economic reconstruction are granted in 
exchange for the introduction of liberal policies in the country itself, regardless of the 
context. (c) Transition dynamics are considered linear, as following a predefined path. As it 
was previously analysed, there is no such thing as a black and white conflict/post-conflict 
dichotomy, but a complex continuum of violence and its transformation (Cramer, 2006: 245-
276). 
Side by side with the critiques to the liberal peace project, post-liberal or hybrid peace 
theories have emerged. Hybrid peace focuses on: the local vis-à-vis the national and 
international levels; the everyday life that people living in a conflict-affected environment 
experience; the specific social needs and ‘shared goals’; and the ensuing institutional 
transformation. In hybrid forms of peace, the domestic politics of peace are central. Both 
state and society concerns are addressed, and both retain an active role in the peacebuilding 
process (Burton, 1990; Jabri, 2013; Keen, 2000; Kriger, 2003; Murray Li, 2007, 2009; Mac 
Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2007; Mitchell and Hancock, 2012; Pugh, 2000; 
Richards, 2005; Richmond, 2008; Richmond, 2009).  
There is a recognition that externally-driven peacebuilding policies that overemphasize 
institution-building at the expense of peoples’ needs had the unintended consequence of 
widening the state’s distance from society and weakening legitimacy. Instead, the processes 
of institution-building and social change have to account for and be driven by local dynamics, 
power politics, shared goals, deliberation and dialogue, even if (or, especially if) this process 
is contentious (Chandler, 2010; Marc et al., 2013; Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 
2007; Barron et al., 2011).20 
This approach is highly relevant because the present research on DDR adopts a micro-level 
focus in which the lives of ex-combatants are fully analysed, beyond the dynamics of DDR. In 
fact, hybrid peace also concerns a methodological approach that focuses on the micro-
determinants and micro-level analysis of conflict and peace. As a research subject, war to 
peace transition may “be contextualized more subtly, geographically, culturally, in terms of 
identity, and the evolution of the previous socioeconomic polity” (Richmond, 2008: 17; 
Duclos, 2012; Kalyvas, 2012; See also the 2014 Special Issue on Micro Approaches in the 
                                                        
20 “If the content and legitimacy of a new institution have been forged by an equitable (if messy and time-
consuming) process of contestation, it is a qualitatively different entity than the seemingly similar best practice 
institutional form borrowed (or enforced) from outside.” (Barron et al., 2011: 259). 
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Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58 (8); Balcells and Justino, 2014; Justino, 2013; Kalyvas, 2006, 
2008). 
The literature recognizes the importance of the dualism between structure and agency in the 
explanation of social reality (Long, 2001; Wood, 2003; Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012; Weinstein, 
2007: 20-22). By acknowledging that citizens are active stakeholders of the social contract 
and not merely passive recipients of development intervention and external shocks, hybrid 
peace formulations focus on agency to explain development, conflict and change (Mac Ginty, 
2010).  
This view contrasts with the two main theoretical foundations on development: 
modernization and Marxism. Even if they reach departing conclusions, the two schools of 
thought share a structural and deterministic approach that maintain that political, economic 
and power-based structures shape social change. 21  To counteract path-dependency 
approaches, Long (2001: 9) and others lay “the foundations for an actor perspective on 
development intervention and social change.”22 A focus on the needs of ordinary citizens 
implies an understanding of peace as an organic outcome, which rests on multiple levels. 
Peace dividends at the local level may not be received as “an integrated framework, [but – 
concerned with their day-to-day survival –] individuals may experience the liberal peace in a 
piecemeal and disjointed fashion – for example, the formalization of an everyday economic 
exchange that previously had been in the domain of the informal economy or a changing 
legal code” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2007: 497). As a consequence, peace is ‘localized’ and 
composite: it is not one but many, and acknowledging the interaction between the different 
dimensions that compose peacebuilding – and DDR – is paramount (Gray, 2012; Murray Li, 
2009; Richmond, 2008, 2009). 
STATE FORMATION AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: THEORIES AND APPLICATION TO LATIN AMERICA 
The above critiques to liberal peacebuilding and overview of hybrid forms of peace set the 
stage for a more nuanced explanation of the transition from war to peace – an explanation 
that goes beyond the implementation of peacebuilding intervention. The political economy 
approach that is proposed here underlines first of all the broader role that war plays (and 
                                                        
21 Modernization believes in a fundamental and progressive advancement of humans in terms of their standard of 
living, sophistication of institutions, and complexity of technologies, among others. According to the theorization 
by Rostow in 1960, development occurs in stages. Modernization believes in an expansion and adaptation to the 
rest of the world of the Western model of transition from agrarian to industrial economies. Instead, Marxism and 
its several political economy emanations are concerned with the exploitative nature of the development process, 
which recreates unequal class structures on a global scale and favors marginalization of the periphery. Marxism 
has dealt with the dichotomy structure-agency as the former crushing the latter, to be defined as ‘structural 
hegemony’. 
22 An actor-oriented approach gives prominence to human beings, their ideas and ingenuity over institutions, 
structures and processes, and “stresses the interplay and mutual determination of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors 
and relationships” (Long, 2001: 13). 
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has played in history) regarding state formation processes, as well as the role played by 
demobilization processes.   
The experience of Europe from the 15th Century on identifies a pattern of state formation. 
Scholars built theories through the analysis of concepts of monopolization, centralization of 
authority and coercion, taxation and economic change, competing politics, as well as the role 
of war and violence in the state-making process (Bates, 2001; Elias, 1982; Giustozzi, 2008; 
Howard, 2001; Migdal, 1988, 2001; North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009; Tilly, 1985, 1990, 
2003).23 
Tilly (1985, 1990) maintains that the process of state making in Europe was inseparable 
from the dynamics of war making by European rulers. This included the defeat of internal 
competitors, and the competition and power struggle with external competitors. Often, the 
internal and external realms overlapped: in the early stages of the state formation process, 
borders were not firm and there was continuous war between states. Kings delimited their 
own borders (albeit unstable) and built up their military; internally, rulers proceeded to 
either liquidate or coopt rivals and local elites. In turn, reining in on local powers and elites 
allowed the state to centralize security through the establishment of police (Tilly, 1985).24 
Both internal and external processes depended on the state’s tendency and ability to 
monopolize and concentrate the means of coercion. Giustozzi (2008) rightly distinguishes 
between a complete monopoly of violence, which rarely occurred in history; and monopoly of 
large scale violence, which entails the absence of armed groups who are engaged in political 
violence that directly threatens political order. The latter is more common as armed groups 
may exist and violent events may occur without necessarily threatening the existence of the 
state and the political order (Giustozzi, 2008). 
Added to the monopolization and centralization of force, a second crucial aspect in the state-
making process concerns the monopoly of taxation, resource extraction and capital 
accumulation.25 The rise of monarchy, reasons Elias (1982), is achieved through an effort of 
enlarging not only the military basis of kingdoms, but also their economic domain at the 
expense of feudalism, power elites and localized interests.  
                                                        
23 We take here Tilly’s definition of states “as coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households 
and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial 
territories. The term therefore includes city-states, empires, theocracies, and many other forms of governments, 
but excludes tribes, lineages, firms and churches as such” (Tilly, 1990: 1-2) 
24 By late 1700 most rulers achieved monopoly of large scale violence “[…] through most of Europe, monarchs 
controlled permanent, professional military forces that rivaled those of their neighbors and far exceeded any 
other organized armed force within their own territory. The state’s monopoly of large scale violence was turning 
from theory to reality” (Tilly, 1985: 174). 
25 “The financial means […] flowing into this central authority maintain its monopoly of military force, while this 
in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation.” If one falls, the other follows suit (Elias, 1982: 346). 
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Failed attempts at monopolization and centralization started early on, in 12th Century 
France: one feudal lord would overcome his competitors and establish his rule, but he would 
lack the economic means to sustain his victory on the ground and expand his power base. 
“Europe [was] parcelled out between thousands of lords, each with his own power base, 
owing allegiance to a notional overlord whose authority was effective only so far as he could 
enforce it” (Howard, 2001: 11-12). Due to the high number of local power holders that were 
able to finance their own private armies, a web of alliances and enmities unravelled, but no 
one could sustainably prevail. This situation produced constant instability and local violent 
conflicts that did not permanently set the axis of power. In a nutshell, there was no ruler who 
could claim wide legitimacy to rule and had the means to do so (Tilly, 1990). 
The main reason for the success of the 17th Century monopolization and centralization is that 
the economy and the control of land was progressively monetized and commercialized: a 
logic of profit based on money is introduced at the expense of subsistence economies 
primarily based on barter. In the past, rulers had to distribute land to the ruled, depleting 
their fortunes and properties in the process; thus, they had to constantly rely on military 
conquests in order to survive. Instead, kings now collected taxes and distributed incomes, 
not land. In turn, they were able to pursue military expansion and develop a bureaucratic 
class through increased financial resources. Distribution of income is “precisely what enables 
him [the king] to break out of the vicious circle which trapped the rulers of countries with 
barter economies” (Elias, 1982: 436). The diffusion of the money sector in the economy 
further weakened the land-centered aristocracy. 
Understanding the pattern of state formation is relevant to the current case of Meta, in 
Colombia. It contextualizes in a longer historical horizon the process of state centralization 
and monopoly of violence, which – to a certain extent – is still ongoing in Colombia. As 
Chapter 4 analyses in depth, Meta is part of a larger region of colonization: throughout the 
20th Century the Colombian state has made botched attempts at including frontier regions 
within the state. Arguably, the unequal and exploitative power of local elites gave rise to 
armed resistance first, and rebellion subsequently. Persistent armed conflict, therefore, 
delayed the state formation process, and frustrated the Colombian state’s efforts at 
centralization. The limited outcome in achieving state centralization and monopolization of 
violence is a feature that Colombia shares with the rest of the Latin American region (see 
below for a discussion of the patterns of state formation in the region). 
A further aspect that shows connections between Colombia (and other contemporary cases) 
and state formation’s theories concerns the centralization of security and monopoly of 
violence. The process of defeating and coopting small private armies led by local elites can be 
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traced in the privatization of security through paramilitary forces that mark the conflict in 
Colombia. The origin of self defence forces to protect and advance local elites’ interests in 
Colombian frontier regions has to be read in the framework of state’s inability to monopolize 
violence. At times, local interests may be aligned with state interests; at times, they may 
clash. What is worth underlining is that the process of brokerage between institutions and 
the parcelization of security – both of which are core elements of state formation theories – 
can apply to modern cases, including Meta in Colombia. This point brings further granularity 
to the case study of Meta: such insights highlight the gradual process of brokerage and 
ridicule the idealistic state building project (Ahram, 2011; Romero, 2003b). 
An important caveat when drawing such parallel is that in 15th-17th Century Europe the state 
had yet to be formed and war highly contributed to its formation. Instead, in post-Second 
World War developing countries – especially after decolonization – the structure and the 
normative legitimacy of the state are in place. Therefore, war may act more as a mechanism 
for either state strengthening or state failure, rather than state building (Taylor and Botea, 
2008). 
There are also authors who deny the state-building role played by contemporary wars. 
Leander (2004) states that war is instead undoing state building. Conflict and violence 
determining state formation in the long run is a theory that does not hold for contemporary 
developing countries due to globalization, which alters the mechanisms described by Tilly 
and others, and put in motion a process of deconstruction and decentralization of nation 
state’s authority. This process has been described by some as neo-medievalism due to the de 
facto observable overlap of authorities and fragmentation of power in several contemporary 
developing countries (Cerny, 1998; Deibert, 1997; Duffield, 2000; Reno, 2003; Verdery, 
1996).26 
With respect to the ‘competition to centralize control’ process, the fact that today external 
boundaries are internationally sanctioned implies that states use military power only against 
internal rivals, and not externally (Leander, 2004). In fact, countries that experienced 
decolonization were automatically part of the international system of states without having 
shared its history and process. After state formation in Europe and the consolidation of 
boundaries, states increased their cooperation, which progressively lead to agreements. This 
process in practice strengthened the process of state formation at the international level 
with the establishment of the League of Nations first, and the United Nations later. These 
developments have high implications for todays’ state formation: the UN system was 
                                                        
26 “Rather than concentrating sovereignty, feudal political authority was defined by its ‘parceling out’ (Verdery, 
1996: 208). This shaped a political order characterized by multiple zones of authority with overlapping and often 
competing boundaries existing in relation to a weak central authority” (Duffield, 2000: 164). 
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extended to the rest of the world, without the rest of the world experiencing the same 
process that European states went through (Tilly, 1985).    
In addition, the process of capital accumulation is also distorted today: the bulk of capital 
and resources has to be looked for in the external realm rather than the internal one, due to 
globalization and internazionalization of financial resources. This is a different scenario from 
European state formation of the 17th Century. Administrative decentralization and economic 
privatization also play a role in undermining state formation dynamics. Privatization 
disperses resources and the state is not well-endowed anymore. This means that it cannot 
distribute resources at local level and use capital, and that today local elites are more 
powerful vis-à-vis the state than they were in the state formation era in Europe. A similar 
process occurs with the centralization of coercion: privatization of security and squeezed 
defence budgets lead to more decentralized (and/or outsourced) control of security 
(Leander, 2004; Reno, 2003; Davis, 2003; Pereira, 2003). 
State formation and war experienced different trajectories in Latin America than the rest of 
the world. Centeno (2002, 2003) argues that different dynamics shaped the close 
relationship between war and state in this region. “Latin American states do not appear to 
have enjoyed the structural boosts offered by warfare”, which was so central to state 
formation in Western Europe. Nor did Latin American states practice international wars on 
the scale that European states did (Centeno, 2003: 82; Holmes at al., 2008: 17-18).27   
Within the mutual relationship state-war, the Latin American case shows that “limited” wars 
produced “limited” states and vice versa (Centeno, 2003). The ability to conduct total war 
(i.e. wars of large scale) requires sophisticated institutions, efficient burocratization of the 
state and economic planning, and mobilization of the citizenry – all features that Latin 
American states never fully accomplished.28 In other words, total wars need a strong state. 
The lack of – or the weak experience with – centralization process and sophistication of 
political institutions mirrors a weaker capacity to conduct war. In turn, strong states are also 
forged by waging wars. Centeno (2003) argues that the inability of Latin American states to 
wage total wars had unintended consequences on their ability to build strong states.  
                                                        
27 Notwithstanding the relative absence of large scale international wars in the region, one can also argue that 
Latin America witnessed a trade-off between interstate and intra-state violence. In the last two centuries, 
virtually all Latin American countries have experienced high rates of political violence (Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, 
Argentina and Bolivia), civil war (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua) or sustained levels of 
criminal violence (Brazil, Haiti, and present-day Venezuela and Honduras). 
28 Centeno (2003) singles out Cuba as one exception in the Latin American continent. Its permanent state of 
confrontation with the US equals a permanent and total mobilization, which in Cuba has taken place along with 
centralization, strong institutions and a high degree of social cohesion. No other Latin American state has 
experienced a total war as Cuba does, and no other one has developed comparable strong institutions and 
people’s mobilization.  
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In turn, the lack of total war making in Latin America had consequence on attaining a 
monopoly of violence – failing to achieve not only a complete monopoly, but even a monopoly 
of large-scale violence, according to Giustozzi’s (2008) formulation. Since Latin American 
states did not conduct total wars, they also did not have to concentrate coercive force (i.e. 
total mobilization) in order to do so. The result is that, to different degrees, these states 
witnessed a perpetual dispersion of the means of coercion, which means that they only 
attained a low degree of monopoly of violence. Colombia represents a perfect example of this 
pattern: non-state armed groups of different origins and conformation (e.g. FARC and 
paramilitaries) have contested – and at times threatened – the tenuous monopoly of violence 
of the Colombian state (Centeno, 2003; Pereira, 2003).    
The pattern of limited wars that Latin American states experience is also self-perpetuating 
and only modifiable in the long term. Centeno (2003: 84) talks about a “cultural repertoire” 
that the experience of total war making requires. There is an intrinsic ideological aspect in 
the call for war mobilization that all states and societies have gone through during history. 
Total war requires individual and collective sacrifices, and these can only be attained 
through a symbolic apparatus that acts as a bonding and cohesive tool between state and 
citizens. These consist of practices of historical memory, honour and ideology. The lack of 
experience with total war goes hand in had with a lack of experience of such bonding process 
that results in mass mobilization. Thus, having avoided total war making, Latin American 
states also experience a lower degree of bonding between states and citizens (Centeno, 
2003; Pereira, 2003).  
REBEL GOVERNANCE AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF ORDER 
Alternative forms of order may result either from local-level negotiations, or from non-state 
armed groups that exercise ‘government’ functions in territories they hold. Thus, it is 
important to touch upon the role of non-state armed groups, including the bargaining 
process with the state, the ensuing ‘order’ and how they exercise authority. A caveat is that 
there is a substantial difference between rebels’ ruling dynamics and those of organized 
crime.  
There is a growing literature that looks at the contemporary role and implications of non-
state armed actors in state formation and failure (edited volume by Davis and Pereira, 2003; 
Podder, 2012; Mampilly, 2011), including paramilitaries (Romero, 2003; Grajales, 2011), 
warlords (Giustozzi, 2009), mafias (Gambetta, 1993) and gangs.  
Two schools of thought on non-state armed groups’ functions are worth mentioning here. 
Some view these groups as mere warlords, who exercise control and establish authority 
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based on short sighted strategies, largely in pursuit of short-term economic goals (Gambetta, 
1993; Marten, 2006; Skaperdas, 2002). These views not only deny the ideological character 
of non-state armed groups, but do also underestimate the complexity of relationships and 
dynamics at play that armed groups experience when they hold territory (Mampilly, 2011). 
A second school of thought looks at the broader implications of contemporary non-state 
armed groups, asserting that such groups and their dynamics resemble those that led to state 
formation in Western Europe. While not denying the capital accumulation framework of 
scholars who see them as warlords, this school of thought considers non-state armed groups 
as embryonic states (Kingston and Spears, 2004; Jackson, 2003). Nonetheless, some authors 
challenge this view as an oversimplification which overlooks the domestic and international 
contexts in which non-state armed groups operate (Mampilly, 2011).  
For example, paramilitaries in Colombia can be considered as part of the process of capital 
accumulation and state formation, because they participated in the social contention of land 
control and exploitation. As a result of this role, paramilitaries established delimited systems 
of authority and power and acted as a state formation tool through violence (Grajales, 2011). 
There is some tension between this interpretation and the one offered above (Centeno, 
2003) asserting that limited and small-scale wars contributed to weak state formation 
processes. In their informality, non-state armed actors usually either resist processes of 
centralization and monopolization of violence through the establishment of global webs of 
relationships; or they get into a bargaining process with the state (Duffield, 2000: 170-187). 
A series of authors offer insightful contributions. In the dichotomy state vs. non-state, Tilly 
(1985) focuses on the central issue of legitimacy. He provides an analogy between protection 
racketeers and state’s governments: both provide the same service (i.e. security), but states 
have the authority and legitimacy, which racketeers lack. He defines legitimacy from the 
perspective of competing authorities: legitimacy is the “probability that other authorities will 
act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. Other authorities […] are much more likely 
to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force” (Tilly, 
1985: 171). 
Related to this challenge, there is the issue of modern fragile states, which often times suffer 
from a permanent crisis of legitimacy. By observing the inherent state weakness of 
contemporary fragile countries, Ahram (2011) recognizes the importance of non-state 
armed actors in successfully maintaining security and stability. Productive approaches to 
state building should forego the goal of a state monopoly on violence and acknowledge the 
“true power” of non-state armed actors – and work with them (Ahram, 2011: 178). The point 
that Ahram makes is that states do not have to necessarily be monopolists: in the pursue of 
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order and stability, states may extend their power through brokering arrangements and 
fragmentation of security – instead of centralization.  
Franchising out the means of violence may not automatically lead to state failure, but it may 
produce an alternative arrangement in which stable forms of order and security emerge. In 
turn, by decentralizing the means of coercion, the power of the state is not necessarily 
weakened. A possible outcome is that a new order emerges without the traditional 
centralization of the means of coercion (Ahram, 2011). 
Other authors reach similar conclusions. North et al. (2007) conceptualize one type of 
fragmented social order in today’s developing countries as limited access order (LAO). This 
is characterized by (i) the absence of a complete monopoly of violence, and by (ii) a 
bargaining process within society to control order and violence, and to divide up rents and 
the economic sphere among elite groups. Implications of such order include an incentive to 
maintain stability by avoiding war and by limiting access to potential competitors. This point 
is applicable to bargaining process at local level in Colombia to implement demobilization: in 
areas where the state is weak or not present, non-state groups administer order and violence 
through a local-level bargaining process, and impede other groups’ influence from rising and 
challenging their power. Thus, to be implemented, the process of demobilization may also 
rely on a local-level bargaining process. 
Together with ad hoc arrangements in the realm of security, it is paramount to recognize the 
specificities of war economies as well, and – at least conceptually – go beyond the rigid 
dichotomies of formal/informal and legal/illegal economy. If the transition from war 
economies to peace economies is to be executed, this will not take place through a clean 
slate, but through a process of interaction between structures of war and structures of peace. 
The term ‘transition’ embodies the meaning that in order to go from state X to state Y, there 
are intermediate steps: to a certain extent, Y would be shaped by X. A superficial or 
ideological read of transition, instead, would deny any space to ‘war’, hoping that somehow 
‘peace’ would materialize through intervening factors. It is imperative, then, to recognize and 
use the structures of war, in order to move toward peace. In other words, peace can only be 
built through existing war structures and the relationship between the two.  
With this premise in mind, war economies bear important elements that any peace strategy 
would need to acknowledge and to build on – not least because the livelihoods of war-
affected population largely depend on war economies. In Chapter 1, I adopted Goodhand’s 
(2004) tripartite formulation on the core functions of war economies (i.e. combat, shadow, 
and coping economies). There are obvious synergies between the three economies. The 
example of the opium economy in Afghanistan can be directly applied to Colombia and its 
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coca leaf economy: poppy cultivation represents a survival mechanism for the farmer (i.e. 
coping economy), becomes a trading commodity (i.e. shadow economy), and, through 
taxation, poppy is also a funding mechanism for non-state armed actors (i.e. combat 
economy). A transition to a legal peace economy will not happen (neither in Afghanistan nor 
in Colombia) without an understanding of and engagement with these three aspects. A 
possible approach to transitioning from war to peace economies “focuses less on containing 
the war economy than engaging with it, in order to harness the energies of war and build 
sustainable peace”, concludes Goodhand (2004: 171).  
As part of these nuanced understanding of order, security and economies during wartime, a 
growing literature on ‘rebel governance’ has recently emerged. The main strand of this 
literature concerns the role of non-state armed groups in administering territory at the local 
level. Predominantly present in peripheral and remote areas outside the reach of the state, 
rebel-controlled institutions exercise governance and authority, but do not fit within the 
parameter of the state or its legal framework (Arjona, 2008, 2014; Arjona et al., 2015; 
Mampilly, 2011; Menkhaus, 2010; Weinstein, 2007). 
Before briefly discussing the main tenants of rebel governance, a relevant point for this 
research relates to the labour market of non-state armed groups – a complete  novel 
dimension of the rebel governance literature. This research adopts an employment and labor 
market lens to the analysis of combatants’ mobilization, membership to the armed group and 
demobilization (See Chapter 3). This aspect is widely analysed empirically (Chapters 6-7-8), 
but it deserves to be mentioned in connection to the theoretical material. My research 
artificially considers combatants as employees and non-state armed groups as employers. 
Thus, the patterns through which non-state armed groups recruit (i.e. hire) combatants is 
part of armed groups’ institutions and governance mechanisms. The bonds between the two 
constitute an implicit social contract, which theoretically fits within the rebel governance 
literature.  
Non-state armed groups that act as rulers and administrators have important implications 
for political order and for transition from war to peace, rather than state formation – says 
Mampilly (2011). It has long been recognized that political order only emanates from the 
state, and that absence of state is synonym with chaos and/or instability. Instead, this new 
literature challenges these assumptions by providing evidence and theoretical foundations 
that order and stability can result from non-state armed groups’ governance. Conceptually 
ignoring this fact does a dis-service to efforts to support transition: such efforts may result in 
more successful transition if war-time institutions in place are not ignored, but they are 
engaged with (Arjona, 2014; Mampilly, 2011). 
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Mampilly (2011) also adds that because political order is seen as only emanating from the 
state, when non-state armed actors engage in governance activities and de facto authority, 
their threat is magnified. Lund (2006) asserts that, during war, authority is a much more 
fluid concept and experience than during peace.29 Depending on the specific service provided 
or function administered, layers of authority may either overlap, or enter in competition 
with one another, or simply be absent. Thus, “it is useful not to see [authority] as stemming 
from one single source, but rather to focus on how particular issues (security, justice, 
development, taxation and others) are governed and which actors are engaged with them” 
(Lund, 2006: 682). The failure to understand that authority can have alternative sources 
compels state actors (and international ones) to exclusively respond with violence 
(Mampilly, 2011: 28). 
Examples of rebel governance abound: state-within-state situations in which rebel groups de 
facto rule over civilian populations, by administering justice, providing service delivery and 
exercising violence. There are also cases where non-state armed groups rule through terror, 
fear and/or forced displacement (e.g. paramilitaries in Colombia; Revolutionary United Front 
in Sierra Leone). 
The quality of governance and authority that rebels exercise does not only depends on their 
initial preference, but also on due-course adaptation and on the interaction with the 
population and other actors. This is why a political economy approach may be more apt to 
explain the complexity and the different types of relationship that characterize conflict 
situations (Arjona, 2008; Mampilly, 2011; Menkhaus, 2010: 181-185; Weinstein, 2007).  
These insights are highly relevant to Colombia where both guerrilla and paramilitary groups 
de facto exercised authority in areas beyond the reach of the state. And where entire regions 
of the country have been historically marginalized and outside state control (Chapter 4). This 
issue is vital for the understanding of the process of demobilization. In its effort to pull out 
combatants from illegal armed groups and to reintegrate individuals into society, the DDR 
program ‘competes’ with the authority and the rule of non-state armed groups at local level. 
The understanding of how this process of ‘competition’ and interaction between state and 
non-state armed actors work will contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of 
recidivism. Arguably, DDR beneficiaries drop out from the DDR program and re-engage in 
illegal activities in areas where state presence is lower and the power of non-state armed 
groups is greater. 
 
                                                        
29 “What characterizes this group of institutions is their movement in and out of a capacity to exercise public 
authority. They operate in the twilight between state and society, between public and private” (Lund, 2006: 678). 
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POST-WAR TRANSITION 
To complete this overview of alternative theories on and political economy approaches to 
peacebuilding, wartime order and institutions, it is necessary to briefly highlight the main 
challenges that the post-war phase presents, as well as the transition that non-state armed 
groups themselves experience. This sub-section contextualizes and gives more explanatory 
power to the theoretical foundations explained in the previous sub-sections.   
The non-linear nature of the transition from war to peace presents a set of challenges in the 
immediate post-war phase. Peace is tenuous and resumption of armed conflict a constant 
threat. Collier and Sambanis (2002) reveal that war resumption and relapse into conflict of a 
country that just experienced civil war is more frequent than a new conflict in a country with 
no war history.30 First, there is high unpredictability in managing the transition and the 
ongoing transformations in post-conflict societies.31 The introduction of market- and 
democracy-oriented reforms stimulates more competition and under certain conditions may 
be disruptive (e.g. electoral violence), all of which compound with a typical high degree of 
societal conflict. Second, post-war countries lack what Paris (2004) defines “conflict 
dampeners” – i.e. history, tradition and societal cultural mechanisms that are in place and 
that favor peaceful resolution of disputes. Third, conflict-affected countries chronically suffer 
from weak political institutions – as the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report 
acknowledges (World Bank, 2011). 
One clear dynamic related to war to peace transition concerns the rise and/or the 
transformation of violence after major war operations. In the aftermath of war, violence is 
not likely to abruptly cease and make way for non-violent peace and security. Transition to 
peace is a much more tortuous road. There are four main mechanisms to explain the 
emergence of post-war violence: (i) Socio-cultural factors, including a higher degree of 
acceptance of violence within society, and societal trauma. (ii) Institutional approach relates 
emerging violence to a failure of or weak institutionalization in the aftermath of war, like 
failed SSR and ineffective DDR (Rotberg, 2004). (iii) A political economy perspective that 
sees war and peace in a continuum considers the social and economic functions of war in 
terms of transformation and power accumulation. In these structural terms, a clear-cut 
                                                        
30 The finding that post-conflict countries have a 50% chance to witness conflict resumption within five years has 
been adopted as a warning light in policy circles in order to justify intervention in post-conflict countries. 
Nevertheless, it is highly controversial and has been refused by academics on several grounds: scholars (Suhrke 
and Samset, 2007; Cramer, 2006) have questioned the integrity and the methodological approach leading to it. 
Years later, the same authors have revised downward their finding – a correction that however went almost 
unnoticed. At the same time, it is safe to assume that post-war countries face higher risks of conflict relapse than 
countries with no prior history of conflict.     
31 To give one more example, Mansfield and Snyder (1995) found that countries going through a transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy are more prone to be involved in an international conflict than either stable 
mature democracies or authoritarian states. 
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distinction between war and post-war is irrelevant. (iv) The nature of the peace settlement 
and the introduction of liberal peace reforms may determine an increase in violence or 
relapse into conflict (Suhrke, 2011; Hazen, 2010). Applied to Colombia’s post-DDR of 
paramilitaries, (i), (ii) and (iii) approaches are useful to explain persistent levels of violence 
in areas of the country under control of non-state armed groups. 
Crime and interpersonal violence have also often increased in post-war countries after large-
scale armed operations ended, and have been the subject of increased attention by scholars 
(Cruz et al., 2012; Suhrke, 2011; Hazen, 2010; Berdal, 2011).32 The cases of Central America 
are notorious. Four years after the war was over, homicide levels in El Salvador had reached 
a rate of 150 per 100,000 inhabitants, which was five times higher than pre-war levels 
(Cordova Macias and Ramos, 2012; Bourgois, 2004). In Guatemala, the homicide rate in 2009 
was 49 (per 100,000 inhabitants), which was twice than the annual average during the years 
of the civil war that ended in 1996 (Torres-Rivas, 2012).33 The explosion of violence in 
Central America is often explained through a lens of poverty, marginalization, migration and 
legacies from the armed conflict. Some authors argue that the failure of the institutional 
response in the post-war phase is largely responsible for these trends. States have either 
failed to implement peace agreements, or they have deliberately acted through repressive 
means and antagonized groups (Cruz et al., 2012). 
The analysis of the different forms that violence assumes in a post-war phase is an important 
dimension to be explored, and highly relevant to Colombia. Here, criminal and politically 
motivated violence often conflate. The change in the patterns of violence, in turn, largely 
depends on the post-war transition that non-state armed groups experience and on the de 
facto settlement between armed actors and the state. Hazen (2010) describes post-war 
‘pathways’ of conflict and non-conflict armed groups during transition to explore their post-
war trajectories (Figure 2.1). For example, the “termination of conflict armed groups” 
pathway is related to the fact that the main conflict parties dissolve and reintegrate into legal 
politics.  
With respect to Colombia, according to Hazen (2010), the DDR of the paramilitary umbrella 
of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) led to 
a pathway of “transformation of conflict armed groups”: paramilitaries – or what was left of 
them – turned into localized criminal organizations without a central structure or agenda 
(labelled “Criminal bands”, or BACRIM by Colombian security), but with plenty of resources 
                                                        
32 Conversely, countries with high levels of crime have shown tendencies toward sporadic socio-political 
instability, as in the cases of post-election violence in Kenya, or riots in Brazil and Haiti. 
33 Similarly, in Italy in a five-year period after World War II, homicide rate increased by 133% when compared to 
a similar period prior to the war. 
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to keep their operations in place. Nevertheless, I would argue that these new criminal actors 
have an important stake in the current conflict dynamics, and that there are elements of 
continuity with the practices and structures of old AUC paramilitaries. Thus, contrary to 
Hazen (2010), I would define these new criminal groups in Colombia both as conflict and 
non-conflict armed groups. Regional specificities and local conflict dynamics determine 
whether they have a more conflict or non-conflict nature and behaviour. Therefore, 
paramilitaries’ demise through DDR led not only to a pathway of “transformation of conflict 
armed groups” – as Hazen admits – but also one of “continuation”. 
FIGURE 2.1: POST-WAR PATHWAYS OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS 
  
Source: Hazen (2010): 170 
2.2 A Political Economy Approach to DDR 
I turn now to describe the role of DDR within state formation theories. In fact, within the 
state formation process, both mobilization for war and ensuing demobilization have played 
an important role throughout history. Before the term DDR as a standardized post-Cold War 
program was ever coined, the practice of demobilisation and reintegration already existed as 
a specific dynamic of state building and consolidation (Paxson, 1939). As states built up their 
military capacity and army strength in preparation for war (mobilization), likewise the 
transition from war to peace entailed a downsizing in terms of military budget, resources 
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and personnel (demobilization).34 As a consequence, the need to downsize a military force in 
the aftermath of war has always been a necessity for states and large political entities.  
DDR has to be put in a longer historical timeframe to highlight its fundamental strategic, 
political and economic functions. In fact, throughout history, disarmament and 
demobilization have been carried out as part of domestic political, social and economic 
concerns: just like mobilization, demobilization is inherently intertwined within the dialectic 
relationship between war and state. If war makes states and the ‘specialists in violence’ 
make war, then the post-war process of states discharging and dealing with the main actor in 
wars (i.e. armed forces) is a delicate and complex one. The relationship between state and 
the demobilized population has been one that has also defined the post-war social contract. 
The role of demobilization on state formation. Nevertheless, the role of demobilization in 
state-formation dynamics has been surprisingly under-researched, compared to processes of 
mobilization for war (Campbell, 2003; Duclos, 2012). Instead, as part of the state-building 
process described by Tilly (1985, 1990), disbanding private armies and banditries (through 
either force or co-optation) was highly functional to achieving monopoly of violence and 
eliminating competitors. In 16th Century England, the royal family of the Tudors was able to 
demilitarize the great lords. Likewise, in France, by declaring the royal monopoly of force as 
a state doctrine in the 1620s, King Louis XIII’s chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu, started an 
enforced disarmament process of local elites that would be complete by the end of the 
century (Tilly, 1985: 173-174; Tilly, 1990; Thompson, 1994). In 1648, after the Thirty Years 
War, most rulers had to rely on co-optation and/or coercion to induce either professional 
armies or private militias to disband (Wilson, 2009: 769-773).  
Before the rise of full-fledge states with monopoly of force in 16th-17th Century Europe, there 
was a blurred line between regular and irregular forces, and between legitimate and 
illegitimate violence. Would-be state makers needed to broker deals with private armies and 
mercenaries: rulers “commissioned privateers, hired sometime bandits to raid their enemies, 
and encouraged their regular troops to take booty.” Once war was over, troops would be 
demobilized, but they would continue on the same violent and pillaging activities they had 
engaged on during war, “but without the same royal protection; demobilized ships became 
pirate vessels, demobilized troops bandits” (Tilly, 1985: 173). 
                                                        
34 Analysing troops demobilization in the US after WWI, Paxson (1939) argues how both ‘mobilization’ and 
‘demobilization’ were new concepts for the US: “It is not that they were unknown before its day, but they were 
related to matters so far removed from American experience that few used or thought about them.” As a novel 
development, he also notes how demobilization involved much more than discharging troops to include economic 
and occupational re-adjustment (Paxson, 1939: 240) 
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As a consequence, due to the high number of elites that were able to finance their own 
private armies, a web of alliances and enmities would unravel in a spiral: kings would have 
to seek alliances with local elites, and those same elites would constitute kings’ enemies. This 
produced constant instability, generalized violence and local conflicts. As it was seen above, 
the conclusion is that kings (“would-be state makers”) were then looking to disarm private 
armies and banditries in order to concentrate and monopolize violence (Tilly, 1985). 
Disarmament and demobilization had therefore a precise and important function in modern 
history and state formation. Disarming bands was highly functional to the achievement of 
monopoly of violence, and cooptation or elimination of competitors.  
Political settlement and social contract. An additional important area that needs coverage 
concerns the relationship between the demobilized and the state. And, in turn, the type and 
quality of both the political settlement and the social contract that derive from and define the 
above relationship. In this case, the demobilized can be either a rebel force fighting the state; 
or it can be a state military that needs to be downsized following a major war. Thus, the 
nature of the political settlement is a crucial aspect to evaluate the demobilization process 
and the ensuing state formation. For the purpose of this research, political settlement is 
defined beyond a formal and legalistic definition to include the underlying configurations of 
power, which reflect the balance of power in society at multiple levels (i.e. both central and 
local powers), the product of elite bargaining, and the outcome of the distribution of coercive 
power and rents (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Khan, 1995, 2000). 
During war, conflict parties develop what Giustozzi (2012) calls “organizational capital”, or 
the self-sufficient capacity in terms of organizational structure to sustain the war effort 
(Giustozzi, 2012: 6). After war, such organizational capacity comes in handy when the 
would-be demobilized group needs to interact with the state. As a specific social class, 
specialists in violence and veterans have always entered in a bargain or negotiation process 
with the state in order to advance their interests and political agenda. In turn, the state 
carefully deals with and weighs veterans’ demands. Arguably, the highly defined skillset of 
veterans and the potential damage that unruly former soldiers would be able to inflict on the 
state (by acting as spoilers), urge the state to act benignly toward them.  
In addition, the relationship between the state and veterans in the aftermath of war involves 
a process of (re)building state legitimacy and veterans’ rights to citizenship. Since wars are 
domestic crises, in their aftermath a new social contract arises – one that involves both state 
and the armed groups that participated in war. Therefore, the politics of demobilization and 
the terms of the political settlement – as the result of a bargaining process among 
stakeholders – help to determine the post-war outcome (Campbell, 2003).  
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Most importantly, total wars entail a total mobilization by states from a material point of 
view, but also from an ideological point of view. Wars present the opportunity to build a 
strong relationship between states and citizenry, which has implications for state formation 
and/or strengthening. Therefore, the “cultural repertoire” that was discussed above 
(Centeno, 2003: 84) concerns the use of emotional tools by the state (e.g. sacrifice, sense of 
unity) to mobilize and coalesce citizens. In this framework, ex-combatants returning from 
war have played a key role to advance state strengthening: the glorification of veterans 
keeps the memory and the spirit of war alive, and, in turn, it fortifies the state-society 
relations. Examples of this dynamics abound. Thus, it is not surprising that states have 
placed critical importance to the post-war welfare of veterans.  
Since the 19th Century revolution in military affairs with the creation of national armies, 
veterans pursue their class interests, uphold their rights to citizenship and convey their 
demands in the same way as the working class would do. Compared to the working class, 
though, former combatants have more leverage in their bargaining with the state as they 
perform the specific function of state builders (Campbell, 2003).  
For example, the political weight of veterans as an influential social class is evident in post-
World War I era in Western Europe and the US (Paxson, 1939; Ward, 1975). During this 
time, Italian liberal parties censure over veterans’ needs and Mussolini’s embrace of their 
cause contributed to the latter seizing power and enlisting veterans’ constituency as an 
unconditional support. In fact, Mussolini focused his rhetoric of national identity and pride 
on the sacrifice and the mission of veterans (Campbell, 2003: 106; De Felice, 1965).  
In the US, veterans have been at the centre of US national politics and discourse. The US has 
used veterans as propaganda tools for forging national cohesion and identity. Invariably, 
countries that honour ex-combatants are those that display stronger national identity 
bounds. Second, it is argued that the role of veterans has been key in the establishment of the 
welfare system in the country. Second World War in the US followed a wide expansion of 
domestic spending and the government sector under President Roosevelt’s watch. The total 
mobilization during the war brought a further expansion and bureaucratization of the state. 
The post-war phase required a re-alignment of defence spending toward social welfare: DDR, 
veterans organizations and claims for veterans’ pensions played a crucial role in this process 
(Skocpol, 1992; Davis, 2003; Browne, 2003; Bensel, 2003; Campbell, 2003).      
These considerations and examples demonstrate how DDR enters in an intimate and highly 
contextualized relational dynamic with the state. Therefore, such considerations warn 
against treating DDR as a discrete and purely technical event. Instead, its broader political 
implications are to be taken into full account both for research and policy purposes. These 
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considerations suggest that the variations through which states have treated demobilization 
and ex-combatants may explain different trajectories in state formation. In particular, ex-
combatants have come to represent a crucial tool to support the social contract between 
rulers and ruled. States use veterans to forge national cohesion. This is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition: the degree to which veterans are glorified and made part of a national 
discourse contributes to determine state formation (Campbell, 2003).  
A seminal study on the DDR process and peace settlement in Zimbabwe (Kriger, 2003) 
reveals the centrality of the domestic and local dynamics rather than the peacebuilding 
external intervention – which constitutes the core principle of hybrid forms of peace 
previously described. Kriger (2003) takes a domestic approach to peacebuilding. A focus on 
external intervention, in fact, puts in the shadow the internal politics, and in so doing it de-
contextualizes the events. In order to understand the outcome of post-conflict, Kriger puts 
more emphasis on the peace settlement itself as a driver for subsequent domestic politics 
and peacebuilding outcomes. Her analysis is about the ex-combatants as a domestic political 
and social actor: she analyses how the pledges toward veterans in the peace settlements 
were subsequently distorted and what the consequences were for peacebuilding, stability 
and internal political dynamics. This type of study and its findings are key to the present 
research, which evaluates the DDR in Colombia and its relationship with peacebuilding 
outcomes. 
An important difference between some of the past demobilization efforts and their 
implications on state formation, and contemporary DDR is precisely the role of domestic 
politics. Some of the above examples highlight the critical politicized role of ex-combatants in 
both advancing their interests, and – perhaps unintentionally – contributing to state 
formation. Instead, by executing DDR as a technical operation and stripping it of any political 
significance, the post-Cold War DDR has missed the potential to use DDR to contribute to 
pursue more sustainable political settlements. While it is true that most of the countries that 
implemented a DDR program in the last two decades are country with tight budgets and 
financial resources, nonetheless the political implications of DDR never made it into the 
policy debates around DDR.  
A practical example concerns the issue of employment – which is central to this research’s 
empirical findings. Some of the past cases show how employment was a central demand 
from veterans in their reinsertion path. Even for this issue, I argue that what matters, 
however, is the politicization of ex-combatants. Their collective engagement with policy and 
lobbying for their interests enables meaningful and sustainable reintegration. In other 
words, if and when ex-combatants are a dynamic actor that is part of the post-war discourse 
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and politics, their demobilization and reintegration may incorporate larger implications for 
the state and the political settlement. Conversely, when ex-combatants at the individual level 
are made passive beneficiaries of DDR packages, their issues fall short of any broader 
implications. Devoid of politics, DDR programs’ factors for success become indiscernible. 
An additional dimension related to employment concerns the relationship between 
combatants and non-state armed groups during war. From a labor market perspective, my 
empirical research highlights the interaction between the two at different stages of the 
combatant’s life. Combatants (i.e. employees) and non-state armed groups (i.e. employers) 
are the economic actors of an ad hoc labour market. An implicit social contract between 
combatants and non-state armed groups ensues, which is further legitimized by the de facto 
authority and order that rest with the non-state armed group.  
During recruitment, non-state armed groups allure potential recruits through different tools 
according to the nature of the armed group: guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN) through the 
use of ideology, for example; paramilitary groups through the prospect of monetary gains 
and personal status, among others. In both cases, such alternative career paths in the war 
economy relate to patterns of marginalization and inequality, which in Meta – as in many 
other regions of Colombia – manifested themselves through the lack of decent opportunities 
in the peace economy. Borrowing from Goodhand’s (2004) tripartite formulation on war 
economies, the labor market of war includes aspects of both the coping economy (i.e. 
individuals who are job- and livelihoods-seekers) and of the combat economy (i.e. armed 
groups recruiting individuals to directly sustain the war effort).   
Local-level dimensions. The political settlement between demobilized and the state and its 
outcome are the result of not only a centralized and national process. But they also derive 
from a highly contextualized local level bargaining process. DDR outcomes result from a 
multiple level bargaining process between the state and veterans. DDR implementation is 
subject to distinct dynamics at the national and local levels, and faces a series of challenges, 
which differ at each level. A main obstacle to the understanding of war and peace is 
represented by the gap between the macro and the micro level of political settlements. In 
fact, there is a discrepancy between the national or the top-level leadership negotiating the 
agreement on behalf of a rebel group, and the mid-level commanders who hold power and 
interests at the local level (Kalyvas, 2012).  
On the ground, a different power arrangement and a re-negotiation take place concerning 
the actual implementation of the DDR program, outside or alongside the legal framework. 
Such arrangements are an example of LAO to control violence and to create a beneficial 
equilibrium for all the parties involved (North et al., 2007; Di John and Putzel, 2009). 
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Borrowing from Reno’s (2000) formulation, we can refer to this parallel dimension as a 
“shadow state”. The lower on-the-ground level of authority seems to retain a parallel power 
at the micro level and is able to bypass formal procedures due to its distance from the state 
level and thanks to its proximity to the local level.  
As Giustozzi (2012) argues, on the one hand, there is the façade of the DDR program with its 
implementation and institution building; on the other hand, there is the ‘real’ process 
involving ad hoc arrangements, the distribution of rents, and local power sharing 
agreements. Such conceptualization, therefore, implicates a myriad of local-level DDR 
processes of bargaining and negotiation – each process characterized by inherent 
contextualized factors (Giustozzi, 2009, 2012).  
Therefore, the success of DDR and of Security Sector Reform (SSR) operations does not only 
depend on the technical implementation of institution-building provisions, but rather on the 
negotiation and bargaining of those provisions. The co-optation of local ruling elites to be 
part of the process is key: often, this aspect is overlooked and local elites’ concerns and 
interests are neglected. To avoid spoilers and fragmentation of security, any DDR and SSR in 
a post-conflict setting should start from below: through the engagement with, and 
transformation and incorporation of insurgent organizations or non-state armed groups 
(Giustozzi, 2008; Ahram, 2011; Di John and Putzel, 2009).  
Peacebuilding and DDR implications from a local-level approach. From a peacebuilding 
perspective, part of the literature stresses the need for a greater attention on local context 
and self-determination, on pragmatism over strategy, and on the unfolding of local 
potentials. A local-level lens on peacebuilding and development is one that is concerned with 
local institutions, ingenuity and the local drivers of recovery (Barron et al., 2011; Bryden and 
Scherrer, 2012; Justino, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2010; Marc et al., 2013; UNDP, 2008; World Bank, 
2011).35 
Such approach is used for the present analysis of DDR in Colombia. There is an important 
operational overlap between ex-combatants and communities. Many DDR programs and 
local-level peacebuilding are pursuing mutually beneficial goals, in the recognition that 
holistic approaches – although harder to operationalize and scale up – may achieve effective 
outcomes. Since community development is vital for the economic reintegration of ex-
combatants, it is important for DDR operations to go beyond individuals to offer help to 
                                                        
35 “The indigenous drivers perspective locates the efforts of individuals, households and communities within their 
socio-historical context and highlights these as the most viable platform on which to base post-war recovery and 
international support” (UNDP, 2008: 49). 
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communities for more effective peacebuilding (Kingma, 2002; Pouligny, 2004; Özerdem, 
2008; Duclos, 2012; Kalyvas, 2012).  
Such a more holistic approach will establish social links and connections between ex-
combatants and non-combatants for social reconstruction, it will encourage community 
participation in decision making processes, it will strengthen community capacity for 
subsequent programs in communities, and it will address issues of resentment among 
community members. According to Berdal (1996), the importance of local level interventions 
is that they are more sensitive to community needs, more flexible, and are geared towards 
integrating both ex-combatants and non-combatants into communities.  
In turn, a micro-level focus and analytical lens put greater attention on the institutional 
transformation that stems from conflict. If violent conflict moves along a continuum and is 
not a discrete event, likewise the institutional transformation that accompanies violence has 
to be understood as a process, which is rarely a linear one. Thus, to hope to be successful, 
peacebuilding has to come to terms with power structures at the local level, and “cannot 
disassociate itself […] from the social, economic and political institutional transformation 
brought about by the conflict itself” (Justino, 2013: 15). Thus, local-level peacebuilding 
shapes its intervention based on local indigenous dynamics of conflict (violent and non-
violent) and ensuing institutional transformation. Thanks to this link with local stakeholders 
and context, local-level peacebuilding potentially harbours greater legitimacy within the 
community because peacebuilding intervention would result from a shared and inclusive 
bargaining process. Wider legitimacy may also lead to better development outcomes (Barron 
et al., 2011; OECD, 2010). 
CONCLUSION 
Through alternative political economy approaches, this chapter highlighted the importance 
of DDR beyond the policy realm of stabilization, security and socio-economic recovery in the 
aftermath of war. In particular, I showed the role of DDR with respect to state formation 
processes and provided some few additional lenses to analyse demobilization, including 
multi-level bargaining processes, the resulting political settlement(s) and social contract. 
DDR is, therefore, not only a security and development policy initiative, but also a process 
with multiple dimensions, of which the policy aspect is only one component.  
The chapter has also provided theoretical insights that add complexity and granularity to 
both the analysis of transition processes, and to the understanding of war. I discussed 
approaches that give primacy to real practices of order and authority, which may either 
reproduce power relations, or transform them, or do both simultaneously. The chapter 
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included an analysis of governance by non-state armed groups, processes of brokerage at 
multiple levels, and practical application of political settlement. It underlines the continuities 
between war and peace in terms of violence, highlighting the continued role of non-state 
armed groups, who do not just vanish, but play a fundamental role in the post-war politics. It 
is observed how violence remains central part of the landscape of transition dynamics, and 
how it frequently mutates into other forms of violence. All of these views contrast with a 
simplistic understanding of post-conflict, and idealistic formulas of state and peacebuilding 
(Cramer, 2006).  
After laying this strong theoretical foundation, which conceptualizes peace and conflict in a 
composite way and in a continuum, the research turns now to the case study of the political 
economy analysis of conflict, peace and DDR in Meta, Colombia; and to the empirical analysis 
of how ex-combatants experienced war to peace transition in their journey to find and retain 
employment. But before the empirical analysis, Chapter 3 addresses the methodological 
approach and foundations of the study. 
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3. Research Methodology 
This chapter explains the methodology that this research adopted. After an extensive 
literature review that established the theoretical foundations and boundaries of the 
research, the discussion of the research methodology precedes the political economy and 
empirical findings from the case study on Meta, Colombia. In a nutshell, this chapter includes 
a treatment of (a) the research objectives and core questions; (b) how the research was 
conceived and designed, what approaches were chosen, and how it was ultimately conducted 
to meet the research goals. The chapter is divided into two main sections. First, I explain the 
research goals and components together with the conceptual and methodological 
approaches that were adopted. Second, after introducing some considerations on the 
opportunity and challenges to conduct research “in” and “on” conflict-affected environments 
(Goodhand, 2001), there is a report on the fieldwork that was conducted (its phases, the 
research techniques that were used and why, sampling strategy, and risks and mitigation).     
3.1 Research Design, Conceptual and Methodological 
Approaches 
This research broadly concerns the understanding of Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) and the transition from war to peace in the region of Meta in Colombia 
using separate but intertwined levels of analysis. Within the broad and non-linear transition, 
focus is on the – at times, cyclical – process from armed group’s formation (i.e. mobilization 
for war) to demobilization. The overall research goal is to account for the multifaceted 
nature of the DDR process through complementing research components and intertwined 
levels of analysis.  
This section will proceed as follows. I summarize the research components next, together 
with exposing the main research question and related sub-questions. Then, I cover the 
methodological approach, including the adoption of multiple levels of analysis.      
This work is the result of three main research components aimed at explaining the above 
research goal. First, two conceptual chapters (1-2) have defined the research’s theoretical 
foundations and have exposed the limitations of the current models of understanding war to 
peace transition. They highlighted how the DDR process is part of this complex transition 
process, which is intended as a continuum (Duclos, 2012; Richards, 2005). It is clear by now 
how demobilization serves a greater purpose than the achievement of the DDR program 
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technicalities and goals. As it was argued, DDR has a role that affects state formation 
processes, is fundamentally political in nature, and interacts with other context-specific 
political, social and economic processes that make up hybrid forms of peace.  
Second, based on interviews with key informants and an extensive literature review in 
English and Spanish languages, I conduct a historical political economy analysis of the 
conflict in Meta (Chapters 4-5). This analysis is centered around the structural conditions 
(e.g. inequalities, land issues) and the conflict dynamics, their interaction, and the role they 
play in armed group’s recruitment and formation, and demobilization. The macro-level 
analysis of this Colombian sub-region unveils context-specific historical political, social and 
economic factors that account for explaining the complexity of the war to peace transition 
process, and the role of DDR in this transition. 
The third research component is the empirical part (Chapters 6-8), which consists of an in-
depth analysis of employment life trajectories of non-state armed groups’ former members 
(micro-level). Based on thirty-one semi-structured interviews with ex-combatants and direct 
observation, this leg of the study examines the pre-, the during and the post-war experiences 
of ex-combatants. The focus is on the job experiences and/or livelihood strategies of ex-
combatants during these three phases.  
The employment and labor market lens serves the overall research purpose because it 
allows to analyse comprehensively the transition from war to peace according to different 
levels of analysis – individual, organizational and structural. At the individual level, through 
employment, I am able to artificially divide the life of an ex-combatant into three distinct but 
communicating phases (before mobilization, during life as a combatant, and the post-
demobilization). At the organizational level, non-state armed groups go through similar 
phases: formation and mobilization, war, and demise. At the structural level, the life of an 
armed conflict can also be divided into three mutually interacting stages (pre-conflict, 
during, and post-war). In turn, the individual ex-combatant’s phases go hand in hand with 
both the path of non-state armed groups, and with the conflict stages. The micro-level 
transition between these three phases in the life of an ex-combatant mirrors both the 
trajectory of armed groups and the macro/armed conflict-level transition from war to peace.  
All research components demonstrate that the war to peace transition is not a linear 
process: the empirical analysis of employment trajectories of ex-combatants shows that the 
micro-level dynamics of recruitment, armed group’s membership and demobilization are not 
linear either (Duclos, 2012). For example, demobilized ex-combatants are at constant risk of 
recidivism, and new armed groups are formed on the ashes of old ones. Nor they are clear-
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cut phases, but often characterized by grey areas: ex-combatants may have a foot in legality 
and one in illegality at the same time.  
In sum, the three components provide parallel analyses with same conceptual framework 
and premises, but with divergent methodologies. They complement each other by providing 
a comprehensive multiple-level research on DDR. Based on this premise, the overarching 
research question is the following.  
How has DDR interacted with the dynamics of war and peace in Meta, Colombia? 
The following three sub-questions further define and disaggregate the research focus:  
 What are the key factors that explain (repeated cycles of) recruitment and war 
mobilization? 
 What are the key factors that shape the DDR process? 
 What is the variation between individual ex-FARC and ex-paramilitary combatants when 
analysing their war and employment life cycles? 
Combining Micro- and Macro-level approaches: Individual-based and political 
economy considerations. As it was stated, the present research takes a conceptual and 
methodological approach that combines a political economy analysis with a micro-level 
analysis to understand the DDR process in Colombia. Such composite approach is applied to 
the analysis of war to peace transition using the administrative department of Meta in 
Colombia as a case study. This research builds on the growing literature on conflict and 
violence that uses theoretical and empirical disaggregation on multiple dimensions, 
including space, time, actors, and forms of violence. Given the wide variations of ‘conflict’ 
cases and their inherent complexity, several authors agree that the understanding of 
transitional dynamics from war to peace may only be accomplished through a case study 
analysis (Barakat et al., 2002; Human Security Report Project, 2011; Justino et al., 2013; 
Kalyvas, 2001, 2010, 2012; Kriger, 2003; Sambanis, 2004c; Suhrke, 2011; Duclos, 2012).  
In terms of individual-level research, this approach builds on a growing literature on the 
micro-determinants of violent conflict, which is concerned with the understanding of both 
individual experiences and local realities in the analysis of and responses to conflict and 
institutional change (Kalyvas et al., 2008; Justino, 2013; Sambanis, 2004c; Weinstein, 2007; 
Duclos, 2012). Two prominent examples and forerunner research projects on micro-level 
issues of violence are the University of Sussex-based “MICROCON: A Micro-Level Analysis of 
Violent Conflict” and the “Households in Conflict Network (HiCN)”. Through a multi-
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disciplinary approach, these research projects are aimed “to promote understanding of 
individual and group interactions leading to and resulting from violent mass conflicts.”36 
The second critical approach is a historical political economy analysis. This approach is able 
to unveil the structural conditions of conflict and violence, including the analysis of power 
relations, actors’ interactions, political and economic incentives, and the sub-regional socio-
economic conditions (e.g. land ownership structure, labour and class relations, economic 
production, drugs and trade) (Berdal, 2011). DDR and the peacebuilding processes are 
analysed in the framework of the political economy of the armed conflict, the balance of 
power between state institutions and non-state armed groups, and the local-level social and 
economic context in Meta. 
Methodologically, the research is also fuelled by and contributes to the emerging literature 
on rebel governance (Arjona, 2014; Mampilly, 2011). As it was reviewed in Chapter 2, this 
literature is concerned with the understanding of armed groups’ internal functioning and 
external behaviours. Among others, this includes how non-state armed groups exercise their 
power and authority and the institutions that they put in place. As it is summarized below, 
the present research makes its contribution to this literature by focusing on the labor market 
and the human resources of non-state armed groups.  
In terms of the case study approach that is adopted here, there are benefits associated with a 
sub-regional approach, compared with a national level analysis. The former allows for a 
more nuanced and context-specific understanding of structural societal and politico-
economic conditions, and a granular account of policies, dynamics, and implications. A local-
level lens is conducive to understand the hybrid context in which DDR, in particular the 
social and economic reintegration aspect, takes place in Colombia. A sub-regional approach 
may also be a requirement when considering the wide regional variation that characterizes 
Colombia and its conflict dynamics. Ultimately, a sub-regional analysis allows for a more 
direct contact with beneficiaries and communities (Justino, 2013; Kalyvas, 2001: 107; Nieto 
Matiz, 2012: 137-139, 177).  
As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, the interaction between violent conflict and 
peace is not static, but intended in terms of continuum. A dynamic and causal approach is 
able to trace different patterns of war to peace transition, as opposed to a purposeless 
approach that seeks to define and delimit cutoff points within the transition. 
Methodologically, only a political economy analysis can provide substantiated explanation 
for the non-linear transition between war and peace, and for the grey areas between the two. 
                                                        
36 MICROCON Website, http://www.microconflict.eu/index.html (accessed on December 18, 2016). 
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The continuum is also a framework to analyse the micro-level transition of ex-combatants 
from recruitment to armed group’s membership to demobilization (Berdal, 2011; Suhrke, 
2011; Duclos, 2012). 
In conclusion, no single explanation of conflict is satisfactory, but the analysis of the process 
is the sole answer (Richards, 2005)37. Thus, a “composite approach” that combines micro/ 
individual-level and macro/political economy-level approaches is the more apt to 
comprehensively explain the process of transition from war to peace (Barakat et al., 2002). 
The latter is conceptualised here as the result of a set of interactions involving the role of 
DDR in the transition, former combatants and their employment path and experiences, and 
the structural historically-based conflict dynamics. Ultimately, “it is the interaction between 
micromotives and macrostructures that determines the expression of violent conflict” 
(Sambanis, 2004c: 263).  
Micro-level research on ex-combatants’ employment trajectories. After justifying and 
explaining how the overall research has a combined macro- and a micro-level approach, I 
now turn to the methodological underpinnings of the micro-level analysis on ex-combatants. 
As it was mentioned, this leg of the research adopts an employment and labor market lens to 
explain the war to peace transition. In turn, this lens is applied to a three-level analysis of: (i) 
the life of combatants and their employment experiences (individual level); (ii) non-state 
armed groups’ behaviour with respect to recruitment strategies and career paths within the 
group (organizational level); and (iii) the political, social and economic factors and the 
conflict dynamics that drive men and women to join armed groups, to stay in them, and to 
demobilize and seek reintegration in society (structural level). This multiple-level 
framework of employment and conflict is applied to and combined with the three stages of 
war to peace transition – before, during, and after conflict. 
At the individual level, the research revisits the employment experiences of individual ex-
combatants. First, it analyses an ex-combatant’s life before entering the armed group. This 
phase includes the jobs he/she held before joining arms, the circumstances and the 
individual motivations and incentives for joining an armed group. Second, I report the 
individual life stories of ex-combatants within the armed group. The objective is to unveil the 
                                                        
37 Duffield (2000) posits that two methodologies can be used in the study of security-development nexus. By 
drawing a comparison from physics, the dichotomy is one of machine-organism: as a machine, we study the 
different parts of it, knowing that the sum of them will result in a positive outcome. Thus, the first approach is one 
that give prominence to aid policy as a deus ex machina: peace and development can be obtained by sums of aid 
and top-down intervention. The second approach is the one that criticizes the first one and that “emphasizes 
complex holistic systems in which interconnections, mutation and self-transformation are key characteristics” 
(Duffield, 2000: 10). By claiming that DDR outcomes are the product of the DDR program as much as they are the 
result of a complex array of structural conditions, dynamics and interaction, this research clearly adopts the 
second approach. 
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different roles and “jobs” held and the functions performed while in arms. Third, in the after 
phase, ex-combatants reveal the circumstances of demobilization and their experience with 
reintegration, especially the challenges in terms of securing employment, and the jobs held 
since demobilization. I also pay special attention to the interaction between these phases – 
i.e. between the individual ex-combatant’s past life in the armed group and his/her current 
status of DDR beneficiary. These phases should be treated organically as they constitute life 
phases of men and women. 
TABLE 3.1: UNDERSTANDING THE LABOR MARKET OF WAR 
 
 A B C 
 LEVEL 
PHASE 
Individual 
(Ex-combatants) 
Organizational 
(Non-state armed 
groups) 
Structural 
(Political economy of 
mobilization & DDR) 
1 Before Conflict 
 Jobs held before 
mobilization 
 Motivations for 
joining: trauma and 
revenge 
 Recruitment 
strategies, patterns 
and incentives 
 Drivers of 
recruitment:  
- Ideology 
- Social network 
- Conflict-affected 
area 
- Employment 
opportunity 
2 During Conflict 
 Job(s) held within the 
armed group 
 Roles and tasks in the 
group 
 Human resources: 
- Training 
- Career development 
- Internal rules 
- 
3 After Conflict 
D
em
ob
ili
za
ti
on
 
 Motivations for D 
(FARC) 
 Perceptions on D 
(AUC) 
 Drivers of D (FARC): 
- Lack of freedom 
- Weakened ideology 
and cohesion 
 Drivers of D (FARC): 
- Military pressure 
- DDR program 
R
ei
nt
eg
ra
ti
on
 
 Jobs held after war  
 Challenges of R 
(finding work) 
- 
 Economic R program: 
Employment 
 Impact of 
employment on R 
outcomes 
R
ec
id
iv
is
m
  Drivers of recidivism: 
- Employment 
opportunity 
- Sense of entitlement 
and power 
 Drivers of recidivism:  
- new recruitment by 
armed groups 
- ex-combatants as 
experienced 
‘workers’ 
 Drivers of recidivism:  
- Ongoing conflict 
- Stigma and lack of 
opportunities 
- Social network 
At the organizational level, as part of the literature on rebel governance, the objective is to 
give some insights on the human resources of armed groups. In line with the three-phase 
classification, I focus on: incentives for, strategies and patterns of recruitment (before 
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conflict stage); on roles and tasks within the armed group, and career development (during 
conflict stage); and on drivers of demobilization that refer to the armed group’s behaviour, 
as well as organizational patterns of recidivism (after conflict stage). 
In order to apply the employment and labor market lens to the organizational level, I make 
the following abstraction. I consider non-state armed groups as employers sui generis, or 
social actors that in order to achieve either economic goals (e.g. drug traffickers’ 
maximization of profits) or political goals (e.g. leftist guerrilla’s change in the political and 
social order) need to “employ” skilled men and women. Such abstraction does not imply a 
treatment of armed groups as purely economic agents, far from it. But it allows to isolate 
employment factors in the analysis of armed groups’ formation, behaviour and strategies, 
and demobilization. The adopted conceptual framework and the empirical analysis that I 
carry out demonstrate that this research does not subscribe to rational choice theories, but it 
recognizes the complexity of non-state armed groups’ motives and dynamics.  
Finally, at the structural level, I examine those historical political economy factors that are 
associated with employment in an armed group. First, I analyse those structural drivers of 
recruitment, including ideology, socialization and available social networks. Most 
importantly, the power of non-state armed groups in controlling social and economic life in 
areas under their control plays an important role in recruitment patterns and profiles. I 
argue that the employment and livelihoods opportunities provided by non-state armed 
groups (and, by the same token, the lack of opportunities in the legal economy) represent a 
key incentive for men’s and women’s decision to join a group. Second, I broadly analyse the 
relationship between economic reintegration (with a focus on employment) and the 
challenges of ongoing conflict and ongoing recruitment by armed groups (i.e. the recidivism 
phenomenon). Specifically, I assess the role and impact of employment on reintegration 
outcomes, and the structural factors contributing to ex-combatants going back in arms (i.e. 
recidivism). 
3.2 Ethics, Security, Fieldwork and Research Techniques 
Between November 2013 and February 2014, I conducted fieldwork in the Colombian capital 
city of Bogota and in the region of Meta.38 Fieldwork consisted of over 75 in depth and semi-
                                                        
38 As a World Bank staff member and consultant working on peacebuilding programs in Colombia, I made a total 
of six trips to the country between 2008 and 2012. Each trip lasted on average one week. I visited several regions 
of Colombia, including the main cities of Bogota and Medellin, the Caribbean coast (Cartagena, Barranquilla and 
Santa Marta), the Oriente Antioquieño, the Uraba Antioquieño, and Meta. During my visits, I met with government 
officials, aid workers and project beneficiaries (including ex-combatants and IDPs), among others. I observed 
both rural and urban contexts, poverty and marginalization, and the perverse effects produced by the armed 
conflict. Thus, at the time I started the doctoral program I had developed a good understanding of the country’s 
conflict and peace dynamics, and its regional variation. Practically speaking, throughout those years I also 
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structured one-on-one interviews with key informants and with ex-combatants, and of direct 
observation.  
In both locations, I ran a total of 46 interviews with key informants. In Bogota, I interviewed 
25 individuals, while in Meta I conducted 21 interviews. Eight of them were with foreigners, 
and the rest with Colombian nationals. In terms of their affiliation, 11 were members of 
international organizations or donors, 10 were part of the governmental agency for 
reintegration (Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, ACR), nine worked with either 
national or local governmental peacebuilding programs, and 16 were researchers and 
academics in think tanks and universities.    
Given the focus on Meta, all the interviews with ex-combatants were done exclusively in this 
region, namely in the provincial capital of Villavicencio and in the oil hub town of Puerto 
Gaitan, in the north-eastern part of Meta. Thirty-one interviews with former members of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and paramilitary 
groups were conducted during this period – with the exception of one.39   
As it is mentioned in the Introduction, while I was already a doctoral student preparing my 
full research proposal, I participated in a government-run study tour of DDR programs in the 
region of Meta in December 2012. During this occasion, I was able to preliminary test some 
hypotheses, meet with a number of ex-combatants and run one in depth interview with an 
ex-FARC member. This interview profoundly shaped by thinking (see Introduction), and it is 
therefore included in the sample. I had also met with and talked to several ex-combatants in 
Colombia during two prior professional occasions, in 2009 and in early 2012. Their stories 
and the dynamics surrounding their reintegration highly contributed to my passion and 
interest for the topic – which ultimately led me to the doctoral research. 
Although I am aware of the relative small size of my sample of thirty-one ex-combatants, I 
think that the fact that I had repeated engagement with both ex-combatants and the 
dynamics of peacebuilding in Colombia over four years prior to starting this doctoral 
program, partly mitigates and offsets the drawback of the small sample and relative brief 
fieldwork of nearly four months. I nonetheless profess profound humbleness concerning my 
findings, and their validity.   
                                                                                                                                                                       
developed a wide network of contacts among academics, key experts, and staff members in the Colombian 
national and local governments, in NGOs, and in partner organizations. This vantage point allowed me to ‘jump’ 
directly into my fieldwork without the necessary and time consuming preparatory phase of acclimatizing, and 
finding and approaching relevant sources. Through appropriate planning, I was able to maximize the 
effectiveness of my time in Colombia. Indeed, my network of contacts and sources considerably expanded 
throughout my fieldwork.       
39 Annexes 1, 2 and 3 include a list of the interviewed ex-combatants, their basic demographics and socio-
economic characteristics. Due to security concerns, I changed the ex-combatants’ real names into fantasy ones.  
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In this section, I bring some considerations related to: (a) security and ethics when doing 
research in conflict settings; (b) the sample, the strategy to build it, and how interviews were 
prepared and arranged; (c) the risks and adopted mitigation strategies in terms of methods 
(i.e. selection bias), substance (i.e. to dispel potential biases in ex-combatants’ answers), and 
in terms of logistics (i.e. safety and security); (d) the semi-structure nature of the interviews 
with ex-combatants; (e) the use of direct observation. 
(a) Security and ethics. It is important, first, to include some considerations on the 
relationship between research and conflict. In particular, it is key to assess the opportunity, 
the risks and the challenges to conduct research “in” a conflict-affected environment and 
“on” a conflict-related issue (Goodhand, 2001).40 There are concerns regarding the safety of 
both the subjects of the research and of the researcher. Especially in conflict-affected 
countries, a “do no harm” ethical consideration has to be prioritized (Wood, 2006). A 
detailed plan of security risks and mitigation tactics was devised early on in my research, 
and it is discussed here and summarized in Table 3.3. 
At the time of fieldwork (2013-14), Colombia was a conflict-affected country with several 
areas of its territory suffering from heavy presence of non-state armed groups. Before 
leaving for fieldwork, in order to be aware of security risks, I gathered and assessed relevant 
security information on Meta and the areas that I planned to visit. This was done through 
exchanges with key informants on the ground and with a review of media sources.    
Once on the ground, I constantly prioritized both my protection and the one of my sources 
when I solicited information and when I analysed data. I was highly aware of the nature and 
implications of my research “in” and “on” conflict. My research was highly related to conflict 
in terms of location and spatial dimension, and in terms of subject, but with important 
caveats. First of all, I researched a subject that is not deemed as extremely sensitive. I 
explored ex-combatants’ employment life experiences throughout all three phases (before, 
during and after conflict). In fact, the unit of analysis is ex-combatants – a group that has 
ended its experience with war and that in theory is not compromised by current war events. 
I solicited information from these sources about past experiences of conflict, and not present 
ones. This factor meant that neither theirs nor my own security was compromised as a result 
of my research (Goodhand, 2000). 
Second, in terms of location, the research took place “in” areas where a DDR program (i.e. the 
state) is present, and was not conducted in areas under heavy influence of non-state armed 
                                                        
40 The distinction between “in” and “on” is important: for example, research can be conducted in a location that is 
affected by conflict and violence, but the subject is not necessarily related to conflict and violence. Or, a study can 
be concerned with a conflict-related topic without being necessarily conducted in a location affected by violence 
and conflict (Goodhand, 2001).  
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groups. However, this distinction is somewhat artificial as it is often difficult to distinguish 
between conflict vs. non-conflict communities (Narayan and Petesch, 2010). This is 
especially true in a country like Colombia where the armed violence has been traditionally 
diffused throughout the whole country. Such situation is starkly different from a country 
with a separatist insurgency, for example, where demarcations are easier to draw. As it is 
seen in the following chapters, armed violence is also a composite phenomenon in Colombia. 
Here, armed actors’ motivation, behaviours and degree of social control have fundamental 
differences: current criminal groups do not exercise forms of social control and mostly 
operate in the underground, whereas the FARC still exercised control and governance over 
certain areas at the time of fieldwork. In addition, on top of security concerns, conducting 
research in highly conflictive areas would have proved unfeasible as ex-combatants tend not 
to live in areas dominated by the FARC, for example.41  
(b) Access to ex-combatants, definition and sampling strategy.  Through the support of 
the regional office of the government reintegration agency (ACR) in Villavicencio, Meta, I 
built a sample of thirty-one ex-combatants. Although the sample’s size is too small to be 
representative, nonetheless the sample reflects the proportions between ex-FARC and ex-
AUC combatants, and it also reflects the demographics of the whole population of 
demobilized ex-combatants in Meta. For this research, ‘ex-combatants’ include only those ex-
combatants who are beneficiary of the DDR program. This is important because the universe 
of ex-combatants in Colombia does also include those ex-combatants who for some reasons 
never entered the DDR program nor accessed its benefits.  
A further distinction, which the empirical research stresses, is the one between ex-FARC and 
ex-paramilitaries. By all means, FARC ex-combatants are deserters: they escaped and 
betrayed the group in order to gain their status of DDR beneficiaries. They are, therefore, not 
representative of the FARC. At the individual level, ex-paramilitaries experienced, instead, a 
different demobilization process. They did not voluntarily demobilized, but accepted it – 
willing or not – as a fait accompli. It is safe to assume that some paramilitary members never 
– or only initially – entered the program. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the term ‘ex-
combatant’ only includes DDR beneficiaries.  
Three specific parameters drove sample selection: armed group, gender, and age. Of the 
thirty-one ex-combatants who I interviewed, eighteen belonged to the FARC and ELN (55% 
and 3%, respectively), and thirteen to the paramilitaries (42%). This percentage mostly 
                                                        
41 On fieldwork location and conflict vs. non-conflict settings, Wood (2006) stated that carrying out fieldwork in 
areas that were contested between the government and the rebels was beneficial to her own research. Perhaps 
counter intuitively, these areas were safer than those controlled by the rebels (where allegiance to the rebel 
cause would have been mandatory), and areas controlled by the military (where instead residents would have 
felt less free to speak out). 
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reflects the percentage variation among the total 3,035 ex-combatants in Meta: 62% FARC, 
3% ELN, and 35% paramilitaries.  
The male versus female variation is 84% to 16% in my sample, and 80-20 for the whole Meta 
population of demobilized. Similar variation also concerns age groups (See Annex 2). I also 
considered important to have a certain variation among ex-combatants in terms of length of 
time spent in arms (from a minimum of a few months to several decades), current 
employment status, and on family background of interviewees (e.g. rural vs. urban, single vs. 
married etc.).  
TABLE 3.2: RESEARCH SAMPLE AND EX-COMBATANTS’ POPULATION IN META AND COLOMBIA 
 
Number of Ex-Combatants who are DDR beneficiaries 
(Percentage) 
 Armed Group Gender Age Group 
Total AUC ELN FARC Female Male 18-25 26-40 41-60 60+ 
Sample 31 
(100%) 
13 
(42%) 
1 
(3%) 
17 
(55%) 
5 
(16%) 
26 
(84%) 
4 
(13%) 
21 
(68%) 
6 
(19%) 
0 
(0%) 
Meta 3,035 
(100%) 
1,070 
(35%) 
83 
(3%) 
1,874 
(62%) 
608 
(20%) 
2,427 
(80%) 
330 
(11%) 
1,962 
(65%) 
651 
(21%) 
54 
(3%) 
Colombia 49,550 
(100%) 
29,767 
(60%) 
3,228 
(6%) 
16,203 
(33%) 
6,616 
(13%) 
42,934 
(87%) 
2,901 
(6%) 
32,461 
(66%) 
12,625 
(25%) 
872 
(2%) 
Source: Adapted from ACR, 2017. 
Because of the support received by the ACR, I would label my sample as a ‘convenience 
sampling’. Only two interviews out of the total thirty-one were set up outside of the ACR 
framework. The first exception concerns a male ex-paramilitary – a taxi driver who I hired to 
take me from Villavicencio to Bogota. This was the only “accidental” meeting with an ex-
combatant (Fujii, 2015).42  The second exception was an ex-FARC member who was 
introduced to me by the regional office in Villavicencio of the Organization of American 
States’ peace support mission in Colombia (MAPP-OEA), although he was also part of the 
ACR program. The taxi driver was also the only ex-combatant that I met who was not a DDR 
beneficiary of the ACR program. All the rest, as being introduced to me by the ACR, were 
indeed part of the program. 
Deliberately choosing to access ex-combatants via the governmental agency carried possible 
biases in terms of the selection of ex-combatants and the sample’s composition, first of all. 
Second, a more substantial potential bias was related to the quality and truthfulness of the 
                                                        
42 Due to this reason and to the fact that he was still involved with some illegal armed group, he was deeply 
skeptical of talking to me, did not want to be recorded, and was only available to talk about his family background 
and first time recruitment. The irony of this ‘encounter’ is that the car company that he worked for was referred 
to me by the ACR office in Villavicencio.  
 83
ex-combatants’ answers to my questions. I will here clarify the reasons behind my decisions 
and the tactics that were adopted to minimize and mitigate these potential biases.  
The reason why I relied on the government program for access to ex-combatants relates to 
security – both the ex-combatants’ and mine (Nussio, 2012: 68). Non-state armed groups 
persist to this day, and at the time of fieldwork, Colombia was still affected by the armed 
conflict with the FARC. Strong FARC presence, continuous military activity in Meta (a 
ceasefire was not in place yet in 2013-14), and presence of criminal groups made ex-
combatants extremely wary of their condition of deserters (ex-FARC) and potential recruits 
by active armed groups (both ex-guerrilla and ex-paramilitary).  
As it will be discussed in Chapter 8, for a number of reasons, ex-combatants of any group 
tend to stay anonymous, not to get visible, and certainly prefer not to reveal their past armed 
group’s membership. Demobilized FARC are essentially deserters, and, thus, considered 
military objective by the FARC, i.e. desertion is punished with the capital punishment by the 
organization. Ex-paramilitaries (but also ex-FARC), thank to their skills and curriculum, may 
be more prone to be recruited by new non-state armed groups – indeed, a proposition that 
this research explores in Chapter 8. Thus, none wants their past identity to be publicly 
revealed. In case they are recidivist – either ex-FARC or ex-paramilitaries – and have joined a 
new group, then, they live in illegality, quietly, as the nature of the business requires. In sum, 
access to ex-combatants without ACR support would have been not only extremely difficult 
in such circumstances, but also dangerous (Mampilly, 2011: Appendix). 
A second point is that due to the ongoing conflict and security situation, there was still lots of 
stigma placed on ex-combatants, which induces them to minimize their exposure to the 
external. Despite government efforts through the ACR and sensitization campaigns, ex-
combatants are poorly accepted within society at large, by public opinion, and even in local 
communities. During a workshop on transitional justice in the small town of Fuente de Oro, 
Meta, I heard one municipal official labeling ex-combatants as “all criminals”43 – a poignant 
example of “accidental ethnography” (Fujii, 2015; see below). Discrimination against them is 
widespread, especially in the workplace, as reported in Chapter 8. Given these conditions – 
in my assessment – reconciliation is a far prospect in Colombia.44 
                                                        
43 However, there is lots of regional variation. Local communities’ sensitivity concerning ex-combatants widely 
varies in Colombia today, depending on how much violence and/or abuse the community experienced at the hand 
of an armed group, for example. The more a community has been negatively affected by violence, the harder it is 
for the community itself to accept ex-combatants back. 
44 An anecdote will further reinforce this point. When I participated in an ACR study tour in Meta in December 
2012, we paid visit to an ex-combatant who opened his own carpenter workshop. When I challenged him about 
being visible and manifesting his past identity of paramilitary member within the community and with other 
fellow shopkeepers, he replied that none of them were aware of his past in the paramilitaries, and that he wanted 
it to stay that way.   
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To summarize, being visible for ex-combatants meant to be either at risk vis-à-vis their old 
group (i.e. FARC), or at risk of being approached by new criminal actors, or of singled out by 
the community and likely discriminated. Thus, without the support of the ACR program, 
looking for ex-combatants to be interviewed would have represented a quasi-
insurmountable obstacle. Doing that would have also put my personal security at risk.45 
As a result of security issues, at the time of fieldwork, the whole reintegration program was a 
discreet endeavor, despite being a state-run program. It is true that there are lots of 
sensitization and marketing campaigns, but at the same time security concerns require 
vigilance and preventive measures. For this reason, the DDR program is highly centralized 
around the ACR, which is anchored in the President’s office, and not in the ministry of social 
affairs, for example. Civil society plays a role as much as it is involved by and integrated 
within the framework of activities of the ACR. There are no independent NGO-type of 
activities that run either outside of or parallel to the government ones, precisely because of 
security concerns. As it is described below, some interviews (5) were arranged as part of 
community social services run by local district councils, which were nonetheless initiated by 
and done in coordination with the ACR. Likewise, due to security issues, there are no 
national or local associations of demobilized combatants that lobby for their interest – as it 
often happens in post-war contexts.   
In conclusion, accessing ex-combatants without ACR support could have been dangerous, or 
at best, unfruitful. Evidence of this is the fact that the only ex-combatant that I interviewed 
without an introduction from the ACR – i.e. the aforementioned taxi driver – proved to be a 
less than satisfactory source. First of all, it took a long time to agree on the opportunity to 
meet, on timing and location – a first sign of his apprehension. Second, when we finally met, 
he told me that an interview could have been dangerous for him. As a result, not only his 
personal narrative and employment history were absent, but also his diffidence and 
hesitation impeded me to understand his perspective on the underlying dynamics of 
recruitment, armed group’s membership, employment, reintegration and recidivism. Were 
all interviews similar to this one, I would have had poor material to build my argument and 
develop this research. 
Interviews took place in the following location: over a third of them (12) were conducted on 
the premises of the ACR regional office in Villavicencio – a two story building in a quiet area 
of the city. The setting was an ample room where usually group activities would take place, 
                                                        
45 On this point, I was alerted by some other researchers who had previously done field research on ex-
combatants in Colombia. There was consensus on the multiple risks (in terms of personal security and of 
feasibility of building a sizable sample) that I ran if I had decided to operate outside the ACR framework (Nussio, 
2012).  
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and where only the interviewee and I would sit in. Thus, it was a setting familiar and 
comfortable for the ex-combatants. Five more interviews took place during a one-day 
community social work activity by ex-combatants. A basic room in a municipal space was 
arranged for the interviews. Four more interviews with newly FARC demobilized took place 
in the Hogar de Paz (“Peace Home”) on the outskirts of Villavicencio. The Peace House is a 
national army-run facility of first reception for demobilized FARC or ELN members. Four 
more interviews were conducted in public locations in Villavicencio: one at a local café inside 
a mall, one at the University of Meta, and two in a local restaurant. Finally, the last six 
interviews took place in the oil town of Puerto Gaitan – 200 km. east of Villavicencio.  
(c) Potential biases, risks and mitigation strategies. Given that access to ex-combatants 
was granted through the ACR, it was essential to emphasize the separation between my own 
research and the work of the ACR. In order to prevent biased answers and to dispel the 
perception that there were right or wrong answers (e.g. “the government reintegration 
program is doing an exceptionally good job”), I devoted the first few minutes of the interview 
to introduce myself and highlight the main issues on which I was seeking information on. 
This was done not only to inform the interviewees about the project, but most of all to gain 
their confidence through stating my independence from the ACR reintegration program, 
assure them of the confidentiality of their answers, and put them at ease (Sluka, 1995).  
The fact that I was interested in their own life experiences related to employment before, 
during and after the armed group contributed to the ex-combatants’ being open and not 
reluctant to talk. They perceived the topic of my investigation with interest and with little 
fear that it could backfire on them. In particular, the fact that I did not focused the interview 
exclusively on the reintegration dynamics, but expanded to other parts of their life, 
contributed to generating genuine interest among the ex-combatants who I interviewed.46 
I always asked for permission to record the interviews, which was always granted. 
Repeatedly, interviewees remarked that their only concern was not to take photos of them. 
In addition, the fact that I was not Colombian positively contributed to gaining trust: as most 
ex-combatants never saw or spoke to a foreigner, they could see fewer risks from talking 
about their experiences to me than to a Colombian individual (Wood, 2006).  
Paradoxically, despite being a source of potential bias, a critical role in obtaining ex-
combatants’ confidence was played by the fact that it was precisely the ACR who introduced 
                                                        
46 In fact, ex-combatants in today’s Colombia have developed a bit of a ‘fatigue’ (and also skepticism, as reported 
above) with respect to being interviewed. In fact, as part of the reparation activities that ex-combatants have to 
fulfill in order to be fully rehabilitated, there is a mandatory interview with the historical memory centre (Centro 
de Memoria Histórica). In addition, especially for paramilitaries, there have been continuous investigations by the 
judiciary to either ascertain individual roles or reconstruct specific instances, like massacres and other human 
rights violation. 
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them to me. All ex-combatants – at least all the ones that I spoke to – trusted the ACR in 
terms of their personal security. This is because they understood that reintegration was a 
consolidated state policy supported by the top national institutions (i.e. presidency, defence, 
judiciary). Although there were cases of ex-combatants who were bitter about the received 
benefits or did not believe in the reintegration process itself, they all agree that the ACR 
would never compromise or endanger their security under any circumstance. Therefore, this 
fact diminished the potential mistrust: a foreign scholar interviewing them on ACR premises 
could have not posed a security risk to any ex-combatant. 
It has also to be noted that interviewees came forward voluntarily. ACR staff would contact 
ex-combatants, but they were in no way pressured or induced to be interviewed. Thus, it can 
be assumed that those accepting to be interviewed were fairly prepared or willing to answer 
questions. Some ex-combatants also displayed the “pleasure of agency” in telling their story, 
in being listened and in having someone interested in their personal history (Wood, 2003: 
377; Wood, 2008). 
In conclusion, it should be added that relying on individual narratives when trying to build 
an argument may represent an additional knowledge bias. This bias can never be fully 
dispelled. Among others, personal narratives are the result of memories, perceptions, value 
systems and emotions, all of which are inherently subjective. Understanding the factors 
affecting why an individual answers a certain way is, obviously, beyond the proposition of 
this study. But, this is a dimension that a researcher has to be aware of. From this 
consideration, it results that I had to adopt extreme caution in interpreting and generalizing 
findings, and making conclusions.  
To mitigate such potential bias, I always triangulated findings between different 
interviewees. These are some of the tactics that I adopted. First, I did not include findings 
that only one interviewee reported. Second, if a new revealing finding came up in one 
interview, I would probe the next interviewee on that specific point: did he/she agree with 
his/her colleague point of view and/or assessment? Is this story plausible? Thus, I included 
findings that were shared by at least more than one ex-combatant. Third, I made large use of 
ex-combatants’ quotes to support all the important findings and points I wrote. The reader is 
therefore able to judge for him/herself, and either agree or discard findings. Last, I 
triangulated some specific important findings with key informants. 
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TABLE 3.3: SUMMARY OF RISK AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
RISK MITIGATION – How I managed to circumvent the risk 
Security and ethics: 
Compromising mine and ex-
combatants’ security 
 Several empirical studies on ex-combatants already 
conducted by other researchers. 
 Conducted fieldwork in areas not directly affected by 
violence. 
 Took necessary precautions to protect my sources: 
conducted interviews within ACR premises; changed 
names and confidentiality. 
Sample of ex-combatants was 
built from the ACR list of 
beneficiaries – not a neutral 
stakeholder 
 Without ACR support, I would have not been available 
to build a credible sample, as ex-combatants tend not to 
get visible. 
 I requested variation in the sample, including: gender, 
age, type of and length in the armed group, length in 
the reintegration process. 
Findings rely too much on 
individual narratives from ex-
combatants  
 Triangulate findings with other ex-combatants and key 
informants. 
 Be aware of inherent subjectivity of narratives. 
 Use of quotes validates findings. 
Risk of biased answers on the 
ACR-run reintegration program  
 Am not interested in the perception nor value 
judgment that ex-combatants place on the ACR 
program, its shortcomings, its outcomes.  
 My focus area is on their employment historic path, 
including armed group. Personal experiences rather 
than specific information or value judgment 
considerations. 
Ex-combatants not generally open 
to talk about violence and/or 
violent events due to personal 
trauma, or fear of prosecution.  
 Did not ask directly about violence perpetration, but 
about functioning of armed groups.  
 Ex-combatants more open to dialogue with a foreigner 
than with a Colombian. 
Recidivism – Practical and 
methodological risks. 
Too dangerous to look for 
recidivist. How can I explain 
recidivism without talking to 
declared / self appointed 
recidivist?   
 Did not make recidivism the core subject of my 
research. 
 Relied on answers from ex-combatants, whom I would 
ask generic questions about the mechanism of 
recidivism. They would generally self volunteer the 
information that they were not recidivist. Thus, focus 
was on the process, and on hypothetical recidivists. 
 Given the sensitivity of the topic and higher possibility 
for biased answers, I asked questions about recidivism 
at the end of the interview.   
(d) Structure of the interviews. The interviews that I conducted with ex-combatants range 
between twenty-five minutes and two and half hours. The length of the interview depended 
on different factors: amount and quality of the information collected, loquacity, willingness 
and/or capacity of the interviewee, as well as his/her availability in terms of time. The 
interviews’ average duration is of fifty-five minutes.  
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Interviews were semi-structured and divided into three parts: one part of standard 
questions and two parts of qualitative open-ended questions. An important – and obvious – 
caveat is that the structure hereby described is a script that I initially followed, but, given 
their qualitative nature, interviews then shaped quite differently from one to another. While 
one interviewee may have focused more on the reintegration side, another one may have had 
more to say on his experience within the armed group, for example. These differences 
depend on various factors, including the length of the time in arms, degree of ideological 
commitment, and personal features. Thus, the interviews are personal oral histories. Besides 
the structure being similar, the unfolding of the interviews were different from one to the 
other (Perks and Thomson, 2006).  
Following a five-minute introduction about the research project and aforementioned 
disclaimers, the first part of the interview concerned some standard demographic questions, 
including: age, marital status and children, place of origin and of residence, education level, 
and family background (urban or rural). After a few more closed questions for statistical 
purposes (armed group, number of years in arms, and year of demobilization), the second 
part the interview was structured around open-ended questions on three main themes. This 
qualitative part of the interview was centered on the history of the ex-combatant, and 
his/her testimony and narrative about particular life events. 
The first theme to be addressed was ‘recruitment’ or how the individual got in contact and 
joined the armed group in the first place. I was interested in knowing the dynamics and the 
context of recruitment, including: family background; how the armed group approached the 
individual or what the first point of contact was; how strong the armed group was in the area 
where the individual lived; incentives for joining; and which promises were made, if any. I let 
complete freedom to the interviewee to tell his/her story, but I always tried to cover the 
above points. My initial question was usually: “Tell me the story of how and where you grew 
up, and the circumstances of how you were recruited or you joined the armed group”. Thus, 
as I mentioned, I was interested in the narrative in order to untangle the dynamics of how 
recruitment takes place, and understand the causes of it. 
The second theme was ‘employment’ within the armed group. After recruitment dynamics, I 
directed the flow of the conversation to the role, functions and activities of the individual as 
an armed group member. I was interested in hearing ex-combatants’ stories about what their 
‘job’ was in the armed group – without characterizing it as such. And, in turn, if and how they 
changed that initial job (e.g. new roles and responsibilities, career advancement etc.). Indeed, 
depending on the individual’s length of time in the group, this part was either shorter or 
longer and richer in insights. As further explained below, there is a great variation in my 
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sample on the ‘time in arms’ variable: interviewed ex-combatants’ length in the armed group 
ranged from a few months to three decades. 
After explaining their ‘employment’ experience in the armed group, this leg of the interview 
included also questions related to all of the work experiences of the interviewee, both within 
and outside the armed group. Thus, I asked them to tell me about jobs held before entering 
the armed group, in order to draw a connection between all work experiences – before, 
during, and, after the armed group. The objective was to draw ‘life work histories’ that would 
include the entire adult life of the interviewee, including the experiences as an armed group 
member. By drawing this connection between ‘employment’ in the armed group and 
employment outside of it, I was also able to assess to what extent the armed group’s 
experience was a rupture with respect to civilian life, and the interaction between the two.    
The third theme of the interview concerned the demobilization and reintegration process. 
Here, I followed the same script as for the other qualitative parts: I would let the interviewee 
lead the narrative. For FARC or ELN members I was interested in why and how he/she 
decided to leave the armed group. For ex-paramilitaries, I wanted to know how the 
individual combatant perceived and reacted vis-à-vis the collective demobilization. I would 
then complete the interview by asking questions about reintegration, in particular, their job 
history and dynamics after demobilization. This included the challenges and obstacles of 
reintegrating and securing a job as an ex-combatant; the perception and reaction from 
community members; the type of jobs more frequent for ex-combatants; and, specifically, the 
jobs held after demobilization. 
The fourth and concluding part of the interview concerned recidivism. I deliberately decided 
to place this topic at the very end of the conversation, because I was aware of the 
controversy and danger associated to it. Many interviewees would shut down when hearing 
a question about recidivism. Thus, I wanted to make sure that discussing recidivism would 
not negatively affect the rest of the interview. Since the interviewee could have lied about it, 
these answers could have also possibly corrupted other areas of discussion. While obviously 
no ex-combatant would admit to be a recidivist – although many revealed of being 
approached and/or threatened – a few interviewees provided some interesting hints on how 
recidivism works and its dynamics. 
Nonetheless, the above final format of the semi-structured interview was not predetermined. 
In fact, it resulted from an initial process of testing a more loose format with less specific 
questions, and progressively adjusting it to the current format. This testing phase concerned 
the first three or four interviews. The most important issue that I added as a result of this 
‘learning by doing’ concerned employment. The draw of a link between employment and 
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conflict (i.e. armed group’s membership) is the fruit of ex-combatants’ answers and my 
initial analysis of such answers. There is no pre-fieldwork hypothesis on this. Instead, 
answers from ex-combatants, many of whom directly explained and revealed the story of 
their period in arms through an employment lens, were crucial in drawing a link between an 
employment experience and membership to an armed group. As much as sui generis the 
armed group’s experience can be, there is a fundamental understanding and perception by 
the combatant himself to be in an occupation, or a job. Chapter 7 clearly shows how the 
employment-conflict nexus is displayed by ex-combatants’ experiences and testimonies. In 
turn, these insights contributed to build my argument on the labor market of war. 
(e) Direct observation. As part of my fieldwork, I also engaged in direct observation, or 
“accidental ethnography” (Fujii, 2015). This technique consists of observing social reality as 
it spontaneously happens, without the researcher’s deliberate effort and/or intention to 
gather data. In direct observation there is no intervention by the researcher in soliciting 
information. Direct observation is effective as it allows the researcher to gather additional 
data and enrich existing one through the direct observation of events, encounters, or simple 
daily life. Unplanned episodes are ‘real’ and not constructed – as an interview might be. It is 
also a way to triangulate findings. Direct observation concerns the community and the social 
context in which the unit of analysis or the study’s subject take place, including simple 
interactions and conversations with community members, and the researcher’s own 
personal perceptions (Gusterson, 2008; Pinsky, 2015). 
For this research, direct observation took place continuously during fieldwork. However, 
valuable findings were gathered only when I re-elaborated what I observed and gave 
meaning and depth to what I witnessed. As Fujii (2015) defines it, accidental ethnography 
aims at “finding revelation in the mundane”. Some relevant examples include the following. I 
attended a one-day visit to Puerto Gaitan by the regional director of the reintegration 
program (ACR) for the whole Eastern Llanos. This included an exchange with the municipal 
mayor, in which I was able to assess the high level of commitment and participation by local 
authorities to the reintegration file. As it is described in Chapter 4, Puerto Gaitan is located in 
a remote and vast area, which is currently been sought after for oil extraction and 
production, and particularly prone to non-state armed groups’ activities. The reintegration 
officials also visited DDR beneficiaries who resided in Puerto Gaitan and surrounding areas 
to collectively go over some new features in their benefits and to gather information about 
their progress and challenges.  
On a different occasion, I took part in a meeting between the ACR and a district council (Junta 
de Acción Comunal, JAC) of a disadvantaged area of Villavicencio to plan activities aimed at 
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bringing together ex-combatants and the community. I also participated in one of the 
sensitization activities that resulted from that meeting. Among others, I attended a ‘social 
work’ activity in which a group of around 20 ex-combatants among both guerrilla and 
paramilitaries, were tasked to clean a public space to later become a community sport 
facility. Although I would not debate the symbolic importance of ex-combatants “giving back” 
to the community as an act of moral and physical repair, I could witness the ex-combatants’ 
inherent disinterest and apathy in mechanically complying with what they perceived as an 
administrative requirement. A partial reason for this attitude was that the overwhelming 
majority of ex-paramilitaries and the totality of ex-FARC members were not from 
Villavicencio, nor spent their time in arms in the city. They only settled there after 
demobilization. Thus, their emotional engagement with the local community was limited at 
best, and they did not feel ownership with the symbolic reparation effort. For the sake of 
avoiding generalizations, it should be added that a few ex-combatants were, instead, moved 
by the reconciliation activities and highly committed to the community work.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter addressed the overall research methods and approach that was used for this 
research. First, the methodological and conceptual frameworks were covered, explaining and 
justifying how a combined macro- and micro-level analysis was designed and conducted. I 
also reviewed the main research questions and components with the related multiple levels 
of analysis that were adopted. Second, the chapter addressed the way in which I put the 
methodological approach into practice. I reported how I conducted fieldwork and the main 
research techniques that were used. In doing so, I included necessary ethical and security 
considerations to be taken into account when researching conflict-affected environments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92
 
PART II - Case Study: War to 
Peace Transition and DDR in 
Meta 
 93
 
4. A Historical Political Economy 
Analysis of Conflict in Meta, Colombia 
This chapter concerns a political, social and economic historical analysis of the conflict in 
Colombia from the 19th Century to modern times, with a specific focus on the region of Meta. 
Special attention is reserved to some of the interpretations about the long-term drivers of 
the violence in Colombia and in the Eastern Llanos – the sub-region that includes Meta. 
These include the quest for land and the process of colonization in peripheral areas of the 
country; and the structural and persistent institutional failure that left peripheral regions in 
a permanent state of lawlessness and/or parallel government by elites. 
The chapter also addresses the understanding of contemporary non-state armed groups’ 
dynamics in Meta. After an exploration of the most salient conflict drivers in the region from 
a historical political economy perspective, the focus shifts to the dynamics of armed conflict 
from the perspective of the main non-state armed groups in Meta, including the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC) and several paramilitary organizations. Understanding the trajectory, behaviour, 
strategies, and incentives of non-state armed groups contextualizes the empirical analysis 
from the interviews with ex-combatants.   
The chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction of Meta, its geographic 
characteristics and some considerations over its colonization patterns, the first section 
addresses the historical dynamics in the region from the 19th Century to the start of the civil 
war in 1948 (La Violencia). The analysis of land tenure and of the socio-economic structure 
that underpins it is the subject of the second section. Section three addresses the unfolding 
and the implications of La Violencia in Meta, which represents the basis for the formation of 
leftist guerrilla groups in the region. Section four includes the historical events of the 1960s 
and 1970s with the rise of the FARC. The concluding section analyses the new conflict 
dynamics from the 1980s on, including: the rise of illegal crops farming and its trafficking; 
the parallel rise of new actors (i.e. paramilitaries); and the alternate phases of war and peace 
attempts between the Colombian state and the FARC. 
The Llano appears like an ocean with its limits being the Orinoco, Amazon, 
and Arauca rivers; its surface is equal to that of an ocean on a calm day. Like 
the ocean, it makes one feel very small in front of such grandeur and also 
instills in one the desire to conquer it. The first impression on reaching the 
plain after the torturous trip through the mountains tears from the observer 
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a cry similar to “Land! Land!”  which Columbus’ men shouted on October 12, 
1492. (Restrepo, 1868. Cited in Rausch, 1999: 127) 
The Eastern Llanos (Llanos Orientales, literally “Eastern Plains”, or Orinoquia) is a territory 
that occupies around 23% of total Colombia and includes the administrative departments – 
Departamentos, the equivalent of “regions” or “states” in a federal system – of Meta, Arauca, 
Casanare, and Vichada. It is formed of tropical grasslands. And it is delimited by the Arauca 
river to the north (the natural border with Venezuela), the Guaviare river to the south, the 
Orinoco river to the east, and the Cordillera Oriental (“Eastern Mountain Chain”) to the west. 
In this vast and sparsely populated region, density was 5.6 inhabitants per square kilometer, 
whereas it was 38.34 at the national level in 2002. Only 3.5% of the total Colombian 
population lives in the Eastern Llanos – the majority of which lives in the areas of Meta 
adjacent to the highlands (Jiménez, 2012: 155; Rausch, 1999: 5; Holmes at al., 2008: 12-16). 
Meta is one of the thirty-three administrative departments in Colombia, and the most 
populated of the Eastern Llanos. It covers 7.5% of the country’s surface, an area that is 
slightly larger than Austria or smaller than Jordan (over 85,000 Km2). It has an obvious 
strategic location as the connection between the Andean centre and the south and east of the 
country. As of 2012, Meta’s population included 906,805 inhabitants. The urban-rural 
distribution of the population is 75.2% and 24.8%, respectively. Meta’s income is equal to 
4.2% of Colombian total gross domestic product (2011). Economically, Meta is the fifth 
largest administrative department in Colombia (Rausch, 1999: 157; FIP, 2013: 6).  
Meta is composed of a number of microregions, which have specific geographic and spatial 
characteristics as well as political, social and economic dynamics, and colonization patterns 
(Nieto Matiz, 2012). Figure 4.1 maps the six microregions of Meta. The two microregions of 
Piedemonte Metense (literally, “at the feet of the mountain”) and Castilla-San Carlos de 
Guaroa are the most populated areas in Meta. Here, the first settlements were established. 
They are geographically located at the bottom of the Cordillera Oriental – one of the three 
mountain chains that cross Colombia. Main municipalities include: Meta’s regional capital, 
Villavicencio, which is the largest city of the Eastern Llanos; and other smaller urban centres, 
like Acacias, Castilla la Nueva, Guamal, and Restrepo (See Figure 4.2 for a map of Meta’s 
municipalities).  
Third, the microregion of Meta River and Villanueva corridor runs along the Meta river in the 
north, connecting Puerto Lopez to Puerto Gaitan to the administrative departments of 
Vichada and Casanare in the east. This area is sparsely populated, and socio-economically 
dedicated to cattle ranching and agro-industrial business. Currently, it is an oil producing 
area and hosts some of the greatest oil reserves in Meta. Fourth, the vast south-eastern 
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microregion that runs along the Guaviare river (dividing Meta from Guaviare) includes only 
the municipality of Mapiripan. Here, in 1997, a massacre perpetrated by paramilitaries 
marked the entrance of these forces in Meta as a belligerent actor (see Section 4.5). 
Mapiripan suffers from lack of state presence, economic isolation and poor connectivity to 
markets due to its geographic remoteness. Last, the Ariari and the Duda-Guayabero (see 
Section 4.4 and Figure 4.5) are the two areas where the FARC have had some of its strongest 
presence in the whole country and where its highest command (“Secretariat”) took residence 
(Nieto Matiz, 2012: 140-142). 
FIGURE 4.1: MAP OF META’S MICROREGIONS 
 
6 Meta River- 
Villanueva corridor 7 Piedemonte Metense 8 
Castilla – San Carlos 
de Guaroa 
9 El Ariari 10 Duda - Guayabero 25 Guaviare River corridor - Mapiripan 
Source: Adapted from Gutierrez, 2012: 28. 
The analysis of the geography of conflict in Colombia provides important hints for the 
understanding of conflict dynamics and the behaviour and strategy of conflict actors. As it is 
seen in this chapter, the region of Meta – included in the broader Eastern Llanos – has been 
traditionally characterized by inhospitable land and colonization, marginalization from the 
centre and from the richer high hill regions of the country, and ensuing lawlessness and high 
rates of structural conflict over land.  
As a marginal region traditionally outside the reach of the state, Meta has been characterized 
by colonization waves and processes. Colonization is at the core of the conflictive dynamics 
in the region, as it mostly unfolded in unequal and unregulated conditions. Different waves of 
colonization characterized the 19th and the early part of the 20th Century. At that time, 
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colonization literally meant the exploration and settlement of vast areas of uninhabited land 
– except for indigenous peoples – and completely outside the reach of state control and 
services. Unregulated land tenure and exploitation of landless peasants date back to this time 
and constitute the structural factors of the conflict in Colombia. 
FIGURE 4.2: MAP OF META’S MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 
Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi, 2002  
In the second half of the 20th Century and following the height of the generalized violence 
that engulfed Colombia in 1948 (termed La Violencia), a wave of rural and agriculture-based 
colonization took place with the support of modernization programs by the state. From the 
mid-1950s, scores of displaced farmers and individuals in search of opportunities came to 
the region. Ultimately, the state failed to deliver services and modernization. In particular, a 
land reform and the establishment of the rule of law never materialized, which meant that 
the previous unequal and exploitative dynamics around land were replicated. As a reaction 
to this situation, the 1960s witnessed an armed colonization process, when the rise of 
Marxist-based guerrilla armed groups established strongholds in various parts of the Eastern 
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Llanos. From the 1980s, a new colonization process took place, once again characterized by 
the lack of state presence and the rule of law. This latest colonization wave in Meta was 
characterized by the rise of illegal drugs farming and production, which created a flourishing 
economy of illicit drugs. This process was accompanied and consolidated by the rise of a new 
social actor, namely the powerful drugs traffickers and affiliated non-state armed groups, 
including the FARC (Richani, 2002: 65-70; UNDP, 2010: 13-14; Sobrevivientes del Comité 
Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del Meta et al., 1997: 14-15). 
4.1 Political and Conflict Dynamics of the Eastern Llanos up to 
1948 
Jenny Pearce’s definition of Colombia as a country with multiple “political time zones” 
(Pearce, 1990: 286) is long rooted in Colombian history, even pre-dating national 
independence in 1810. Its history has been characterized by centre versus periphery 
dynamics, by the remoteness of Colombian frontier regions, and by persistent regionalism 
(Holmes et al., 2008: 12-26). If we want to understand contemporary conflict dynamics in a 
frontier region like Meta, it is necessary to briefly revisit territorial organization and policies 
throughout the last two centuries. 
In Colombia, colonization and settlements traditionally concentrated in the core provinces of 
the Andean Highlands connected by the Magdalena River to the Caribbean coastal port cities 
of Cartagena and Barranquilla – all areas characterized by temperate climates. During the 
19th Century and first half of the 20th Century, these areas used to encompass 98% of the 
population, but less than half of Colombia’s geographic extension. Although percentages have 
changed since then, the overwhelming majority of people still lives in the core central areas. 
On the other hand, the five frontier regions (Eastern Llanos, Amazonia, Pacific Coast, La 
Guajira Peninsula, and the islands of San Andres and Providencia) were sparsely populated 
and of difficult access due to tropical climate, inhospitable territory and diseases. These 
features combined with a chronic lack of infrastructure, transportation routes, 
communication means, and viable sanitary conditions (Rausch, 1999; Kalmanovitz, 2010: 
65-85).    
Frontier regions and governance arrangements. Politically, from Colombian 
independence in 1810 up to 1930, frontier regions have remained on the margin of the 
political arena and of national elites’ interests. From the 19th Century, the centre versus 
periphery and centralism versus federalism dynamics became permanent features of 
Colombia’s political system. Territorial policy and the very nature of the Colombian state 
were unstable, resulting in a permanent political and armed battleground. Four successive 
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republics were established between 1832 and 1886, before the current Republic of Colombia 
was founded in 1886. As a sign of chronic instability and political indecisiveness, between 
1832 and 1863 the boundaries of territorial administrations in the frontier were modified 
fifteen times (Holmes et al., 2008: 12-26).  
The Llanos of San Martin (as present-day Meta and Vichada were referred to in the 19th 
Century) was allocated to the department of Cundinamarca during this period. To rationalize 
and centralize control of the periphery, a system of ‘special territories’ was created under the 
direct control of the central government. In 1892, the Llanos of San Martin was permanently 
ceded to national control and established as a ‘special territory’ (Rausch, 1999: 10, 158-159). 
By 1930, ten ‘national territories’, as they were renamed, were established, which included 
all frontier regions. There were four intendancies: Choco, Amazonas, San Andres, and Meta 
(created in 1909); and six comisarias (or commissariats, units which required more central 
government’s assistance): namely, Arauca, Caqueta, Guajira, Putumayo, Vaupes, and Vichada. 
Intendancies and commissariats were put under direct control from the centre and 
encompassed more than half of Colombia’s land (Rausch, 1999).  
Overall, throughout this whole period, the centre government neglected the frontier regions. 
In turn, by being put under tutelage from central government control, national territories 
were slow in developing institutions and administrative capacity. Thus, acknowledging 
successes and limitations of territorial reorganization in the 19th Century and first half of the 
20th Century is crucial to understand why Colombia is to this day a collection of disparate 
regions and why achieving territorial integration is still a main policy challenge.  
The role of the Catholic church. The Catholic church played an important role. During 
colonial times – after realizing that the plains did not contain natural resource wealth – 
rulers left to the missionaries the task of administering these unruly lands, and converting 
indigenous people to Christianity. After independence, civilian and religious authorities 
worked together to promote Christianization, and integration of frontier regions within the 
Colombian state. Since the state did not have neither interest nor the capacity to rule far 
away regions, central government used religious orders for administering basic functions, 
thank to their local presence. In the Llanos of San Martin, the order of the Franciscans was 
tasked to proselytize and act as a de facto authority for long time. Clergy’s rule in the frontier 
regions culminated in 1902 with the signing of the Convention on Missions between the 
church and the state. The agreement formalized church’s undisputed rule (in terms of 
governance, security, and education) in the special territories, and established Apostolic 
Vicariates and Prefectures to be assigned to different religious orders. The convention also 
entailed the assignment of vast amounts of public lands to the clergy in order to promote 
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colonization. Since 1896, the Salesians operated in the Llanos of San Martin; but in 1908 the 
Vatican City assigned the Apostolic Vicariate of Meta to the Montfort Fathers (Rausch, 1999: 
8-9, 16, 161; Rausch, 2013: 7). 
A two-party system: Liberals and Conservatives. Politically, the year 1930 saw the 
beginning of the sixteen-year Liberal Republic after forty-four years of continuous 
Conservative rule. The leftist Liberal party and the moderate Conservative party have 
dominated and monopolized Colombian political system since their foundation in 1848 and 
1849, respectively. This two-party system prevented any other challenger from entering 
legitimate politics. Both parties have conveyed all political and social requests in the country 
– even during the darkest hours of war and violence. They have traditionally been composed 
of the wealthiest and most powerful political and economic elites in the country. The Liberal 
party has had multiple – often-contradicting – components within its ranks: next to members 
of the powerful oligarchy, there were leftist students, the rising urbanized middle class, and 
“the industrial and merchant’s bourgeoisie.” As it will be seen later, party’s affiliation was 
loose, and neither a unified identity nor a party program were present (Richani, 2002: 16).     
Renewed focus on the frontiers in the 1930s. The Liberal presidencies of Olaya Herrera 
(1930-34), Lopez Pumarejo (1934-38, 1942-46), and Santos (1938-42) included a strong 
focus on the development and integration of the peripheries within the country. Especially, 
Lopez Pumarejo’s first term was characterized by a genuine effort at correcting some of the 
inequities and economic distortions of the Colombian system. Thus, the 1930s witnessed an 
acceleration in the implementation of policies of administrative reforms, education, health, 
infrastructure development and transport routes, security sector reform, and land titling, all 
of which acted as an incentive for migration and new settlers in many of the frontier regions 
and in Meta, especially. This shift by the Colombian state was partly due to the brief war with 
Peru over the border town of Leticia (Amazonas) in 1932. The border war largely exposed to 
Colombian elites and public opinion the fragility of Colombian borders and the neglect of 
frontier regions (Rausch, 1999; Gonzalez, 1989: 115-118). 
The necessity was nonetheless to ‘rediscover’ Colombian peripheries rather than recover 
them – as Lopez Pumarejo first tenure’s campaign stated at the time (Rausch, 1999: ix). 
Through his slogan “Revolution on the March”, Lopez, in particular, showed a specific 
interest for the Llanos and Meta, to which he made frequent trips in 1936-37, and of which 
he sensed the economic and development potential. As a result, the 125 km motor road 
connecting Bogota to Villavicencio was completed in 1936, spurring trade, development and 
migration. Also, a 860 km road connecting Villavicencio with the capital of Vichada, Puerto 
Carreño, via Puerto Lopez in the east of Meta was initiated. Public works and infrastructure 
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development were priorities in Meta, including construction of bridges, water supply, 
aqueduct and sewer systems, and a long distance telephone line, among others. (Rausch, 
1999; Richani, 2002: 16-18).  
The education system and access to health were also strengthened. In Meta, this outcome 
was achieved through institutionalization and in coordination with the religious order of the 
Montfort. First, the national budget for education was quadrupled throughout Lopez 
Pumarejo’s first presidency, in order to extend education to the frontier regions and to fight 
a nation-wide 63% illiteracy rate. Between 1938 and 1944, the budget for education in Meta 
increased nine-fold. Second, health units were established in the territories to prevent 
mortality from curable diseases like malaria and yellow fever, and to improve hygiene and 
sanitary levels overall (Rausch, 1999). 
In administrative terms, the Department of Intendancies and Commissariats was created in 
1933 (later renamed Department of National Territories). The constitutional reforms of 
1936 switched control of intendancies and commissariats from the Presidency to Congress, 
thus ensuring more continuity and accountability in the frontier regions’ affairs, but 
maintaining the tutelage. Then, Law 2 of 1943 removed some shortcomings of previous 
reform and territorial administration by regularizing national territories’ legal status, 
improving administration and governance, and establishing electoral rules (Rausch, 1999).  
Consolidation of territorial policies, and national and local turmoil in the 1940s. Both 
domestic and foreign policy reasons contributed to cool down the emphasis on frontier 
regions’ development from the late 1930s to the start of the civil war known as La Violencia 
in 1948. Even though Latin America and Colombia were not a battlefield, the Second World 
War had an important influence on the country: Colombia sided with the Allies, declared war 
on the Axis in 1943, and economically contributed to the war effort.  
Domestically, President Santos (1938-42) – a moderate Liberal at odds with the more left 
wing Liberal Olaya Herrera and Lopez Pumarejo – consolidated the latter policies toward the 
national territories, falling short of introducing new initiatives. The warning signs of the civil 
war that will engulf the country from 1948 could already be felt during Lopez Pumarejo’s 
second term of 1942-46, which was characterized by rising partisanship and tensions both 
within the Liberal camp and with the Conservatives. These dynamics frustrated any new 
intervention toward national integration. Lopez Pumarejo even resigned one year before the 
expiration of his term, which was completed by Lleras Camargo. The split within the Liberals 
was irreconcilable to the extent that two Liberal candidates (Turbay as the official Liberal 
Party candidate for the moderate factions, and Jorge Eliecer Gaitan for the left) ran for the 
1946 presidency, with the result of opening the way to the return of the Conservatives to 
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power with Ospina Perez, after sixteen consecutive years of Liberal rule (Rausch, 1999). 
Political instability and tensions within mainstream politics were also reflected in rising 
insecurity in the peripheral national territories. The Eastern Llanos, in particular, became 
areas where cattle rustling, banditry and indigenous peoples’ attacks were common 
occurrences. Given the limited infrastructure, the national government was unable to 
effectively police the vast territories, with the result that rising crime and insecurity affected 
ranchers, colonos and new migrants, and characterized many areas of Meta and the rest of 
the Llanos. In Acacias – a few dozens kilometers from Villavicencio – a penal colony was 
opened in 1924 until the 1960s. Due to its growing size, escapes of inmates became common, 
fueling rising violence and crime in the area, including in Villavicencio (Rausch, 1999: 64, 
113, 167-168). It should also be noted that the nationalistic fervor that surged following the 
1932 border war with Peru and that contributed to the implementation of integration 
policies, faded away. By the mid-1940s there was less interest in public opinion and less 
political will to further the integration of frontier regions (Rausch, 1999: 124). 
The political battle at the national level was reflected in the intendancy of Meta, where 
political participation was higher than in other frontier regions of the Eastern Llanos. In 
Meta, the split between Liberals and Conservatives was pronounced – with the 
Conservatives holding a slight majority. Accusations of electoral fraud, purges and political 
instability within the intendancy, violent protest and politicization of police forces were the 
ingredients contributing to the general violence in Meta that followed the assassination of 
Gaitan in April 1948. These factors merged with an endemic resistance to central 
government authority in the Eastern Llanos – a resistance that dated back to colonial times 
(Rausch, 2013: 31-34).  
Economic growth, the limited extent of the land titling process (which is analysed in the next 
section), and the rapid changes undergoing in the region contained the germs of the 
upcoming political violence and strife. In Meta, rapid economic gains in few sectors caused 
rampant speculation and higher prices, and were limited to small elites around Villavicencio 
and other towns. In the periphery, there were remote rural areas still marginalized and 
untouched by development and services. Marginalization was even more pronounced in 
other national territories of the Eastern Llanos, like Casanare, Arauca and Vichada, where 
poverty and neglect from the centre were rampant (Rausch, 1999: 182-186; Rausch, 2013: 
15-16, 21-22). 
Ultimately, the effort to pursue reform and modernization in the national territories came to 
a halt in 1948 due to the start of full-scale warfare. In the Eastern Llanos, the government did 
not have full control of the territory. During the following decades, it was never possible to 
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re-vamp reforms and policies of integration, with the result that by the end of the 20th 
Century Colombia was still a country in which its peripheries were unruly and outside state 
control. This historical process helps us to understand how and why many Colombian 
regions are still to this day outside government control, and why non-state armed groups are 
still persistent.  
4.2 Land Tenure and Meta’s Economy 
A brief overview of the Eastern Llanos and Meta’s economic trajectory is important to 
contextualize the political and social upheaval that characterized La Violencia from 1948. 
The 1930s political reforms of integration occurred in presence of a favorable economic 
trend for the region – which the reforms also contributed to shape. During the advancements 
of the 1930s, demographic pressures in the highlands and the economic and social toll 
exacted from the global economic depression that started in 1929, contributed to a rapid 
inflow of migrants to the Eastern Llanos. In Meta, the population rose from 11,671 in 1918 
and 19,320 in 1928 to 51,674 in 1938 and 67,492 in 1951, not including indigenous peoples 
(Rausch, 1999: 65). 
Land tenure and policies. Among pull factors for migration and colonization in the early- 
and mid-20th Century, it is crucial to underline the role played by (partial) land reform in the 
1920s-30s, which, on the one hand, gave an incentive to small farmers to migrate to the 
peripheries; but, on the other hand, its ultimate ineffectiveness represents one of the 
structural issues of the conflict in Colombia throughout the XX and XXI centuries. But, first, it 
is worth making one important historical digression to understand the origins of the 
institution of land in Colombia. 
After the abolishment of the colonial land system (based on encomienda, concierto, and mita), 
the institution of the hacienda (large farm) was created in early 19th Century – based on 
servile labor and on limited access to land. In order to support the establishment of the 
hacienda system, a republican decree dictated the parcelization and privatization of 
communal lands (resguardos) owned collectively by indigenous population. This process 
resulted in large landowners driving out indigenous people and small subsistence farmers 
from their land, and in the increase of land concentration. However, there were some notable 
exceptions of small farmers in Cauca, Caldas and Tolima, who resisted incorporation in the 
hacienda system and maintained the status of free peasantry (Richani, 2002: 12-15; 
Kalmanovitz, 2010: 215-231).   
As an effect of these dynamics, a process of land colonization by small peasants started. A 
composite class that included free peasants, peasants escaping haciendas, Afro-Colombians 
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escaping slavery, indigenous peoples, and poor colonos (peasant migrants and squatters) 
started moving to undeveloped public lands in the frontiers, in the quest for wealth and 
better life conditions. However, too often, colonos were unable to acquire rights to the 
occupied lands, with the result of turning into tenant farmers for powerful large landowners. 
This process strengthened land concentration in the hands of few rich families, solidifying 
the oligarchic system. In addition, land concentration at the expense of small farmers acted 
as a disincentive for use of unfarmed and/or unproductive lands (LeGrand, 1986; Richani, 
2002: 12-15). 
This pattern of colonization and of unequal competition for land between landless peasants 
and large landowners that was created in the second half of the 19th Century, represents one 
the core issues of the conflict in Colombia throughout the 20th Century as well. In the 
unfolding of the different conflicts, a constant feature has been the recourse to and use of 
violence by social actors to solve their disputes. LeGrand (1986) estimates that 
approximately 450 major violent confrontations took place between landlords and colonos in 
the period 1875-1930. However, the use of violence was also extended to conflicts within the 
large landowning class itself. Most notably, during La Violencia, the dynamics were sectarian 
(local conflicts between parties on an ideological and political basis), more than class-based 
– although the latter’s component cannot be discounted (Richani, 2002: 12-15). 
Land reform in the 1930s. With the purpose of correcting such distortions, in the late 
1920s and 30s, both judicial rulings and central government’s policies seemingly sided with 
the small and landless farmers in their quest for titles and ownership. A series of 
intervention culminated in the constitutional amendments of 1936 and Law 200. The new 
legal framework established ownership rights for farmers after five years of working on a 
plot of land, set procedures of land expropriation by the state for unused or unproductive 
lands for a period of ten years, and institutionalized land judges tasked to settle disputes 
from the application of the law (Kalmanovitz, 2010: 215-231).  
Despite producing an important change, the effectiveness of the new law, its application and 
implementation are questionable. In the Eastern Llanos, the main land system of production 
was the latifundio, which is characterized for being a large commercial estate of more than 
500 hectares. With ownership centralized on one main landowner, the land is then allocated 
and administered by landless small farmers, who farm and produce on behalf of the 
landowner. The alternative systems to the latifundio are the minifundio and other mixed 
systems, which were prevalent in the highlands and the slopes of Colombia, respectively 
(Jiménez, 2012: 156-157).  
In Meta, traditional large cattle ranchers dominated land tenure and production through an 
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exploitative economic system based on large concentration of rents in the hands of few. 
Large landowners permeated both social and economic life. Following the phase in which 
land was exclusively controlled by representatives of the Catholic church, a wave of 
colonization from the Andean regions of Antioquia and around Bogota to Meta took place at 
the end of the 19th Century. The newcomers displaced and subjugated the small farmers and 
indigenous peoples that were present at that time.  
Thus, by the 1930s, most of these large landowners and cattle ranchers already held land 
titles. Inevitably, ranchers’ claims were stronger than those originating from new colonos. 
Inadvertently, then, Law 200 of 1936 either did not have an impact on social and economic 
structure in Meta; or, worse, contributed to more land concentration in those cases in which 
the power of elites could not be infringed by medium and small farmers (Jiménez, 2012: 156-
157). Such conclusions seem to be validated by looking at Table 4.1.  
TABLE 4.1: LAND CONCENTRATION AND ATTEMPTED REFORM 
Number of Land Claims Granted in Meta and Number of 
Hectares, 1931-46 
Year Grants Hectares 
1931 1 2,449 
1932 3 4,886 
1933 4 200 
1934 58 3,741 
1935 31 2,690 
1936 50 748 
1937 13 11,895 
1938 28 2,518 
1939 11 252 
1940 22 1,480 
1941 29 5,068 
1942 22 5,725 
1943 53 2,962 
1944 11 1,704 
1945 8 2,768 
1946 10 440 
Total 354 49,526 
SOURCE: Diot, 1976. Adapted from Rausch, 1999: 67, 100. 
First, by comparing the five-year periods before and after Law 200 was passed (1931-35 and 
1936-40), it is clear that the new law did not have a substantial impact on the number of 
titles granted and hectares adjudicated: in fact, only a modest increase was recorded. The 
second hypothesis (i.e. more land concentration) can be confirmed by considering that of the 
thirteen claims granted in 1937 (a year after Law 200 passed) two of them totaled 11,702 
hectares, whereas eleven small farmers were adjudicated only 193 hectares combined. 
Moreover, in the period 1939-46, of the 166 grant titles adjudicating over 20,000 hectares, 
six of them were for 1,500 hectares or more. These figures underscore continued high land 
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concentration; and also how the law strengthened the opportunity for commercial 
agriculture and ranching of existing land owners, at the expense of subsistence farming and 
colonos (Barbosa, 1988; Diot, 1976; Rausch, 1999: 66, 100, 165-166). 
Cattle ranching. In macroeconomic terms, land titling had a positive impact on economic 
growth in the region. Cattle ranching has traditionally been the most important industry in 
Meta and in the Eastern Llanos. The number of cattle substantially increased from the mid-
1920s, thank to improved pasture, to crossbreeding, and to better market connectivity with 
Bogota after the construction of the highway connecting the capital with Villavicencio. In 
turn, Villavicencio was being transformed from a village into a bustling provincial town and 
the most important city of the Eastern Llanos (Rausch, 1999: 178-179).  
Cattle numbers seemingly increased from 49,000 in 1922 to 77,000 in 1925 up to 300,000 in 
1950. One of the main projects to further growth in this sector was the construction of a local 
refrigerated slaughterhouse, the lack of which impeded the commercialization of larger 
quantities of beef. However, its ultimate construction in 1950 did not yield the expected 
benefits: transportation costs were still high and the refrigerated cells to go on trucks were 
inadequate. In political economy terms, the cattle industry was organized according to a 
rent-seeking logic around the latifundio, dominated by large landowners at the expense of 
small and medium farmers and producers. This dynamic has impeded the growth and 
development of a modern industry (Jiménez, 2012: 157; Rausch, 1999: 98-99, 159, 170-171, 
177). 
Expansion of commercial farming and other economic activities. In parallel, commercial 
farming expanded. Cultivation of rice and other products (corn, platanos, and yucca) was 
increasing from subsistence levels to being commercialized and traded to the highlands. 
Between 1936 and 1938, rice production and exports increased by approximately 50%. By 
1947, the intendancy of Meta was the fourth producer of rice in Colombia: its value grew 
from 600,000 in 1936 to 5.5 million a decade later. Exports of platanos, corn and yucca also 
skyrocketed, and the combined value of the three crops nearly tripled between 1936-8. Oil 
exploration in Meta started in the 1930s, but its actual discovery only took place six decades 
later. Liquor production (in particular, beer) started to be an important local industry; 
alcohol sales quickly became the first source of revenue for Meta’s budget thank to the high 
consumption and high taxes levied on it (Rausch, 1999: 98-99, 122, 171-173, 178). 
4.3 La Violencia in the Eastern Llanos and its Aftermath 
La Violencia at the national level (1948-1957): Liberals and Conservatives go to war. 
From 1948 to 1962, an armed conflict characterized by extremely high levels of violence and 
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brutality engulfed the whole of Colombia. This conflict was termed La Violencia due to its 
ferocity, its generalized indiscriminate violence, and the lack of direct involvement of the 
main political actors. The war was, in fact, conducted by a disparate number of guerrilla 
groups, bandits, and non-state armed actors, holding fluid allegiances to the two main 
parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Thus, most actors did not have a coherent 
strategy of war nor an end goal; although the political and, in part, ideological characters of 
the war cannot be denied.47  
It is estimated that approximately 200,000 people perished in the conflict. An estimated 
three quarters of them were killed during the most violent phase of the whole conflict, in 
1948-53. The main war theater of this first phase was the Eastern Llanos (Pearce, 1990; 
Pardo Rueda, 2008: 465-498).  
Although widespread unrest occurred since 1946, it is the killing of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, one 
the left leaning Liberal leaders and hopeful presidential candidate, on April 9, 1948 that 
triggered massive urban mobs and ensuing open warfare throughout the country. For its 
place in historiography and in Colombian national memory, Gaitan’s assassination can be 
equated to the role of Archduke Ferdinand’s death in Sarajevo marking the beginning of the 
First World War. 
The conflict had multiple dimensions that challenge easy interpretation. Started as a political 
struggle between Conservatives and Liberals and limited to urban violent unrest, the conflict 
turned into a rural-based class strife. Urban uprisings were deadly but overall did not last 
long as the Conservatives annihilated labor unions that had formed since the 1920s. In rural 
areas, locally based guerrilla movements representing colonos, peasants and impoverished 
small farmers were in control of areas outside the government reach. Guerrilla groups held 
formal and informal ties with the Liberal party and its dignitaries; with time, however, they 
moved beyond the control of the Liberals, who lost grip and influence over their own power 
base (Rausch, 2013; Pearce, 1990; Pardo Rueda, 2008: 475-476). 
                                                        
47 The Colombian tradition of Violentologos, or scholars dedicated to the study and analysis of violent forms and 
conflict dynamics in Colombia, has its origin in the studies and interpretations of La Violencia. The first example 
of this tradition is dated 1962, with the first serious analysis of La Violencia, including its causes, drivers, and 
actors. The book (La Violencia en Colombia) was commissioned by the national government to a committee 
composed of monseñor German Guzman, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña Luna, to analyse the causes of 
the conflict that erupted in 1948. The volume was the first attempt to analyse the social origins and dynamics of 
the conflict, treating the masses as a social actor. The most notable studies that followed include: Dix, Robert. 
1967. Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Fluharty, Vernon. 
1981. La Danza de los Millones. Regimen Militar y Revolucion Social en Colombia (1930-1956). Bogota: El Ancora 
Editores. Oquist, Paul. 1978. Violencia, Conflicto y Politica en Colombia. Bogota: Banco Popular. Payne, William. 
1968. Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Ramsey, Russell. 1981. 
Guerrilleros y Soldados. Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores. Weinert, Richard. 1966. “Violence in Pre-Modern 
Societies: Rural Colombia”, The American Political Science Review, No.2, June 1966. Williamson, Robert. 1965. 
“Toward a Theory of Political Violence”, Western Political Quarterly, March 1965. 
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Since its foundation in 1848, the Liberal party had traditionally been composed of a vast 
array of internal factions, responding to contrasting ideas vis-à-vis the country’s political 
system and the strategies to get to power. Liberals’ strategies have ranged from “a 
permanent reconciliation with the adversary to the proclamation of armed insurrection as 
the only tactic for coming to power.” (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 10). The party has 
always acted as a ‘container’ of different – and at times – contradicting positions and 
requests from the masses. “This range of strategies allowed one Liberal faction to use the 
discontent of the masses to its advantage, thereby defusing the threat of a consolidation of 
nationwide class-based parties that might have competed with the long-standing two-party 
system.” (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 10). During La Violencia, these contradictory 
tendencies are reflected in the uneasy and equivocal relationship between the Liberals, the 
guerrillas and the masses; and, in turn, between legality, illegality and the pursue of violence 
(Richani, 2002: 16-17).48    
The centrality of the two-party system for the country’s stability is confirmed by the fact that 
the civil war starts precisely on the day of Gaitan’s slain, who represented the rising left-
wing faction of the Liberal party. Gaitan’s vision was centered on the masses and the working 
class, to break the monopoly of power of the two parties. Against the traditional oligarchies, 
he sought a more participatory and inclusive political system as a way to bring shared 
economic prosperity and social mobility.  After his death, the sideline of his popular Liberal 
movement in favor of the elite and bourgeoisie faction of the Liberal party, created the 
conditions for sectarian violence. The masses could not be persuaded to stay under the 
Liberals’ tutelage this time, and, thus, the Liberals were overcome by the events. It is the 
weakness and disintegration of Gaitan’s centralized populist movement – which strived to 
lead the masses – that impeded a coordinated struggle against the Conservatives; opening, 
instead, the way to generalized violence, authoritarianism, and extremism (Rausch, 2013; 
Pearce, 1990; Pardo Rueda, 2008: 475-476; Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 10-19).   
The agents of violence and armed actors that arose from the chaos that followed Gaitan’s 
death were of different origins and politicized to different degrees. There were Communist 
guerrillas, Liberal guerrillas, as well as groups that resembled more banditry rather than a 
political outfit.49 Guerrilla groups confronted traditional local oligarchies of landowners, 
who, in turn, with the support of the central government, organized local armed groups – the 
forerunner of modern paramilitary forces. Throughout the 20th Century, and even the 21st, 
                                                        
48 On the nature of the Liberal and Conservative parties, Sanchez and Meertens even say that “the nineteen-
century wars appear to have been caused by a disturbing irrationality that characterized these two large political 
forces as subcultures of daily life more than as parties.” (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 9). 
49 For a discussion about banditry and its role after La Violencia, see Sanchez and Meertens, 2001. 
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common thread between the colonos / poor peasants and the large landowners is that 
neither of them relied on the state as far as their protection or representing their class 
interests are concerned. In different phases and shapes, both social actors established 
and/or supported non-state armed actors that militarily pursued their interests and 
protected them against the state itself. Explaining this institutional failure is key to the 
understanding of the conflict drivers and dynamics in Colombia (Richani, 2002: 11-12). 
Ad hoc police forces and embryonic paramilitary groups (the Chulavitas, the Pajaros or the 
Aplanchadores) were established by the Conservatives – with the either tacit or explicit 
support from elites and the Catholic church. Mandated with the re-establishment of order, 
they were, in fact, determined to persecute and terrorize Liberals and guerrilla members. 
Loyalty and/or affiliation to one of the two main political parties were a sufficient cause for 
an individual to be murdered or persecuted (Dudley, 2006; Pearce, 1990; Pardo Rueda, 
2008: 479-480; Isaza, 1959).   
Faced with generalized insurrection, in 1949, the Conservative government of Ospina Perez 
dismissed Congress, passed restricting legislation on civil liberties and de facto assumed 
authoritarian powers. These special powers were sanctioned by the contested election of 
Conservative leader, Laureano Gomez, as president in 1950. Under their watch, the conflict 
and sectarianism intensified, and the levels of violence further increased.  
A military dictatorship (1953-57) supported by both parties ensued, with the objective of re-
establishing order. The new head of state, General Rojas Pinilla, devised an amnesty and a 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program for the guerrillas, which, 
with the exception of the Communist guerrillas and bandits, most of the armed groups 
subscribed to.  Together with a national plan of rehabilitation, these initiatives managed to 
substantially decrease the intensity of violence, but not to pacify the country. Following the 
demobilization, a more surgical campaign of repression and military pressure hoped to 
thwart the rest of the insurgents. In fact, Rojas Pinilla contributed to entrenching the conflict 
and to further radicalization through the persecution of Communists and through terror 
practices in the areas under communist influence (Pearce, 1990: 60; Pardo Rueda, 2008: 
488-493).  
Then, in 1957, the Conservative and Liberal parties withdrew their support to Rojas Pinilla, 
and legitimized an alliance that would have been impossible at the height of La Violencia. In 
1958, the two main parties launched a bipartisan National Front, re-established the 
constitutional order, and sidelined the military (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 19-20).      
La Violencia in the Eastern Llanos (1948-53). At the local level, a closer look at the civil 
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war’s dynamics reveals the multiple sub-regional conflicts within it, to the extent that it is 
hard to speak of one civil war. The two main parties acted as a container and a channel of 
local-level political battles and socio-economic issues. However, local conflicts progressively 
developed their own dynamic, independent from centre parties’ politics (Pearce, 1990: 49; 
Buitrago, 1984). 
The Eastern Llanos experienced one of the most violent and brutal phases of the whole war 
in the period 1948-53 (Pearce, 1990: 57-58). In particular, the death toll in Meta, between 
1949 and 1951, is estimated at 9,000 people plus 6,000 people forcefully displaced, out of a 
population of 51,674 (1938) and 67,492 (1951). (Rausch, 2013: 49). Other figures put the 
death toll among civilians at 10,000-15,000 between January 1950 and June 1953. In the 
same period, an estimated 390 military personnel and 115 non-state counter insurgency 
members lost their life (Ramsey, 1981; cited in Pardo Rueda, 2008: 486; Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2014: 185-187).   
Rausch (2013) enumerates three main causes of the war in the Eastern Llanos. First cause 
had to do with the remoteness and the marginalization of these frontier regions with respect 
to the highlands. Given geographic conditions, the Llaneros developed an aversion of and 
resistance to any kind of authority and central government. Second, the immobility of the 
social structure: society and the economy were still dominated by cattle ranching, and social 
and economic exploitation of peasants still resembled colonial times. Related to this, the 
third cause is concerned with the limited – and uneven – reach of the reforms of the 1930s to 
integrate the Llanos to the rest of Colombia. Although Meta was in a privileged position with 
respect to Vichada and Arauca, for example – where little had changed since the 19th Century 
– still, land ownership’s contestation and economic hardship were persistent despite 
positive outcomes in infrastructure and modernization (Rausch, 2013: 31-32).  
In the wake of Gaitan’s killing in Bogota, urban violence spread to Villavicencio and to 
smaller centres throughout the Eastern Llanos. Within hours, Eliseo Velasquez, a charismatic 
leader, formed the first guerrilla group in Meta, which sieged the town of Puerto Lopez and 
led armed incursions into other Conservative strongholds. By 1950, nineteen guerrilla 
organizations totaling 2,500 combatants were present in the Llanos. In 1952-53, twenty-
three armed groups covered the whole territories of the Eastern Llanos and included an 
estimated 20,000 combatants. Guerrillas held different political affiliation within the Liberal 
camp, and had different strategies and tactics to achieve their goals, but they mostly 
cooperated with one another. Guerrilla groups in the Llanos were fairly organized from a 
military standpoint, responded to an established hierarchy, were able to hold territory and 
to finance themselves. Nonetheless, the small population of the Llanos, its vast geography, 
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and the limited available resources at hand did not allow the guerrillas of the Llanos to 
mount a truly national campaign nor to threaten the country’s stability (Rausch, 2013: 39-
43; Pardo Rueda, 2008: 479, 487; Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 17).  
For their part, civilian authorities in Bogota proceeded to strengthen the military in the 
Llanos. Terror by both state and irregular forces hit Liberal members and their supporters in 
the attempt to eradicate the rising guerrilla movements. More repression followed, including 
a 1952 scorched earth campaign by the military and the carpet bombing of several villages, 
including Puerto Lopez, Las Delicias, and El Turpial aimed at uprooting the guerrillas. The 
campaign led thousands of people to flee their homes, and renewed fighting and recruitment 
by the guerrillas (Rausch, 2013: 41-43). 
In terms of support for the guerrilla, they mostly enjoyed high popular support in the areas 
under their control, especially among peasants. An interesting dynamic concerns the Liberal 
middle-class ranchers, who up to 1951 supported the guerrilla groups in their struggle 
against the Conservatives. Animated by entrepreneurial spirit and aversion to the centre, 
ranchers saw with favor the Liberal cause of breaking the status quo of underdevelopment in 
the region. Nonetheless, the alleged growing criminal character of some guerrilla groups, 
rising military pressure, and the prevailing insecurity and anarchy convinced ranchers to 
side with the military and police for the restoration of order and the annihilation of the 
guerrillas. An important role was also played by a government-led economic blockade of 
cattle pertaining to either guerrilla supporters or Liberals, through the establishment of safe-
conduct passes for cattle being sold outside of the region. This practice economically 
strangled those ranchers who did not support the military – and was then adopted for rice 
producers as well. This situation resulted in deeper cycles of violence and in the creation of 
new paramilitary units to expel guerrillas and protect economic interests (Rausch, 2013: 40-
42, 47-8; Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 19; Pearce, 1990: 57).  
Nonetheless, the Llanos were not the most pressing priority for the military and the central 
government. Therefore, the guerrillas were able to expand, up to a point in early 1953 when 
they controlled 90% of the Eastern Llanos. A process of “armed colonization” by Communist 
factions and de facto self-government in many areas took place. Under the leadership of 
Eduardo Franco Isaza and Guadalupe Salcedo, the guerrillas established their own law, 
governing bodies and courts (“First and Second Law of the Llanos”), enjoying a high degree 
of internal legitimacy and popularity (Rausch, 2013: 43-44; Pearce, 1990: 60).  
However, the guerrillas were essentially a peasant insurgency, which lacked the necessary 
political culture, unity and leadership’s sophistication to establish an effective government, 
and to propose an alternative political and socio-economic system to the Conservative one. 
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The areas controlled by the guerrilla were, in effect, remote enclaves of “permanent refuge 
and often insurmountable barriers to the imposition of government authority” rather than 
vibrant autonomous political entities (Rausch, 2013: 49, quoting Sanchez, 1992: 93). In 
addition, “throughout 1952, as the guerrillas grew in quantity and quality, they sought to 
detach themselves from Liberal ideology and the influence of the National Liberal 
Directorate” – the Bogota-based Liberal leadership (Rausch, 2013: 43).  
The inability of the Liberals to lead and/or to influence the guerrillas contributed, on the one 
hand, to the latter radicalization and ultimate defeat. On the other hand, the Liberals 
abandoned their proposition of changing the political and social order by forming an alliance 
with the Conservatives in 1957. The ultimate outcome was a de facto re-establishment of the 
oligarchic system and the preservation of the social and economic status quo in the country – 
which in retrospect brought several more decades of war, up to the present day.  
Pacification and demobilization in the Eastern Llanos. To deal with insecurity and 
mounting unrest, in early June 1953, Rojas Pinilla’s dictatorship devised a general amnesty 
for all combatants who laid down weapons. General Duarte Blum sent the following ruling to 
all military commands throughout the country. 
Interpreting the will of His Excellency, the President of the 
Republic, Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, I authorize 
that all individuals, who in either one or other form have 
committed subversive actions against public order and who 
voluntarily surrender to military authorities by handing over their 
weapons, are let completely free, their life to be protected, are 
helped to restart their work-related activities, and are to be 
assisted in their most urgent needs.50     
In the Eastern Llanos, several guerrilla groups, as well as other irregular militias, responded 
favorably to the amnesty and demobilization proposals. The speed with which the surrender 
of weapons was organized suggests that guerrilla groups in the Llanos were eager to end the 
armed struggle. In reality, not all guerrilla groups responded positively to the call to end the 
fight. The most prominent and legendary leader, Guadalupe Salcedo, agreed to demobilize 
his group, receiving a great deal of attention by the media and public opinion (Figures 4.3 
and 4.4). Several other guerrilla organizations scorned Salcedo for his alleged betrayal and 
did not agree to demobilize until the political and socio-economic conditions for which they 
had fought in the first place were adequately addressed. Seemingly, concerns over security 
for the prospected demobilized also played an important role in the decision of several 
groups not to disarm (Rausch, 2013: 54-58; Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 21-22). 
                                                        
50 Pardo Rueda, 2008: 485-486. Translation by the author.  
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FIGURE 4.3: GENERAL DUARTE BLUM AND GUADALUPE SALCEDO DISCUSS THE TERMS OF THE 
DEMOBILIZATION (1953) 
 
Source: Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 133 
In June 1953, the first demobilization process began. This included 1,124 of Salcedo’s 
combatants along with several smaller groups: 446 guerrilla members led by Eduardo 
Fonseca, 256 led by Dumar Aljure, 253 led by Jorge Gonzalez, and 169 led by Carlos 
Perdomo. Another approximately 10,000 combatants laid down arms between August and 
September in the region. At the national level, over 10,000 combatants demobilized between 
June and September 1953. Highly symbolic public ceremonies of delivery of weapons were 
organized. In exchange for weapons, “each combatant received a pair of shoes, a sweater, a 
pair of pants, a bar soap, and food for several meals.” (Ramsey, 1981: 226; Pardo Rueda, 
2008: 486). 
Some of the most important issues that the guerrillas negotiated with the government 
resemble those of today’s DDR frameworks. First of all, guerrillas wanted the political 
character of their struggle to be acknowledged, away from being labeled bandits. Second, 
concerns over personal security. Third, guerrillas were assured that economic aid and social 
benefits would be provided to support their reinsertion into civilian life. On this point, it is 
interesting that of a seven-point document of requests from a group of seventeen guerrilla 
commanders of the Eastern Llanos to Rojas Pinilla as conditions for their surrender, 
employment generation for the demobilized is singled out as one of them. However, the 
seven-point plan was rejected (Rausch, 2013: 54-58).  
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FIGURE 4.4: DEMOBILIZATION IN THE EASTERN LLANOS (1953) 
 
Source: Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 132 
Ultimately, while not all groups participated in the general amnesty nor the causes of the 
conflict were addressed, the initiative achieved to dramatically decrease the levels of 
violence, and to temporarily pacify the Llanos, in particular, Meta. The demobilization’s 
success also demonstrates the guerrilla’s internal discipline and the leadership exercised by 
guerrilla leaders, who were able to impose their decision on the foot soldiers. This point 
reinforces the political nature of La Violencia in Meta, away from interpretations of the war 
as irregular banditry and mere criminality (Rausch, 2013: 54-58; Pardo Rueda, 2008: 488). 
Economic recovery in Meta and the conditions for renewed struggle (1953-57). After 
the demobilization, Rojas Pinilla focused on the economic development and recovery of the 
Eastern Llanos as one of his policy priorities. No longer engulfed in violence, Meta was able 
to recover its momentum as frontier region with a booming economy and growing 
population. The latter grew to an estimated 150,000 as of mid-1955. The city of Villavicencio 
expanded in size (its population grew from 17,000 in 1951 to over 45,000 in 1964), 
improved basic services of education, health and sanitation, and modernized through the 
establishment of a local radio, a few movie theaters, and even hotels to attract tourists 
(Rausch, 2013: 58-68). 
Throughout the 1950s, in order to deliver prosperity and shared benefits, first of all, the 
state focused on supporting colonization of abandoned public lands in selected regions of the 
Llanos. This policy was devised as a way to respond to the great masses of displaced peoples 
present in the region. As the war brought immense damage to farming and economic 
productivity, promoting colonization hoped to contribute to the economic recovery of the 
region. However, despite some well-intended initiatives – like the beginning of a colonization 
and modernization process of the Meta microregion of Ariari – on a macro scale, results were 
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modest due to the huge toll that the violence had in these regions, lack of capacity, the 
geographic remoteness of several areas that were chronically underserved; as well as due to 
unresolved contestation over land ownership of under utilized or unproductive territories, 
and to the conflicts generated by the interests of powerful landowners (Rausch, 2013: 58-
66). 
Second, Rojas Pinilla aimed to boost the cattle industry as the engine of economic growth not 
only in the Llanos, but to benefit the whole country. A National Federation of Ranchers was 
created to improve market connectivity. In addition, to stimulate recovery, infrastructure 
initiatives were created to improve internal transport (construction of highways) and to 
boost hydroelectric power. At the institutional level, state presence was strengthened 
through the creation of various national institutions related to recovery (provision of public 
health, addressing extreme poverty, extending social security to peasants, establishment of 
public credit lines for farmers and ranchers etc.). To support ex-combatants’ reintegration 
into society and their income generation, the Oficina de Rehabilitación y Socorro was 
established. Ultimately, even though the economy was growing, the factors of conflict had 
not been resolved. In Meta, the same old social and economic structure of large landowners 
and cattle ranchers persisted side by side with a now even larger mass of peasants, laborers 
and displaced people (Rausch, 2013: 58-66).  
Although benevolent toward its people, the military dictatorship failed to consolidate peace: 
albeit less active, guerrillas were still present in the Llanos and in other parts of the country. 
With the demobilization of the more moderate groups and growing pressure on the 
remaining guerrillas, the Communists resisted by forming self-defence autonomous 
territories, from which they could launch a new armed campaign. A few incidents in 
Cundinamarca and Tolima, combined with allegations of broken promises toward the 1953 
demobilized combatants, resulted in a resumption of armed operations by guerrillas in the 
Llanos in early 1957. For example, after having served as an advocate of peace and a 
mediator between the government and other guerrillas, Guadalupe Salcedo rejoined the 
armed struggle, but was assassinated in Bogota in June 1957. At the same time, the 
popularity of Rojas Pinilla was declining: he was forced into exile in May 1957 and briefly 
substituted by a military junta, until the restoration of civilian authority with the bi-partisan 
National Front in 1958 (Rausch, 2013: 74-78). 
4.4 A Tenuous Post-War and the Rise of Communist Guerrilla 
Groups 
The political angle. After it came out from the most acute phase of the civil war, Colombia 
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was politically dominated by a restricted oligarchy from both Liberal and Conservative 
parties – as it was when it entered the civil war. The combined threat from the rural- and 
urban-based fragmented insurgencies had been contained – and even manipulated into 
further sectarianism to the elites’ advantage. The elites managed to turn peasant fighting 
forces, self-defence groups, banditry and guerrilla groups against one another: these forces 
lacked a leadership and a common vision that could translate their cause into a unified 
political battle – something that the FARC would achieve. “No expression of social conflict 
was permitted outside the control of the two traditional parties”, which grew more wary of 
any form of dissent (Pearce, 1990: 64-65). 
The power-sharing agreement between Conservatives and Liberals that gave birth to the 
National Front in 1958 stipulated that both parties would be equally represented in all 
national institutions. There would be alternation in the presidency regardless of electoral 
results in order to rule out the sectarianism that led to La Violencia. Thus, during the two 
decades from 1958 to 1978, three Liberal and two Conservative presidents alternated in 
office: namely, Liberal A. Lleras Camargo (1958-62), Conservative G. Leon Valencia (1962-
66), Liberal C. Lleras Restrepo (1966-70), Conservative M. Pastrana Borrero (1970-74), and 
Liberal A. Lopez Michelsen (1974-78) (Rausch, 2013: 79). 
The economic angle. Economically, Colombia experienced a virtuous cycle of prosperity 
and economic development, driven by investments in infrastructure development and 
modernization. The country quickly became the World Bank’s fourth largest borrower 
globally. Colombia was the poster child for the US-led Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy 
administration’s initiative launched to counteract the Cuban revolution and communist 
expansion in Latin America (Pearce, 1990: 65-66; Rausch, 2013: 87-91).  
In terms of social indicators, results were limited. Despite a visible countrywide agricultural 
reform in 1961, its impact on structural issues of land distribution and ownership was 
limited. Instead, the expansion of commercial agriculture led to further displacement of poor 
peasants and of subsistence farming from the countryside, reinforcing the oligarchic 
landowners’ position. In addition, low manufacturing production meant low industrial 
development and poor diversification of the economy (Pearce, 1990: 65-66; Rausch, 2013: 
87-91). 
Meta during the National Front. The Eastern Llanos received preferential treatment during 
the National Front era. In 1959, Meta was elevated from Intendancy to the status of 
Departamento, the institutionalization of which proved to be an enormous challenge in terms 
of both financial and human resources. As a Departamento, Meta had now representation in 
Congress and in all national institutions. Thus, it was now institutionally and politically 
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integrated into the country, participating to its political, social and economic life, and moving 
away from the tutelage and control from the centre. Elites were coopted into formal 
institutions (Rausch, 2013: 79-104).  
Efforts to integrate the vast region to the core highland areas of the country continued 
unabated. Improvements in transport and connectivity were registered. The 1961 agrarian 
reform was applied in Meta through a plan known as Meta No. 1, aimed at protecting 
landless peasants and new colonos through land titling. Unfortunately, the reform’s outcome 
in Meta resembled the one at the national level, i.e. the impacts on inequalities and on land 
ownership were negligible. Thank to immigration and colonization, Meta’s population grew 
to 260,000 people in 1973 and boomed to approximately 480,000 in 1984. Meta also 
witnessed a dramatic increase in both cattle production, which quadrupled during the 
1960s, and in farming and crop production, a considerable amount of which started to be 
exported (Rausch, 2013: 79-104; Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2016: 93-180). 
The security angle and bandolerismo (1958-65). During its twenty-year rule, the National 
Front was unable to establish peace and security throughout the country, and to come to 
terms with the remaining non-state armed groups, either by militarily defeating them or by 
launching a peace process to include them into the system. Pockets of insurgencies 
controlling defined local areas, or self-proclaimed ‘republics’, survived throughout the 
country, in particular, in Tolima, Cauca, Huila, Caqueta, Cundinamarca, and Meta (in the 
microregion of Ariari). In Meta, after demobilizing in 1953, the guerrilla of the Liberal leader 
Dumar Aljure rose in arms once again in the early 1960s. It took control of sixty thousand 
hectares in the Ariari, and in the municipality of San Martin. In 1966, Aljure refused to ally 
his guerrilla with the newly formed FARC. Two years later, the army eventually annihilated 
Aljure’s guerrilla. 
Nonetheless, the main security threat faced by the National Front during its first phase 
(1958-65) was represented by a new phenomenon, termed ‘bandolerismo’, or banditry. This 
was a direct legacy from the previous phase, and as such it needs to be framed. A 
fundamental transition took place in the armed conflict. After the 1948-53 peak, violence 
became more fragmented, diffuse and anarchic: it was harder to grasp who the main actors 
were, their motivation and agendas. Although the same leaders were at the head of armed 
groups, in the eyes of public opinion and of the whole mainstream political spectrum, 
guerrilla groups transitioned into being more like criminal outfits or bandits. After the 1953 
demobilization, the failure to quell the remaining armed groups and to recover territories to 
state authority highly contributed to this transition to banditry. 
There was lower ideological commitment and lower political character – precisely because 
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the legitimacy that the Liberal party had granted to the rebels in the past was now 
completely gone.51 As a matter of fact, since there was no longer a national-level struggle 
between Liberals and Conservatives, guerrilla leaders’ allegiances and patronage also 
shifted. The conflicts became highly localized: local political patrons (gamonales) were the 
first and only reference for guerrillas and bandits. Thus, this provincialism rendered the 
armed conflict less of a ‘conflict’ and more a local-level dynamics of lawlessness, competition 
and aversion to the new political centralism, which resembled the old one. In the areas under 
their control, guerrillas were still considered resisting fighters, who enjoyed high popular 
support from discontent peasants and local population – as it was at the height of La 
Violencia. Finally, there was also a legacy of vengeance and retribution from the destruction 
and sufferings of the first phase of La Violencia (1949-53). This legacy acted as a constant 
incentive for further violence (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 21-25). 
Geographically, banditry was widespread in areas where two attendant factors were present 
at the peak of La Violencia. First, areas that had been subject to high levels of repression and 
terrorism. Second, areas of lower political mobilization and resistance. Where peasants had 
been unable to politically and militarily organize themselves and guerrilla groups were 
weak, banditry – combined with high levels of violence, destruction and brutality – took hold. 
Instead, in areas with strong and entrenched guerrillas, such as the Eastern Llanos, banditry 
was less widespread (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 26-27). 
Rise of the FARC and Communist insurgencies in Meta and Colombia. Concomitantly, the 
1960s witnessed the rise of independent guerrilla groups with a revolutionary agenda, both 
in Colombia and in the rest of Latin America. Guerrillas received new inspiration from the 
victorious Cuban revolution of 1959. In Colombia, Communist insurgencies started a process 
of strengthening both politically and militarily. The disparate rural-based insurgency 
experiences of the 1950s were re-shaped by new urban-based intellectual revolutionary 
movements, which based their ideology and practices on Marxist doctrines and experiences 
including Maoism and the Chinese Revolution, the Cuban one, and of course Marxism-
Leninism and the Soviet Union. With different fortunes, several groups rose during this 
period (Pardo Rueda, 2008).  
Some of the most significant examples include the following. The Army of National 
Liberation (Ejercito de Liberación Nacional, ELN) has been leading an armed struggle since 
1964. The Workers’, Students’ and Peasants’ Movement (MOEC) attempted to establish a 
stronghold in the Eastern Llanos, in Vichada, but was defeated, and ultimately split into 
factions in 1964. In 1967, the Popular Liberation Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberación, EPL) 
                                                        
51 “To be a bandolero meant, above all, to have lost political legitimacy.” (Sanchez and Meertens, 2001: 22). 
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– an armed wing of the USSR-influenced Marxist Leninist Communist Party (PC-ML) – was 
established.  
The FARC originated from the central region of Tolima and were formed in 1964 under the 
auspices of the Colombian Communist Party. For much of the 1960s and 1970s, it remained a 
self-defence armed organization, dedicated to the protection of the rights and livelihoods of 
landless peasants. As Pearce summarizes it, during this phase “communism was less a 
political ideology than a strategy of survival” (Pearce, 1990: 167; and Brittain, 2010: 4-14; 
Pecaut, 2008: 41-46; Pardo Rueda, 2008).  
After holding its second conference in Ariari in May 1966, the FARC set their theater of 
operations in the eastern Meta microregion of Duda-Guayabero, by establishing the 
organization’s headquarter (Casa Verde) in the municipality of La Uribe. The death of Aljure 
provided the opportunity for the FARC to further expand in the Ariari. From the onset, the 
FARC competed with governmental authorities in the provision of goods, services and 
protection for the peasants and the poorest, paving the way for decade-long confrontations. 
Throughout the 1970s, the FARC expanded its reach and consolidated its domination in 
Ariari, by winning popular support through the provision of services and the protection of 
landless peasants from exploitation and/or displacement. Zones of self-defence became 
guerrilla fronts, allowing the FARC to establish solid roots among local population – a factor 
that chiefly contributed to its survival throughout the 1970s, and expansion in the 1980s 
(Rausch, 2013: 104-116; Molano, 1992: 205; Pearce, 1990: 167-168; Pecaut, 2008: 46-50). 
During the 1970s and after the defeat of most of the groups that arose in the 1960s, a second 
generation of guerrilla groups flourished. The most important ones include the urban-based 
Movement of April 19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril, M-19), which enjoyed the support of a young 
urban-based middle class; the Workers’ Self-Defence (Autodefensa Obrera, ADO); the 
indigenous-based Quintín Lame Armed Movement (Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame, 
MAQL); and the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores, PRT). 
As far as the FARC is concerned, by its seventh conference in 1982, the organization added 
‘People’s Army’ (EP) to its name and made a leap forward in its strategy. The FARC-EP 
expanded into being a sophisticated and disciplined military actor in pursue of power (See 
Chapter 7 and Figure 7.1 for a brief description of FARC’s structure). From a self-defence 
organization aimed at protecting its rural base, the FARC turned to an offensive strategy by 
building a centralized military outfit. The FARC boomed.  By the end of 1983 it had tripled 
the number of fronts it had in 1979, jumping to 27 fronts. In 1989, the number of fronts 
reached 44, and by 1999 there were 60 fronts of the FARC (Figure 4.6). Its military and 
territorial expansion was accompanied by the establishment of strict law and order in the 
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areas under its control (“the Law of the Mountain”). The FARC enjoyed considerable 
legitimacy and popular support allowing for further internal strengthening. In Meta, the 
FARC exercised its military, political and social power through the Eastern and the Southern 
Blocs – two of its greatest and most powerful ones (Pearce, 1990: 172-174; Brittain, 2010: 
16-41; Richani, 2002: 76; Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del 
Meta et al., 1997: 41). 
Geographically, the FARC held one of its traditional stronghold in the eastern part of Meta, in 
the microregions of Duda-Guayabero and of the Low Ariari – where a demilitarized zone will 
be established as part of the 1998-2002 failed peace process. The Duda-Guayabero is a vast 
microregion in eastern Meta, composed of the municipalities of Mesetas, La Uribe, and La 
Macarena (Figures 4.1 and 4.5). It is formed by a mountainous natural park of rich 
biodiversity (Serranía de la Macarena) and delimited by the two rivers of Duda and 
Guayabero in La Uribe municipality. The topography makes the terrain impenetrable, and 
thus ideal to establish a guerrilla warfare. The Duda-Guayabero remained a FARC stronghold 
until the 2000s, when the Uribe government was able to militarily penetrate the region 
(Gutierrez, 2012: 189-191).  
To the east of the Duda-Guayabero, the more hospitable microregion of Ariari represented 
the key territory to strategically dominate the east and south of Colombia. The Ariari can be 
further divided into three areas: High (north), Medium (centre) and Low (south) Ariari. High 
Ariari includes the four municipalities of Cubarral, El Dorado, El Castillo, and Granada. 
Medium Ariari is composed of the three municipalities of Lejanias, San Juan de Arama, and 
Fuente de Oro. Finally, Low Ariari includes Puerto Lleras, Puerto Rico, and Vistahermosa. 
Combined, the Ariari and the Duda-Guayabero constitute 48% of Meta’s total area (Gonzalez, 
2012: 12; Nieto Matiz, 2012: 140).  
The Ariari had always been an area of colonization, and as a result it had been marginalized 
from state control, as it was explained above. Most of its population and settlements come 
from the massive displacement and population moves that took place during and following 
La Violencia of the late 1940s and 1950s. Thus, the people who settled in these areas were 
overwhelmingly landless peasants. They represented the right social base to support a 
revolutionary guerrilla. If the Duda-Guayabero was an area of strategic retreat for the FARC, 
the Low Ariari was instead an area of expansion (Nieto Matiz, 2012: 140-144; Gutierrez, 
2012: 191).  
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FIGURE 4.5: MAP OF MICROREGIONS OF ARIARI AND DUDA-GAYABERO (META)  
 
Source: Adaptated from Gutierrez, 2012: 190  
The region of Ariari was also the core area of one of the most important strategic corridors in 
Colombia, which provided access to the whole south of the country. This corridor will come 
to play a fundamental strategic role in military terms from the 1980s on. The corridor runs 
from the rivers of Ariari, Duda and Guayabero down to the south-west of Colombia (Caqueta 
and Putumayo) and to the south and south-east (Guaviare, Vaupes and Amazonas). 
Therefore, the control of Ariari was functional to the control of the south and south-east of 
Colombia, providing access routes for illegal drugs trafficking, which had become a core 
feature of the conflict in Meta since the 1980s (Gonzalez et al, 2002: 117-118; Gonzalez, 
2012: 12-13). 
4.5 Conflict from the 1980s on: New Dynamics, Armed Actors 
and Violence 
Drugs economy and a new phase of war. By the end of the 1970s, the new dynamic of 
drugs production and ensuing trafficking arose. Combined with the existing conflict, this new 
development brought a new wave of violence on a greater scale for the successive three 
decades, including human rights violation, forced displacement on a massive scale, and 
sectarian and criminal warfare. The 1975 demise of marijuana production in Mexico led 
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Colombia to become the centre of illegal drugs production (first marijuana, then cocaine) for 
the whole Southern hemisphere. In Meta, the municipalities of Vistahermosa and Puerto 
Lleras (Low Ariari), San Juan de Arama (Medium Ariari),  and especially La Macarena (Duda-
Guayabero) experienced the rise of marijuana farming at the end of the 1970s, and of coca 
production during the 1980s. The expansion of coca production created a new process of 
colonization in the south-east of Meta and in northern Guaviare (Jiménez, 2012: 157; Rausch, 
2013: 113-115; Nieto Matiz, 2012: 144-146; Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por los 
Derechos Humanos del Meta et al., 1997: 23, 38). 
The intersection between distinct but linked dynamics (drugs, ongoing conflict, land issue, 
persistent state weakness) paved the way for multiple actors resorting to violence for 
different motives. The introduction of drugs trafficking created several new actors and 
transformed some of the existing ones. In a context of political vacuum by the state and lack 
of or weak territorial control, new actors controlling territory and exercising monopoly of 
force co-existed or competed with one another. The establishment of a remunerative drugs 
economy was accompanied by a fierce armed struggle in Meta for the control of cocaine 
producing areas and trafficking routes. The result was an exacerbation of the existing conflict 
dynamics and related violence (Pardo Rueda, 2008: 625-651; Chernick, 2005).  
First, as far as the peasantry is concerned, the introduction of new and more profitable crops 
– marijuana and coca leafs – distorted the traditional crop production market. This created a 
rush to the region by small and medium peasants. It also spurred renewed interests by large 
landowners. Everyone was attracted by the surplus generated by illegal drugs farming vis-à-
vis traditional crops. More profitable illicit crop plantations meant that the traditional poor 
landless farmers in Meta had for the first time the opportunity to earn a decent income. Coca 
leaf crops represented a crucial livelihood source for the peasantry and fundamentally 
altered the local economy.  
Second, a new class of powerful drugs traffickers equipped with non-state armed 
organizations arose. They soon turned into outfits for social control, dedicated to protection 
of crops and routes, extortion, and other illegal practices. Third, drugs trafficking impacted 
existing actors, like the traditional elites, the peasantry and the FARC, all of which saw a shift 
in their value norms and material incentives, contributing to their ruthlessness and decay of 
norms. The drugs economy in Meta had also perverse effects on the social fabric. High 
revenues led to the sudden enrichment of some peasants who were overcome by the new 
wealth, and dissipated money on luxurious products, alcohol consumption, and prostitution 
(Brittain, 2010: 89-108; Richani, 2002: 70-73; UNDP, 2010: 13-14; Sobrevivientes del Comité 
Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del Meta et al., 1997: 23-24).  
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Regarding the FARC, after the demise of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels in the mid-1990s 
and as a result of the fierce competition with paramilitary groups for territorial control at 
this time, the FARC replaced drugs traffickers in some of the areas under its control (e.g. 
region of Caqueta) in order to step up the war effort, expand funding for it and establish 
tighter control to local areas. The FARC started charging taxes on farmers growing illicit 
crops and on facilities used for coca processing. The source of financing from taxation of 
illicit drugs allowed the FARC to consolidate its role as a state within a state providing 
governance and security, and extracting resources. Therefore, coca cultivation and 
trafficking changed the political economy of the conflict, including actors, funding 
mechanisms, means of control at local level, and political and social capital of conflict parties.  
Armed actors would either fight one another for the control of strategic areas for drugs 
production and commercialization, like Vistahermosa and La Macarena. Or they would come 
to terms by dividing and allocating routes and territories through mutually advantageous 
agreements, in a permanent precarious equilibrium at the expense of state authority and the 
rule of law. Thus, the drugs economy converted into the engine of the armed conflict, which, 
as a result, expanded and intensified. The drugs economy came to represent the most 
relevant funding source for the war effort of non-state armed actors (both guerrilla and 
paramilitaries) (Brittain, 2010: 89-108; UNDP, 2010: 13; Chernick, 2005: 182). 
Conflict dynamics in Meta in the 1980s and 1990s. In terms of FARC members and social 
base, as it will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7, communist ideology was the fundamental pillar 
for all of its members and a core tool of recruitment. The FARC expansion as a military 
organization from the 1980s on, necessitated of a constant wave of new recruits, who 
needed military training, political indoctrination etc. Thus, the FARC became a sophisticated 
machine which recruited among its constituency in the peasantry. Such expansion in 
numbers also represented a qualitative shift of FARC combatants. If Marxist political identity 
was the common denominator for all recruits in the 1960s and 1970s, from the 1980s a new 
dynamic arose. Exclusion at the political, social and economic levels became the common 
denominator for new recruits and the core identity of the organization. As analysed in 
Chapter 6, FARC recruits joined the organization mostly to escape a situation of economic 
misery, social exclusion and neglect from state authority in terms of livelihoods, rights, 
education and all basic services. In this sense, as the sole legitimate social actor, the FARC 
monopolized and dominated political, social and economic life, and became the only 
‘employer’ for landless peasants. Recruitment becomes an escape from and the only 
alternative to political, social and economic exclusion (Richani, 2002: 62-65, 75).  
From the 1980s, the expansion of the FARC and its increased revenue base is associated with 
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a shift in both the quantity and quality of new FARC recruits. By having an expanded army, 
the FARC had to increase its volume of combatants. Consequently, the strong ideological 
character of recruitment somewhat weakened, and new recruits were not as ideologically 
firm as old combatants. 
The intensity of the war also changed in the 1980s, from a low intensity to a high intensity 
conflict. The switch in intensity was first of all a result of the offensive military strategy 
adopted by the FARC from 1982 on, which overturned the self-defence tradition of the FARC. 
The rise of drugs production and trafficking and the emergence of extremely powerful 
criminal actors, which directly threatened the stability and the very existence of the state, 
also contributed to the scaling up of the conflict in terms of intensity. As a result of these 
changes, the traditional areas of FARC control and/or influence started to play an important 
strategic role for the control of the country (Ferro and Uribe, 2002). And a fierce armed 
competition started, as it was mentioned above. Undoubtedly, one such area of strategic 
value was the Ariari in eastern Meta. The scaling up of the war meant that this region turned 
to be one of the important prizes in military terms, and one where the military and the 
paramilitary intensified their pressure. 
At the national level, there is an attempted peace process by President Belisario Betancur 
(1982-86). The first ever national peace talks between the FARC and the government were 
held in the municipality of La Uribe, Meta – within the FARC core stronghold of the Duda-
Guayabero microregion. The collapse of an agreed ceasefire stipulated in 1984 led to 
increased military pressure against the FARC, especially in the Ariari. During the 1980s, an 
estimated seventy-two military confrontations took place in Meta, involving indiscriminately 
the FARC, the ELN and the military.  
During this period, much of the political violence was directed against the Patriotic Union 
(Unión Patriótica UP), a leftist political group with ties to the FARC. The UP arose in the mid-
1980s as part of the Betancur peace process and the democratic opening in the country. The 
UP gained great popularity in Meta and in other areas of the country by joining the 
mainstream political arena. Its members and cadres ran for local and national elections. 
However, because it challenged the established socio-economic order with its land-related 
structural inequalities, the UP was wrongfully perceived as a FARC political wing 
(Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por los Derechos Humanos del Meta et al., 1997: 28-29). 
Thus, the UP fell victim of a widespread and infamous extermination campaign against all its 
members and sympathizers, in Meta as well as in the rest of the country. A carnage that the 
state was unable (and at times, unwilling) to prevent. Nationally, over 3,000 UP members or 
sympathizers died at the hands of rising paramilitary forces (Dudley, 2006; UNDP, 2010: 11-
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12).  
In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the UP won one seat in the Senate for the Meta electoral 
district; in the 1988 municipal elections, several UP mayors were elected in the Ariari, as 
well as in other parts of the Eastern Llanos, especially Arauca. Under President Virgilio 
Barco’s watch (1986-90), the repression against the movement perpetrated by paramilitary 
factions – sometimes with the complicity of the military – was fierce. In 1988 alone, one 
hundred twelve armed attacks against UP members were recorded in Meta, the 
overwhelming majority of which were murders and disappearances. Between one and two 
hundred individuals affiliated to the UP were victims of political violence in the same year in 
Meta (Rausch, 2013: 113-115; Pearce, 1990: 233).  
In the early 1990s, the government of President Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) launched a 
Constitutional Assembly to reform the institutional framework of the country, resulting in 
the 1991 Constitution. This phase saw the disarmament and the inclusion in the political 
system of a number of the second-generation leftist armed actors that confronted the state, 
including the M-19, the EPL, Quintín Lame and the PRT – see Chapter 5 (Bejarano, 2012: 
209-211; World Bank, 2008).  
In the meantime, the FARC continued its political and military expansion, despite the setback 
suffered in 1991 with the attack to FARC’s leadership in Casa Verde. In 1993, the group held 
its 8th conference in La Uribe, where the FARC had their stronghold and headquarters. Here, 
the guerrilla group widened its political ambition and launched a platform for “a government 
of reconstruction and national reconciliation”. FARC military rise progressed unabated, 
widening their area of influence in Meta and the Eastern Llanos. By 1998, the guerrilla group 
controlled an estimated 60% of national territory, corresponding to 622 municipalities. This 
figure represents an astonishing increase from the 173 municipalities under FARC influence 
in 1983 (Richani, 2002: 68, 96). In the period 1990-98, Meta was the second administrative 
department in Colombia for number of FARC attacks against the Colombian army – after the 
central region of Antioquia.  
At the end of the 1990s, in a display of its military strength and in an attempt to bring the 
conflict to a higher level of engagement, the FARC carried out some large-scale attacks 
against the Colombian army and some of its local garrisons. This included Las Delicias 
(Putumayo) in 1996, El Billar (Caqueta) in 1998, and even the capture of Mitu, the capital of 
the remote state of Vaupes, which was under FARC’s control for three days in 1999. Many 
commentators saw these events as the prelude to a general takeover of power by the FARC 
(RAND, 2011: 47-49; Echandia Castilla, 2011: 10-13).   
 125
FIGURE 4.6: PRESENCE OF FARC BLOCS AND FRONTS (1998) 
 
Source: Pecaut, 2008: 109  
To measure FARC’s impressive expansion it is worth citing the following statistics. In 1985, 
the FARC had a military presence in 62% of municipalities of “internal colonization” – as 
defined by Richani52 – and in 44% of municipalities of “frontier colonization”. By 1995, these 
percentages rose to 93% and 81%, respectively (Richani, 2002: 68). 
During his term, President Ernesto Samper (1994-98) was unable to make any advancement 
on the peace front, nor was he able to militarily counteract the FARC. His successor, 
President Andre Pastrana (1998-2002), launched a wide peace initiative. Under the ceasefire 
and negotiation terms, a demilitarized zone was established in part of the Low Ariari and 
Duda-Guayabero microregions in Meta, corresponding to the four municipalities of La Uribe, 
Mesetas, La Macarena, and Vistahermosa. Peace talks were set up in the municipality of San 
Vicente del Caguan in the administrative department of Caqueta. The FARC were, thus, given 
large concessions, and the group used its military strength as leverage for the duration of the 
talks (UNDP, 2010: 12-13). 
Oil boom. In parallel, the discovery and production of oil in the region also represented a 
factor that contributed to change the political, economic and conflict landscape in Meta. Oil 
discovery in the Eastern Llanos dates back to 1983 at Caño Limon in Arauca. A quick boom 
                                                        
52 Richani (2002) defines internal colonization as “target[ing] public or privately owned land”, while frontier 
colonization as targeting “the border rainforest areas” (Richani, 2002: 68). Both types of colonization were 
featured in Meta. 
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followed, especially in Casanare. In Meta, oil production started in 1996 in the areas of Apiay, 
Castilla La Nueva, and Chichimene. By 2001, Meta was the third largest producing region in 
Colombia behind Casanare and Arauca, with twenty-one million barrels a year, or 11% of the 
total national production. The Meta-based municipalities of Puerto Gaitan, Puerto Lopez and 
San Martin were the ones that were more affected by the oil boom (Rausch, 2013: 116-117; 
Masse and Camargo, 2013; Velasco and Rocha, 2012).  
The discovery of oil led to dramatic changes in the Eastern Llanos. Meta’s population rose 
from 474,000 in 1985 to 789,000 in 2005, with Villavicencio reaching a population of 
285,000 in 2003, or three times its size in 1973. A new process of colonization took place. 
Waves of migrants attracted by employment opportunity flooded the region, especially the 
small remote towns close to the oil wells. Changes in norms, cultural values and socio-
economic structures were equally pronounced. An example is the expansion of the town of 
Puerto Gaitan where part of the fieldwork for this research was conducted. There, I inquired 
about and witnessed the social decay brought by the oil economy. 
Rausch (2013) speaks of the creation of “a distinctive type of oil town”, which almost 
overnight faced the surge of the oil industry and its impacts, including waves of migrant 
workers from other areas of the country, increase of commodity and real estate prices, 
environmental damages in a context of lawlessness, prostitution, petty crime, and corruption 
of small local officials. “The cumulative impact was a loss of a sense of identity.” (Rausch, 
2013: 119; and Jiménez, 2012: 157-158). Currently, there are several municipalities in Meta 
where there is an interest by oil companies to start exploration activities. Wary of similar 
perverse effects on their social fabric, municipal authorities unanimously oppose exploration 
and are trying to resist this penetration.  
Non-state armed groups have an influence on the oil sector in Meta. By means of extortion, 
illegal capture of royalties and other practices, armed groups guarantee the protection of oil 
infrastructure and the smooth flow of oil operations. In addition, there is an overlap between 
oil production areas and violation of human rights (Masse and Camargo, 2013: 3, 8-14). 
Notwithstanding, oil brought positive effects to the economy of Meta. The oil boom allowed 
for a diversification of the regional economy and the strengthening of other sectors. Cattle 
ranching suffered from a slow but inexorable decline that rendered the industry irrelevant 
by the early 2000s. Among the causes that can be listed, production methods were old and 
costs were constantly high. However, agriculture and farming increased. In particular, a 
boom in both dry and irrigated rice was recorded. The establishment of a modern factory 
(Induarroz) led Meta to be the first and second largest producer in Colombia of dry rice and 
irrigated rice, respectively. Another crop that experienced a great expansion in Meta was the 
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African palm, which was produced by the multinational Unipalma (Rausch, 2013: 124-125). 
The rise of paramilitarism, and institutional and economic transitions. The legal 
framework allowing paramilitary groups in Colombia dates back to the 1960s: Decree 3398 
of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968 established the legal foundation of civil self-defence 
organizations. Such groups were legalized as a response to the formation of Marxist guerrilla 
groups. In a nutshell, paramilitary’s nature is founded on the protection of traditional 
interests (e.g. landowners) against communist subversion. Paramilitaries are a cornerstone 
of all modern counterinsurgency strategies by the Colombian state: paramilitaries are, thus, 
considered a partner in the fight against guerrillas which seek to overthrow the established 
social and political order (Richani, 2002: 104-105). However, it is not until the early 1990s 
that the paramilitaries were able to strengthen and expand, and gain national attention as a 
conflict actor (Figure 4.7). This latest development is, in fact, a consequence of the financial 
resources from the rising illegal drugs trafficking.   
In the Meta region, the rise of paramilitarism is inextricably linked to the rise of illegal drugs 
production and trafficking. The profitable trade brought to Meta a new class of drugs 
entrepreneurs and non-state armed groups who were already active in the north of 
Colombia – a clase emergente, or emerging class, as it was scornfully defined by the 
traditional landowners. In Meta and the Eastern Llanos, these new groups adopted the same 
goals they pursued elsewhere: militarily contribute to the weakening of the FARC and of any 
communist armed group, maintain social order, counteract the kidnapping practice of the 
FARC, and profit from illicit drugs trafficking through the control of illegal crops farming 
areas and of strategic corridors (Nieto Matiz, 2012: 146-149). 
However, the rise of paramilitary groups and the new wave of armed violence can not be 
attributed only to the nascent drugs business and to the strengthening and expansion of the 
FARC from the 1980s on. Two additional factors include the change in the political and 
institutional order in Colombia, and the decline of traditional local elites under new 
economic processes of liberalization. Both dynamics played a crucial role during the 1990s in 
changing the conflict dynamics in Meta and in the rest of Colombia (Richani, 2002: 93-132; 
Romero, 2003). 
First, as a result of the peace process between the FARC and President Betancur (1982-86), 
Colombia embarked in a process of institutional decentralization – which is defined as the 
devolution of power and competences from central state authorities to local ones. Up to the 
1980s, the President of Colombia was mandated to appoint all governors and mayors. From 
1988, these institutions started to be elected by popular vote. The FARC’s interest was to 
have elected local officials, with in mind the goal of strengthening and institutionalizing its 
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local power base. The state saw this measure as a way to appease the guerrilla and to slowly 
bring it within the mainstream political process – “decentralize to pacify” was the motto 
(Castro, 1998). The creation of the UP and its participation in local and national elections has 
to be framed within this process. In addition, the 1991 new Constitution integrated the 
political decentralization of electing local authorities with fiscal and administrative 
decentralization (Ballve, 2011: 3-5; UNDP, 2010: 16-17; Nieto Matiz, 2012: 154-158). 
Nonetheless, inadvertently, the decentralization process contributed to the emergence of a 
new and more violent phase of the war in Meta and in several other regions of Colombia. A 
decentralization process can be successful when the state that implements it has already a 
consolidated, sole and legitimate monopoly of violence and power over its territories. In a 
situation of decade-long armed conflict, where powerful non-state armed groups challenge 
the state, and entire regions of the country are outside the reach of the rule of law and of 
state services, a decentralization reform is a gamble, at best. In these conditions, 
decentralization equals more a de facto institutionalization of the fragmented regions of the 
country, a parcelization of the state, and the solidification of armed groups. In other words, 
given the current situation of Colombia at the time, the decentralization reform deepened 
conflict dynamics and entrenched power of local elites and armed groups vis-à-vis the state. 
Guerrilla and paramilitary were able to siphon public resources by directly influencing local 
authorities, who had now a looser connection to Bogota. A new system of armed clientelism 
arose (Eaton, 2006: 533; Ballve, 2011: 4-5; Romero, 2003b: 179-181; Llorente and Palou, 
2011: 429-430; Nieto Matiz, 2012: 155).  
A second important dynamic to understand the rise and success of paramilitarism concerns 
the relative decline of traditional elites and large landowners. At the global level, the 1980s 
saw the advent of liberalization and market-oriented reforms in several Western countries. 
Colombia was greatly affected, in particular the agricultural sector. Rural elites in Colombia 
had enjoyed high rents and profits through protectionism and high barriers to trade, at the 
expense of optimization of production, market efficiency, and wider economic development. 
After tariff barriers were slashed from an average 83% in 1985 to 6.7% in 1992, the 
economic position of landowners was devastated. A dramatic redistribution of resources 
took place from the high income sectors in rural areas to the urban centres of the country, 
moving from an agrarian society to a progressive financialization of the economy (Ballve, 
2011: 7).    
As a result, the traditional class of powerful large landowners initially despised the new 
drugs traffickers that flooded the region. Drugs traffickers started buying large estates of 
land from declining traditional landowners, thus, reconfiguring the political economy of land 
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in Meta and other regions of Colombia (Nieto Matiz, 2012: 135-136; Reyes, 2009). In 
conclusion, local elites came to depend on paramilitaries to defend their dwindling resources 
and declining power base. Local elites saw the decentralization process and the rise of the UP 
from the mid-1980s as an existential threat to their privilege and interests. In fact, the UP 
had land reform and its redistribution at the top of its policy agenda. At the same time, the 
growth of the FARC in the region during the 1980s and 1990s contributed to this 
radicalization of the conflict, in which the rise of paramilitarism was intended as a counter 
offensive to the FARC expansion (Gutierrez, 2005: 118; Sobrevivientes del Comité Cívico por 
los Derechos Humanos del Meta et al., 1997: 28-29). 
Notwithstanding important regional differences, the paramilitaries were formed by an 
heterogeneous group of actors. This included emerging drugs traffickers, traditional 
landowners elites, business owners, regional and local politicians, and members of the 
security services.  The common denominator among all these actors was a strenuous 
aversion to the FARC and its military and political advancement. One of the first incarnations 
of paramilitary groups with a broader political objective was the MAS (Muerte A 
Secuestradores, Death to Kidnappers), which appeared in the 1980s following the rise of 
kidnapping practices by the FARC. In Meta, this group settled in with the name of Los 
Masetos (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 189).   
The first important centralized paramilitary group emerged in 1994 in Córdoba under the 
name of Peasant Self Defences of Córdoba and Urabá (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y 
Urabá, ACCU). The ACCU was founded by the three ruthless Castaño brothers, whose father 
was kidnapped and killed by the FARC in the 1980s. Then, in 1997, the Castaño brothers 
completed their ambitious plan to form a national paramilitary umbrella organization, the 
United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC). Figure 4.7 
shows the extension of AUC influence throughout the country at the peak of its power in 
2002. The AUC was a federation of regional paramilitary structures, which were fairly 
independent from one another in their operations.  
Paramilitarism in Meta. The month of July 1997 marked the start of paramilitary’s 
penetration in Meta and the Eastern Llanos with the massacre of Mapiripan, a municipality 
located in the remote south of Meta at the border with Guaviare. A battalion from ACCU was 
flown in from the northern region of Uraba to perpetrate the systematic killing of around 50 
individuals, and the displacement of nearly 70% of its population, with the complicity of the 
Colombian army53. The massacre was intended as a symbolic event to show the FARC the 
resoluteness of the paramilitaries, and that the latter was going to actively challenge FARC’s 
                                                        
53 For this massacre, one Army colonel and one captain have been sentenced to 40 years in jail in 1999.  
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dominion in the Eastern Llanos. Mapiripan also represented a strategic objective along the 
Guaviare river for drugs trafficking routes (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 
190-191; Spencer, 2001: 13-15).  
FIGURE 4.7: PRESENCE OF AUC BLOCS (2002) 
 
Source: Echandia Castilla, 2013: 13  
In Meta, there were three main paramilitary groups that surged in the 1990s. The Bloque 
Centauros – headed by Miguel Arroyave – was the only one affiliated with the AUC and was 
the most powerful paramilitary group in Meta. As it can be seen from Figure 4.7, the Bloque 
Centauros del Llano established its influence over the regional capital Villavicencio, the 
sparsely populated south and east of Meta, and consolidated its presence in the central 
municipalities of San Martin and of El Dorado. The second group was the Peasant Self 
Defences of Meta and Vichada (Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada, ACMV), which 
had influence in the north and east of Meta, along the Meta river connecting Puerto Lopez to 
Puerto Gaitan, and extending to bordering Vichada. The ACMV was lead by Victor Carranza. 
Although it had relationships with the AUC and the other large federation of paramilitaries, 
known as the Bloque Central Bolivar, ACMV remained as an independent group and 
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demobilized as such in 2005 (Garzon, undated; Echandia Castilla, 2013: 11-18).54 The third 
main group was the Peasant Self Defences of Casanare (Autodefensas Campesinas del 
Casanare, ACC) headed by Hector Buitrago, alias Martin Llanos, which dated back to the late 
1970s. The ACC stayed independent and did not demobilize. It extended its power from 
Casanare to the north and east of Meta (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 183).  
Between 2003 and 2004, a high intensity armed conflict took place between the ACC and the 
Bloque Centauros, which produced over 1,500 casualties. They had competing interests over 
strategic corridors of illegal drugs trafficking. The ACC wanted to expand to the south of 
Meta, while the Bloque Centauros sought to oust the ACC from Casanare and extend AUC’s 
influence to the east of Colombia. The Colombian army openly sided with the Bloque 
Centauros: the army’s intervention in September 2004 marked the end of the war and the 
defeat of the ACC. The latter did not join the collective demobilization of the AUC. Most of 
ACC members were captured or killed (at its peak in 2002-2003, the ACC was estimated to 
have 2,000 combatants), with the exception of its leader, Martin Llanos, who was finally 
arrested in 2012. The ACC survived as a small group with around 200 members and never 
joined the demobilization process (Verdad Abierta, 2009; Perez Salazar, 2011: 119-127; 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 192-201).   
To reach their goals, paramilitary groups employed a ruthless strategy to uproot the 
guerrilla and establish social control. This included massacres and killings of (real or 
perceived) sympathizers or collaborators of the FARC (as per the case of Mapiripan); the 
widespread practice of extortions; and the use of forced displacement against farmers living 
in areas where either the FARC had some influence, or areas that were strategically 
important for coca leaf farming and trafficking. As a result, the war in Meta reached a peak in 
levels of violence and brutality. To maintain control of their respective territories, non-state 
armed groups of all colors were forced to employ increasingly harsh and brutal methods for 
social control. In several municipalities, this new phase of the conflict resulted in a regime of 
terror and a climate of fear against the local population.  
The state displayed an ambivalent behaviour. While officially it maintained a discourse of 
legality and opposition to all outlawed armed groups throughout the whole 1990s, in many 
cases the state itself was instead complacent of paramilitary’s activities on the ground. The 
state tacitly supported the paramilitaries, given the common enemy that both faced, namely 
the FARC. Since the AUC was deliberately set up to confront the FARC, the state and the army 
did not have an interest in fighting it. The brutal paramilitary methods were also seen as 
effective to confront the FARC as opposed to the legalistic approach that the army had to 
                                                        
54 Two ex-combatants who are part of the sample for this research were part of the ACMV. 
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follow (Richani, 2002: 103).  
The 2000s also witnessed the rise of the Parapolítica, a phenomenon of social, economic and 
institutional intersection between paramilitary organizations and the political establishment 
at the local and national level. The convergence of interests centered around the demise of 
the FARC produced alliances of convenience between local officials and paramilitary groups. 
In Meta, paramilitary infiltrated electoral politics through the support of specific candidates 
from different parties. The Bloque Centauros was the paramilitary group that mostly 
interconnected with the political establishment in the region (Nieto Matiz, 2012: 103-134).  
The Parapolítica was based on mutual benefits. On the one hand, the paramilitaries had 
interest to capture public resources for their business activities, or to obtain a favorable legal 
framework, among others. On the other hand, corrupt politicians used paramilitaries for 
protection, to advance their political agenda, and also for personal enrichment. Between 
2000-2006, the paramilitaries influenced the election and the policy-making of several local 
mayors in parts of Meta, including Villavicencio. In 2003, the Bloque Centauros was even able 
to affect the outcome of the election for governor of Meta, securing a candidate that was 
favorable to paramilitary’s interests.  
Nieto Matiz (2012) notices that the ACC achieved more political goals and tighter 
relationships with political elites than the Bloque Centauros ever did. The reason is that the 
ACC was an autochthonous paramilitary force: its social and economic networks were from 
within Meta. Thus, the ACC had a higher level of integration in the regional context than the 
Bloque Centauros, which was from the northern region of Uraba. Despite its greater 
resources and military strength, the Bloque Centauros was ultimately unable to unilaterally 
dominate Meta from both political and military standpoints (Nieto Matiz, 2012: 158-166, 
170-179).   
To this background, all armed actors aspired to establish their social and economic models to 
the regions under their control. By all counts, these groups exercised power on their 
territories, and had de facto sovereignty. These instances resemble those alternative orders 
and power arrangements that Chapter 2 discussed in greater detail. In Meta, on the one 
hand, the FARC established its own governance structures and economic model of land 
distribution to the rural areas of Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Puerto Concordia and La 
Macarena. On the other hand, as mentioned, the AUC-affiliated Bloque Centauros established 
its control over a vast area in the centre and south of Meta, around the municipalities of San 
Martin, Puerto Lleras, Puerto Rico, Puerto Concordia and Mapiripán. From there, it pursued a 
development strategy centered on agro-industrial and aero cargo projects (UNDP, 2010: 16). 
Thus, these alternative orders compete with one another through armed violence; at the 
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same time, they also necessarily interact with state institutions, including the army, and 
regional and local authorities.       
The 2000s: political developments at the national level.55 The collapse of the San Vicente 
del Caguan peace dialogue in 2002 led the overwhelming majority of Colombian public 
opinion to believe the inherent bad faith of the FARC in pursuing a peace deal. In the eyes of 
the public, the FARC used the demilitarized zone and the period of talks to politically and 
militarily strengthen in the areas under its control, to only reactivate the armed struggle 
once it achieved its objectives. The backlash from the aborted negotiation paved the way for 
Alvaro Uribe’s conservative double mandate as President (2002-10) (Echandia Castilla, 
2011).  
Uribe’s presidency entailed a 180 degrees reassessment of state’s strategy in the conflict, in 
particular versus the FARC. The two tenants overturned by Uribe were the following. First, 
the main objective of the Colombian state became to militarily defeat (and hence, disarm and 
demobilize) the main rebel groups, rather than a negotiated solution. Second, re-establish 
the state’s monopoly of legitimate force through curbing the privatization of security and the 
proliferation of paramilitary groups (Gutierrez Sanin and Gonzalez, 2012).   
During his first mandate (2002-2006), Uribe launched a fierce counterinsurgency campaign. 
The so-called Democratic Defence and Security Policy aimed at re-establishing state control 
over areas under armed groups’ and criminal organizations’ influence, through both the 
rolling back of FARC’s advancement and the containment of the paramilitaries.56 To achieve 
this objective, there was a strengthening and expansion of the security sector. The army rose 
from 158,000 personnel in 2002 to 267,000 in 2009, while the police force went from 
104,000 to 137,000 in the same period. The army also started employing more professional 
soldiers than using the draft (RAND, 2010: 46; Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011). 
Supported by public opinion, Uribe’s aggressive campaign was highly effective as the FARC 
suffered a number of setbacks. Militarily, the government was able to recover numerous 
areas of the country at the expense of the FARC. Between 2004 and 2006, President Uribe 
launched the Patriot Plan (Plan Patriota), the objective of which was to produce a decisive 
military offensive against FARC’s traditional regions of control in the south and the east of 
                                                        
55 The narrative of Chapter 4 only succinctly addresses the conflict dynamics from the 2000s on. The reason is 
that these most recent dynamics are intertwined with the events surrounding the demobilization of the AUC, and 
the post-DDR security situation of criminal groups taking centre stage. It is imperative, then, to first address the 
unfolding of the DDR in Colombia (with a particular focus on Meta), which will be the subject of Chapter 5. After 
an examination of the DDR, a concluding section of Chapter 5 concerns an overview of the more recent conflict 
dynamics in Meta. 
56 “The core aim of the policy is to generate a virtuous cycle in which increased security produces confidence and 
stability, which in turn creates an environment favorable to private investment and economic growth” (RAND, 
2010: 45-46).  
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Colombia, including Meta and the Eastern Llanos. Faced with an unprecedented attack which 
highly debilitated its infrastructure and capacity, the FARC switched tactic. From large scale 
operations in the 1990s, the FARC went back to guerrilla warfare tactics, through hit and run 
attacks and sabotages (Echandia Castilla, 2011: 18-20).  
During this time, the FARC suffered from an internal morale crisis – as reported in Chapter 8 
by several FARC ex-combatants. The activation of an individual-based demobilization 
program, and the targeted killing campaign against FARC’s top leadership permanently 
weakened the organization. Regarding the paramilitaries, they were neutralized via the 
collective demobilization of the AUC, its umbrella organization, and the disarmament of its 
nearly 30,000 combatants (see Chapter 5). 
After these successes in security terms, President Uribe focused his second term (2006-
2010) on the social and economic recovery of conflict-affected regions, while keeping 
military pressure high. This new phase was characterized by the re-establishment of state 
presence (via services and institutions) in areas formerly under the control of the FARC or 
any armed actor. Following military achievements against armed groups, it was now time to 
consolidate those victories through enabling services and strengthening institutions. The 
new approach was termed Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security, and was 
unveiled in 2007. One of the largest programs of social and economic recovery of this kind 
was set up in La Macarena, after the FARC was uprooted from this area (RAND, 2010: 56). 
In military terms, the Colombian army focused on strategic objectives to permanently 
debilitate the FARC. The military carried out operations to bring the war to the FARC 
strongholds and attack its leadership. In 2008, the FARC Secretariat lost three of its seven 
permanent members: Raul Reyes and Ivan Rios were killed during two separate operations. 
And Manuel Marulanda, the FARC historic leader and spiritual father, died of natural causes. 
Scores of other mid-level commanders and heads of fronts were also either captured, killed 
or deserted. Then, in 2010, FARC’s leading strategist and head of the Eastern Bloc, Mono 
Jojoy, was also killed in action. The combination of these political, military and organizational 
setbacks forced the FARC to the negotiation table once again, in 2012 (RAND, 2010: 56; 
Echandia Castilla, 2011: 21-24). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an extensive analysis of the conflict factors and historical 
dynamics in the administrative department of Meta. It made ample reference to the national 
context, without which the ‘sub-regional’ story would be de-contextualized. As it was 
demonstrated, the benefit of a sub-regional conflict analysis concerns a nuanced and deep 
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outlook at social, economic and political local phenomena. The sub-regional conflict analysis 
of Meta has also unveiled a more micro approach. Meta is made of six microregions, all of 
which have specific dynamics that are important to be understood both discretely and in 
their interaction with the other levels (sub-regional and national) (Gonzalez et al., 2012).  
In conclusion, a few considerations about Meta’s role and development in the 20th Century. 
Despite its improvements and attempts at integration with the rest of the country, Meta and 
the rest of the Llanos remain a frontier region, due to its geographic location, remoteness, its 
inhospitable living conditions, and also its economic structure. The second half of the 20th 
Century has certainly seen dramatic economic and population growth in the Llanos, and in 
Meta in particular. However, it is debatable whether this growth has brought a proportionate 
level of development and ‘inclusion’ with the rest of the country (Rausch, 2013: 133-136).  
One of the causes may be that Meta has not yet developed its ‘independence’ as an 
autonomous region from the centre. In a way, Meta’s economy, political leadership, 
administrative capacity, and social structure still depend on the tutelage from Bogota, 
and/or are unable to display and exercise endogenous capacity. One example concerns the 
city of Villavicencio, which has sprawled in the last few decades without any developmental 
plan and/or agreed vision (Rausch, 2013: 133-136).  
A second example concerns the regional economy: Rausch (2013) and other authors 
(Baquero, 1990) lament the inability of Meta’s political and economic elites to build a strong 
agro-industrial economy and market from the wealth of natural resources in its territory. A 
practice of ‘savage’ capitalism has dominated Meta’s economy throughout the 20th Century 
through an asymmetric relationship with Bogota and the centre. In Meta and in the Llanos, 
there is an apparent lack of interest for the collective good, shared benefits and wealth, and 
local development. Instead, there is an extractive economy based on continued exports and 
rent seeking, insofar they are functional to the centre economy and mirror its interests. This 
is true for cattle ranching. As far as rice and African palm are concerned, on the other hand, 
large enterprises that do not reside in the region and whose taxes do not benefit the regional 
economy drove small and medium production firms out of business without local authorities 
being able to defend them. Oil production followed a similar trend – and even more perverse 
if we consider the social toll paid by oil rich towns. In addition, Meta’s small manufacturing 
industry (cotton, garments, furniture), local carpenters, and sawmills remain with outdated 
techniques of production, unable neither to further develop nor to compete with outsiders. 
As per land ownership, to this day, 61% of Meta’s land is owned by less than 2% of the 
population, in essence replicating the structural factors of conflict that persisted and fueled 
violence throughout much of the 20th Century (Rausch, 2013: 133-136). 
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5. The Dynamics of DDR in the 2000s 
The present chapter complements the previous political economy analysis of the conflict in 
Meta by narrowing the focus on the dynamics of Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) in the 2000s as they relate to war to peace transition in the region. An 
analysis of the events surrounding the genesis and implementation of the collective DDR 
with the paramilitaries and the individual DDR with the guerrilla is provided. The chapter 
concerns two underlying main themes: (i) how reintegration unfolds, in particular economic 
reintegration; (ii) the implications of DDR in terms of transition from war to peace, including 
state formation, the security landscape and the competition between state and non-state 
armed groups.  
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section gives an historical overview of the 
processes of collective demobilization of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia 
(Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) and the individual DDR of members of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC), with ample reference to Meta. The second section concerns how reintegration was 
conceptualized, strategized and implemented in Colombia during both Uribe (2002-2010) 
and Santos (2010-) dual mandates. This section contains a description of the benefits 
available to ex-combatants, and how reintegration policies evolved over time depending on 
programs’ outcomes and on the political context. Special attention is reserved to economic 
reintegration and to employment considerations. These first two sections are meant to give 
necessary insights that serve the understanding of the empirical Chapters 6 to 8. 
The third section provides an overview of the security conditions following the DDR of the 
AUC. It highlights the rearmament process in Meta and the formation of new non-state 
armed groups, pointing out both the continuities and the ruptures between the pre-DDR 
phase and the post-DDR phase, in terms of security, stability and the landscape of armed 
violence in Colombia and in Meta, specifically.    
5.1 The Collective and Individual Demobilization Processes  
Early DDR efforts. Disarmament and demobilization programs in Colombia have repeatedly 
featured throughout Colombian history. The forerunner of modern DDR in the country were 
the 1953 demobilization processes of guerrilla factions in Meta. As it was covered in Chapter 
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4, following La Violencia, a series of ad hoc DDR programs were signed and implemented in 
Meta, targeting a number of local rebel groups. 
It was, however, not until the 1980s that DDR was adopted as part of conflict resolution 
mechanisms. In 1982, as part of the Betancur peace initiative, some armed groups, including 
ADO (Movimiento Autodefensa Obrera), participated in a general amnesty through Law 
35/1982, which involved between 1,348 and 1,423 combatants (Villaraga, 2013: 111-115). 
Then, in the early 1990s, President Gaviria launched a peace plan to demobilize armed 
groups. Throughout the decade, the plan was embraced by a number of small rebel factions, 
including the EPL and the M-19. According to the World Bank citing government sources, a 
total of 4,817 combatants disarmed and demobilized – Table 5.1. Given the limited numbers, 
the state economic and social support largely contributed to successful reintegration 
outcomes. None of the groups that demobilized took arms again (World Bank, 2008; Derks, 
Rouw and Briscoe, 2011; Nussio, 2012).  
TABLE 5.1: COLLECTIVE DEMOBILIZATIONS IN THE 1990S 
Year Armed Group # of Demobilized 
1990 M-19 923 
1991 Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) 208 
1991 People’s Liberation Army (EPL) 2,109 
1991 Quintín Lame (MAQL) 159 
1992 Ernesto Rojas Commando 25 
1994 Socialist Renovation Current 443 
1994 Medellin People’s Militia 650 
1994 Francisco Garnica Front 150 
1998 MIR-COAR Independent Revolutionary Movement 150 
Total 4,817 
Source: World Bank, 2008: 14. 
The political dimension of the 1990s demobilization was an important feature. Former 
leaders became politically active particularly in civil society and the non-governmental 
sector. This factor largely contributed to the rise of a new opinion movement within 
Colombian society – one that was concerned with non-violent conflict resolution efforts. 
Particularly, the demobilization of over 900 members of M-19 is deemed a success. Its model 
was based on the reinsertion of the M-19 leaders within the mainstream political spectrum 
in exchange for their pledge to work within the legal framework and to demobilize their 
armed structure. Notwithstanding good outcomes with respect to demobilization and social 
and economic reintegration, none of these former armed groups was able to survive the 
political competition, and swiftly disappeared. On this front, their most important legacy 
concerned both intellectual efforts and practical applications toward peace (Palou and 
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Mendez, 2012; Guaqueta, 2009; Gutierrez Sanin and Gonzalez, 2012; Villaraga, 2013: 116-
124). 
Desertion program for FARC members. In 1994, a counter-insurgency strategy to weaken 
existing rebel groups was unveiled. Presidential decree 1385 launched a policy to induce 
members of guerrilla groups, namely the FARC and ELN, to voluntarily abandon arms and 
surrender to public authorities. In exchange for desertion, the state would award legal 
benefits and the prospect of reintegration to individual combatants. Notwithstanding slight 
modifications that were introduced throughout different administrations, the core of this 
program remained standing until the signing of the final peace agreement between the 
Government and the FARC in 2016 (Villaraga, 2013: 124-125; World Bank, 2008). 
This counterinsurgency strategy – which was the cornerstone of Uribe’s democratic security 
policy – has been largely criticized on ethical grounds. Detractors from the left, civil society 
and including the United Nations asserted that such practice encouraged human rights 
violations by security forces. More poignantly, the desertion program delegitimized the 
socio-economic foundations of the conflict in Colombia, and undermined efforts aimed at a 
sustainable peaceful conflict resolution outcome (Guaqueta and Arias, 2011). 
The state’s efforts to pull out combatants from armed groups are also at the core of this 
research, which explores the dynamic interaction between the state and armed groups as far 
as recruitment and reintegration are concerned. It is argued that the two actors enter in a 
‘competition’ on a number of issues. First, the power and the military aspects: state and 
armed groups fight over the control of specific areas. Second, they fight to win the 
propaganda war of ideas and ensuing public support. The third aspect concerns the subject 
of this research: armed groups recruit members within the areas under their control, while 
the state tries to erode this recruitment cycle, which is the life-blood of non-state armed 
groups. The program to induce guerrilla fighters to desert – which is here discussed – fits 
within this model of ‘competition’ between state and armed groups.  
Chapter 8 demonstrates that the ex-combatants who decided to desert did not do so allured 
by the prospect of the reintegration benefits – or at least they did not declare that this 
represented an important factor in their decision to flee. According to interviewees, other 
factors were at play, including disillusionment with the rebel cause, and heightened military 
pressure, among others. Regardless of the individual motivation, there is however a link 
between the state reintegration program and the diminished quality of new recruits within 
the FARC. I argue that because thousands FARC members fled and joined the reintegration 
program, this factor played a role in the recruitment tactics and modus operandi of the 
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organization. By weakening the FARC organizational impermeability, the state 
fundamentally eroded the internal cohesion of the FARC and its way of recruiting members. 
Although over 2,000 combatants deserted during the Pastrana government (1998-2002), it 
was only with Uribe that the policy became priority and was further institutionalized. 
Decrees 128 of 2002 and 2767 of 2004 expanded the policy, set economic benefits for 
deserters, and legally established the practice of “individual demobilization.” The 
institutional strengthening coincided with booming numbers of individual demobilized. 
Between 2002 and 2016, 21,965 combatants from leftist guerrilla groups laid down arms 
and accessed the reintegration program. The peak number of individual demobilized was 
registered in 2007 with 2,934 individuals who deserted. Between 2003 and 2010, the 
average number of individual demobilized has been of 2,652, whereas since 2011 numbers 
have declined (ACR, 2013, 2017).  
Since 2002, the individual demobilization process has been largely standardized. After a 
combatant surrendered to a public authority, he/she would initially be put in the hands of 
military intelligence for up to 3 days. Here, a first screening of his/her status of combatant 
would take place, together with being questioned by the military authority on vital 
information regarding the armed group. As confirmed by ex-combatants in Chapter 8, the 
inclusion in the program and access to benefits were dependent on the disclosure of valuable 
military information (e.g. location of armed units and weapons). After this initial phase, the 
demobilized entered the Ministry of Defence-run Humanitarian Assistance Program for the 
Demobilized (PAHD, according to its Spanish acronym). A thorough investigation would be 
conducted to determine the criminal history and legal status of the combatant (i.e. if he/she 
has pending charges of war crimes). During this phase – which could last up to a few months 
– the combatant was hosted in a “Peace House”, where he/she received initial benefits and 
support.57 Once this process is cleared, the combatant was considered demobilized, and 
legally certified as an ‘ex-combatant’ by the Committee for the Laying Down of Weapons 
(Comité Operativo Para la Dejación de Armas, CODA) (Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011; 
Guaqueta and Arias, 2011).   
The CODA certification marks the shift from the demobilization phase to the reinsertion and 
reintegration. Institutionally, each file is moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry 
of Interior. Up to 2006, the latter ran the Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Life 
(Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil, PRVC), which included provision of healthcare, 
                                                        
57 A number of interviews were conducted with ex-FARC who were hosted in a Peace House. More details in 
Chapters 6-8. 
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education, 2-year monthly cash allowance and seed funding to start-up a business or fund a 
vocational training (Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011; Guaqueta and Arias, 2011).  
Given the booming numbers of individual demobilized – together with the parallel collective 
demobilization of the paramilitaries – this model was deemed insufficient. Its short-term 
timeframe only allowed for narrow and specific reinsertion goals. An internal evaluation also 
concluded that the seed funding scheme failed to produce positive outcomes as most ex-
combatants lacked the required skills to effectively use the capital and build a sustainable 
income. Many of the other benefits also failed to reach the beneficiaries.  
Once the demobilized population reached the order of tens of thousands, a more 
encompassing and broader policy was needed – one that used resources more efficiently, 
looked at the long-term horizon of ex-combatants, and that involved also society at large. As 
a result, the Presidential High Council for Reintegration (Alta Consejería Presidencial para la 
Reintegración, ACR) was created in 2006 to attend the reintegration needs of both individual 
ex-combatants from FARC and ELN, and the collective demobilized of the AUC (Derks, Rouw 
and Briscoe, 2011; Thorsell, 2013).  
In the next section, I go into a deeper analysis of and considerations about the reintegration 
process in Colombia from 2006 on. Before doing that, I now provide a synthesis of the 
demobilization process of the paramilitaries at the national level and in Meta.  
Paramilitary demobilization. Related to the pursue of military victory against the FARC, 
the second core element of Uribe’s security strategy was the re-establishment of the state’s 
monopoly of force. To regain the state’s control over all Colombian territories, Uribe 
launched a dialogue with multiple paramilitary structures, including the umbrella 
organization of the AUC. The exploratory talks in Santa Fe de Ralito led to the agreement of 
July 2003 – barely one year in Uribe’s first term. The framework agreement involved 22 out 
of the 26 main paramilitary blocs constituting the AUC, and called for their demobilization in 
exchange for state’s support to social and economic reintegration, and judicial benefits.  
The landmark “Justice and Peace Law” (Law 975 of 2005) established the legal condition for 
paramilitary reinsertion into society. In a nutshell, the law recognized legal benefits for ex-
paramilitaries in terms of reduced sentences for those responsible for crimes against 
humanity. Out of 30,000+ demobilized paramilitaries, over 3,000 benefitted from reduced 
sentences. Such benefit came in exchange for disclosing all the truth and provide full judicial 
collaboration. The merits and shortcomings of the law were at the centre of polarized 
debates within the Colombian establishment. The peace process with the paramilitary was a 
top-down endeavor rather than a wide and inclusive process. In addition, the law resulted in 
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the unveiling of the Parapolítica, the scandal that disclosed the tight relationship between 
certain state sectors and paramilitary groups – as reported in the previous chapter 
(Gutierrez Sanin and Gonzalez, 2012).  
Further, a detailed and more inclusive agreement between the government and the AUC was 
negotiated, and signed by all major paramilitary groups in May 2004. The DDR started even 
before the agreement with the demobilization of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara in 2003. By 
August of 2006, a total of 31,671 individuals that were part of 37 paramilitary groups 
demobilized as part of the agreement (Guaqueta and Arias, 2011; Nussio, 2012).  
In Meta, the paramilitary demobilization intertwined with the internal war among 
paramilitary factions – see Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. Following the victorious war against the 
Autodefensas Campesinas del Casanare (ACC), the Bloque Centauros was hit by an internal 
struggle that led to the assassination of its leader, Miguel Arroyave, in September 2004. As a 
result, the Bloque Centauros split into three groups: the faction that was loyal to Arroyave 
(Leales a Arroyave) and that retained the franchise name of Bloque Centauros kept its 
presence in Casanare; the Héroes del Llano, headed by Jorge Pirata, and the Héroes del 
Guaviare, headed by Pedro Oliverio Guerrero, alias Cuchillo, both of whom were allegedly 
responsible for the death of Arroyave, had their stronghold in Meta (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2014: 193; Verdad Abierta, 2009; FIP, 2013). 
With the end of the internecine wars, the main paramilitary factions joined the AUC 
collective negotiations and demobilized between 2005 and 2006. The only exception was the 
ACC, which, following defeat, was nonetheless on the verge of dissolution. The following 
section describes the events that led to the rearmament under different name of some of the 
groups that demobilized in the first place. By national standards, thus, the demobilization in 
Meta was not successful. 
TABLE 5.2: PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION IN META 
Paramilitary group Date Location # of arms surrendered 
# of demobilized 
combatants 
Autodefensas Campesinas de 
Meta y Vichada 08/2005 
Puerto Gaitan, 
Meta 232 209 
Bloque Centauros 09/2005 Yopal, Casanare 705 1,134 
Frente Héroes del Llano y 
Héroes del Guaviare 04/2006 
Puerto Lleras, 
Meta 1,024 1,765 
Source: Adapted from ODDR, 2013: 90. 
At the national level, there were three practical steps of the collective demobilization 
process, which all demobilized paramilitary groups went through. These included: an 
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awareness-raising phase in which paramilitary members were prepared to the 
demobilization. Second, a cantonment phase with the laying down of arms and the 
registration in the list for the CODA processing. Last, the certification of the status of ex-
combatant and the start of the reintegration phase (Guaqueta, 2009; Nussio, 2012; Arias and 
Prieto, 2011). 
There is controversy over the total number of paramilitaries who demobilized. Pre-
demobilization estimates put their number between 10,000 and 20,000, with the actual 
number of demobilized ultimately exceeding 30,000. Speculation rose about the causes for 
these inflated numbers, suggesting that last-minute negotiations took place to the advantage 
of paramilitary units, which secured more subsidies from the state. It is also true – as 
demonstrated by the sample of interviewed ex-combatants – that several demobilized ex-
combatants were actually in supporting roles, and not directly involved in violent events.  
By all standards, the disarmament and demobilization phases have been successful in terms 
of collecting weapons, largely cutting ties between former combatants and the power 
structures of armed groups, and increasing security. Among others, the DDR programs have 
been one of the driving factors for the decrease of violence and drop of homicide rate in the 
country, particularly in main urban areas like Bogota, Medellin, and Cali. The homicide rate 
was halved from 70 to 35 per 100,000 inhabitants between 2002 and 2009, with the actual 
number of homicides going from 35,000 to 16,000 during that period. Associated with the 
drop in homicides, other heinous illegal practices also dramatically decreased, without 
disappearing though. This included extortions, massacres, and forced displacement, among 
others (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2015b: 137-138).  
5.2 The Politics and the Policies of Reintegration 
Definition of reintegration in Colombia. As it was explained in Chapter 2, the literature 
has largely exposed the gaps and failures of DDR programs to define clear outputs in terms 
of reintegration and establish feasible measurement outcomes, especially in the long term 
(Muggah, 2009). There is an underlying tension between short-term reinsertion and long-
term reintegration (Gomes Porto et al., 2007: 137-142). If the former is more easily 
measurable and quantifiable, nonetheless it fails to account for long term societal dynamics 
involving reconciliation, for example. As it was mentioned above and is further analysed 
here, between Uribe’s first and second term, Colombian policies shifted from reinsertion to 
reintegration goals when (a) the scale of demobilization dramatically increased with the 
DDR of the AUC; and (b) when the policy to incentivize desertion of FARC and ELN members 
became a core counterinsurgency strategy (Guaqueta and Arias, 2011). 
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In one of its programmatic documents, the Colombian National Council of Economic and 
Social Policy (CONPES in its Spanish acronym) defines ‘reintegration’ in the following terms: 
“The process through which the demobilized population acquire the status of civilian and 
obtain an employment and a sustainable income. Reintegration takes place primarily at the 
local level, it is part of the country’s development, and it constitutes a national responsibility 
that can be supplemented with international support” (CONPES, 2008: 7).  
This definition has two main components, namely, the individual and the structural 
dimensions of reintegration. At the structural level, there is an emphasis on the community 
level – the space where reintegration shall take place. It is at the local level that material and 
symbolic investments for reintegration are to be implemented. There is a reference to the 
national level as well, implying that achieving reintegration is a far-reaching goal, which is 
intertwined with broader development objectives. At the individual level, the definition 
highlights first of all the transition of an ex-combatant in terms of ‘status’. From a ‘military’ 
status the ex-combatant transitions to a ‘civilian’ one, implying the temporary nature of the 
status of ‘ex-combatant’ (Interview with key informant).  
Both individual and structural components of the CONPES definition are reflected in and are 
in line with the conceptual framework of this research. At the structural level, I conduct a 
comprehensive political economy of the conflict in Meta and of DDR in Colombia, which takes 
into account local contextual factors, actors’ behaviours and incentives, and national-level 
political and economic dynamics (Chapters 4-5). At the individual level, I investigate the 
employment dynamics of the individual transition from war to peace (Chapters 6-8).  
The CONPES definition also concerns the need to obtain a sustainable job in order to be fully 
reintegrated. This aspect stresses the productive role that an individual exercises as a 
member of society, and the related economic right of enjoying an adequate income. As it is 
amply reported in Chapters 6-8, the employment factor is not only an economic means. But it 
is also about regaining dignity and self-respect, and perceiving to hold individual agency 
within society. Because the time spent in an armed group is – among other things – an 
occupation and a day-to-day activity, the issue of obtaining a job after demobilization is one 
of the factors that most contributes to distancing the individual ex-combatant from his/her 
past in arms. This finding is further explored in Chapter 8. 
Reintegration strategy from Uribe to Santos. To put this programmatic definition into 
practice (from a policy standpoint), once the Presidential High Council for Reintegration 
(ACR) was established in 2006 with a stronger focus on reintegration, the first step was to 
harmonize the benefits and the reintegration route of both ex-guerrillas and ex-
paramilitaries. Although routes for the two groups were aligned, the cash allowance and the 
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seed funding to start a business were lower and more stringent for paramilitaries than for 
guerrilla members. Second, a shift to long-term reintegration implied that the original 2-year 
time limit for participants to stay in the program and receive benefits was abolished – as 
long as ex-combatants advanced in the process and completed milestones. An individual 
approach was also devised to attend the specific needs of each ex-combatant. 
Institutionally, the strengthened ACR-led program was put under the direct control of the 
President’s office – which gives a measure of how central the reintegration policy was for the 
Uribe’s administration. From a programmatic point of view, the new approach led to a 
number of significant changes, including: a strengthened psychological assistance; the launch 
of training to strengthen citizenship and reconciliation approaches; the establishment of first 
reception centres (“Peace House”) throughout the country; and a greater focus on economic 
reintegration through the introduction of new employment generation schemes and through 
stronger ties with the private sector. Some of these changes are further explored below. 
The shift from reinsertion to reintegration implied also further complexity in the way 
reintegration outcomes are assessed. There are no agreed indicators and benchmark of 
success among policy-makers that work on reintegration globally, as there is no 
standardized practice of what it takes to achieve reintegration. Reintegration’s outcomes are 
difficult to measure because the definition of reintegration itself is multifaceted and subject 
to context and to different interpretations. Reintegration is a volatile concept that defies a 
clear pattern of program implementation, requiring instead a longer term development 
approach. Many authors have argued for its separation from DDR, and for the inclusion of 
more manageable reinsertion goals (Gomes Porto et al., 2007: 137-142). Notwithstanding 
these considerations, the Colombian government signed up for an ambitious reintegration 
plan.  
However, the ACR decided not to disclose its indicators for successful reintegration. Reason 
is that given the complexity of how to measure reintegration, these indicators would have 
been subject to criticism in their attempt to define and circumscribe reintegration. Another 
reason relates to the highly top-down structure of the ACR, anchored under the President’s 
office. Although with field presence and regional offices, the ACR has always maintained a 
solid vertical structure. In Colombia, the information of what it takes for an ex-combatant to 
be reintegrated (“to graduate” in the Colombian DDR jargon) is not publicly available. By not 
disclosing indicators, what it takes to achieve reintegration in Colombia remains passible of 
subjective interpretations.   
Institutionally, the ACR proceeded to establish institutional and programmatic links with 
other layers of government, with the private sector and with civil society. This expansion 
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also meant that ‘reintegration’ had now a wider breadth, and had direct implications on 
socio-economic recovery and on reconciliation. Although the program was given resources 
to be able to attend the booming number of ex-combatants from both AUC and FARC/ELN, it 
ultimately failed on a number of programmatic and institutional respects. ACR’s centralized 
model under the President’s office did not allow for a ‘learning by doing’ approach nor for 
programmatic flexibility. Instead, it was based on models that, albeit thorough, were too 
rigid (Thorsell, 2013; Guaqueta and Arias, 2011). 
The economic reintegration program has also to be understood within the larger political 
context of the Uribe’s presidency. The peace agreement with the paramilitaries and the 
resulting DDR program were the product of a centralized and top-down approach by 
President Uribe and his cabinet, and not the result of a larger and inclusive political process 
in Colombia. The demobilization of the AUC was, in fact, a controversial outcome in the 
country, which was certainly not a textbook case of an open and encompassing peace 
process. Not only civil society and the political opposition criticized it, but also local and 
regional authorities were completely extraneous to the process. The DDR of the AUC was 
perceived more like an Uribe affair than a Colombian one. In fact, the economic reintegration 
strategy was also a top-down one, without the input and participation of the administrative 
regions, for example. Among other factors, its failure is, then, the result of a lack of inclusion 
and consultation with stakeholders (Thorsell, 2013: 202-203).   
The centralized and, to a certain extent, the secrecy of this process can be read through a 
political settlement lens. Peace with and DDR of paramilitaries are the result of a complex 
bargaining and balance of power dynamics – the full origins of which are not crystal clear. 
The scope and rationale of the paramilitaries’ DDR have to be analysed beyond DDR itself, to 
weigh in other factors, including: the fact that in 2002 (a year before the agreement to 
demobilize the AUC) the FARC reached the pinnacle of their power threatening to overthrow 
the government; the resulting or concomitant US-led Plan Colombia to militarily support 
Colombia against the FARC and to curb the illegal drugs production and trafficking. These 
factors can help contextualize the rationale for the DDR.   
Under Uribe, most of the focus and resources on peacebuilding would go toward ex-
combatants, at the expense of other conflict-affected populations and vulnerable groups. The 
centralized nature of the DDR program reflected the Uribe administration’s centralized 
security strategy, and DDR was a core part of this strategy. Nonetheless, reintegration cannot 
be forced upon society: a reintegration program has other dimensions on top of security. 
Uribe’s inner circle of policy makers, instead, treated economic reintegration on the same 
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line as a security and military issue, discarding societal and contextual factors, and economic 
and labor market considerations that enable reintegration.  
The election of Juan Manuel Santos to the presidency in 2010 represented a turn around for 
security and development policies in the country. A former Minister of Defence under Uribe, 
Santos departed from his predecessor and his polarizing policies. Although he kept a high 
military pressure on the FARC, he opened informal negotiations with the group, which led to 
the establishment of the formal peace process in 2012. On the peacebuilding side, the new 
administration passed the landmark Victims’ Law (1448/2011), which ruled schemes of 
reparation and land restitution that aimed to compensate the millions of Colombians who 
had been displaced and/or affected by the armed conflict. While initially Santos enjoyed 
greater legitimacy among Colombians after the polarization of Uribe’s rule, the final peace 
agreement with the FARC has been perceived as extremely divisive by Colombian society.  
In turn, the reintegration strategy, which took centre stage under Uribe lost relative 
importance with respect to other peacebuilding initiatives. Within the first few months of 
President Santos administration, the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (Agencia 
Colombiana para la Reintegración, which has the same acronym, ACR, as the previous one) 
was established. The new ACR adopted a decentralized approach, and was able to strengthen 
relationships with regional and local authorities. It progressively established thirty-four 
regional offices (Centros de Servicio) across the country, as of December 2016. The Centro de 
Servicio in Villavicencio, Meta – which is where I conducted most of the interviews with ex-
combatants – was responsible not only for Meta but also for most of the Eastern Llanos and 
the southern administrative departments of Guaviare, Vaupes and Guainia (ACR, 2013; 
Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011). 
Reintegration program in Colombia. Here, I briefly revisit the reintegration route that ex-
combatants follow and the range of benefits available to them. The next sub-section focuses 
specifically on the economic dimension of the program and the employment component. The 
pillars of the reintegration program are the following: 
Education is a core component of the whole program. It is understood as an essential vehicle 
for social and economic reintegration, including labor market participation. Education needs 
are tailored to the individual ex-combatant. There is the expectation that primary and 
secondary schools are completed in order to graduate from the DDR program. The education 
benefits cannot be extended over six years and half.   
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Healthcare: Ex-combatants and their family benefit from health services for as long as they 
are in the reintegration program. This includes preventive care, as well as issues of mental 
health, addiction and domestic violence.  
Psychosocial attention includes one-on-one assistance on psychological issues related to 
reintegration, including dealing with the legacy of war and the challenges of reinsertion, 
improving decision-making and conflict resolution skills, and managing interpersonal 
relationship. Psychosocial attention is not only a stand alone service available to ex-
combatants, but it is highly integrated in the reintegration route. This principle translates 
into the following practice: each ex-combatant is assigned to a specific reintegration officer 
(in Spanish, Professional Reintegrador), who follows his/her file throughout the whole 
reintegration process. In this role, the Professional Reintegrador provides individualized 
assistance not only in terms of psychosocial reintegration, but acts as a focal point, whom the 
ex-combatant goes to for the provision of all other benefits too. Usually a trained 
psychologist, the reintegration officer is responsible for the ex-combatant’s advancement 
toward reintegration. This centralized system around the reintegration officer was 
established in 2008 after the failure of the previous system. Up to 2008, the ex-combatant 
had to individually interface with different layers of bureaucracy to access the different 
benefits, creating duplication and confusion. The unintended consequence was that some ex-
combatants would either abandon the program or never access some of their benefits and 
requirements. The centralized system around the reintegration officer is more effective as it 
allows for a higher degree of monitoring, and for a streamlined access to benefits for the ex-
combatant.  
Community reintegration. The link with community is key for (re)-establishing social ties, 
promoting reconciliation, and ensuring that the ex-combatant is able to establish and 
maintain relationships within his/her social environment. The centrality of this aspect is 
confirmed by the CONPES definition. The approach recognizes that social and economic 
reintegration largely depends on the inclusion and involvement of local communities in the 
process. An additional goal is to strengthen community security, including through violence 
prevention approaches. 
As part of the community reintegration component, each ex-combatant has a mandatory 
requirement to complete a minimum of 80 hours of social and community work, in order to 
graduate from the program. These activities include public space and community area’s 
regeneration, cultural programs, but they can also concern preventive activities with 
vulnerable categories. The symbolic meaning of social work programs outweighs the 
material impact of these activities. Although it is hard to measure the ‘soft’ impact of social 
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work, these activities do play an important role for social cohesion and reconciliation 
through improving perceptions of ex-combatants among community members – in a context 
where stigmatization of ex-combatants is high. 
Community reintegration and the way it is conducted has been criticized by several of the 
key expert interviewees. As communities throughout the country – especially rural ones – 
have traditionally received little attention from the state, at times they have resented a 
renewed focus around ex-combatants’ concerns. Several experts suggest that community 
reintegration should instead be part of an integrated and larger community recovery 
approach, rather than a process driven by the reintegration program. This would reinforce 
legitimacy.  
Employment and economic reintegration. This research considers employment as a key 
component of economic reintegration. I demonstrate that there is a tight relationship 
between different employment experiences that ex-combatants go through during their life. 
Some of these experiences take place before being recruited in an armed group, while some 
take place even during the time spent in the armed groups. In fact, individuals gain 
meaningful employment experiences also when they are in arms – experiences that have an 
impact on reintegration and that can be valuable during the reintegration phase. 
Employment experiences (before and during armed group’s participation) influence the way 
the ex-combatant reintegrate from an employment point of view. Failing to recognize and to 
account for these previous employment experiences when devising a reintegration program 
is detrimental to the very success of economic reintegration. 
As far as economic reintegration is concerned, the Colombian program has two main 
components: namely, vocational training and income generation. The program encourages 
ex-combatants to enroll in vocational training activities (up to a maximum of two different 
cycles of trainings) in order to either learn or hone professional skills that can serve them to 
find an employment. Through a partnership with the National Training Service (Servicio 
Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA, which is ascribed to the Ministry of Labor), the ACR places 
ex-combatants into professional trainings according to individual needs and will. Vocational 
trainings concern virtually any profession, are conducted at different levels, and are adapted 
to the local labor market. The benefits related to vocational training run for a maximum of 
six years – provided that primary school has already been completed.  
Together with the reintegration officer’s counseling, ex-combatants devise a tailored plan 
that goes from acquiring the necessary training to finding a job. Such plan is based on the 
previous experience that the ex-combatant has in any given area, and his/her will. For many 
ex-combatants that I interviewed, the vocational training is also an opportunity to explore 
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potential professional careers. This applies mainly to those ex-combatants with no prior 
working experience except for the armed group. As it is reported in Chapters 6-7, some of 
the FARC members that I interviewed spent their entire life in the group, and are, thus, 
devoid of any professional skill whatsoever. 
The second component of the economic reintegration stream concerns income generation. 
Income generation can, first, take the form of supporting formal employment and job 
placement for ex-combatants. In this area, despite modest achievements, the ACR has 
worked hard to mobilize the private sector to hire ex-combatants. The role of the private 
sector in harnessing peacebuilding and supporting DDR has been recognized as key by the 
literature (International Alert, 2006: 144-152). In Colombia, formal institutional links have 
been established on an ad hoc basis, including programs to train ex-combatants, provide 
apprenticeships etc. A further incentive for the private sector came in 2010. Under Santos’ 
watch, the Law of Formalization and Job Creation (1429/2010) extended tax benefits to 
businesses which employed individuals from certain vulnerable groups, including ex-
combatants (Guaqueta and Orsini, 2007; Thorsell, 2013: 192). Overall, results are 
encouraging. As of December 2016, 73% of ex-combatants at the national level who are, or 
have been, part of the program are reported to have an occupation. Of these, 70% are 
employed in the informal sector, and 30% in the formal one (ACR, 2016). 
However, as it is further analysed in Chapter 8, ex-combatants report being subject to 
discrimination due to their status, including on the workplace. There is a considerable 
societal stigma placed on ex-combatants. To offset negative perceptions, the ACR runs 
campaigns to sensitize the private sector and, more recently, to increase the visibility of its 
employment-related activities (MAPP-OAS, 2015; Nussio, 2012). Institutionally, the 
reintegration program also establishes ties with local chambers of commerce and other 
actors. The goal is to enhance employment opportunity for ex-combatants through matching 
ex-combatants’ skillset and labor supply with the labor market needs. Results are mixed: on 
the one hand, there are successful best practices of private sector involvement that have led 
to sustainable formal employment for ex-combatants. On the other hand, results had failed to 
scale up on a macro level – at least up to 2014 when fieldwork was conducted (Derks, Rouw 
and Briscoe, 2011; Guaqueta and Arias, 2011).  
In addition to employment support schemes, the ACR may also support business plans of ex-
combatants. This policy was central under Uribe whereas it became a secondary policy 
under Santos. Given some specific requirements, the ACR is able to provide seed funding to 
ex-combatants to either support an existing business or to start up a new one. Between 2003 
and 2013, a total of 8,879 participants have had access to funds to either build or support a 
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business plan (ACR, 2013). An ex-combatant – or a group of them – designs a business plan 
and submit it to the ACR for approval. If accepted, the ACR provides start up capital.  
Initially, funds were distributed parsimoniously, against business plans that resulted either 
unviable or unsustainable. Instances of corruption were reported to have taken place too. 
Several reintegration officers that I interviewed signaled that ex-combatants either lacked 
the necessary skills to set up a business or collected the funds in bad faith. As a result, the 
rate of plans that translated into sustainable businesses has been low, despite a considerable 
investment of resources from the program.  
Since 2009, the entrepreneurial scheme has been subject to a number of modifications. A 
series of stringent criteria to vet proposals and ex-combatants who submit them are applied, 
including level of education, training received, and degree of participation in the program’s 
activities. Programmatically, the scope of grants were expanded: it is now possible for ex-
combatants to access a grant to support housing needs, and not only a new business, when 
the ex-combatant has retained a job for a minimum of 12 months.  
In sum, in the last few years, there has been a consequential shift in priorities from 
promoting entrepreneurship to supporting employability of ex-combatants, which is 
currently seen as the most adapt vehicle to economic reintegration. Overall, there is evidence 
that the business generation program have failed to produce sufficient revenues for 
individual businesses and sustainable results. Although an internal study estimated that 70% 
of 4,750 business grants provided by the program as of 2011 resulted into active businesses, 
there is more evidence that points to an overall failure due to lack of entrepreneurial skills 
and market penetration. The shift from entrepreneurship to employability is also the result 
of the transition from the reintegration model under Uribe, which was focused on a one-size-
fits-all approach to the Santos approach, which privileges context specificity and local level 
implementation (Thorsell, 2013: 189-198).  
5.3 The Political Economy of Post-DDR Security in Meta 
Although the demobilization of the AUC was followed by an overall decrease in violence 
throughout the country, still there are broader security considerations that are associated 
with the demobilization of the AUC and that are worth being analysed. First of all, the issue of 
power and order. Once the AUC demobilized, this situation created a power vacuum at the 
local level in several conflict-affected regions of Colombia. The vacuum concerned the 
political, social, economic and security orders. As it was analysed in Chapter 2, non-state 
armed groups establish ad hoc governance structures and power arrangements in the areas 
that either they control or on which they exercise influence. Non-state armed groups create 
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institutions for political control and for maintaining security, and establish a social contract 
with the people living in their areas – which can be based on fear and terror, for example. As 
part of these institutions and arrangements, armed groups also perform economic functions: 
they collect taxes, allocate resources and shape economic activities.  
The demise of a non-state armed group is necessarily followed by a new power arrangement 
between other authorities, which at times may either compete or cooperate. Among new 
institutions that are in charge, there can be the state as well as there can be other non-state 
armed groups. These authorities are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they often co-exist 
through formal or informal arrangements. When a non-state armed group completely 
controls an area, still there is some influence from the state – even if it is ineffective. For 
example, a FARC-run municipality may still be formally headed by a mayor. In the economic 
sphere, arrangements that are mutually beneficial and multiple sources of power and control 
are even more common. 
In the Colombia case, the AUC demobilization was not accompanied by a direct state strategy 
to regain the areas previously in the hands of paramilitary factions. This is easily said than 
done. Colombia’s conflict is characterized by highly context-specific dynamics, as it was 
analysed. A homogenous national-level strategy would have not necessarily worked. In 
addition, demobilized paramilitary blocs were virtually scattered around the whole country. 
Thus, to succeed, a strategy to repossess areas from the departing paramilitaries would have 
been not only extremely costly, but also complex, as it would have had to involve and secure 
the buy-in from all levels of state authority (national, regional and local) and operate on all 
spheres (security, political, social and development levels). In terms of state resources, most 
of the state’s focus and priorities were directed toward undermining the FARC. Simply, there 
may have not been enough capacity to also attend security and development in former 
paramilitary areas.   
Whatever the cause, the state demonstrated weakness and/or inability to fill the power 
vacuum. In fact, some of the political, social and economic spaces left empty by demobilized 
AUC blocs were swiftly filled in by the rise of new criminal groups. To a certain extent and 
under circumstances that are different from region to region, BACRIM (or Bandas Criminales, 
literally “criminal bands”) inherited illegal activities from the old paramilitaries (Figure 5.1). 
The government of Colombia has designated five BACRIMs following the AUC 
demobilization. These are: the People’s Revolutionary Counterinsurgent Army of Colombia 
(Ejercito Revolucionario Popular Antisubversivo de Colombia, best known as ERPAC) 
operating in the Llanos (see a discussion below); Los Urabeños, Los Rastrojos, Renacer and 
Los Machos. The scale of the remobilization (or mobilization) and the nature of this process 
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have been debated in the literature. Given several continuities, some authors speak of ‘neo-
paramilitaries’ or ‘narco-paramilitaries’, together with BACRIMs. Due to the uncertainty of 
definition and characterization, the two terms are used here interchangeably (International 
Crisis Group, 2012; Masse, 2011; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015b; Indepaz, 
2012). 
FIGURE 5.1: PRESENCE OF BACRIMS (2013) 
BACRIMs’ Influence in Areas ‘with’ Previous AUC Presence (Red Color) and in Areas ‘without’ Previous 
AUC Presence (Grey Color). 
 
Source: Echandia Castilla, 2013: 23 
Since the AUC demobilization, Colombia has suffered from many security issues, some of 
which, however, predate the demobilization process. These include: persistent drugs 
trafficking and other rising illicit economic activities; process of recidivism of demobilized 
ex-combatants and remobilization of armed groups; rise of armed groups that are 
fundamentally criminal in nature with no political agenda. Arguably, these issues that have 
permeated the conflict in Colombia are a consequence of the original sin by the state: i.e. the 
failure to regain former conflict-affected areas after the AUC dissolved (Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2015b; Masse, 2011). 
Security and remobilization in Meta. In Meta – as well as in the rest of the country – there 
are both elements of continuity and elements of rupture between the pre-DDR of the AUC 
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and the post-DDR situation. These elements are analysed here. Notwithstanding the 
demobilization that involved all groups (except for the ACC), there was a high incidence of 
either remobilization of old groups or formation of new ones. By several accounts, the 
demobilization of some of the groups in the region took place only on paper. In reality, some 
of the old paramilitary structures and chains of command in Meta only transmigrated to new 
ones. In sum, there may have been more continuity than rupture for some of the group. The 
events described below surrounding alias Cuchillo and the formation of the ERPAC follow 
this script.  
Nonetheless, if one assesses the post-demobilization phase from the point of view of state 
formation, power arrangements and competition between state and non-state armed groups, 
then, what may transpire is a situation in which there has been a substantial state 
strengthening vis-à-vis non-state armed groups. If momentarily we leave the FARC on the 
side, by demobilizing the paramilitaries the state was able to reassert itself politically and 
strengthen its feeble monopoly of violence. While it is true that there are new actors with 
illicit interests and political power, this situation is qualitatively different from the pre-DDR 
situation. Then, a nation-wide federation of paramilitary blocs with a political agenda had 
the power to influence – and at times dominate – the state legitimate authority.  
Indeed, there are substantial differences between the AUC era and the post-demobilization 
phase. The context has changed from the era when paramilitary groups had a national 
agenda, and established a unified federation. After the AUC demise, first, there has not been a 
centre of paramilitary power, like the AUC, with a somewhat coherent political agenda. 
Second, going through demobilization, paramilitary groups have been completely taken out 
of the picture – as far as the state is concerned. In fact, their heirs have been labeled 
“criminal bands”, and the state has clearly dismissed any legitimacy to this new 
counterinsurgent project. This is demonstrated by the surrender of part of the ERPAC in 
2011: by categorically avoiding being pulled in talks with the ERPAC, the state made clear 
that the BACRIM issue was permanently a law enforcement and judicial one, with no political 
angles. As told below, the ERPAC was going to be treated as any criminal outfit (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015b; Masse, 2011). 
When one assesses the regional conflict dynamics in Meta and the state security response, 
there are important continuities between the two phases, i.e. old paramilitaries and new 
BACRIM. The new criminal groups, although equipped with an either loose or non-existent 
political agenda, have inherited some of the old economic interests of paramilitaries, as well 
as their modus operandi in terms of forced displacement, land eviction, and human rights 
abuses (International Crisis Group, 2012). From a security perspective, the new groups are 
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much harder to counteract. Affiliations are loose, groups are smaller, and allegiances 
constantly shift. BACRIMs “display a constant process of mutation in which once [a group’s] 
leaders leave their post (either due to homicide, capture or death in combat), mid-
commanders rise to power; the armed group is then either absorbed in or sold to another 
larger criminal structure, or disappears altogether.” (FIP, 2013: 3, 19-20).  
Given this context and dynamics, since the AUC demobilization and until 2013, three 
generations of BACRIM have operated in Meta (Figure 5.2). The first generation concerns the 
immediate post-DDR, with alias Cuchillo as its undisputed protagonist. Despite the 
demobilization of the Héroes del Guaviare, its leader, Cuchillo, refused to turn himself in 
together with the other paramilitary commanders, who were gathered in La Ceja, Antioquia. 
He returned to illegality to form a new group based out of Meta, the ERPAC. Given its strong 
leadership, ERPAC is sometimes referred to as Los Cuchillos (literally, “knives” in Spanish) 
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 193). 
FIGURE 5.2: PRESENCE OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN META (2011) 
 
Source: Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 211.  
The ERPAC started an armed campaign in 2006-2007, which succeeded in defeating a rival 
criminal group known as Los Macacos, or Paisas. The group benefitted from the inertia of the 
regular military and had an estimated death toll of up to 800 casualties. The offensive aimed 
at controlling the Meta river corridor and those strategic areas for drugs production and 
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trafficking. Once again in Colombian history of war, territorial control is both the means and 
the end of counterinsurgent practices. ERPAC’s actions were based on ruthless tactics that 
included forced displacement and systematic human rights violations (e.g. disappearances, 
threats, extrajudicial killings) against those communities that were perceived as FARC’s 
constituents. By all means, the ERPAC operated as a paramilitary organization, intent on 
weakening the guerrilla and pursuing counterinsurgent plans. At the same time, it is 
reported that the ERPAC signed an alliance with the FARC’s Front 43 to split commercial 
routes for drugs trafficking. Thus, the ERPAC’s project was mainly an economic one (Human 
Rights Watch, 2010: 72-74; FIP, 2013; International Crisis Group, 2012; Echandia Castilla, 
2013; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014). 
One of the main difference with the pre-DDR phase in Meta is that the security context and 
the non-state armed groups’ dynamics are now more fluid. Non-state armed groups 
“transformed themselves, they disappeared and reappeared according to specific 
circumstances and internal dynamics; therefore, what also changed was their geographic 
location, strategies and behaviours, all of which were based on drugs trafficking’s logic and 
concerns.” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014: 270). Smaller groups are affiliated 
and/or pledge allegiance to bigger ones, or are even sold and bought as franchises. With the 
result that an accurate mapping of armed groups is not possible. For example, the infamous 
group of the Aguilas Negras (literally “Black Eagles”) were reported to operate in Meta, 
under the leadership of Cuchillo. At its peak, in 2009, the ERPAC extended its influence to 
Meta, Guaviare and Vichada, and numbered between 770 and 3,000 combatants, depending 
on the number of franchises that are included (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 72-74; FIP, 
2013).  
After Cuchillo’s death at the hands of the national police in 2010, a second generation of 
BACRIM in Meta rose under the leadership of alias Caracho. In November 2011, together 
with 272 combatants – an estimated third of the total number of ERPAC’s members at that 
moment in time – alias Caracho turned himself in. This represented a unique case of a 
collective surrender of a BACRIM. The ERPAC’s faction was not granted any legal benefit – to 
the dismay of some of the rank and file members who believed they were going to be 
demobilized. By not getting involved, the government was clear in characterizing the 
surrender to authorities as a law enforcement issue, and not a demobilization process (FIP, 
2013: 21; International Crisis Group, 2012; Masse and Camargo Castro, 2013; Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014). 
The third generation of paramilitaries in the Eastern Llanos appeared in 2012. Two main 
rival groups rose on the ashes of the ERPAC. The first one is the Libertadores del Vichada. 
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Headed by Pijarvey and conformed by nearly 180 combatants, it has presence primarily in 
Vichada, and in some parts of northern Meta. Libertadores del Vichada pursues similar 
economic agendas as other BACRIMs, including control of drugs trafficking routes. This 
group controls the drugs trafficking’s strategic corridors that run throughout northern and 
eastern Meta. Smaller in size and with a presence in the Ariari, the second BACRIM is the 
Bloque Meta, which has been seeking territorial expansion over the vacuum left by the 
ERPAC’s surrender. Although the two groups were in competition, they did not openly fight 
one another, but they mostly used selective homicide as their way of confrontation. There 
are different interpretations surrounding the genesis, latest dynamics and the confrontation 
between Libertadores del Vichada and Bloque Meta. It is also reported that the powerful 
BACRIM of Los Urabeños established its presence in the Llanos following the demise of the 
ERPAC, and that they either influence or control the Bloque Meta (FIP, 2013: 22; 
International Crisis Group, 2012; Masse and Camargo Castro, 2013; Centro Nacional de 
Memoria Histórica, 2014: 269-282; ODDR, 2013b). 
To assess the level of violence associated with BACRIMs and other neo-paramilitary groups 
in Meta since the DDR of the AUC, it is important to provide some statistics. Between 2008 
and 2011, the level of incidence of these non-state armed groups has substantially increased 
in Meta. The percentage of municipalities with BACRIMs’ presence rose from 41% to 65% in 
the 2008-2011 timeframe. Out of a total number of 29 municipalities in Meta, those with 
armed groups’ presence have increased from 12 in 2008, to 13 (2009), to 16 (2010), all the 
way up to 20 in 2011. Such increase is mirrored at the national level too: 259 municipalities 
were recorded with BACRIMs or other groups presence in 2008, rising to 406 in 2011 
(Indepaz, 2012: 3).  
With respect to the homicide rate in Meta, there has been a substantial decrease over the last 
decade (Figure 5.3). Such decrease has, however, been quite irregular. Homicide rate has 
increased during the height of paramilitary confrontation in Meta during 2000-2003 and 
again in 2005-2007. Overall, it has nonetheless dramatically decreased, although the 
homicide rate is higher in Meta than in the rest of the country. At the national level, instead, 
the homicide rate has decreased steadily year by year since 2000 (FIP, 2013). 
The contradiction between the parallel increase in BACRIM’s presence and decrease in 
homicide rate is evident, and deemed of different interpretations. One observation is that the 
proliferation of non-state armed groups does not have to necessarily be accompanied by 
increased levels of violence. The multiplication of armed groups may signify a greater 
equilibrium in terms of authority and local-level balance of power. As it was seen in Chapter 
2, political order emanates from different sources and it is not necessarily associated with 
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state presence. The situation in Meta and Colombia following the DDR of the AUC seems to 
follow a pattern in which (increased) order is the result of a more stable equilibrium 
between non-state armed groups. 
FIGURE 5.3: HOMICIDE TRENDS IN META AND COLOMBIA, 2000-2012 
   
Source: FIP, 2013: 25. 
Numbers and data also need to be contextualized. In the early 2000s, levels of violence 
skyrocketed as a result of paramilitary internal infighting, and FARC’s strengthened military 
capacity. The subsequent DDR of the AUC and the weakening of the FARC decreased the 
overall levels of violence, which however started from a very high point in the first place. 
Nonetheless, the ambivalent data that was proposed above, give further validity to the 
political economy approach of this research, which sees actual balance of power and 
alternative forms of order and authority as the appropriate lens of analysis to understand 
war and post-war dynamics.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a comprehensive review of the dynamics surrounding the DDR 
process with the AUC and with individual members of the FARC in Colombia and Meta, in 
particular. A review of the DDR policies has been accompanied by a thorough discussion of 
the dilemmas of implementing a DDR strategy in the midst of an armed conflict. In turn, the 
implications for state-building and formation are complex and multifaceted. If, on the one 
hand, the demobilization of the AUC has taken out one important actor of the armed conflict 
and has somewhat reinforced state legitimacy and monopoly of force, still, on the other hand, 
there is a cloud over the short-term security achievements and the long-term peacebuilding 
implications. 
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In parallel, the chapter has focused on reintegration, in particular economic reintegration. It 
has introduced the employment factor as an important variable of reintegration outcomes. 
This also serves as an introduction to the empirical chapters, which treat employment as a 
core dimension in the individual and structural transition from war to peace. 
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6. Transition From Civilian Life to the 
Armed Group: Dynamics and Drivers of 
Recruitment and Mobilization 
The first important issue to be tackled is the one of recruitment, which is the first phase of 
the three-phase analysis on war to peace transition. It is relevant to understand the ‘why’ 
and the dynamics by which men and women join either the insurgency or the paramilitary. 
Since I consider armed groups as employers, then, it is important to know how and why 
individuals started ‘working’ for this peculiar employer in the first place.  
In this sense, recruitment is the first step of a comprehensive analysis concerning non-state 
armed groups as employers, which also includes career paths within the organization, tasks 
and role, reasons for termination (i.e. demobilization) and for possible re-entry (i.e. 
recidivism), and the connection between job experiences before, during and after conflict.     
The rest of this chapter deals with some recurring patterns of recruitment, based on the 
experiences of thirty-one ex-combatants, with whom I held one-on-one interviews. In line 
with the conceptual framework of individual, organizational, and structural frameworks of 
analysis, I isolated some dynamics of recruitment. 
All interviews started with questions about recruitment. In particular, I was interested in 
hearing about the reasons and circumstances surrounding the transition from civilian life to 
joining an armed actor. I would ask the interviewee about the events that lead him/her to get 
involved with the armed group. Interviews include ex-combatants’ personal story of being 
recruited or entering the group. I, thus, collected a number of testimonies on what the 
individual motivations, the context, the external incentives and the pulling factors were, as 
well as the existing structural factors.  
By underlining the dynamics and reasons why someone goes to war, I am, in fact, making 
broader considerations related to conflict dynamics. As it is seen below, the question of 
recruitment is functional to the understanding of the structural dynamics of conflict. Hence, a 
three-level analysis reconciles (i) individual motivations and occurrences for joining an 
armed group; (ii) structural factors that are related to conflict dynamics and which play an 
equally important part in the decision to go to war; and (iii) organizational explanations 
centered around the armed group itself – including its incentives and promises, its appeal 
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and its strategies and patterns of recruitment. Table 6.3 at the end of the chapter 
summarizes the main findings. 
The chapter summarizes and highlights some of the most interesting stories and insights 
related to recruitment that come out of the interviews. Then, it is organized along the above 
three levels of analysis – as all the other empirical chapters are as well. In particular, the 
chapter underlines one specific driver of recruitment, which has traditionally been 
overlooked by the literature. This concerns the lack of employment in the legal economy 
(including the informal sector), and the employment opportunity provided by an armed 
group as a motivating factor to join a group. I posit that ‘employment’ represents the missing 
factor among the recurring explanations for recruitment. The quest for meaningful 
employment can be hardly categorized within either individual or organizational or 
structural approaches, but it is a blend – a grey area that carries elements from all 
approaches.  
An important caveat has to be added here. Dividing up the factors for recruitment in 
individual, organizational and structural levels is an artificial construction done by the 
researcher. Interviewees were simply asked to describe their recruitment and the 
circumstances leading up to it. Based on available data, I classified recruitment drivers 
according to the above three levels of analysis.  
I argue that recruitment is a function of a combination of individual, organizational and 
structural reasons. Indeed, each personal story of recruitment is made of a unique mix of 
these three levels. I am not arguing that some reasons are more important than others 
(ideology over socialization, for example); or that some explanations are more recurring 
than others. What I am trying to do, instead, is to single out specific reasons in order to 
dissect them. The aim is to show how each reason contributes to the overall and final 
outcome of joining a non-state armed group. In conclusion, the single drivers of recruitment 
– when they are taken alone – are necessary but not sufficient ingredients to explain the 
phenomenon of recruitment. Instead, it is when they are analysed in their inter-relationship 
and complexity that the explanations of recruitment are more convincing.   
The chapter deals with drivers of recruitment along the three levels of analysis (individual, 
structural, organizational). It is accordingly divided into three main sections corresponding 
to the three levels of analysis – a structure that is replicated in the following two empirical 
chapters. It opens with the analysis of the ways and the circumstances by which ex-
combatants either joined, or were approached and recruited by non-state armed groups. At 
the individual level, motivations of recruitment are related to episodes of trauma 
experienced by the ex-combatant, which, in turn, generate feelings of revenge and hatred, 
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and ultimately play a role in him/her taking sides and mobilizing. The section about 
structural factors of recruitment include ideology and indoctrination; socialization 
mechanisms and the role played by social and family networks; and the structural conflict 
dynamics. In areas where non-state armed groups exercise power and territorial control, 
going to war is often one of the few options available. Thus, one of the propositions of this 
chapter is to test the hypothesis that the  employment opportunity provided by armed 
groups is a key driver of recruitment. A final section on the organizational level deals with 
some recruiting patterns and tactics utilized by non-state armed groups.   
6.1 Individual Level: Personal Stories of Mobilization 
MOBILIZATION AND TRAJECTORIES OF EMPLOYMENT BEFORE ARMED GROUP’S MEMBERSHIP 
All interviewed ex-combatants (including 18 ex-guerrilla and 13 ex-paramilitaries) have 
been keen to remember and share the story and the circumstances of their recruitment. 
These episodes provide valuable data that go beyond the individual account, but provide 
insights on the conflict dynamics, on participating actors and their modus operandi. This 
section will be divided into: first, the stories of mobilization and recruitment by ex-members 
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia, FARC); second, ex-paramilitaries’ accounts of recruitment.  
Table 6.1 includes a few features of ex-combatants’ social and family background. The 
objective is to capture the main differences between ex-FARC and ex-members of the United 
Self Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) in terms of their 
origin.58 One of the purpose of this chapter is, in fact, to account also for the different socio-
economic starting points of ex-combatants, i.e. before being recruited by armed groups. 
FARC stories of recruitment and mobilization. Cesar59 – a 45-year-old man from Guaviare 
– voluntarily demobilized in 2010 after 27 years in the FARC. His story is one of the most 
complete and revealing – as the introduction emphasized. In a two hour interview, Cesar 
demonstrated to be an articulate man – a clear sign and indication of his role as a political 
mobilizer and leader of peasantry while in the FARC. From humble peasant origins, Cesar 
grew up in a background of rural warfare and fight for land. He explains how land 
exploitation and unequal property structure generated rampant inequality and chronic 
poverty, and as a consequence mounting grievances, political and armed mobilization 
followed. 
                                                        
58 See Annexes 1 and 2 for a full demographic profile of ex-combatants that are part of the sample. 
59 Those that appear in this research are not the real names of interviewed ex-combatants. In order to protect 
their identity, all names have been changed to invented names.   
 163
TABLE 6.1: EX-COMBATANTS’ BACKGROUND BEFORE RECRUITMENT 
 FARC (18 XCs) AUC (13 XCs) 
Social origin Rural (17) Small town (6), Urban (4), Rural (3)  
Family background Peasants (17) No clear pattern: services, public sector, peasantry, illegality 
Jobs held prior to recruitment Landless peasantry (17) Military (4). Others, mostly unstable and unsecure employment 
Domestic abuse or neglect 
(N. of XCs who volunteered info)  8 4 
Cesar’s father had been a liberal guerrilla member during the civil war in the Llanos of the 
early 1950s; subsequently, he joined the FARC until his death in 1979, when Cesar was only 
13 years old. Despite passing when Cesar was still very young, his father’s figure and 
influence are central to Cesar’s story of recruitment and political mobilization. He was raised 
in a rigid communist environment, permeated by profound sensibility toward injustice and 
class division, pride and respect for peasant work, and a strong sense of personal morality. 
Cesar describes his recruitment at 17 years old as a life choice and a service: a choice of 
commitment to struggle on behalf of the poorest, the hard working individuals, and the 
exploited ones.60 As many other ex-FARC members, he recalls the FARC often visiting and 
providing help to his family after his father passed. Living in an area dominated by the FARC, 
Cesar’s family was out of the reach of the state and its services, including health and 
education. In such circumstances of complete state’s absence, ex-combatants describe the 
FARC as a state within a state – an organization tasked with providing services, solving local 
conflicts, and sensitizing peasant communities to class struggle and land reform.  
Vast parts of rural areas in Colombia have historically been neglected and marginalized 
areas, which the FARC turned into strongholds. The FARC would easily win the battle for 
hearts and minds by being close to and cooperating with its political constituency, i.e. the 
peasantry, and by acting as a de facto state. In a region of colonization like Meta and the 
Eastern Llanos, the marginalization feature is even more pronounced. Some areas controlled 
by the guerrilla were marginalized and out of the state’s reach even before the appearance of 
the 20th Century land conflicts. 
“I lived in a red zone: there, the ones that are in charge are the FARC. In those villages where 
they are present, they exercise full control”61, says Roberto, a 31-year-old ex-FARC member 
from Vichada, who remembers the FARC visiting his family’s farm since he was 8 years old. 
                                                        
60 Interview held in December 2012, Villavicencio. 
61 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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Roberto was finally recruited at 16. “In these settings, in these areas, the FARC was the law. I 
discovered who the police and the army were when I was already a grown up. Because in 
these remote regions the FARC is the law, the army, and the government”62, adds Cristina, 
who was abused and neglected by her family and then taken by the FARC when she was 8 
years old. 
Several ex-FARC members stress FARC’s generosity and commitment toward helping 
individual households with their livelihoods as a determining factor for joining the group. 
Laura, 28 years old from San Juan de Arama in the medium Ariari, spent 10 years in the 
FARC. She says that she “was not recruited, I joined voluntarily. I was 15 years old and I 
enlisted because I liked the FARC, because I grew up in this environment. Where the FARC 
were, they would look after people, and provide help if one needed it. My mum was a single 
mother with three kids to be raised by herself after her husband died. Then, she remarried 
and I was born. But my father left too. She was left with five kids all by herself. Therefore, 
when there was need, the FARC would give us food, things, cooperate with supplies and 
logistics. I mean, they would help out. Thus, a child becomes fascinated by such behaviour 
and actions. And you start admiring this type of environment, and grow up with this idea. It 
is like a child that grows up in the city looking up to the police and saying “As a grown up I 
want to enlist in the military or join the police because I like it”.”63  
Similarly, Enrique joined the FARC at 9 years old, recalling that the FARC “would often come 
to my family’s farm. We were poor and came from very humble background. And they came 
bringing us some food. We would eat what they gave us, a bit of rice, pasta etc. Thus, I grew 
fond of them, until one day I left the house and followed them.”64 As it appears from these 
descriptions, one recurrent feature that all ex-combatants growing up in FARC-controlled 
areas shared is the peasantry background and the humble origins associated with chronic 
poverty dynamics (Ferro and Uribe, 2002; Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012).  
A second typology of ex-combatants from the FARC is those who started to operate with the 
FARC as external members, either because they were doing business with the FARC, or had 
some other role (political, for example); or, more commonly, they were young teens 
supporting the FARC with logistics and transportation. Nine ex-FARC and one ex-ELN 
members (out of a total of 18 ex-guerrilla) were involved with the rebels in some capacity 
before being enlisted. Walter, 19 years old, spent only eight months in the FARC before 
deciding to flee. He admitted of “having done favors and small things [for them] since I was 
very little. They would come to our land, and ask for favors like “bring this over there”. I 
                                                        
62 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
63 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
64 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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would help by transporting food, supplies and documents, etc. I started [in the FARC] that 
way.”65 
Giovanni, 24 years old, explains in detail the transition that he experienced from his own job 
into being a FARC member. His family worked with cattle in a FARC-dominated area, but 
they were poor. “My uncle worked with cattle for different clients, including the FARC. 
Because the FARC also own cattle! […] I first started working with the organization not as a 
guerrilla member, but as a laborer with cattle. Afterwards, I got more involved until I ended 
up within the FARC itself.”66 
Roberto describes how his family would cooperate with the FARC when he was a child. “They 
[FARC] would come to us and ask to use our truck to transport supplies and their people. We 
never lent it: either my dad or I would always go and take them. […] “I won’t give it to you, I’ll 
take you”, my dad would say. Therefore, I started going to the guerrilla camps, meeting 
people there. Progressively, I had to go and transport food, supplies, logistics. At the end, 
they enlisted me, just like that.”67 
Sometimes, ex-combatants got involved with the FARC for accidental reasons – for example, 
an economic migrant would move to an area dominated by the FARC. It is the case of Sergio, 
37 years old from Puerto Lopez, Meta, who spent two years in the FARC in his mid-30s. From 
a poor rural family, Sergio worked not only in agriculture but also in the construction sector 
and as a generic laborer. He would move according to job opportunities. He moved to 
Vistahermosa – a FARC stronghold in low Ariari – and met with the organization while being 
a seller of small farming products. He started working with the FARC as “a trader, and they 
would pay me. I would go and buy things for them, and come back, and transport supplies. 
When I fully realized what I was doing, I was already fully involved and they integrated 
me.”68 
Fernan also had a similar experience. He spent fourteen years in the FARC, from 17 to 31 
years old. Originally from San Vicente del Caguan in Caqueta – an area from where the 
military pulled out completely as part of the failed peace process of 1998-2002 – Fernan 
grew up in a humble peasant family. “Integration [in the group] occurred as they would come 
[to my family’s farm] and meet with us, play football with us; therefore, they encourage you 
to follow their life path. […] So, one starts to admire them. That is what happened to me. With 
time, I would go to the camp, do small jobs, move supplies, transport food with my dad’s car. 
                                                        
65 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
66 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio 
67 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
68 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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I went and went back again. In the end, after two years of working with them this way, 
abruptly they told me: “Now, you belong to us”.”69 
As it is clear from the interviews, several ex-FARC members experienced a somewhat similar 
pattern. Many of them got progressively involved with the FARC to the point that the 
organization decided then to enlist them. To summarize, these are the most recurrent 
features in terms of recruitment and mobilization among ex-FARC members – all of which 
will be further analysed in the next sections: 
 Living in a FARC-dominated area with no state presence. 
 FARC acting as a state within the state and performing social and political functions 
(i.e. rebel governance). 
 Peasantry background and poverty. 
 Strong relationship between the FARC and the peasantry. 
 Progressive individual involvement with the FARC would lead to mobilization: from 
supporting roles to full membership. 
One further aspect that will be analysed in the next few sections concerns the degree to 
which the decision to join was a voluntary one, or it was forced. The above quotes already 
provide some hints to which one is the answer. In fact, I will bring evidence that there is not 
a single answer to this question: to some ex-combatants, the ideology, the display of 
solidarity and the role model of FARC members played an important role in their decision to 
mobilize; others, instead, perceived their recruitment almost as an abduction.  
Before moving on to these aspects, let us first hear some stories of mobilization from ex-
paramilitaries.    
Paramilitary’s stories of recruitment. Personal stories of recruitment and mobilization 
from ex-paramilitaries are quite different from the FARC ones. In particular, whereas ex-
FARC’s recruitment was quite homogenous in terms of dynamics and experiences, ex-
paramilitaries that I interviewed had quite different experiences among them. First of all, 
there are both rural- and urban-based paramilitaries, with different backgrounds and 
upbringings. Second, there are ex-paramilitaries that were never in a combat role but 
performed a variety of different functions – or so they claim. In turn, their recruitment 
patterns were also different. 
Nonetheless, despite more heterogeneous experiences, the motivations for ex-paramilitaries 
to join a non-state armed group are somewhat similar. The overwhelming majority of ex-
paramilitaries refer to the lack of employment as the main cause of their mobilization. In fact, 
                                                        
69 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
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the employment opportunity factor is much stronger for ex-AUC than for ex-FARC. Several 
stories highlight the centrality of the employment aspect and the need for a job. As per 
guerrilla members, recruitment is not exclusively and necessarily associated with a choice, 
but a whole spectrum of individual and structural factors play a role in recruitment 
dynamics (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012).  
Alejandro, 35 years old, is from Granada, Meta, a town that has traditionally been a 
paramilitary stronghold. After spending eight years in the regular army in the Amazonas 
border post of Leticia, and later in his hometown, Alejandro quit “because I did not see any 
future. You know, a professional soldier will gain the same wage all his life.” He then worked 
in the construction sector as a day laborer, but without long term prospects – always looking 
for better opportunities. “I was in such situation when I was approached [by a paramilitary]. 
[…] He tells me: “You see, we are looking for people with military background to come and 
work for us”.”70  
Radamael, a 34-year-old from Villavicencio, was also a professional military for over seven 
years. After he quit, he went through economic hardship and unemployment, until a friend 
helped him to join the AUC. His military background helped, he claims. Radamael laments his 
lack of good judgment and poor decision-making for joining the paramilitaries, admitting 
that the job prospect was the main driver of his mobilization.  
Holding a military background before joining the paramilitaries is a feature that four ex-AUC 
share, out of a total of 13 ex-paramilitaries that I interviewed. However, the number of those 
that were in the military could be higher because interviewees were not directly asked if 
they were in the military or not, but rather they volunteered the information. The point 
related to military background will be touched upon in the organizational section dedicated 
to the recruitment strategies by non-state armed groups.      
Employment-seeking is the thread that links almost all the ex-paramilitaries that I 
interviewed. Under often different circumstances, they all relate their mobilization in the 
AUC primarily to the attractive employment opportunity. For example, the story of Camilo, 
37 years old from Villavicencio. After he as well was employed by the military for almost 
three years, he quit because he started a family. Camilo moved back to Villavicencio to open 
an ornament and soldering workshop. However, he says that he was robbed of everything, 
and, as result, fell in economic hardship – he was already married by then, with two children 
to support. “I moved to San Jose del Guaviare; there, I asked to meet someone from the AUC. 
                                                        
70 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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[…] I introduced my self to a local commander. […] It was very easy to tell him: “I want to 
enter the group”.”71  
Like Camilo, several others joined the paramilitary while job hunting under difficult personal 
economic circumstances. Ibarbo, a 32-year-old from Bogota, moved to Villavicencio in 2000 
with his parents, who were in search of better economic opportunities. Ibarbo spent six 
months looking for work, unsuccessfully. “During this time, I met a friend, who operated as 
an urbano here in Villavicencio. An urbano is the one who manages AUC business and issues 
[in a given territory]. Like a politician for the paramilitaries. I started working for him and 
then he got me in.”72 Here as well, the employment aspect is the most important factor.  
The last example concerns Maria Victoria, 34 years old from Villavicencio. At the time she 
was enlisted in the AUC, Maria Victoria was a single mother of two children – she now has 
five. Her aspiration was to be a medical nurse, but she did not have the resources to study 
and get the necessary training. Thus, she was introduced to someone who “could help me to 
study, so I would be capacitated, nothing else. That same month the guy started to help me 
and I started to study and to learn. One day he asked me to go with him to get interviewed 
with those who were helping me. Simple. I was interviewed by someone who everyone 
referred to as ‘the doctor’. He told me that they were looking for people who would work in 
nursing in small towns. That is how it all happened. […] I was not tricked or anything. The 
only thing I wanted was to study to bring forward my life and career. […] Thus, I went. But I 
knew with whom I was going to work.”73  
In conclusion, as far as ex-paramilitaries’ recruitment is concerned, the following are the 
most common points that came out from the interviews, and which will be analysed in the 
following sections: 
 Ex-paramilitaries’ main driver for joining the AUC is a difficult economic situation, 
unemployment and the job opportunity provided. 
 Urban / small town background is more common than rural one. 
 The AUC had extended networks in the city of Villavicencio, and in the towns of San 
Martin, Granada and Puerto Gaitan, which made recruitment relatively easy for 
individuals who wanted to join. 
 Several interviewees refer to friends or acquaintances who introduced them to the 
AUC. 
 A military background was a resume booster for AUC recruitment. 
                                                        
71 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
72 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
73 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CAUSES FOR MOBILIZATION: TRAUMA AND REVENGE 
For some of the interviewees I spoke to, the individual level played an important – 
sometimes decisive – role in the decision to join an armed group. Individual-level reasons, I 
argue, have to do with those very intimate reasons animating a person to take a certain 
action or behaviour, including reasons related to psychology, personal security, family 
issues, or perceptions. 
Given the long scope of the conflict in Colombia and in Meta, individual drivers of 
recruitment have often to do with the traumatic legacy of war. Communities and households 
have suffered from waves of violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups. Sometimes, 
this violence is perpetrated by state security forces. In turn, repeated cycles of violence 
throughout several decades imply that the emotional legacy of war passes from one 
generation to the next. Communities, households and individuals that become victimized 
necessarily (and almost automatically) take sides and make a decision about who they will 
support.  
As far as ex-FARC members are concerned, the aspect of trauma, revenge and the legacy of 
war as a motivating factor to go to war (or even to pick a side) did not appear at all in my 
interviews. No ex-guerrilla member has cited one single episode of violence against them, 
their family or their community as a driver for political and armed mobilization. While it 
could be a coincidence, I think that it is highly unlikely that in a conflict that has killed 
hundreds of thousands and displaced millions, none of the ex-FARC that I spoke to were 
victims of violence. Especially when, on the other hand, in interviews with ex-paramilitaries 
the issue of trauma and vengeance came up. But I do not have an explanation for why no ex-
FARC mentioned this aspect. 
With respect to the FARC, then, the drivers for mobilization that I could single out as 
individual-based reasons concern generic resentment and adolescent or post-adolescent 
crisis, low self-esteem and sense of loss. In one word, for psychological reasons. One example 
is Laia, 39 years old from an urban background, Villavicencio – something unique among ex-
FARC members. She had a difficult family situation as she was brought up by her aunt and 
never met her parents. After moving to bustling Bogota, she enrolled in university to study 
engineering. Having to work at the same time as studying in order to maintain her studies, 
she progressively fell behind with her coursework. “After three years, when I was forced to 
drop out I was full of pain and resentment. Doors shut down for me and life itself shut. I 
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needed to recover from what had happened to me, from knowing that I did not have a future. 
[…] Thus, I took this extreme decision to go and look for the group [the FARC].”74  
There is not much insight to gain from this personal story other than to give an example for 
the myriad of reasons of why an individual may join a non-state armed group. 
Notwithstanding, Laia’s actions were directed to attaining an education, and, in turn, a future 
job and a better life. Thus, the common thread of my research concerns Laia as well – i.e. 
presenting employment and employment-seeking behaviours as a framework for the 
analysis of mobilization. Laia abandoned everything and joined the FARC. Although her 
reason was not directly related to seeking an employment opportunity, the events that led 
her to go to the FARC have to do with seeking an education functional to a future job. In this 
sense, mobilization is as much as a life choice as it is an employment prospect.   
The aspects of trauma and how war legacy turn into hatred and revenge are present in some 
of the ex-paramilitaries stories. Jairo, a 39-year-old ex-AUC mid-level commander, grew up in 
a remote region of the Amazon: Mitu, the capital town of the state of Vaupes. In 1998, Mitu 
was the theater of one of the boldest FARC military operations in history. The FARC laid 
siege to the remote town, defeated the weak army and police posts there, and held Mitu for 
two days before a decisive military operation uprooted the guerrilla. In the process, Jairo’s 
brother – a policeman – was kidnapped by the FARC, an event that deeply marked Jairo’s life 
and subsequent choices.  
Jairo did not mention what the outcome from the kidnapping was, and if his brother survived 
or not. As a result of the Mitu takeover, Jairo and his family were forcefully displaced from 
the town. That same year, he moved to San Martin, Meta – a paramilitary stronghold – with 
the intention of joining the ACCU (Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba e Urabá), a 
forerunner of the AUC (see Chapter 4). 
Jairo describes the reasons for mobilization as follows. “The phenomenon of the guerrilla 
deeply affects people’s conscience; in particular, the psychological side [was affected] as a 
consequence of the takeover, the kidnapping, and of the fact that my mother fell ill and got 
crazy. All this affected me and I started developing hatred toward the organization. In 
addition, I had a worrisome economic situation: I did not have any money. Thus, I was 
determined to enter the paramilitary group here in Meta.”75 The personal tragedy behind 
Jairo’s mobilization conflates with the more terrain economic aspect. After being forcefully 
displaced from Vaupes, Jairo admits of needing employment and livelihoods for him and his 
family. The paramilitary would be able to provide just that. 
                                                        
74 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
75 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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One more ex-paramilitary who describes both the trauma aspect and the employment 
opportunity as drivers of mobilization is Mauricio, 40 years old, from a rural background in 
Meta. Mauricio is currently employed by the reintegration agency (Agencia Colombiana para 
la Reintegración, ACR) as a group facilitator. In fact, it is not so uncommon for the program to 
hire ex-combatants to act as liaisons between ex-combatants and the state.  
Asked about the circumstances of his recruitment, Mauricio said: “As it happened for most of 
us, an array of factors contributed to my recruitment. On a personal level, I have been 
victimized as the guerrilla killed my mother. We were forced to leave. We had to abandon 
our property, which was in an area controlled by the FARC. […] We moved to town – Granada 
– and we started to depend on our own. [Then,] when I started looking for work opportunity, 
I was alerted that yes, there is a job opportunity but you have to go to a farm to work for a 
man. Well, I needed work because obviously I had to bring food home and support the 
family. Thus, a job offer materialized to work as a driver. I said to myself: of course, I have to 
go.”76  
Mauricio claims that he did not know that he was going to work for the paramilitary and had 
he known so, he would have not accepted. Nonetheless, his mobilization started from a 
traumatic event which led him and his family to move to a paramilitary stronghold. As for 
most ex-paramilitaries, the employment factor acted as a material necessity: regardless of 
the individual motivation and circumstances, the need for a job is common to all ex-
paramilitaries.  
6.2 Structural Factors of Recruitment  
LIVING IN A CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREA 
A recurrent conflict dynamic in the Eastern Plains concerns individuals and communities 
that find themselves in the middle of active fighting among armed groups, including the 
military. As it stands clear from the above stories of recruitment and mobilization, the 
number one structural factor of recruitment and mobilization concerns the local-level power 
that non-state armed groups display.  
Whether one group is in control of an area or not – and to what extent it exercises this 
control vis-à-vis the military and other non-state armed groups – directly determines the 
recruitment pattern and its scale in that same area. The more an armed group is powerful in 
a given area, the greater the scale of recruitment in that same area. As demonstrated by the 
interviews, individuals that are recruited in a given area do not necessarily end up being 
                                                        
76 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio 
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deployed in that same area, but rather they are moved around according to the armed 
group’s needs (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012).  
The important point is the following. When a non-state armed group establishes a 
stronghold in either a rural or an urban area, the extent to which the group is able to 
militarily control the area itself – and to not be challenged by other armed contenders – 
determines the extent to which the group has control over local institutions. Military 
strength goes hand in hand with political power and influence over institutions. Thus, armed 
groups are able not only to control security, which is the most visible aspect of their power. 
But also, they exercise control and/or influence over political mobilization, administrative 
functions, and social and economic life in all of their aspects, via either cooptation or 
coercion.  
Increased local power comes with the need for greater responsibility. In order to exercise 
such power and perform an increased number of functions – functions that are qualitatively 
more complex, and quantitatively more numerous – non-state armed groups are forced to 
increase their ranks and to widen their skillset by recruiting new members. Non-state armed 
groups become an attractive employer that needs to expand its workforce. Through this 
mechanism, armed groups influence the local labor market. 
In turn, locals who experience collapse or failure of state institutions are more prone to 
potentially consider joining a non-state armed group than individuals that live in an area 
with little or no penetration of armed groups, for example. The employment opportunity 
provided by armed groups becomes, then, even more irresistible in the face of economic 
hardship. As many ex-combatants argue, the attractive job opportunity, associated with 
livelihood needs, played a decisive role in the recruitment pattern of several ex-
paramilitaries. 
Adapted to different contexts, local-level power as a factor of enhanced recruitment trends is 
at work both in towns dominated by the paramilitaries and in FARC-controlled rural areas. 
Several stories from ex-paramilitaries who were recruited in the AUC strongholds of 
Granada and San Martin, for example, display such dynamic. Where they exercise power, 
non-state armed groups become more visible, because they are unchallenged. All of which 
increases the easiness of recruitment. As Alejandro – an ex-paramilitary from Granada – 
reports, “one already knows who they are [the paramilitary], because in a small town 
everyone knows who everyone is. The fact that one does not get involved with them is quite 
possible, but everyone knows who they are.”77 Jon, ex-AUC for over 8 years from San Martin, 
                                                        
77 Interview held in November 2014, Villavicencio. 
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confirms this point: “In San Martin, it was not a secret to anyone [who the paramilitaries 
were]. People who were part of the AUC were just there… normally.”78   
The FARC established political and military strongholds in vast rural areas of the Eastern 
Plains, either by winning territory on the battleground or by filling a political and security 
vacuum in marginal areas. As many interviewees pointed out, the political and social 
influence from the FARC in such areas was utter. So profound was the weakness and/or the 
absence of the state that, throughout the decades, the FARC acted and were perceived as the 
sole and legitimate authority. Indeed, such overwhelming control by the FARC contributes to 
enhancing local recruitment. 
Local communities living in FARC-controlled areas were so marginalized to the point that 
they never even had any contact with state institutions or never even thought of supporting 
the state. Individuals grew up with the FARC being the only social and political institution 
around them – a state within the state. In remote areas, people almost never questioned 
their loyalty to the FARC, nor the legitimacy of its cause. Even those interviewees who 
resented the FARC for forcing them into the ranks did not display any opposition with 
respect to the FARC’s legitimacy as a fighting force. It was natural for them to be against the 
state and the paramilitaries. 
The issue of public support toward the FARC, and to what extent it was either spontaneous 
or forced, generated contradicting answers in my interviews. Laia – the engineering 
university student drop out – believes that the peasantry’s support to the FARC was always 
forced, because it took place either in the presence of arms, or under their direct threat. 
“People have to make good face to whoever comes. The army comes, and the peasant has to 
give them food and water. If the FARC came, you have to give them food and water. The 
paramilitaries come, and you have to do the same. […] The peasantry in Colombia does not 
have the authority to say “no”. […] You have to receive [armed actors] well, because you 
know that if you do not, they force you out of there, or they even kill you. […] I saw the fear in 
the peasants’ eyes when they would give me food and water. Thus, I knew that they did not 
do it because they cared about me, but because they had to.”79 Laia’s answer is useful also 
when thinking about recruitment by the FARC. The psychological and concrete subjugation 
of the local populations by armed groups may also contribute to a feeling of inevitability of 
recruitment and armed group’s membership.       
Jaime, 36 years old from Villavicencio, spent twelve years in the FARC between the ages of 19 
and 31. He says that there are several instances of public support, and that this is not always 
                                                        
78 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
79 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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forced. “Politics is the means of ruling. But, in many places, weapons are the ones that rule. 
Several people cooperate with armed groups due to arms, due to fear. Others [support them] 
because they are sympathetic, or because they have family members inside the same 
organization.”80 Finally, another ex-FARC, Roberto, discards the forced or induced dimension 
of public support. According to him, “when [the FARC] gets to a village, the local population 
that lives there loves the group, the guerrilla; because they are the ones that support the 
peasantry, help with the land, and allows them to have some decent livelihood.”  
Whether public support is coerced or genuine, the key point here concerns the levels of 
penetration and influence by the FARC in the areas under their control. A Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) senior officer from the OAS Peace Support Mission 
(MAPP-OEA) downplays the ideological character of the conflict in favor of an analysis based 
on local level power by armed groups. He says that “it is about which [armed] group came 
about first, which one established roots, who is paying the bills, and who helps me to survive 
and provide a livelihood for my family. Meaning that individual, family and collective 
allegiance to armed groups is dependent on context, circumstances and balance of power at 
local level.”81 
In conclusion, the structural drivers for recruitment are strongly connected with the 
extensive power that the FARC exercised in these areas. And a similar mechanism applies to 
paramilitaries. The other structural factors that are examined below (social networks, family, 
ideology) are all sub-factors of the fact that non-state armed groups exercise political and 
military control over specific areas (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012).  
THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY 
The civil war in Colombia started with the foundation of the FARC in 1964, during the Cold 
War. Five decades have brought several changes to the Colombian conflict dynamics, as well 
as to the international system. From a bipolar system centered around the US-USSR 
ideologically-based conflict, a transition to a multipolar world took place. Such transition led 
to changes in domestic conflicts as well. Arguably, since 1991, we have witnessed an 
apparent weakening of ideologies as a primary motivating factor for rebellions and 
revolutions.  
On top of being the oldest active war in the Western hemisphere, the civil war in Colombia 
was highly ideological in its premises. The communist guerrilla of the FARC fought the 
Colombian state with the stated goal of overthrowing the unequal political and economic 
                                                        
80 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
81 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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system. On paper (based on FARC top leadership’s statements), the ideological element is 
still the prevailing one. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that both within its ranks and in the 
political mobilization of the peasantry, ideology does not play a dominating role as it did up 
to one to two decades ago.  
The interviews that I conducted with ex-FARC members confirm this point. The power of 
ideology has weakened and the ideological commitment of FARC members has progressively 
lowered. Older recruits in my sample (both in terms of age and seniority within the 
organization) displayed stronger ideological background and commitment. Incidentally, the 
demise of ideology within the FARC is at the very base of the older members’ decision to 
demobilize – as it will be seen in Chapter 8. 
Ex-paramilitaries express their disdain at the changes that drugs trafficking brought to the 
conflict dynamics and to the higher ideals for which they were fighting. Camilo, who – as we 
saw earlier – joined the paramilitary after losing his business and due to a dire economic 
situation, admits that “nowadays, someone who says that he wants to defend the ideals of 
Colombia is lying, because now there is no politics, but only economic interests. One joins 
these groups [new paramilitaries and criminal bands] in order to make money, that is it. No 
one thinks about the wellbeing of anyone. Put simply, it is not how it used to be before, when 
some ideals existed. Nowadays, illegal drugs permeate the conflict. Thus, the ideals are 
lost.”82 
Ibarbo, another ex-paramilitary who spent six years in the AUC, says the following. “When I 
joined, there was the thought and ideal of the necessity to fight against the guerrilla, because 
there has always been the willingness to defeat the FARC. But after a few years, one realizes 
that the driver of all the paramilitaries and the guerrilla is drugs trafficking. Finance comes 
directly from there, and no where else.”83  
Notwithstanding these recent changes, interviews with ex-guerrillas reveal that ideology 
played an important role as a recruiting tool through the peasantry. This is because the FARC 
were able to politically sensitize and educate its main political constituent, i.e. the peasantry. 
They established a tight relationship with the peasantry: among the many services that the 
FARC would provide to it, political awareness of the causes of the armed struggle was one of 
them.  
Many interviewees cited the positive role model that the FARC played. Earlier Fernan 
expressed admiration for the FARC thank to their solidarity attitude. In addition, he talks 
about how ideology and indoctrination were crucial. “Normally, like all other kids, I would 
                                                        
82 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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study at home. […] These people [FARC members] would run meetings in my family’s farm, 
instilling in peasant’s minds [considerations] about weapons, the struggle, the causes of war, 
and the reasons for keeping the fight alive. Under these circumstances, one does not have the 
mindset to resist to these pressures. One does not know anything! Anyway, I enlisted and I 
joined the FARC.”84 
For many ex-combatants, the FARC were a role model for two reasons. First, because they 
practically cooperated with the peasantry in their most immediate needs. Second, because 
the FARC were fighting on behalf of the peasantry. They were, in fact, able to bring forward 
the message that the peasantry would have been the main beneficiary once they won the war 
and took power.  
In this sense, the guerrilla (but also the paramilitary) were able in many cases to win the 
hearts and minds of local population. Armed groups that control or exercise power over a 
certain area seek the active support of the local population through the provision of services 
and livelihoods opportunities, for example. In turn, local communities embrace rebels’ 
grievances and ideology, and end up supporting the armed struggle. Going to work for (i.e. 
joining) the non-state armed group is one manifestation of this support. 
Nonetheless, the latter quote from Fernan pointing at the peasantry’s intrinsic weakness and 
ignorance of the outside world, also highlights the marginalized condition of the peasantry in 
Colombia, which had the FARC as its only institutional and cultural reference. As it was 
explained earlier in this chapter, state absence in certain areas played in the hands of the 
FARC’s political, military and also cultural control over the peasantry.  
For the paramilitaries the ideology factor was less important than for the guerrilla. While the 
FARC ideology was based on the sophisticated political thought of Marxism-Leninism, 
paramilitarism lays its ideological foundation on a generic patriotism and on the defence of 
the current order against anti-establishment communism. Even though we cannot consider 
paramilitaries as holding an ideology, nationalistic ideal values and a generic belief in ‘doing 
good’ by replacing the state – which was embroiled in its hardest crisis – cannot be discarded 
when analysing the phenomenon of paramilitaries.  
Camilo adds some considerations on the anti-FARC ideals that inspired him to join the 
paramilitaries. “I have always admired the AUC commander, Carlos Castaño, who bravely 
fought the guerrilla. I wanted to be like him. For this reason, I also joined: because I did not 
agree with any of the guerrilla ideals. […] We received news that the FARC put bombs, mined 
and collapsed bridges, and cut electricity. All this was outrageous.” Camilo also points at the 
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perceived ‘good’ that the AUC did. “I wanted to get involved because the state was absent 
[and unable to react] to this situation. […] Within the legal framework [paramilitarism] is 
illegal. But if you do not look at it that way, one sees that we were doing things right.”85   
Paramilitary members would not go through political indoctrination in the same systematic 
way as guerrillas did. Political mobilization among paramilitaries was not part of the 
standard curriculum during training as it was in the FARC. In the interviews, ex-
paramilitaries express their deep resentment and hatred toward the FARC and their 
admiration for the paramilitaries’ leaders to bravely take on the fight for the sake of 
Colombia’s survival. These two thoughts are the only common ideals among ex-
paramilitaries. 
SOCIALIZATION, SOCIAL AND FAMILY NETWORKS, AND DOMESTIC ABUSE 
One more area of investigation in terms of the structural drivers of recruitment concerns the 
role of socialization processes, as well as the role played by both the social and the family 
context of ex-combatants. Introducing socialization is important in order to complement and 
play down the highly deterministic conceptualization of employment as the leading driver of 
armed group’s recruitment. While I show that my findings go in the direction of explaining 
recruitment and mobilization through the lens of employment-seeking behaviours by ex-
combatants, this framework still needs to be integrated by other structural factors, including 
socialization mechanisms and family background.   
The research findings show the role played by socialization and social networks. With 
respect to the FARC, I showed that, in areas under their control, the FARC and the local 
population were often in a tight relationship permeating the whole social context. Peasantry 
living in FARC areas have been exposed and subject to political mobilization and ideological 
consciousness, before – or together with – armed mobilization. Thus, socialization 
mechanisms are at play: potential recruits – especially the youngest ones – join as a result of 
peer pressure and or social conventions, for example. After having performed small tasks for 
the FARC, Walter, from Mapiripan in southern Meta, ultimately joined at the age of 17 
because “a girl told me “let’s go, this is good!” I liked the girl, she was good looking. I fell in 
love and I followed her. […] She was from inside the guerrilla.”86  
The role of emulation features among several ex-paramilitaries’ stories too. Some ex-AUC 
admitted to have joined when it was fashionable to be a paramilitary, or because they were 
subject to peer pressure. A social environment where non-state armed groups’ recruitment 
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is the norm favors emulation among peers. Indeed, emulation and peer pressure apply when 
an area is tightly controlled or dominated by an armed group. Wendy, an ex-paramilitary 
from the Autodefensas Campesinas de Meta y Vichada (ACMV, which was formally not part of 
the AUC), says that “a lot of paramilitaries were present and working here [Puerto Gaitan, a 
paramilitary stronghold]; thus, that is when I was persuaded to join and I went!”87  
Socialization dynamics also concern the role model provided by FARC rebels. The solidarity 
and the commitment toward cooperating with the peasantry created a bonding between the 
FARC and the local population. The fact that the FARC was often the only institution in place, 
acting as a state, created a social environment by which non-members were either FARC 
supporters or were dealing with the FARC through small jobs.  
In turn, this social environment was characterized by contiguity and constant exchanges 
between those who were recruited and the local population. Several ex-FARC combatants 
admit of how they were psychologically attracted by FARC members when the latter visited 
their farms, for example. The power of guns, the nobility of their struggle, and the perceived 
adventure of an unconventional life in arms were powerful tools that attracted potential 
recruits. Thus, the role of socialization is an important factor of recruitment88.     
The role played by role models is also important for paramilitaries. In a context of rural 
poverty and economic depression, paramilitary members would stand out in the eyes of local 
population thank to their clothing and vehicles. “They arrive by car and always with nice 
apparel. They invite you to eat, and they show you that they act with care and concern. Thus, 
one immediately trusts them”89, Alejandro says – an ex-professional soldier turned into 
paramilitary. Camilo pushes it even further: “In 2002, it was fashionable to be a paramilitary 
here [in Villavicencio]. Everyone wanted to be a paramilitary. You would see paramilitaries 
everywhere: nicely dressed, armed, and with a vehicle.”90 
Among ex-paramilitaries, a common pattern of socialization leading to recruitment concerns 
the role of friends or acquaintances. On revealing the circumstances of their recruitment, 
several ex-paramilitaries – including Radamael, Ibarbo and Maria Victoria – say that people 
they knew referred them to a local paramilitary commander or recruiter. Such a word-of-
mouth system of recruitment seems quite logical: paramilitaries were illegal organizations 
after all, and they could not openly advertise their job openings. Thus, a personal 
                                                        
87 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
88 The literature on social capital has exposed some of the links between social networks, social bonding 
processes and the outcomes in terms of cohesion and mutual benefits. The concept of social capital is relevant 
here as it provides an overarching understanding of the ties that were established between the FARC and the 
local population; and the extent to which those ties produced social benefits that were shared (Putnam, 2001; 
Cox, 2009; Aghajanian, 2012). 
89 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
90 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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introduction from someone is often how a first contact was established. What is striking is 
that the role of socialization and friends is understated in the literature on recruitment. 
In terms of family background, I have analysed whether there is a relationship between ex-
combatants’ family context and recruitment. For the paramilitaries, there are no common 
patterns of family background that are associated with recruitment, but other factors are 
important. Ex-paramilitaries’ families were employed in a variety of industries including 
services, public sector, agriculture, retails, and the military. Thus, the family’s professional 
background cannot be accounted for recruitment. It is interesting to notice that there were 
only two ex-paramilitaries whose family members were part of illegal organizations. The 
first one is Marco, a man in his mid-30s, who I met casually. He was not part of the collective 
demobilization: in fact, he never demobilized. He said that all his family was in the 
paramilitary: his father, his mother, and his siblings. The second one is Jairo, who had his 
brother kidnapped during the Mitu takeover. Jairo admitted that his father was a drug 
trafficker. 
For ex-FARC, I have showed how subsistence or landless farmers were the main target of 
recruitment by the FARC in areas under their control. The totality of ex-FARC interviewees 
come from a rural family background, the overwhelming majority of whom were chronically 
poor, subsistence farmers or landless peasants. 
A strong pattern related to families of recruits either concerns domestic neglect and/or 
violence, or single headed households. The interviews highlighted a common theme among 
several ex-combatants. Many of them describe their difficult upbringing and/or a 
dysfunctional family context as a factor for joining a non-state armed group. Some ex-FARC 
members even say that the group provided an alternative family to the violence and neglect 
that they experienced in their own household; with the FARC acting as a sort of child welfare 
support service.  
Twelve out of a total of thirty-one interviewed ex-combatants (both FARC and paramilitary) 
were either raised by only one parent or were victims of violence and/or neglect while 
children. Of those, the most significant cases are five ex-guerrilla members who were 
recruited between the age of 7 and 12, including the only ex-ELN combatant who I 
interviewed. By way of example, Mono JoJoy, one of the five members of the FARC Secretariat 
and top military commander, grew up without his father.   
Muriel, 43 years old from rural Cundinamarca, spent thirty-two years in the FARC – he joined 
when he was 11 years old. He describes his family situation as follows. “My father was very 
poor and he still is today, at 85 years old. When we moved to La Vega, Cundinamarca, I was 6 
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or 7 years old, which is when my mum passed away. She was young: she died at only 38 
years old due to a chronic hepatitis. Afterwards, both my older brothers enlisted in the FARC. 
I was left alone with my dad, who was out working all day. At only 7 years old I had to 
prepare food for him. Also, since my mum passed, my father was hit by depression and he 
started drinking heavily. […] Without my mother, I was left alone, I did not have anyone’s 
support. I was 8 years old, I did not receive an education, I had nothing, nothing. Thus, I felt 
lonely. Due to his depression, my dad had to drink and drink. […] I would not even have 
clothes. I used to go around without shoes. […] As a consequence, I started seeing the 
guerrilla as a viable option in order to survive. One day I told my father: “Dad, am leaving.” I 
made a deal with the guerrilla and I started working with them as a messenger.”91 
There are also cases of domestic violence and abuse. Faustino, an 18-year-old Afro-
Colombian from Nariño, lived in an ELN stronghold. Since he was 7 years old, “I would 
simply go with them [the ELN] because in my house there were a lot of problems. But, I was 
not a guerrilla member. When my dad would hit me, then I would flee and go with them.”92 
Cristina revealed the terrible violence that she suffered from her mother since she was very 
little, and how the FARC helped her. “Seeing the abuse to which I was subject to, [the FARC] 
had already spoken to her [my mother] several times about it, but she would not change. 
Thus, one day they told me: “walk with us”. And I just went. […] The way I see it is that the 
FARC did not recruit me; this is not accurate. They rescued me.”93 One ex-paramilitary of 42 
years of age, Juan Manuel, admits that the violence that he was subject to by his father made 
him flee the house at 12 years old. Subsequent events led him to join the paramilitary twice: 
first, in his early twenties; and later in his mid-thirties. 
THE MISSING INGREDIENT: THE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
The ‘employment’ factor in the decision to join a non-state armed group, I argue, is the key 
factor to comprehensively understand the dynamics of recruitment and mobilization (Table 
6.2). There is ample literature on the causes of mobilization, its drivers and the reasons for 
individuals to join a rebellion (Arnson and Zartman, 2005; Berdal and Malone, 2000; 
Ballentine and Sherman, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Gates, 2002; Viterna, 2006). 
Nonetheless, there is scarce or no interest in conceptualizing and analysing recruitment by 
armed groups as an ad hoc employment recruitment, nor war as employment, as this 
research aims to do (Andvig and Gates, 2010; Hoffman, 2011).   
                                                        
91 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
92 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
93 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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As it is analysed in this section, most ex-combatants (especially ex-paramilitaries) were 
concerned with lack of sustainable employment and of meaningful livelihoods alternatives. 
The majority of ex-paramilitaries were in some dire economic situation. In this sense, 
individuals who joined a non-state armed group did so mostly on the basis of employment-
seeking behaviours. The overwhelming majority of stories from ex-combatants attribute the 
joining of an armed group to the lack of alternatives, to no other employment options, and to 
poor and marginalized contexts outside the reach of the state and the formal economy. 
The degree to which employment considerations were important in the decision to join a 
non-state armed group, depends on a mix of individual, organizational and structural factors 
of mobilization. At the individual level, the search for employment by individuals needing 
livelihoods has been repeatedly stated in several interviews. At the organizational level, non-
state armed groups put in place specific recruitment strategies (as it is analysed in the next 
section). At the structural level, conflict-affected areas with no state presence provided the 
conditions for non-state armed groups to operate (and recruit), and the conditions for which 
many individuals had to resort to armed groups for a job. 
In FARC-dominated areas, the sole economic activity was agriculture and its small-scale 
commercialization – mostly, subsistence farming, which products would often not even 
suffice to the household’s needs. As I have showed, the remoteness and marginalization of 
these areas prevented any social and economic actor but the FARC to be present. In such 
areas, there was little or no meaningful alternative to being a peasant: the only employment 
would be to work on the family land or as a day laborer. Thus, it derives that the concept of 
employment and occupation is itself distorted. Young people growing up in FARC areas could 
not aspire or even imagine a different life path outside the landless peasant one. “One does 
not know anything!” and “I had nothing!” shouted both Fernan and Muriel (Ferro and Uribe, 
2002). 
As a consequence, arguing that the FARC provided an employment opportunity to minors 
and young adults in areas under guerrilla control is a stretch. There were no employment 
opportunities, period. And the FARC were not offering a job. The ex-combatants to whom I 
spoke perceived that the FARC were offering them an alternative (and risky) life path, 
outside the misery of peasants’ every day life. Life in the group would be hard, dangerous 
and physically painful. But, it would be a life of dignity, of camaraderie and of noble values; a 
life dedicated to a higher cause.  
Indeed, these factors have different weight according to the individual and the context in 
which he/she grew up. Thus, which was the primary factor in the decision to join? The 
refusal of the intolerable every day’s life or the attraction coming from the ideological and 
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socialization processes? Regardless, it was not a matter of employment, but rather of life 
path; and – as many argued – it was a matter of survival. 
Notwithstanding, the employment and labor market lens becomes useful in the analysis of 
those ex-FARC combatants who got involved with the FARC in a gradual manner: starting 
with small jobs and tasks that progressively transitioned into full membership. Here, there is 
a tighter conceptual and practical relationship between employment seeking and FARC 
membership. According to the experience of several interviewees, the FARC sought the 
active collaboration of peasants (seemingly, young people) to its logistics, transportation, 
and food supplies. As I have showed earlier, several ex-FARC combatants – mostly, but not 
exclusively, young teens – were approached by the FARC when guerrilla members would 
visit farms and hold public meetings with the peasantry. After gaining their trust and using 
them for logistics purposes, the FARC would induce (or force) young recruits to join.  
Jaime – a FARC ex-combatant who spent twelve years in the group – spoke of the tight social 
relationship between the FARC and the peasantry, which is at the base of the organization’s 
recruitment. “In these areas the guerrilla is very widespread and rooted. Everyone always 
speaks to everyone. It is a lie when someone from rural areas says that he does not talk to 
any armed group.” Having lost both his parents at young age, by the time Jaime was 14 years 
old, he moved frequently according to job opportunities – mainly in rural areas. He defined 
himself as a “day laborer” with no ideological or political awareness before joining the FARC. 
Jaime joined the organization with the same spirit with which he started several other jobs – 
he labeled it as just “another adventure.”94 
I argue that stories like Jaime’s one are illustrative of the employment framework of this 
research. Given the heterogeneity of experiences (rural and urban, paramilitary and 
guerrilla) and the often marginal and poor social and economic context in which ex-
combatants lived, I hold a wide definition of employment. This is not only limited to 
searching, finding and holding a formal or informal job. As I argued previously, employment 
in a conflict-affected rural area means working on the family’s farm – with no alternatives. 
No other options would be available. There is therefore a more blurred boundary between 
employment and life. Joining the FARC is a life choice as much as an employment-seeking 
behaviour.  
For the paramilitaries, applying an employment and labor market lens to their recruitment 
and armed group’s membership is more straightforward. In fact, I argue that employment-
seeking motivations and behaviours in the decision to join an armed group apply chiefly to 
                                                        
94 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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paramilitary groups, rather than the guerrilla. For example, Wendy, 33 years old from oil-
rich Puerto Gaitan, was a radio operator for the ACMV for over six years. At the age of 19 “I 
would only get jobs in bars. […] I got tired of it, because I did not like that kind of work. 
Therefore, I was easy to get convinced, and I joined a paramilitary group.”95 
As I have argued in the introductory section, several ex-paramilitaries joined the armed 
group out of economic necessity and unemployment. Mauricio, for example, whose mother 
was killed by the FARC admits that, after being displaced, the need to economically support 
his family was the main driver for his mobilization. “They offered me a job as a driver and I 
needed to work. At that moment, I did not have a family of my own, did not have kids nor a 
wife, but I needed to help my two sisters who were already single mothers. This was an 
additional pressure I had while I was looking for work.”96 There are several other ex-
paramilitaries who joined the AUC because they needed to work. Whether or not it was the 
primary driver of mobilization, still it is the most common factor that all ex-paramilitaries 
mentioned while speaking about their recruitment. 
TABLE 6.2: INCIDENCE OF RECRUITMENT FACTORS 
FACTORS OF RECRUITMENT FARC AUC  
Trauma and revenge No effect Low 
Territorial control by armed group High Medium 
Power of ideology Medium No effect 
Socialization dynamics and family network Medium Medium-High 
Employment and livelihoods opportunity Medium High 
An additional consideration relates to the heterogeneity of jobs within the paramilitaries, 
which indicates heterogeneity of recruitment experiences as well. Whereas in the FARC 
every combatant started his/her career from a low ranking soldier and received the same 
training, in the paramilitary experiences were diverse. Since the AUC was an umbrella of 
different paramilitary organizations, there was a relative flexibility among paramilitary 
factions in organizing their internal structure, including recruitment. Thus, as many 
interviews highlighted, different circumstances of mobilization led to different work 
experiences within the armed group. We just saw that Mauricio was recruited to be a driver 
– nothing else. The next chapter deals in more detail with the different jobs within the 
paramilitary. Here, it is important to underline that the interviews show how ex-
                                                        
95 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
96 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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paramilitaries went through more diverse experiences in terms of recruitment than ex-FARC 
members did.  
6.3 Organizational Level: Armed Group’s Practices 
STRATEGIES, INCENTIVES AND PATTERNS OF RECRUITMENT 
This section deals with the organizational level of recruitment. After having explored the 
individual dynamics of mobilization and the structural drivers of recruitment, I complement 
this chapter on recruitment with some considerations on the non-state armed groups’ 
behaviours, tactics and patterns in attracting and enlisting new recruits. This section 
includes insights on how non-state armed groups pursue recruitment of new members.    
Ex-combatants’ permanence in arms vary considerably.97 As far as FARC members are 
concerned, there were ex-combatants recruited in the early 1980s, who stayed in the group 
for several decades. Others were recruited as late as 2013 and only stayed in the FARC for a 
few months. Consequently, recruitment patterns for this group changed over time: it is not 
conceivable that someone recruited in 1983 went through a similar pattern than someone 
enlisted in 2010, for example. 
The ex-paramilitaries that I interviewed, instead, were more or less recruited at the same 
time, and had more or less an equal overall time spent in the group (between one and six 
years total). The main reason is that the AUC only officially formed in 1997, despite 
paramilitary groups had operated in Colombia for long time. Also, the AUC demobilized 
collectively, altogether. In the Eastern Llanos, paramilitary groups mostly demobilized in 
2005-2006. Since the AUC was the entity negotiating the demobilization, ex-combatants 
refer as their time in arms only to those years when they were affiliated to the AUC, and not 
earlier. By the same token, my research only addresses modern paramilitarism, i.e. the AUC.  
With one exception, no ex-combatant admitted of having worked for the paramilitaries 
before the institutionalization of the AUC. This factor, of course, may suggest that ex-
combatants were reluctant to reveal a path of crime and illegality spanning earlier than the 
AUC. In fact, as DDR beneficiaries through the governmental ACR, they are only accountable 
for their AUC past.  
Paramilitary groups are more volatile and less structured than the guerrillas. I argue that 
this also plays a role in the paramilitaries’ heterogeneous recruitment tactics and internal 
behaviours. I have already mentioned in the last section how recruitment practices were 
more diverse and less structured in the paramilitary than in the FARC. As far as paramilitary 
                                                        
97 See Annexes 1 and 2 on demographic profile of ex-combatants.  
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recruitment behaviours are concerned, the following common features can be inferred from 
the interviews. 
First, entering a paramilitary faction is described by ex-paramilitaries as an employment 
opportunity, or being offered a job. When they enrolled, ex-paramilitaries were indeed 
conscious of starting a path in illegality, but their main concern was obtaining livelihoods, 
and their intention was, thus, to secure an employment. The language that ex-paramilitaries 
constantly used during the interviews (‘I was looking for a job’, or ‘I needed a job’) confirms 
the primary importance of this aspect over other recruitment drivers. Incidentally, it is this 
language during the interviews that made me orient the research to an analysis of war 
mobilization and demobilization focused on employment and livelihoods.  
The employment opportunity aspect has been discussed above, from the perspective of labor 
demand, i.e. the individual ex-combatants’ employment-seeking attitude and behaviour. In 
this section, it is worth considering the supply side of labor, i.e. the employment opportunity 
offered by armed actors (Andvig and Gates, 2010; Specht, 2014; Cramer, 2010). Paramilitary 
groups have acted as employers, when needing to expand their workforce. Their recruitment 
was done through word of mouth, or through personal reference from friends, acquaintances 
or family members.  
There is also a tight relationship between control and dominance over an area and the ability 
to effectively do recruitment. The more unchallenged a paramilitary faction was on its own 
territory, the more openly it was able to attract recruits. This point is confirmed by the fact 
that most of the ex-paramilitaries that I interviewed come from the AUC strongholds of 
Villavicencio, Granada, San Martin and Puerto Gaitan.  
Second, several ex-paramilitaries refer to the broken promises by armed groups, saying that 
they felt cheated and played around by recruiters. New recruits were offered highly 
attractive salaries compared to the legal labor market, only to discover later that such figures 
were unrealistic. Wendy, an ex-paramilitary recruited at 19 years old, was allured in the 
group by the promise of a high salary. “They told me that they would pay me 1 million pesos 
and that everything would be fine. But when we arrived there, they only gave us 150,000 
pesos.” 98  Alejandro, another ex-paramilitary from Granada, Meta, shared a similar 
experience: “They told me that they would pay me 2.2 million pesos, and later they actually 
only paid me between 120,000 and 160,000 pesos, and without any right to leave. […] I 
trusted them, and it was very naïve of me.”99 
                                                        
98 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
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The dynamic was the following. A recruiter would offer an attractive figure, and when the 
recruit would go and claim his salary, the local commander would give him/her a different 
amount, saying that now he was in charge and not the recruiter. Wendy explains: “They 
never paid us what they promised. Never. Because here [in Puerto Gaitan] they promised us 
something, but when we arrived there [remote areas in Guanape, Vichada] those in charge 
were others.” The actual salary of a low ranking paramilitary member did not differ much 
from a local salary in a formal or informal job. “The salary [they gave us] was what we would 
earn here working all day [in a normal job]; 1 million would have been much more money”, 
concludes Wendy.100 It is clear then that this monetary incentive induced several people to 
join the paramilitary. 
Third, in terms of profiles, the paramilitary would tend to hire people who had already work 
experience. Compared to the FARC, which pursued the recruitment of youths, the ex-
paramilitaries that I spoke to were all adults when they were enlisted. In fact, there was no 
minor and the prevailing age cohort is 24-26 years old at the time of recruitment. In 
particular, the paramilitary preferred to hire individuals with a past in the military. This 
represented a guarantee that the recruit had already training in arms and self defence, had 
experience with discipline and hierarchy, and was resentful toward the guerrilla. As it was 
mentioned, four out 13 interviewed ex-paramilitaries spent time in the military prior to 
joining the AUC. 
One more element that did not directly appear in the interviews, but is present in the 
literature, concerns personal trust. Duncan (2011) posits that the most important feature to 
be recruited by a paramilitary or criminal armed group was “loyalty, trust and certainty that 
[the individual] would not turn out to be an informer.” Complete trust was a pre-requisite 
rather than previous knowledge and experience on the job (Duncan, 2011: 173). This finding 
is in line with many interviewees who admitted that a friend or someone of confidence 
introduced him/her to the armed group. As it was mentioned, then, a personal 
recommendation to be recruited was key. 
Compared to the paramilitaries, there is no attempt whatsoever from the FARC to equate 
armed mobilization with employment. FARC’s recruitment strategy consisted in being 
committed to and aligned with peasantry’s interests. The peasantry has been central to the 
FARC with respect to its cause, strategy and institutionalization. First of all, the peasantry 
and its welfare is the original cause of why the Marxist-Leninist FARC rose in rebellion. 
Second, it is undeniable that in order to be able to survive (and, at times, to prosper) 
throughout the decades, the FARC has adopted a strategy of serving and working with the 
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peasantry, rather than exploiting or abusing it. Following Mao’s formulation of the fish 
needing water to survive, the FARC relied on the peasantry as their political constituent and 
main supporter to strive (Mao Tse-tung, 1961: 92-93). As it was seen above, the FARC’s good 
attitude toward the peasantry is confirmed by most ex-combatants’ interviewees. Third, 
building political awareness within the peasantry and serving its interest are at the base of 
the FARC’s recruiting strategy as well. Thus, the “Ejercito del Pueblo” is made of 
ideologically-committed members from the peasantry itself (Pecaut, 2008: 76-81).    
As it was discussed in the first section, FARC’s benevolent attitude toward the peasantry 
represents a common thread among all ex-FARC members that were raised in an area of 
exclusive FARC control. There is a positive value judgment with respect to the way the FARC 
acted and behaved toward local populations. A strategy of recruitment by the FARC was one 
of presenting themselves as a legitimate organization, one that was present in the wake of 
state’s absence, and one committed to goals of solidarity and survival. The political 
indoctrination performed by the FARC through local communities paid off in terms of 
winning hearts and minds, as well as in recruiting committed members. 
All interviewed ex-combatants admitted to appreciate FARC’s cooperative and sympathetic 
behaviour toward local civilians and peasants – to the extent that this played an important 
role in several ex-combatants’ decision to enlist. Jaime explains how the FARC “sends several 
people to talk [to peasants], to sensitize them about the struggle, to organize, to orient and to 
help. To help in what sense? They would call on peasants during public meetings to receive 
improvements of walking paths, bridges and streets; or they would set up community 
collective farms. […] Thus, people take note and appreciate. They know that the FARC are 
cooperating. Ultimately, this is the strength of this organization, this is its major strength.”101 
Nonetheless, as much as the FARC entertain a close relationship with the peasantry, there is 
also an element of trust (and mistrust), with which the FARC has to cope. Undoubtedly, a 
rebel movement fighting the state for five decades without being defeated, adopted a series 
of strict internal rules in order to survive and to make the organization impermeable from 
external infiltration. Several ex-combatants underlined this aspect of profound mistrust that 
the organization has for everything and everyone. With respect to recruitment, the golden 
rule was to deploy a new recruit in an area far away from his/her area of origin or from 
where he/she was originally recruited. Giovanni says that the FARC “always send the new 
recruit to another place: because if someone enters [the organization] here, they do not let 
him here, they send him to another region. The one who enters somewhere else is sent here, 
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instead. This is how it works.”102  
FORCED OR VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT?  
One additional dimension that was raised by many ex-FARC interviewees is the alleged 
‘forced’ character of recruitment, which involved mostly minors, but not only them. I will 
come back to this dimension in Chapter 8 when I analyse the drivers and the individual 
reasons for demobilization: arguably, the forced and perpetual nature of FARC’s membership 
played a role in the individual decision to flee and demobilize. However, it is relevant to 
introduce the topic here because it has often been claimed that non-state armed groups 
practice forced recruitment (Gutierrez Sanin, 2004).  
According to my interviews, there are only few ex-FARC members (3) who have been 
forcefully recruited, without consent nor any prior involvement with the organization. It is 
the case of Carlos, who was enlisted in the FARC in 2001, when allegedly the organization 
was forcing each household to contribute two members to the war effort. Ivan state that he 
felt deceived: he was told that he had to stay in the FARC forever only when he arrived at the 
FARC camp.   
More common was the situation of being forcefully integrated only after having been 
somewhat involved with the FARC. A good number of ex-FARC members admitted of being 
forcefully recruited against their will due to their progressive involvement with the 
organization. After having performed tasks for and/or contributed to the FARC in some 
capacity, these individuals were forced into the organization. The FARC claimed that 
collaborators were now too exposed and could have been a liability to the FARC in case of 
capture. This is the case of Fernan, who – as I quoted him above – after working with the 
FARC for sometime, was suddenly told: “Now, you belong to us”. He tried to resist, saying 
that he had been trustfully selling farming products for two years to the FARC. “They told me 
that I already knew too much about them. […] And because of that, they added, “we do not 
want you to have a civilian life, but we want you to integrate”.”103 Roberto tells me a similar 
story. He started going to the FARC camps for small tasks, but after a while “they enlisted me. 
And when I wanted to leave they did not let me. Because I already knew a lot, I knew some 
commanders.”104 
Nonetheless, as other quotes above demonstrated, there are other stories of ex-FARC who 
say that the decision to join was a personal and voluntary one. The tight relationship FARC-
peasantry and the mutual cooperation between them often acted as a recruitment 
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mechanism. There was also a continuous indoctrination and building of political 
sensitization among the peasantry. Both these factors played a role in encouraging young 
potential recruits to join the FARC, to the point that enlisting became a quite a natural path 
for many of them.  
Thus, there is a tension between forced and voluntary recruitment. It is debatable, for 
example, to what extent recruitment is voluntary – under any circumstances – when the 
recruit is a minor. International law is clear in this regard. Human rights law prohibits 
enlisting minors in armed groups under any circumstances, even if recruitment is voluntary. 
Recruiting and using children below 15 years old is a war crime under international 
humanitarian law.  
FARC rules prohibit to forcefully recruit anyone against his/her will, but there is evidence 
that forced recruitment took place. Nonetheless, the different answers that I collected on this 
matter (i.e. some interviewees were forcefully recruited, while some others were not) 
suggests that there was not a common practice on forced recruitment. Giovanni – who 
admits being among those who were voluntarily recruited – summarizes this conundrum as 
follows. “[Someone] who grows up in the mountains does not see the army, does not see 
anything. He sees the guerrilla, he grows up there; the only things that one can see are 
weapons and one establishes a relationship with guerrilla members. They tell you that the 
army is bad. Therefore, a kid grows up with this [mindset]. As the army publishes its 
propaganda, the FARC has its own way of recruiting which is considered ‘forced’. However, if 
we look at it deeply [we realize] that it is not forced. The recruitment that here [the state] 
calls ‘forced’, there [for the FARC] is about cultivating the potential recruit. They take people 
who are very young, they sweeten them, they offer them a perspective, up to the point in 
which the young man or woman goes in arms on his/her own will.” Then, he concludes: “it 
turns into forced [recruitment] out there [in the camp]. Here no! When you leave, you are 
never forced to go.”105  
Giovanni’s explanations reinforces the point about the strong ties between the FARC and the 
peasantry: acting as a state within the state, the FARC is able to socially and politically 
penetrate the peasantry, including extracting recruits voluntarily. As it was repeatedly 
mentioned throughout this chapter, for ex-FARC members the employment lens of 
recruitment applies only partially. Young recruits were not necessarily looking for an 
employment opportunity before joining the FARC – although some were looking for ways to 
survive, as Cristina testified. Rather, they were included in a social context in which the FARC 
was one of the few options available. Notwithstanding, although I cannot argue that FARC 
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recruits were fully driven by an employment-seeking behaviour, still, the labor market of 
war argument applies to the FARC case.  
For ex-paramilitaries, a different dynamic was at play. There was no forced recruitment per 
se, although some ex-paramilitaries report that once in, they were impeded to leave the 
group. This is the case of Wendy, who was hired as a radio operator for six years in a remote 
location in Vichada. Even though she wanted to leave the group, she was not allowed to do 
so. 
Indeed, the FARC applied strict rules and discipline not only to their internal organization, 
but also to their practice of recruitment. To avoid infiltration from the military or state 
intelligence services, the FARC had to use caution when recruiting, especially when the 
potential recruit had an unusual background or profile.  
This is the case of Laia, for example, who wanted to join the FARC after being a university 
drop out. Laia fled to the jungle and after some efforts she was introduced to a FARC mid-
level commander. “I told him that I studied engineering, and that while I did not complete my 
study, I still had a background in engineering. “I came here because I could not keep studying 
and I want to be with the FARC”, I told him. To which he answered: “Well, you are not a very 
common new comer; I cannot let you in like that, I have to consult with my superiors.” Thus, 
he took me to a small village, put me in a hostel and told me that he had to talk with people 
above him. He went and spoke to Mono Jojoy, who was in the vicinity at the time. For sure, 
Mono Jojoy ran an investigation over my life, after which he ordered that I would be taken 
directly to him for an interview. In the end, he was the one who let me in, or better say, the 
one who recruited me.”106 
More common profiles of recruits are young teens, who are more easily malleable and 
controllable. The overwhelming majority of ex-guerrilla members that I interviewed were 
recruited as minors. Thirteen ex-FARC and one ex-ELN out of a total of 18 ex-guerrilla were 
recruited before turning 18 years old. As we saw from the interviews, there were ex-FARC 
that for different circumstances (e.g. domestic violence, extreme poverty) were integrated 
even before they turned 10 years old. Others were recruited as teenagers, in their 15 to 17 
years old. Arguably, the FARC would target young teens in order to be able to educate them 
to the teaching of revolution, motivate them and train them. There is ample literature on 
children recruitment (Gates and Reich, 2010; Andvig and Gates, 2010; Blattman, 2012; 
Specht, 2003, 2014; Barnitz, 1997).  
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CHANGES IN RECRUITMENT PATTERNS 
In this section, it is also important to report how the decline of the ideological aspect for the 
FARC in the last one to two decades had a profound impact on the organization’s recruitment 
tactics and practices. Most interviewees attribute this shift to the FARC’s involvement in 
drugs trafficking. The opportunity to notably expand its revenues and, in turn, its power base 
through the production and commercialization of cocaine had the perverse effects (i) to 
break the internal cohesion within the group, both ideological and practical, and (ii) to 
fracture the ties with the peasantry. On the one hand, attracted by easy and quick profits, 
mid-level commanders managed to acquire more independence in their operations, favoring 
the rise of greed practices. On the other hand, drugs trafficking weakened the ideological 
commitment by the FARC, especially in their relationship with the peasantry. I will show in 
Chapter 8 how this factor caused several senior FARC members that I interviewed to 
demobilize.  
Here, it is important to remark how drugs trafficking altered the relationship of trust and 
collaboration between the FARC and its main constituent, the peasantry, and, in turn, the 
impact on recruitment. Fernan captures the loosening of the cohesion between the FARC and 
the peasantry, and within the peasantry itself. “There was a time in which the mafia rose, the 
power of mafia. Thus, [the FARC] changed. We no longer dedicated our time to the people, 
but to money, to buy weapons, vehicles and to strengthen the group. Therefore, the people 
and the peasantry, which is the reason why we fought, opened. And the FARC are no longer 
cooperating with them. […] [Other heinous practices] started, like the law of monetary 
reward for peasants, or [the practice of] spying on others. Thus, the FARC no longer hold the 
honesty that they used to have. Now they live like animals. And all of this is because their 
interest switched to money.”107 Roberto confirms the same consideration: “They [the FARC] 
changed their ideology from being a committed guerrilla and from being close to and 
cooperating with the peasantry, once they started trading with drugs traffickers. This was in 
2000. Or not; it has been since 1997-98 that they started buying, themselves conducting 
drugs trafficking.”108 
Put in simple terms, the shift that took place is the following. Generally, all non-state fighting 
forces have to adopt strategies to collect resources to sustain their war effort, with no 
exclusions. The FARC, in order to survive and prosper as a fighting force throughout several 
decades, relied on the peasantry – as its political and ideological base, and its source of 
recruitment. Only through the support of the peasantry were the FARC able to strengthen, 
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via expanding their power base, territorial control, and active fighting force. Thus, in line 
with Communist revolutionary propositions, the FARC were using most of their political 
capital toward gaining peasantry’s hearts and minds.  
The entry of drugs’ illegal economy and the potential enormous monetary gaining gave the 
FARC the option to strengthen and increase its power through other means. It would be too 
simplistic, I argue, to place all the blame on drugs trafficking without conducting a conflict 
analysis that included other factors. Nonetheless, in terms of timing, the moment the FARC 
entered the drugs economy coincided with the beginning of its political, moral and 
ideological decline. This shift took place between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of 
the 2000s.  
In turn, the weakening of the link between the FARC and the peasantry had a negative impact 
on recruiting, which draws mainly from the peasantry. With weakening ideology it is harder 
for the FARC to attract committed recruits. Most of all, since the peasantry provides the core 
of FARC’s fresh recruits, the weakening of the relationship between the two, negatively 
affects the quality, and, arguably, the quantity of new members. Therefore, less committed 
members are recruited, and, perhaps, practices of forced recruitment may have been on the 
rise due to this reason too. 
With respect to my interviews, there is a notable difference between the older members and 
those who were recruited in the 2000s. Mostly, I perceived the more recent recruits being 
less ideologically driven, and with a lower commitment toward the peasantry and the 
struggle. They also do not describe in detail the ideological indoctrination through which all 
FARC members are subject to. Juan, 22 years old from Granada, Meta, is such an example. He 
grew up without his parents in a marginalized context; was recruited by the FARC when he 
was 12, and stayed in the group until he turned 17 years old. What struck me most from his 
story is the lack of empathy toward the FARC: he was neither resentful toward them nor he 
seemed to share the ideology or the cause. The same applies to Walter, who joined the FARC 
in his teens to follow a girl he was in love with. On both cases, the revolutionary aspect was 
definitely missing. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a comprehensive analysis of non-state armed groups’ recruitment 
from the point of view of employment (Table 6.3). It addressed the complex and multifaceted 
issue of recruitment from three different levels. The expectation was to apply multi-causality 
to the reasons why men and women join non-state armed groups. Through the personal 
stories of recruitment of 31 ex-combatants, the chapter highlighted the individual reasons of 
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joining an armed group, the political and economic drivers of recruitment, and the strategies 
and behaviours by armed groups themselves to attract men and women in arms.  
TABLE 6.3: RECRUITMENT AT A GLANCE: CONTEXTUAL FACTORS, DYNAMICS AND INCENTIVES 
 FARC AUC 
Areas in 
Meta under 
armed 
group’s 
control 
- Marginalized rural areas of Duda-
Guayabero, and Ariari 
- Stronghold towns of Villavicencio, San 
Martin, Granada, Puerto Gaitan 
Power of 
non-state 
armed group 
- Military and social control over 
marginalized areas 
- Recruitment taking place in context 
of lawlessness and lack of 
opportunities  
- Social influence in towns with strong 
AUC presence driving recruitment 
trends upwards 
Dynamics of 
recruitment 
- Strong ties with the peasantry 
- ‘Winning hearts and minds’: FARC’s 
active role in supporting peasants as 
a driver of recruitment 
- Progressive individual involvement 
with FARC: from small tasks to 
mobilization 
- Most XCs recruited while teens 
- Voluntary recruitment; forced 
membership 
- Difficult economic situation and 
unemployment are main drivers 
- Attractive job opportunity is a crucial 
incentive 
- Personal introduction by friends or 
acquaintances 
- Role model of paramilitaries: powerful 
and well-off  
- Several recruits previously in the Army 
- No possibility to quit 
Recruitment 
strategies by 
armed 
groups 
- Develop strong ties with peasantry 
through (a) political mobilization, 
(b) practical support (livelihoods, 
infrastructure, access to goods and 
services) 
- Target young recruits (both male 
and female) to build ideologically-
committed members 
- Recruitment pursued informally 
through network of family members, 
friends and acquaintances 
- Promise of higher salary than actual 
one 
- Target men with work experience – 
preferably in security sector 
- 24-26 years old is most common age 
group 
While accounting for several of these drivers of mobilization, I have placed special focus on 
employment seeking and opportunity as one of the lead causes of recruitment. Jairo, an ex 
mid-level commander with the AUC, summarized the reasons for his recruitment. “The three 
most important issues for me were: revenge and anger, unemployment, and hunger. The mix 
of these three factors made me join. […] It was a mix of the fact that when I lived in 
Villavicencio I did not find work opportunities, and I suffered hunger and had unmet needs. 
Thus, I had to enlist. But I [also] had the raw material: I had hatred and resentment toward 
the guerrilla.”109 
As a concluding consideration on recruitment – which introduces us to the next chapter on 
employment in the armed group – I would like to point to the feelings and emotions of ex-
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combatants once they were recruited and started working in the armed group.  Several ex-
combatants – both guerrilla and paramilitaries – would go through feelings of 
disillusionment once they permanently joined the group. As the hard daily life of a 
combatant kicks in, the passionate ideals and the myth of armed group’s membership 
partially wane. As Horgan (2009) puts it, “a common realization for new recruits is the 
crushing discrepancy between the fantasies that influenced their initial mobilization and 
involvement, with the subsequent reality of engagement.” The romantic dream view of 
armed group’s membership and engagement is taken away. 
TABLE 6.4: KEY FINDINGS ON RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION 
 
For example, Ibarbo admits of having been allured by paramilitaries’ display of power and 
money when he arrived to Villavicencio and was still not in the group. “This life is dazzling 
for many. You see everyone going around in trucks, with money. Thus, one believes that 
everything in life shines and is about money. But what you see is different from reality.”110 
Some ex-FARC also underline the boredom of and disillusionment with daily life routine. 
Thus, if the magic wanes and daily life in the group is rather ordinary – albeit hard and 
dangerous – then the armed group’s experience can be conceptualized as an employment 
experience. The routine and tediousness of daily life in the group is a feature that is shared 
by the day-to-day life of any job. The next chapter is dedicated to the analysis of employment 
in a non-state armed group. Its findings will be helpful in drawing more links between armed 
mobilization and employment. 
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 There is a relationship between recruitment by non-state armed groups and employment 
(supply and demand). There are individual, organizational, and structural ramifications of this 
relationship. 
 Recruitment and mobilization are the product of a mix of individual-, organizational-, and 
structural-level reasons. 
 Individual: The employment opportunity provided by a non-state armed group plays a critical 
(and understated) role in the individual decision of joining a non-state armed group. 
 Organizational: Non-state armed groups pursue recruitment strategies to attract men and 
women within the group. 
 Structural: Territorial control and power by a non-state armed group is necessary to pursue 
recruitment.  
 Structural: In a conflict-affected area, the political economy of war determines the informality 
and illegality of the labor market. Employment in armed groups is often an attractive and 
natural option. 
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7. Employment in Conflict: A ‘Job’ in a 
Non-State Armed Group 
This chapter analyses armed group’s membership from the point of view of employment. 
After observing ex-combatants’ experiences of mobilization and analysing the drivers of 
recruitment in the pre-conflict phase, this chapter delves into the second phase of ‘during 
conflict’ – as part of the three-phase analysis of war to peace transition. Through individual 
stories of mobilization, the previous chapter provided the necessary insights to understand 
the causes and the contextual factors for why individuals join non-state armed groups. In 
particular, it showed how central employment seeking is to recruitment and mobilization. 
This knowledge (‘why and how people mobilize’) is now leveraged to analyse the dynamics 
of armed group’s membership through the lens of employment. The present chapter seeks to 
answer the following questions: What do combatants do while in arms? And, how do non-
state armed groups organize their human resources? Ultimately, the focus is on explaining 
the employment dynamics of ex-combatants inside the armed group. 
The chapter is organized along two main lines: the individual level and the organizational 
one, which are in line with the multi-level analysis of this research. Nonetheless, elements 
related to the individual level and elements related to the organizational level sometimes 
conflate within the analysis, and cannot be too artificially separated. The first section on the 
individual level presents the stories of ex-paramilitaries and ex-guerrilla from the 
perspective of their day-to-day activities and duties, and the tasks that they had within the 
group. It describes the main professional roles in a non-state armed group, including: military 
and combat functions; the political and/or governance roles, meaning those functions 
related to political mobilization, control of territory and those roles that require contact with 
local population; lastly, there are a myriad of other roles in non-state armed groups related 
to logistics, supplies, nursing etc. As it was the case for the mobilization chapter, the 
empirical findings from the interviews represent the ground on which the analysis is built. 
The second section, on the organizational level, uses the testimonies of ex-combatants to 
understand how non-state armed groups internally organize human resources. This includes 
how they deal with their employees, in terms of career development and advancement, 
training and capacity-building, the rules of conduct within the group (with a special 
emphasis of discipline and trust); as well as how armed groups deal with transfers and labor 
mobility, promotions or demotions. As it was explained elsewhere, the conceptual 
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framework of the organizational level that this research adopts, squarely fits into the rebel 
governance literature on the understanding of armed groups’ internal functioning and 
organization, and external behaviours. The present research makes a modest contribution to 
this literature, by focusing on the human resources of non-state armed groups from the 
perspective and the testimonies of its rank and file members.  
There is no attempt to comprehensively look at the internal organization of armed groups, 
since this would have required an in depth look at their internal structure – a proposition 
that goes beyond this research. The present study, instead, refers to the human resources of 
armed groups inasmuch it is reported by ex-combatants. The analysis of armed groups’ 
recruiting patterns – which was done in the previous chapter – is complemented here by the 
analysis of how armed groups organize their labor force.  
Some of the topics that are touched upon include: how careers unfold; what the patterns are 
for career development; how members climb up the career ladder and what skills are needed 
to succeed; how capacity building is structured and what trainings are available and/or 
required; and, finally, how armed groups make sure that their members abide by the rules 
and that the discipline code is enforced.     
Like the previous chapter, all sections untangle the differences between ex-members of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, 
FARC) and ex-members of the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia, AUC). As much as recruiting patterns were quite different between FARC and 
paramilitaries, there is also a substantial difference between FARC and AUC in terms of 
career structures and functions within the group. While the FARC build and are made of 
homogenous and polyvalent members who are able to perform multiple duties, the AUC 
mostly (but not exclusively) pursued labor specialization through diversified job profiles and 
functions. As it is explained, these different practices are the result of one being a highly 
centralized organization (FARC), and the other being an umbrella of units that were quite 
autonomous in their decision-making process (AUC).  
An additional set of reasons for the differences between FARC and paramilitaries concern the 
level of integration of the non-state armed group within the socio-economic context. On the 
one hand, the FARC is a clandestine rurally-based armed organization fighting a rebellion 
against the central state. Its survival is dependent on its level of self-sufficiency. On top of its 
combat and security capacity, the FARC has to provide for itself in terms of all of its needs, 
including livelihoods and food, services (health and education) and all logistics. On the other 
hand, in areas where they were present, the AUC were more integrated within society – 
albeit discreetly. As a result, paramilitaries built a workforce that was more flexible and 
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diversified in terms of functions than the standardized ‘combatant’ profile that the FARC had 
(Gutierrez Sanin, 2008). 
The great variety of roles, background and circumstances for mobilization – especially within 
the paramilitaries – gives an idea, first, of the complexity and multifaceted character of rebel 
organizations and armed actors. This study does not aim to account for that complexity, nor 
a typology of armed groups is part of the scope of this research. Nonetheless, through life 
stories of ex-combatants, the chapter on roles and tasks in non-state armed groups 
contributes to a more detailed and granular understanding of armed groups’ organization 
and behaviours.  
Second, by providing all these examples of roles and functions within each group, the 
research aims to challenge the flat and uniform notion of ‘ex-combatant’ among 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) scholars and practitioners. By 
highlighting personal stories of employment and armed group’s membership, the research 
provides a rich picture of the different ways of being an ex-combatant.  
Language of ‘job’. “This was my job in the AUC”111, Camilo says, referring to his role as social 
worker and liaison with the local population. The first aspect that highlights an 
interdependence and a tight relationship between employment and conflict is semantic. All 
the ex-paramilitaries who I interviewed describe their experience in arms with the language 
of ‘employment’: they all refer to it as a ‘job’, or as ‘work’. This is hardly surprising given the 
circumstances under which many paramilitaries were recruited. As it was recollected in the 
previous chapter, the great majority of ex-paramilitaries were on the look for employment 
opportunities or were in a dire economic situation when enlisted. It is only natural that they 
refer to the phase of recruitment as an employment placement. Thus, even when referring 
back to their armed group’s membership, they call it ‘work’ or ‘job’. I asked Jon, for example, 
how the AUC allocated combatants to one functions or another, and why some went to 
combat and others did not. “It is very simple: it is like if you have four employees”, Jon swiftly 
answered.112 Then, he went on describing those four core jobs.  Jon’s immediate reply 
underscored the deep perception that combatants have of belonging to a professional 
context (Hoffman, 2011). 
In addition, in more than one case the paramilitary organization is referred to as the ‘firm’ 
(la empresa) by ex-combatants. When I asked Alejandro to tell me about how the AUC 
worked, what its internal organization looked like, his first straight answer pointed to the 
similarities between armed groups and normal employers. “When there was Carlos Castaño 
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[the founder and leader of the paramilitary umbrella organization of the AUC], this firm 
(empresa) was shaped with the goal of being very organized: [there were] the articles of 
incorporation, the internal rules, and tailored functions.”113 
For FARC members, the identification between armed group’s membership and employment 
is not so direct. FARC recruitment – I showed – was far more complex and encompassing 
than the process of simply finding work by most ex-paramilitaries. Nonetheless, as the 
drivers of individual recruitment in the FARC included aspects related to securing a life 
opportunity, also ex-FARC combatants experienced a connection between membership and 
employment during their permanence in the armed group. After all, a FARC combatant – 
among many other things – is a worker who – as any worker – has to comply with orders and 
perform tasks, and who may want a better position for himself within the organization. By 
the same token, ex-FARC members also often used the language of ‘job.’ 
Giovanni explains how “I worked in the cattle industry, with cattle. From there, when I 
entered [the FARC], I entered by doing the same job because the FARC also have cattle!”114 
Another ex-FARC combatant, Laura, has some insights about employment and armed group’s 
membership. Answering the question of which aspect of being part of an armed group 
attracted her, Laura replied that she has always liked weapons. Then, she elaborates: “I have 
always liked male jobs. I am no friend of women’s jobs, like being in the kitchen, or in the 
house. No! I have always liked manual labor, even heavy lifting. Being in the house was not 
for me.”115 To Laura and to many other ex-combatants, being in the group meant – among 
other things – pursuing one’s own vocation and/or feasible path in life. These answers offer 
a further glimpse into ex-combatants’ perceptions about what meant being a member of an 
armed group. In fact, for ex-combatants, armed group’s membership is, among other things, 
about what someone wants to do in life, what he/she can do,  what job he/she wants to have 
and how he/she thinks he/she can survive and gain meaningful livelihoods. 
Juan was recruited by the FARC in his early teens; and, while in combat, he surrendered to 
the military when he was 17 years old. In the interview, he did not display ideological 
commitment to the cause. When talking about leadership and direct superiors in the FARC, 
Juan drew an unsolicited comparison between employment and armed group’s membership. 
Being in “the guerrilla [is] like working in a firm. When there is a change in management is 
like when there is a change in the commander [of the front]. […] [In any employment], I like 
to work with X because he is a nice person, and he knows how to be in charge. He gives you 
stimulation in order to make you love your work, to make you do it well. [In the guerrilla] it 
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is like that. There are commanders who give you incentive. They give you a soda, for 
example: they tell you “look, take this”. Small things like these give you strength and 
stimulation, and they keep your morale high. By the same token, there are commanders that 
get there and the only thing they say is, “hey, you are just coming back from a battle today; 
tomorrow you have to go back. The army arrived there and you have to go.” Thus, they do 
not even give you a resting day, nor stimulation, nothing. This aspect very much demoralizes 
troops.”116 
These few quotes provide some preliminary insights on how ex-combatants perceive their 
roles, routines, functions and interpersonal relationships while in the armed group. I asked 
them questions about ‘what they used to do’ in the group, ‘what tasks and functions’, ‘how 
they changed functions, if at all’, ‘what the dynamics and circumstances needed to be to 
change roles’, and ‘what and how internal rules within the group were perceived, if they 
were respected, and how contravening behaviours were sanctioned.’  
I did not ask questions that directly hinted at work relationships and ‘jobs’. I wanted these 
findings to come out without me providing the framework of analysis I was using. In fact, the 
draw of a link between employment and armed group’s membership is the fruit of ex-
combatants’ answers and the analysis of such answers. There is no pre-fieldwork hypothesis 
that I tested on the relationship between conflict and employment. Thus, not only findings 
are fieldwork driven, but also the research design itself and the focus of this research has 
been highly affected and determined by the answers I received from the first batch of ex-
combatants that I interviewed.  
Answers from ex-combatants, many of whom directly explained and revealed the story of 
their period in arms through an employment and labor market lens, were crucial in drawing 
a link between an employment experience and membership to an armed group. As much as 
sui generis the latter can be and other factors be present, there is a fundamental 
understanding and perception by the combatant himself to be in an occupation, or a job. This 
chapter clearly shows how the employment-conflict nexus is displayed by ex-combatants’ 
experiences and testimonies.   
7.1 Individual Level: Roles and Jobs Within an Armed Group 
COMBAT AND MILITARY ROLES  
In describing ex-combatants’ ‘work’ experiences while in arms, it is worth starting from the 
combat role (which all FARC members had to go through) and those other security-related 
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roles (e.g. patrolling function, and personal security detail). First, a note about method. 
Generally, ex-combatants were not particularly open to share stories about violence. The 
reason for it is certainly personal, to a certain extent. Ex-combatants – like all humans – 
experience difficulty in remembering traumatic events and/or do not feel comfortable about 
sharing private memories of violence with a stranger.  
But the reason may also have to do with their current role as DDR beneficiaries. As it was 
already pointed out before, I conducted most interviews within the DDR program premises – 
and all interviews were arranged through the program. At the time of the interview, most ex-
combatants were still receiving benefits as reintegration beneficiaries. Therefore, given their 
status, they may have considered it a risk to share details about violent events, and any role 
that they may have taken up in them.  
Currently, for ex-AUC members there are open transitional justice mechanisms, like 
historical memory, reparation to victims, and even investigations, all of which discourage ex-
paramilitaries from being too open about violent events. In addition, it is to be reminded the 
stigma that society places on ex-combatants, not only in Colombia, but in most post-war 
settings. As part of their individual and psychological reintegration process, ex-combatants 
do not feel at ease in telling stories of violence. Two of the local social workers who interact 
directly with ex-combatants told me that no ex-combatant has ever spoken to them either 
about violence that was perpetrated or about events in battle. Given these considerations, I 
did not ask direct questions about violent events, which could have endangered the 
interview. As stated before, my questions were about roles and functions, and not specific 
occurrences. 
In terms of the paramilitaries, ex-AUC who were recruited either without a particular skillset 
or with a background in the regular army, were generally directed to and employed in a 
security-related capacity from the beginning. Of the 13 ex-paramilitaries that I interviewed, 
six of them revealed of having been at some point involved either in combat or in an armed 
security function while in the AUC. With an 8-year military background on his resume, 
Alejandro joined the Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare – which never integrated into the 
AUC – while looking for a job. “When I entered the group, I was in a military capacity. […] 
When I arrived there, there was fighting and all of it”, he reveals.117 “I started as a normal 
patrol” in the AUC, echoes Jairo, who fled Mitu after the FARC takeover.118  
In search for work, Ibarbo ended up in the AUC Heroes del Llano in Villavicencio, where he 
started working as a security detail for the city’s local paramilitary commander. “He was the 
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one who enlisted me; so, I ended up working in his bodyguard team”, Ibarbo says.119 
Radamael, who only stayed in the group for less than one year, says that “it was like I got 
there [in the AUC] and I had to do the basics: stand guard, and do the work that is required to 
a foot soldier, nothing else.”120 
Alejandro describes in detail the war between rival paramilitary factions in Meta, Guaviare 
and Casanare, which he witnessed as a medical worker. He specifies that as a medical worker 
he was very close to the line of fire for a long time. The interesting point he makes is about 
the ‘how’ a battle is fought from the perspective of a combatant. The war spanned over “two 
years. [We spent] two years fighting. And one [paramilitary combatant] would last for a 
maximum of 15 days. Then, he would be on leave. But the daily course of the fight is of five 
hours. Then, one stops and rests, and afterwards goes back to fight. And the day after, one 
goes again to battle. The fight [takes place] in small bits.”121 The description of how a battle 
unfolds day by day, told by the individuals who actually carry out that battle, underlines the 
very ‘employment’ side of war. Alejandro speaks about those aspects related to ex-
combatants’ shifts, the daily schedule of battle, as well as the combatants’ perception about 
needing breaks and time away from battle. When talking about routines and functions, there 
is no room for ideology nor for the causes of conflict: the important point seems to be the 
practical part (i.e. surviving, most of all), or the employment experience – what we do, how, 
when and for how long.    
FARC ex-combatants who admitted of having been in combat are more common. In fact, in 
principle, all ex-FARC members directly experienced war – which is not the case for the 
paramilitaries. First, the FARC is a proper army where all members go through the same 
military training.  All recruits, with no exception, have to spend time as foot soldiers. 
“Everyone must participate in combat at some point, because you get trained for it”, says 
Jaime.122 Second, by providing a standard political training and by pursuing continuous 
political mobilization, the FARC enjoys a high degree of internal legitimacy and cohesion 
within its own ranks. As it was seen in the previous chapter, FARC members are generally 
highly motivated and uniformly driven by the common cause of fighting against injustice, 
poverty, and the state.  
Therefore, the thought that the violence that the FARC employs is a necessary means to 
achieve higher goals, resonates with most ex-FARC combatants. Generally, they are not 
ashamed of it. They may regret what they did; but they still show some pride for their 
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actions. Violence is sanctioned and legitimized by the political cause, and this mantra is 
shared by the whole organization. As a consequence, ex-FARC members are more open than 
the paramilitary to reveal their experiences in battle – essentially because they see combat 
and war as a noble endeavor. 
“I grew up being in combat zones. I participated in several military campaigns”, says Enrique, 
who was recruited when he was 9 years old.123 The role of a foot soldier is a comprehensive 
one. This does not only include functions related to security or combat, but – as in any 
regular army – it concerns also all the organizational and logistics activities to make the 
army work and stay cohesive. Laura explains as follows: “What every guerrilla member [does 
is to] stand guard, work, find and allocate wood, prepare food. […] One stays in the camp, 
does training, both military and political education. This is all that one does. Then, one needs 
to cooperate with the local population, like fixing a path or a road.”124 
Carlos spent three years in a FARC camp as a foot soldier. “The only thing they give you is 
training courses and more training courses. And thus, one gets trained to live by the internal 
regime, in terms of rules and statutes. One has to spend the night alert, load and transport 
wood; in short, one has to do everything.”125 Cristiano, who spent eleven years as a foot 
soldier between the FARC 7th Front and the mobile Rondon Column, also stresses the aspect 
of adapting to rules and life in the camp: “I arrived there [in the camp] and the first few 
months were very tough; the first six months. After that, one keeps the pace. They work your 
mind, the ideology hits you and all that.”126 
In fact, the ideology and the political aspect are the second fundamental pillar for FARC 
combatants – next to the military one. They go together and are inextricably linked. FARC 
recruits are meticulously trained in both the military and the political arts. A FARC member 
is first of all an individual who believes in the legitimacy of the political and armed struggle 
for a more just society in Colombia. Through a simple example, Jaime explains the dynamics 
of a FARC operation to clear a territory from military presence, and then, the task to hold and 
rule it. “They order you: “Get ready to go with three other combatants to village X; the army 
is there and you need to go and shoot at them.” Fine, you go and you do it. Then, you go with 
four more to the same village to organize it. You go and explain the situation, the politics. “Go 
there and talk to them, gather them and explain them – without any threat.” When you are 
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not in combat, you are studying, studying history, such as how this movement arose and the 
reasons behind it.”127   
Despite appearing to be an overly simplistic example, the underlining point here concerns 
the understanding of the compenetration and interdependence between armed struggle and 
political one. Without the military part, the political mobilization is unfeasible; and without 
the political aspect, the military confrontation loses its legitimacy and its end goal.   
Security guard and personal detail. More than one ex-FARC talked about being in the 
security team for a mid-level commander or even a top-level one. These were ad hoc roles. 
Laia – who joined the FARC after fleeing her civil life as a university student in Bogota – 
started her career in the security team of Mono JoJoy, number two of the FARC at the time he 
was killed by a targeted operation in September 2010. For some months, Laia was one of 
Mono JoJoy’s security detail “during the despeje128 and [Mono JoJoy] almost did not move 
from the camp at all. […] We were part of his immediate security, meaning, those who slept 
at his doorstep. We were one guerrilla129, between 25 and 28. And then, in the vicinity, in the 
same camp, there would always be around 200 more combatants. He would sleep in the 
middle of three rings [of security]. But, next to him we were about 25.”130 Ivan, who for 
several years was in the immediate security team of Mono JoJoy as well, further explains how 
the ring system worked. “There was an imaginary circle. They would set a restricted area 
within which no one could enter without permission.”131 He explains how when other chiefs 
needed to enter the circle either to meet with the leader who was being protected, or to just 
pass, they needed to be escorted by the same security details at all times. It was an elaborate 
system to maximize the Secretariat members’ protection.  
An interesting aspect is how the role of security detail was, in fact, a highly privileged one. 
Such units would not go to combat and risk their life, and did not endure the constant 
physical and mental hardships that normal troops would go through. Ivan says: “In reality 
the time that I spent in the FARC I did not suffer too much because for most of the time I was 
in the security team to protect superiors. […] I mean, one always suffers, but not as much as 
going to war, being up all night, and experience hunger. We would not eat special food, no. 
But, at least, one has three meals guaranteed per day. Whereas someone who goes with the 
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troops experiences days without eating anything. If someone looks for food, bombs may start 
falling.”132  
As a security detail for Mono Jojoy, other than standing guard, Ivan’s tasks included, at times, 
cooking special meals for the high commands. He says this was a “delicate” business 
“because one would serve them food, but the moment one of them would not feel well, then 
the cook and the immediate staff would go under investigation.” Leadership would eat the 
same food as troops, but prepared in a highly sanitary and hygienic environment, “with a lot 
of care. One could not let anyone walk through the kitchen.”133 Other than tasked with food 
preparation, Ivan also managed radio communication for Mono Jojoy.    
It is also worth noting the way in which Ivan gained this privileged position in the FARC. He 
reveals that his dad knew Mono Jojoy’s brother, and that thank to this connection Ivan was 
assigned to a relatively less risky role. However, he specifies that “my discipline has always 
been impeccable; I mean, I have always successfully completed my tasks.” Ivan wants to 
make sure I understand that he could have easily been stripped of his security detail job in 
case he would be deficient. In this sense, the personal connection helped, but it was his 
individual qualities that made him succeed and/or rise versus someone else. We will deepen 
this point about personal skills further below, when discussing career advancement within 
the organization.     
Nonetheless, perhaps the most important variable – when speaking of security details’ role – 
is personal trust. In a war environment with mounting incentives for desertion and betrayal 
– due to the benefits of the DDR program which incentivizes combatants to surrender and 
betray the organization – high-level leaders have faced more and more pressure to increase 
their protection and scrutinize the loyalty of those around them. In fact, allegedly, the 
targeted killing campaign which took down the FARC leadership between 2010 and 2011, 
was enabled precisely by the information given by those combatants who laid down arms 
and joined the DDR program.  
Muriel, with 30+ years in the FARC, was able to gain historical leader Alfonso Cano’s trust 
thank to his long standing tenure in the organization. Muriel was raised by the FARC since he 
was 11 years old, due to the extreme poverty in which his family versed. Growing up close to 
Cano since childhood, Muriel ended up spending close to 20 years next to him as one of 
Cano’s staff. His role was to allow access and move goods directed to Alfonso Cano, and to 
manage the transfer of external individuals who needed to meet with Cano – including 
foreign supporters, donors and journalists. Ultimately, Cano was killed alongside other top 
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rebels in 2011: allegedly – reveals Muriel – it was one of his closest aides who betrayed him 
and led the army to bomb his camp.  
HETEROGENEITY OF JOBS: OTHER ROLES IN THE AUC AND THE FARC  
As far as AUC ex-combatants are concerned, the combat role is one among other performed 
functions. Several ex-AUC started in a security-related function, only to later move to some 
other role. Six of them shared stories about being local operatives, in terms of running 
operations for the organization. Such roles may have entailed functions of extortion, money 
laundering, drugs trafficking, but also of facilitator with the local population. But there were 
also more normal functions of transporting vehicles, provision of food and other supplies, 
guarding property etc. (Duncan, 2011: 173). 
As a local head of finance, Jairo was in charge of “everything related with extortions and tax 
collections. For example, I was responsible for buying supplies for the group, all the food, and 
gasoline for all the vehicles. Basically, these were my functions, together with collecting 
revenues from the front. The AUC considered them revenues, whereas for the state and the 
law they were extortions.” One similar case is Jon, who, after running some logistics 
functions in San Martin, moved to operations, or “department of initiatives” (área de 
iniciativa), as he defines it.134 Here, activities concerned the collection and management of 
revenues coming from drugs trafficking. 
A different set of functions constituted Ibarbo’s job. He started as a security detail for the 
AUC chief in Villavicencio, and quickly rose to be his number two. “In Villavicencio, I was 
responsible for the transportation of money and of the injured. I would not collect extortions, 
that was not my job. But I would do business development with other firms. Because the AUC 
would do business and get into a relationship with several firms here in Villavicencio, like 
hospitals, clinics, car dealerships etc. Thus, I was the one that would put the face on behalf of 
the organization.”135 Ibarbo managed a team of seven people (called urbanos) to perform 
these functions. They would be armed, of course, but would go around in plain clothes.  
To add to the variety of roles within a non-state armed group, some ex-AUC performed more 
basic tasks, never rose in career nor held positions of responsibility. Both Alejandro and Jairo 
had experiences in the AUC as medical workers, which allowed them to drop the riskier 
combat role in which they were in. “As front chief for medical nursery, I was in charge to 
bring in the injured and those who were ill, move the dead persons, and buy medications”, 
explains Jairo.136 A similar experience for Maria Victoria, who worked in the Bloque 
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Centauros as a medical nurse for a year and half in Villanueva, Casanare. “I used to receive 
those who were ill, who had malaria, infections, or pregnant women. I would take them to 
the hospital”, she said.137   
One more story is the one of Mauricio, who joined the paramilitary as he was looking for 
work in the AUC-dominated town of Granada. Asked about the job he held, he answered the 
following. “I travelled all the time because I was a driver. […] My residence was the car I was 
assigned to. There, I would have my things, my food, and my clothes – all in a suitcase. 
Wherever I had the opportunity to shower or to rest, I would do it. Because I did not have a 
proper place that I could call home.”138 Juan Manuel says that he was a punto for two years. 
“A punto is someone who, as a civilian, observes people that pass by a certain area. He is on 
the look for any suspicious people. […] I would observe a main road to make sure that the 
enemy would not pass by or come over.”139 
An interesting story of paramilitary’s membership is the one of Ignacio. Ignacio is an ex-
combatant who was a mechanic and who had his own car repair shop in Puerto Gaitan – a 
paramilitary stronghold in eastern Meta. He would fix vehicles for the Autodefensas 
Campesinas de Meta y Vichada (ACMV, a paramilitary faction that was not part of the AUC), 
but was not a member. His relationship with the paramilitaries could be described as a 
business one. Ignacio explains: “Puerto Gaitan is the second largest municipality in Colombia 
[for geographical extension]. On top of it, [the AUC] held all the state of [neighboring] 
Vichada. As these are vast regions, to go from one to another you could drive for hours and 
hours. Thus, they would need reliable cars, motorbikes and trucks. Since I knew of mechanics 
and I had a good background, I coordinated the fixing of all vehicles, without belonging to the 
group, but as a simple mechanic. […] They would come and I would charged them, normally, 
and they would pay me. […] I was never under the orders of anyone: I was independent.”140 
Nonetheless, a local prosecutor issued an arrest warrant against him, at which point Ignacio 
had to flee Puerto Gaitan. When the demobilization took place, Ignacio was incorporated in 
the reintegration program despite never having carried a weapon nor being formally in the 
group nor having received any training.  
Ignacio’s job and cooperation with the ACMV determined his membership and, ultimately, 
his status as ex-combatant. Ignacio’s story is important because it highlights the grey area 
that there may be between combatants and non-combatants within the local population. An 
armed group controlling a certain area shall necessarily establish relationship with the local 
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population – its economy, society and institutions, governance structure. These relationships 
have a direct effect on individuals, who, in turn, have their livelihoods. Thus, employment 
and work define the level of membership and/or affiliation of individuals to the armed 
group. A similar tension is also present in the FARC. In the previous chapter we saw the story 
of Giovanni, a cattle trader who was forcefully recruited after trading cattle with the FARC 
for sometime. Also in that case, Giovanni’s job showed the middle (and ambiguous) way 
between combatants and non-combatants; and the negative implications for the local 
population from the presence of non-state armed groups.       
Coming back to the other roles in the paramilitary, Wendy also joined the ACMV in Puerto 
Gaitan and was sent to a one-month military training. After it, “I trained as a radio operator; 
thus, they placed me to work with radios. […] I worked with a radio equipment to connect 
different operatives that were in the area.”141 Wendy ended up working as a radio operator 
for six and half years: she was stationed in a remote rural area of Vichada in the Eastern 
Llanos, and only allowed to visit her family once a year.  
There is gender-related consideration to be made here. Wendy and Maria Victoria were the 
only two ex-paramilitary female who I interviewed. Both of them were in a supporting role 
(a radio operator and a medical worker, respectively). What is striking is that neither of 
them was permitted to leave the AUC: they were, in fact, forced to stay against their will – an 
experience that I did not hear from any ex-AUC male. In addition, neither of them changed 
function or role throughout their mobilization. The latter circumstance starks in contrast 
with the other male interviewees, almost all of whom had more than one job in the group. 
This finding confirms that the AUC was a predominantly male-oriented and male-dominated 
organization.   
The FARC, instead, practiced gender parity – at least on paper – although the interviews 
highlighted contradicting experiences with respect to gender. Women were subject to the 
same rules, training and life cycle as men were. And they were deemed the same respect. For 
example, Laura, the ex-FARC member who said she liked men’s roles and jobs in life, said: “A 
guerrilla member has to do what is required: stand guard, be ready if the army launches an 
assault, go on explorations, work, participate in battle. I mean, you have to do everything. 
And it is the same for men and for women. One has to work the same. If a man works, a 
woman equally works. Skills are the same”, implying that skills are not gender-sensitive.142  
Laia, on the other hand, has an opposite view (and experience). “Women are second-class 
combatants”, she says. “For a man it is easy to be a commander. For a woman, well, you need 
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to be more bloodthirsty, more cruel and nastier than any other man in order to be given such 
a role. They do not let any woman be commander” – Laia adds. She posits that she would 
have been a commander if not for her gender. “There is just more consideration for men. For 
women not!” she concludes.143  
FARC’s other roles. Interviews showed that a number of ex-FARC members were employed 
in other non-military capacities (Table 7.1). Non-military roles are dramatically less frequent 
in the FARC than in the paramilitary: as it was explained above, the FARC were a military 
organization in which everyone had to first be a good soldier. A first example of non-combat 
functions are those – highlighted above – who were security details for military and political 
commanders like Mono Jojoy and Alfonso Cano.       
One outlier – given her past and background is Laia. She had received tertiary-school 
education and was a university drop out: Laia was not the typical FARC recruit from the 
peasantry. Throughout almost all of her permanence in the FARC, she was destined to tasks 
that required a certain degree of skills and education – although like everyone else she also 
spent time in combat. Among the jobs she had, she was a cartographer: she would draw 
maps and run trainings on how to do them. She did also conduct classes on how to read and 
write. With time, Laia moved to producing propaganda material directed to the local 
population. She first worked in a broadcasting unit, where they would run radio programs 
and statements. Then, she wrote leaflets and contributed to the draft of magazines, including 
one called Resistencia (“Resistance”). 
Laia raises also an important point about the infrequency for the FARC to enroll someone 
with the level of education she had. “Because they [the FARC] have a problem with 
education; I mean, the majority of combatants are individuals who never had access to 
education. Those who obtained an education stopped at third grade, or maximum at fourth 
grade. Therefore, someone who completed high school and who knows how to draw and 
how to type on a desktop is a highly valuable asset to them.”144 This point reveals (and 
confirms) the fundamental homogeneity of FARC’s combatants and of the human resources 
available to the organization. As it was analysed in the previous chapter, the pool of 
candidates from which the FARC were able to recruit, overwhelmingly consisted of the 
peasantry. Peasants who lived in areas controlled by the FARC and with little or no 
penetration of state presence and services, like education, for example. It is plausible to 
assume, then, that Laia’s consideration is valid: the FARC would view a candidate like her 
with favorable eyes because she would bring in a skill set which was in high demand within 
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the organization. As it was pointed earlier, the FARC leadership would also be suspicious of 
members like Laia, who had an unconventional past.       
POLITICAL ROLES, LOGISTICS, AND TIES TO LOCAL POPULATION 
This section discusses the roles and the experiences of ex-combatants who were involved 
and had ties with the local population in a non-military capacity. Non-state armed groups 
necessarily establish relationships with the local context in which they operate from several 
perspectives: from an economic point of view (e.g. demand of goods and services, logistics, 
revenue collection), from a social and political perspective (e.g. political mobilization, and 
winning hearts and minds), as well as from an institutional point of view (e.g. rebel 
governance). Therefore, armed groups ‘employ’ a specific set of their workforce to carry over 
some of these tasks.  
As far as the FARC is concerned, one of the most common non-military role in the 
organization is the one of miliciano, or militia man. A miliciano is someone who works either 
for or with the FARC, but as an external member, not as a full time for-life combatant. It is a 
non-military function, representing a link between the FARC and the outside world. A 
miliciano may perform logistics and administrative tasks, like purchasing or transferring 
supplies for the organization, for example; or, he may deliver intelligence about the army’s 
movements and position (Brittain, 2010: 35). 
Giovanni explains the role of a miliciano. He describes the milicia as a “support network”, and 
the miliciano as one who “operates within the same rules [as troops], but with some 
differences. The miliciano does not sleep in the mountain [i.e. in camps, with troops], does 
not go around in military clothes, does not carry a rifle, nor he does patrolling. Instead, he 
goes as a civilian [performing tasks of] intelligence and gathering information.”145 A miliciano 
is not in captivity, but carries on with his real identity with the outside world.  
In charge of 23 other milicianos, “I would meet with them and allocate them throughout 
different zones to check what the army is doing, if it is there. In case they are there, [it is 
necessary] to know more details: how many [soldiers] there are. [Another task is to know] if 
there is someone new who came to the area. So, for example, if a seller arrives to an area, a 
miliciano starts investigating him – where he is from, how he looks, if he carries a camera or 
speaks over the phone.”146 The miliciano is then someone who acts and lives as a civilian, in 
disguise within society, and who keeps doing his civilian job. He keeps living at his/her 
home, and has, obviously, a very limited knowledge about the organization.    
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Sergio, who was a miliciano for two years before he fled, stresses the aspect of organizing the 
purchase and transport of food supply and goods. “They send you to buy things, and move 
them from one place to another. […] They do not let any civilian to enter [FARC’s territory], 
but only someone of trust. So, one delivers shipments. The “economy of shipment”, as they 
call it there.”147 
The most important trait of a miliciano is that he/she is in disguise: he keeps conducting his 
normal life as a civilian, but he is in reality working with the organization. They all have a 
cover story. In case you are questioned by the military or the police, “everyone defends 
himself with what one is actually doing; but you change some details. Let’s say that I 
purchase cattle and I sell it to the guerrilla. In case I am questioned about it, I say: “no, I buy 
cattle for a gentleman. We work within legality: I have receipts, orders and everything””, says 
Giovanni.148 
Authorities do not know a miliciano‘s real identity. Giovanni says that once the army 
discovered his full identity, then, his coverage was blown and he had to be pulled out of the 
area in which he was in. As a result he had to go into hiding: in cases like these, in order to 
protect themselves and their operatives, the FARC feels obliged to fully integrate the 
miliciano as a combatant. “When a miliciano gets to be a military objective, after [the 
military] detects him as a miliciano with convincing evidence that you are part of the milicia, 
you are considered a member of the FARC.”149 And, thus, to avoid capture and a potential 
security breach for the FARC, the organization forces the miliciano inside the group. 
Giovanni, and not only him, laments the forced transition from a miliciano who operates on 
the fringes, to being a full FARC member in a war setting. As a miliciano “I was in charge of up 
to 23 men, worked with cattle and with financial aspects [for the FARC]. I lived well with my 
family, they depended on me. I could buy things when I needed to.”150 This degree of 
freedom, independence and responsibility comes abruptly to a halt the moment Giovanni 
was integrated and moved into being a simple soldier with all the limitations and hardship of 
such life. Such forced transition from the milicia to the military wing of the FARC may take 
place because a miliciano is discovered by the military, and thus the FARC has to bring him in 
to avoid his/her capture and the associated risks for the organization. It could also be the 
case that the FARC does not fully trust a miliciano; he could be an informer of the military, for 
example. Thus, integration in the FARC should minimize risks. Given these risks, it seems 
that the role of miliciano is always a transient one, never permanent. 
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Political mobilization and propaganda activities through the local population represent an 
additional set of tasks that some higher-rank FARC members who were interviewed 
conducted. The previous chapter underlined the importance of the relationship between 
armed groups (especially the FARC) and local population, when it comes to recruitment. I 
referred the stories of several potential recruits (mostly from the FARC) who were somehow 
attracted by the commitment and behaviour of armed groups toward locals, and by their 
spirit of solidarity and cooperation as an additional incentive for mobilization. Now, it is 
worth to report some of the direct experiences of ex-combatants who were in a political or a 
liaison role through local population.  
Muriel talked to me about the “organization of the masses”, a specific FARC set of activities 
aimed at mobilizing the population (i.e. the peasantry) and educating them about the 
legitimacy and the grievances animating the fight. Sergio defined this aspect as “to work for 
the masses”, capturing the spirit of service that the FARC felt toward the local population, in 
terms of its politicization, awareness of injustices and sensitization to the common cause.  
Cesar – who stayed in the FARC for 27 years – describes his role as political mobilizer for the 
FARC and peasant leader working in the organization of masses. Not knowing his real 
identity, the army questioned him several time, he describes, about his links with the FARC. 
Cesar vividly describes the scenes in which he always managed to keep his nerves in check 
and not betray himself. He says he has always been very sure of himself and self-confident: 
thus, he would not fear the military.  
Enrique describes some of the tasks of establishing alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, like “to talk and solve the issues taking place within local communities. […] I 
devoted myself to the masses. I would frequently go with the local population and explain 
people why we were in an armed group. [I would tell them that] there were issues and 
reasons why the government did not comply [with its mandate].”151 Political mobilization 
would go hand in hand with community work that FARC members would perform to assist 
local population with infrastructure projects, for example. In fact, it is through the 
community work that FARC mobilizers would gain legitimacy to do political mobilization. 
After being deputy head of the school of political training for FARC members for one year, 
Muriel started working in the organization of masses – something that he had at his heart. “I 
liked to read a lot of books, to deepen my knowledge of political and cultural issues. […] I 
studied the history of the FARC, of Marxism, of Che Guevara. […] I had eagerness to 
understand the fight, the issues of conflict in this country, and the causes and circumstances 
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surrounding the FARC.” He admits of having run “meetings with 800-900 people, in which I 
presented FARC’s ideas and policies.” Muriel defines political mobilization as “to share or 
explain the FARC fight and its objectives – both political and military – to the masses, the 
people, the communities, and the peasants. This was our work. […] We needed to tell them 
the reality […] that our struggle had an end goal and means, and it was not like how the 
media would depict us.”152 All FARC members who spoke about political mobilization and the 
“organization of masses” showcased a strong sense of pride: the political activity is perceived 
to be the most noble task for a FARC combatant.  
AUC’s social work. Concerning the paramilitaries, the AUC had also in some cases a tight 
relationship with locals. Two of the thirteen ex-AUC interviewees performed some political 
function related to local communities. Camilo spent four years in the Bloque Centauros of the 
AUC. After successfully rising up and being appointed as head of military training – he was a 
professional soldier before entering the AUC – he sustained an injury that impeded him to 
resume his post. He, thus, moved to delivering political training for new recruits, which then 
transitioned him into a political role for the AUC. Camilo describes his wider role as a local 
administrator who was in charge of development, security and dispute resolution. “I stayed 
in a local town, in a cooperative: I lived in a cooperative for two years. The cooperative is not 
a municipality [i.e. it is a smaller unit which establishes participatory institutions and shared 
economic arrangements]. […] There, I only had contact with the local population, doing social 
work. This was my job in the AUC, do road maintenance, build bridges, keep mountain paths 
clean etc. […] We were the ones providing life [to the local community]. It was us who were 
also providing employment [to locals].”153  
The AUC would also set up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and Camilo acted as a 
judge to solve local disputes. “I would help people to find solutions to their problems: if 
someone stole money from you, I would intercede. I was the local population’s prosecutor 
and the one who would solve problems. Someone had to step in to enforce the law.” Clearly, 
he underlines state institutions’ absence and failure in these areas. “We would provide 
security to people, [to make sure that] the guerrilla would not take away things from people, 
or would not kill peasants’ cattle. Because this is what they would do: the guerrilla would not 
steal the animals, they would kill them.”154    
Ignacio, the mechanic who had to flee from Puerto Gaitan after an arrest warrant against 
him, settled in a remote village within the same municipality. He had a similar role to 
Camilo’s. Ignacio managed social work programs of infrastructure rehabilitation. “I started 
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doing road works, because the AUC had two bulldozers, ten dumpers and one other vehicle 
in the area.” Since he was a mechanic, “I would fix the machinery and participate in social 
work with the community.”155 
TABLE 7.1: JOBS IN A NON-STATE ARMED GROUP 
Frequency of Roles and Functions in a Non-State 
Armed Group 
FARC  
(18 XCs) 
AUC  
(13 XCs) 
Military roles:   
In combat 17 6 
Security guard 3 1 
Administrative roles:   
Finance: fund raising, tax collection and accounting  1 4 
Political mobilization and community work  4 2 
Intelligence role, logistics and supply  6 1 
Other roles:   
Medical worker - 3 
Driver - 1 
Radio operator 2 1 
Capacity building: Trainer 1 1 
Cook 2 - 
Cartography 1 - 
7.2 Organizational Level: Rebel Governance and Human 
Resources 
After detailing the professional roles, functions and experiences of ex-combatants while in 
arms, this section provides some insights on the ways non-state armed groups organize their 
labor force (i.e. how careers unfold, capacity building). The section also comments on how 
certain features of or behaviours by armed groups with respect to their human resources 
shed light on the relationship between employment and conflict. For example, the strict 
discipline, the internal rules, issues of trust and of coercion all have an effect on ex-
combatants’ performance and on the incentives to either do better or to quit (as it is seen in 
the next chapter).  
There is ample evidence that the way non-state armed groups organize their combatants and 
the division of labor within the group respond to accurate planning. With the appropriate 
differences, both FARC and AUC establish their own set of internal rules on how to manage 
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human resources. As this chapter shows, the link between employment and conflict is at both 
levels: from the ex-combatant point of view (employee) and from the armed group’s 
perspective (employer).    
A CAREER IN AN ARMED GROUP: AUC AND FARC  
Among all ex-AUC members who were in a security-related role, there is the willingness to 
improve their condition and to raise their position within the organization. Many joined the 
AUC out of economic hardship: they wanted to get rich and powerful, and knew that working 
their way up the ladder of the organization may deliver just that. The role model of well-
dressed paramilitaries and the easy access to money acted as incentives for recruitment – as 
it was previously showed. In the AUC, there was also more labor mobility than in the FARC, 
as its structure of command was more loose. Plus, a position of power in the AUC guaranteed 
a higher pay and, likely, better living condition. In the guerrilla, instead, careers were more 
rigid, and higher positions did not necessarily translate into better living conditions.  
In addition, there was an immediate and practical incentive for ex-AUC wanting to move 
career fast: many would invariably start from a combat or patrolling role. A risky position to 
be in, from which all of those who I interviewed tried to quickly move out from. Notably, this 
represents an additional difference between ex-FARC and ex-AUC combatants. The latter – 
lacking a strong ideological base and, in turn, the personal drive to be in war – expressed 
their dismay toward a combat role, which could have led to injury or death and was, thus, 
more risky than other organizational or logistics positions. Ex-FARC, on the other hand, did 
not have that luxury: their ability to be in a less risky position was limited, at best. In 
addition, FARC combatants are ideological and, thus, more predisposed to accept the danger 
of war, because they accepted the legitimacy of it.  
This is not to say that all the ex-AUC interviewees moved out of combat or patrol and had a 
‘career’ within the organization, but there was more opportunity for labor mobility. For 
different circumstances (e.g. lack of capacity or talent to be in a different role, short length of 
time between recruitment and collective demobilization, gender role), some ex-
paramilitaries stayed in the same role as they started. Five of the 13 ex-AUC interviewees 
had a proper ‘career’ within the organization. They admitted of having had progressively 
more responsibility and/or having changed role.  
Alejandro says that he had been a medical nurse while in the regular army. After he joined 
the paramilitary, he was thrown into combat right away. “During the first battle there were 
some injured. Because there were no doctors, I said: “well, I can help, yes.” Thus, I started 
helping with curing the injured and performing medical tasks. […] I had a small base to 
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attend the injured. They would fight, and then bring all the injured to me. Afterwards, they 
sent me to a training on nursing and surgery. There, there were all the medical workers for 
all [AUC] groups. Once again, I graduated as first. Thus, they put me in charge of the main 
health facility.”156 Ultimately, Alejandro nearly spent his entire period in the AUC as a 
medical worker. Alejandro’s story shows how career development and the achievement of 
more responsibility could take place at different levels, even in a position like medical 
worker.  
Jairo, who ended up being a mid-level commander within the Frente Guaviare of the AUC, 
had a similar experience to Alejandro’s. “Initially, I started in a patrolling role. Soon, though, 
someone asked [in the team which I was part of] if there was anyone with any medical 
knowledge. I raised my hand, and this allowed me to become a combat nurse after only three 
months I joined. […] Afterwards, they realized that I had good skills, and thus, after two more 
months, I was appointed as head of front for nursing.”157 Jairo’s career did not end in nursing, 
but rather he moved to being head of finance in Casanare.   
Other stories from Ibarbo, Camilo and Jon reveal the informality and the randomness 
through which careers would develop within the paramilitary. Arguably, there was not a 
clear path to rise career within the AUC. Resumes would be built on personal reference, 
trustworthiness, and ingenuity. Jon, who was from the AUC stronghold of San Martin, admits 
of having started gradually, with small tasks of delivery and logistics within the town 
(“mandados”, as several define them), to later move to cash transfer. Ultimately, these 
functions granted him the trust of his superiors. 
These examples also offer a glimpse on the variety of job experiences within armed groups. 
With respect to the homogenous label of ‘ex-combatant’, these examples show a much more 
complex array of jobs, ranging from medical nurse to logistics to finance. Working for an 
illegal outfit is the common denominator for all ex-combatants. The roles and functions that 
they perform uniquely characterize their individual experience. In turn, their reintegration 
patterns also shall differ: the homogenous category of ex-combatants assumed by DDR 
programs should instead acknowledge differences and be disaggregated.  
According to the employment-conflict framework, a non-state armed group can be compared 
with a firm or with an organization – as far as its human resources are concerned. In these, 
there is diversity of functions performed, and individuals performing a variety of functions 
organically participate in the organization’s life. Alejandro explained the main functions and 
divisions of a paramilitary group: “In the firm, you have those working on finance, who are in 
                                                        
156 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio 
157 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
 216
charge of accounting. They collect money, extortions etc. And they have their superior, who 
is the [chief] accountant. Then, there are those who manage money: they buy illegal drugs. 
And they also have their own book-keeper. And there is the one who buys weapons. […] 
There is the principal medical doctor, who, in turn, has his own medical workers and nurses. 
[…] There are the recruiters, who are those in charge of pulling people in. They are paid a 
certain percentage for each combatants they are able to recruit. […] Finally, there is the 
military command, which is headed by a commander.”158       
Despite differences among roles and functions, what any firm’s employees have in common 
among them include the firm’s goals and objectives, its internal rules, work ethics and a 
personal drive to succeed and improve. Employees’ day-to-day job is, instead, specific. The 
same dynamics applies to non-state armed groups and combatants. Jobs in a non-state 
armed group vary, as they do in any firm or organization.  
FARC’s structure and roles. With respect to the FARC, ‘careers’ are more structured than 
the AUC, as the FARC is a military organization. One has to move up the ladder of the military 
hierarchy. In the FARC, the military structure is composed as follows (Figure 7.1). The 
smallest unit is the unit of combat (or UTC, Unidad Táctica de Combate), made of only five 
combatants. After which, there are squads (escuadras), composed of 12 members; then, there 
is a guerrilla of 24 units, after which, there is a company (compañía), of two or more 
guerrillas. A column (columna) is made of 110 combatants; while a front (frente) is 
composed of two or more columns – both Ivan and Muriel explain (Brittain, 2010: 27; 
Pecaut, 2008: 107; Richani, 2002: 77). 
Everyone in the FARC starts from being a foot soldier. Like Roberto, for example: “from the 
beginning, [I was] a simple soldier – as those soldiers without any authority are called. Then, 
as time passes I was given authority of command and I got to be head of guerrilla and in 
charge of nearly 40 men and women.”159 He says that it took him one and half year to be 
promoted as head of team, and two years total to get to be in charge of a guerrilla. Fernan 
had a similar experience to Roberto’s, although the former rose to a higher level in the FARC. 
“I started as a foot soldier.” Progressively, over time, he rose to higher positions, getting to 
“being in charge of more or less one company.”160 Conceivably, Fernan’s longer permanence 
(he stayed in the FARC for close to 20 years) with respect to Roberto, (who, on the other 
hand, stayed for 8 years) played an important role in Fernan’s more successful career.  
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Jaime also started to rise after one year as a simple soldier. He was head of guerrilla, and 
ended his career as head of company in charge of two guerrillas. Muriel, on the other hand, 
admitted that he did not advance at all his career in the FARC – except for a brief time as 
head of team. “I had the capacities and everything, but I did not rise because throughout my 
whole time in the FARC, I stayed next to [Alfonso Cano].”161 Muriel was in the unit of 
protection of the FARC leader, and the personal trust he gained through Cano, therefore, 
prevented him to move and be in a leadership role. 
FIGURE 7.1: FARC MILITARY STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHICAL COMMAND 
  
Source: Brittain, 2010: 27 
When asked about what factors played a role in their career advancement in the armed 
group, all interviewees agreed that a mix of personal qualities and skills including being a 
hard worker, decision-making capacities, discipline and organization, ideological 
commitment, as well as combat experience and courage were key. Roberto says: “Initially, 
what helps someone to obtain a higher role and be in charge is behaviour: to obey and 
comply with orders as they are given to you. Second factor is combat. If you are a good 
soldier, outstanding in battle, or in a fight, this is something that allows you to rise in 
hierarchy.”162 
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Jaime has a different explanation than Roberto. He stresses the importance of the moral and 
intellectual capacities over the military skills. “If you have intellectual capacities you can rise 
[in career]. Whereas, if you do not, even in the military side you will always be a foot 
soldier.”163 It also seems that it was quite common to be promoted, or at least that there was 
often demand for mid-rank officers. There was no standard time which one had to spend at a 
low ranking soldier level, nor there were specific tests one had to pass in order to move up. 
Individual qualities, behaviour and the display of those qualities were factors for career 
advancement. 
As there was not a strict set of milestones to be accomplished in order to be promoted, by the 
same token, military careers were flexible and reversible. There was a constant and fluid 
system of rising and ascending in career within the FARC: Jaime says that this was due to 
contingencies and “battle plans”. For example, someone who is a head of company today 
could be demoted to head of guerrilla tomorrow, if needed be. With the purpose of not 
replicating class divisions and social stratification within the FARC, a flexible system of 
promotion and demotion was in place. Jaime further explains: “Let us say that we are 100 
combatants, and that I am in charge of all of them. However, we need to conduct an 
operation, and so the group gets divided [into two]. As the group gets split, I am no longer 
ruling over 100 soldiers, but only 50 of them. So, by dividing the group, my role lowered.”164 
TRAINING AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
In order to understand the human resources of armed groups, one important aspect 
concerns training and capacity building. The FARC and the AUC had quite different practices 
on this, reflecting their differences in structure, ideology and internal organization.   
We have seen in the sections above that many ex-combatants pointed out to the fundamental 
role of, and the extent to which they were exposed to, training and capacity building. FARC 
members are subject to a rigid military training, and, in parallel, to a comprehensive political 
education on the causes and drivers of the armed struggle, and the history and the ideology 
of the FARC. As in any regular army, a first feature of FARC training is its rigidity and the firm 
discipline associated with it. “The FARC has a rigorous discipline, quite complex. 
Nonetheless, when one feels the revolutionary feelings, when one has the revolution in the 
head, thus, one is motivated to [psychologically] defend [and justify] this discipline”, Muriel 
explains.165 
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When one arrives, Roberto explains, “they put you in the school166. In this school, they give 
you classes on the use of arms, on physical fight, personal defence; how you are supposed to 
go forward, or pull back, how to transport the injured, how to throw grenades, 
everything.”167 To these, Carlos adds the “training on explosives, […] the course on special 
forces, and the survival course.”168 Laia explains how she was trained in a course for mid-
level commanders throughout an entire year. “It was very hard, very hard. […] They taught 
us how to use explosives, how to kill, how to shoot from a motorbike etc. They taught us 
artillery, and first aid. A commander has to know everything if he/she wants to effectively 
rule over others.”169    
All ex-combatants who spoke about training also remarked how the training phase had a 
practical (and dangerous) side. Military training did not stop at mere simulations, but there 
would be real life exercitations, and sometimes, even, combat. Laia says how they would 
bring the mid-level commander course’s participants to war, in order for participants to have 
a chance to stand out and gain credits. “In the process, there would be the injured, and even 
someone died during the training.”170 Roberto underlines the normal military training, and 
the simulations that the FARC would conduct. “At 2AM, the trainer would give the alarm and 
scream to get up that the enemy arrived. Thus, one starts running; [real] grenades fall close 
to you, so you need to throw yourself in a trench, which could be 1.6 meter high – sometimes 
higher. […] Those that do not manage to get to the trench could be hit by a grenade, and they 
could even die! During training! The commander used to tell us that training is like war, 
because in war there is no resting.”171     
In addition to the military part, there is also the political education – as it has been reported 
earlier. Guerrilla members had to be good combatants, but also committed revolutionaries. 
This aspect included classes on the history of Colombia, on the structural character of 
exploitation, Marxist theories, economics principles, and the history of revolutions.  
As many ex-FARC combatants joined the group when they were children or in their teens, it 
was often the case that children were illiterate. As I showed in the previous chapter, most of 
those children came from the poorest and most marginalized backgrounds. Illiteracy came 
with the package. Several ex-combatants report how the FARC would make sure that 
children and youngsters learned how to read and write. Ivan says: “In our times, one did not 
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know how to read and write; thus, they set up groups with the goal of learning [these 
skills]”172. 
For their part, ex-paramilitaries describe their training and capacity-building activities as a 
function of their subsequent job placement. Military trainings were standard for all new 
recruits, as Camilo, who was head instructor, explains. Trainings were then followed by a 
sort of individual assessment, which would result in a job placement. According to Ibarbo, 
“everyone has to do both a combat training and a first aid course. Afterwards, they [AUC 
recruiters and commanders] look at your profile: if one has good relationships skills, if one is 
good at talking to people, then they send you to a community. But if someone does not know 
how to talk they will not send him to a town. […] As I said, they are very good at managing 
profiles.”173  
The AUC methodically allocates recruits to different positions and areas. Jon confirmed this 
point: “This guy is more useful for the city; some other people were good at talking with 
peasants. To talk to a peasant is different from speaking to someone from the city.”174 
People’s background was also a factor in allocating combatants to tasks and roles.   
Thus, with respect to the FARC, in the AUC there is a much more differentiated and targeted 
approach to recruits. In the FARC, everyone starts as a foot soldier, and profiles and careers 
are much more homogenous – as it has already been remarked. The AUC, instead, values 
more job placement via assessment of individual candidates’ skills, background and 
capacities. Ibarbo also explains how this skill-based approach to job placement helped the 
AUC to effectively mix within society and to be in disguise. 
RULES, DISCIPLINE, TRUST AND FEAR 
One additional feature which has been recurrent in interviews with both ex-FARC and ex-
AUC is the imposition of strict rules of conduct, both to trainees and to combatants. Several 
ex-FARC combatants remarked how the adoption of a strict discipline was a permanent 
factor of life in the camp. First of all, rules and discipline were functional to the survival of 
the organization: “in order for it to survive, the FARC has to be disciplined. For this reason 
the FARC is the oldest rebel group in the world”, says Muriel.175 More than one ex-combatant 
repeated what Muriel stated. There is an underlying sense of pride among FARC members – 
even after they left the group – about the cohesion and the self-respect that abiding by strict 
rules entails at the individual level.  
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Second, the above section on career development highlighted how being disciplined and 
complying with rules was one of the most rewarded skills for combatants when a decision 
had to be made about either promotions or the entrustment of more responsibility. Within 
the FARC, there is the recognition that successfully executing orders meant that an individual 
was trustful. In a non-state armed group the issue of trust operates not only at the individual 
level – between a superior and a subordinate, for example – but it also concerns the overall 
trust that the organization places on its combatants as members who would not betray the 
organization.  
“The FARC is harsh. For the smallest issue they stop trusting someone. They mistrust!” says 
Giovanni.176 On this aspect, it is worth reflecting on the rising mistrust that has been running 
through the FARC since the start of the individual demobilization program in 2002. By 
incentivizing individual FARC members to lay down arms and surrender to the army in 
exchange for amnesty and reintegration benefits, the Colombian state has considerably 
weakened the organization by (i) taking away man power from the FARC; and, most of all, by 
(ii) using the information that deserters had to give to the army once they surrendered, to 
militarily hit the FARC itself. As a response, the FARC had to protect itself even more from 
potential deserters and traitors. This resulted into the adoption of an enhanced mindset and 
culture of mistrust. No one could be trusted anymore – after even some of the leadership 
ranks deserted.  
Here, it is worth highlighting the importance of trust and mistrust in the internal 
organization of the FARC, and in the interpersonal relationship between combatants. A story 
from Giovanni is illustrative. “When I was a miliciano, [there was an operation in which] a 
commander fell in an ambush and I was participating as a miliciano. I survived the ambush: 
when the commander was killed I threw my self in a narrow pass and I did not die. The 
police caught me and took me with them. But they could not find any evidence, because I was 
going as a civilian. So, they let me go. But the organization did not trust someone who is let 
go [by the police or the army]. […] They do not trust you because one has been in the army’s 
hands. Thus, they think that the army caught [a combatant] and set him/her up [to go back to 
the FARC and spy on them].”177 Laia also says that the FARC “developed a paranoia, which 
makes everyone mistrusting everyone.”178  
One additional aspect related to rules and trust concerns the ban for members to share 
details about their own private life – in terms of origins, family members, and even real 
names. Everyone has a nom de guerre, and that is all one can reveal about his identity. Ex-
                                                        
176 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio 
177 Ibid. 
178 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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combatants lamented with me the harsh reality of this ban: in a life that is often monotonous 
and extremely repetitive in the camp, combatants are prevented from sharing stories about 
their past life. Of course, it happens that people share their real identity after becoming 
friends, but in a climate of fear due to having contravened rules. Secrecy about one’s own life 
preserves the organization from potential betrayals and provides an additional security 
layer to the organization.  
In the AUC, rules and discipline were as strict as they were in the FARC, but with a 
substantial difference – which is in line with the different nature of the two organizations. 
While the FARC was highly centralized and its rules and discipline were codified and 
unanimously understood throughout the organization, in the AUC there was more room for 
arbitrary behaviours, hence the human rights violations perpetrated by some paramilitary 
factions. In other words, sanctions and their application were not necessarily codified in the 
AUC as they were in the FARC. In the latter, there was a proper ‘rule of law’, which prevented 
arbitrary actions outside of it. In the AUC, there were rules, but their application was subject 
to several factors and circumstances, including local commander’s attitude, power struggle 
among mid- or high-level ranks, level of engagement with the local population, intensity of 
war with the army and/or the FARC, among others.    
As a result, several ex-AUC members testify how they lived in constant fear. Jairo says that 
members used to “have more fear of the organization itself than of the guerrilla. […] For 
whatever thing they would kill you: 1,000 pesos [USD6] were missing from a transaction, 
they would kill you for that! Someone got offended from a joke, they could kill you for that 
too. Therefore, because my career was rising fast, this generated a lot of envy in people.”179 
Jairo pointed to the fact that a feeling of fear permeated his whole life while in the AUC. 
Mauricio, who was a driver in the AUC, says that every morning he would feel as if it could be 
his last day. “One never knows what can happen within the group either for envy or for some 
situation. [One is aware] that the group itself can terminate one’s life. Thus, one does not 
conduct a proper life: as much as one has money and a livelihood, or drives the best car, one 
does not have a safe life.”180 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter focused on the relationship between employment and conflict through the 
analysis of the duties that ex-combatants performed and the roles they held in non-state 
armed groups. It has brought together a wide array of ex-combatants’ individual experiences 
while belonging to either the FARC or the AUC. Focus has been on the diversity of roles, 
                                                        
179 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
180 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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functions and tasks, in order to give a picture of the heterogeneous ‘jobs’ in armed groups. 
Some strong empirical argument is presented to counteract the homogenous notion that the 
academic and policy literature hold on who an ‘ex-combatant’ is.  
TABLE 7.2: KEY FINDINGS ON MEMBERSHIP IN A NON-STATE ARMED GROUP 
 
After exploring the pull factors for recruitment by non-state armed groups from an 
employment-seeking point of view, this chapter makes one further step. It highlights the past 
experiences and the perceptions of ex-combatants within the non-state armed group: men 
and women who are trying to stay alive in the first place, but also either make a living 
(especially, paramilitary recruits) or contribute to a cause and a war effort (especially but 
not exclusively, FARC members). Many ex-combatants associate their armed group’s 
membership to an employment experience – although a unique and traumatic one – because 
for many of them, this is what it ultimately was. A job. 
 Not all armed groups’ employees (i.e. combatants) are engaged in violence. As any type of 
organization or business, armed groups have an established and organized division of labour. An 
armed group is necessarily made of members that fulfil all needed tasks, including recruitment, 
accounting and finance, strategy, operations, and logistics (drivers, cooks, nurses etc.). Therefore, 
the term ‘combatant’ is a misconception when intended as someone necessarily carrying weapons 
and responsible for violent actions.   
 Within the ‘non-state armed group’ category, ‘jobs’ in paramilitary and in guerrilla are different. 
Due to different ideology, social background, organizational behaviour, and type of control over 
communities and institutions, then armed actors’ internal organization with respect to jobs and 
division of labor also differs. 
 There is a grey area between combatants and civilians in areas dominated by armed groups. 
Non-state armed groups have to necessarily establish relationships with locals and local areas, 
including its economy, society and institutions. There are stories of ex-combatants who, by living 
and working in a conflict-affected area, entered in some relationships with armed groups. Hence, 
there is an area of contiguity between armed groups and the local context in which they operate: 
such contiguity is rarely acknowledged or understood. And it has implications for individuals who 
may be drawn in an armed group or identified as combatants. 
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8. Transition From the Armed Group 
Back to Civilian Life: DDR, 
Reintegration and Recidivism 
The present chapter concludes the empirical analysis of ex-combatants’ employment cycle 
by turning to the dynamics of the post-war phase. After the exploration of the dynamics and 
drivers of recruitment, and the analysis of how and in what capacity non-state armed groups 
employ their combatants, it is imperative to understand the way in which ex-combatants 
demobilize, find and retain employment after they cease to be part of an armed group. This 
aspect concerns the challenges of reintegration, on how to find a job and how the state 
reintegration program has been supporting ex-combatants. Thus, the exploration of the 
factors that contribute to economic reintegration, and its dynamics, complements the 
previous analysis by providing a comprehensive overview of the employment life cycle of ex-
combatants from the drivers of recruitment to the challenges of post-war reintegration.  
Within the broad literature on what reintegration is and how the policy practice 
operationalizes it, the present contribution seeks to single out the employment aspect. Some 
of the core questions of the overall research concern the factors that account for successful 
post-war reintegration. Within the multiple components of reintegration that are recognized 
by the literature, this chapter focuses on the role that having a job plays for an individual ex-
combatant in order to feel reintegrated in society.  
I argue that – other than productively occupying time – finding and retaining a job 
contributes to the reintegration of an ex-combatant in a number of ways. One mechanism is 
psychological. The war experience is an all-encompassing one, permeated by a strong and 
pervasive group cohesion, which may lead to a psychological identification between the 
single individual combatant and the armed group itself. In the post-demobilization phase, 
this all-absorbing life abruptly comes to an end. To the extent that an ex-combatant is able to 
re-build a normal life, then he/she is able to psychologically distance him/herself from the 
armed group’s experience and move on. The experience of finding and retaining a job in 
society is a necessary (although not sufficient) factor to embark in that process of 
psychological distancing. It has to be remarked the immense challenge that an individual 
faces when trying to even envision a potential job, after having spent all adult life in an 
armed group. 
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From a psychological point of view, there are also some discrete issues related to finding a 
job that help an ex-combatant to move on: (a) interaction with other members of society 
who did not share the war experience. While in the armed group, a member exclusively (in 
the case of the guerrilla) and mostly (for the paramilitary members) interact with other 
combatants. Thus, the constant interaction with non-war members of society contributes to 
the distancing process. (b) A job gives an individual a role in society: life is work, and work 
gives people pride and sense of belonging (World Bank, 2013). 
In terms of demobilization, this chapter will address some key qualitative differences 
between the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) 
and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia, FARC) – differences that have an impact on the two groups’ members’ 
reintegration path. FARC demobilized combatants start their reintegration process often as a 
result of a deliberate decision of quitting the group. Therefore, they have higher individual 
motivations than AUC ex-combatants, who – because of the collective demobilization of their 
group – join the reintegration program sometimes without the same commitment as FARC 
ex-combatants. On this aspect, AUC ex-combatants have presented stronger challenges for 
reintegration officials. However, demobilized paramilitaries are more socialized, often more 
educated, and to a number of accounts better prepared to re-join society. Instead, most FARC 
ex-combatants have spent several years completely isolated from society, have a stronger 
ideology, and, thus, require more support to re-adapt to society. In conclusion, as it is 
explored below, both groups present specific challenges for reintegration.        
The chapter is divided into three distinct parts. A first part deals with factors and dynamics 
of demobilization. Why and how combatants decided to quit their job (FARC); and the 
perceptions about being put out of a job (AUC). As it was seen in Chapter 4, opposite 
dynamics governed the demobilization of the FARC and the AUC. The latter reached a 
negotiated agreement with the national government to demilitarize, and had all of its 
combatants collectively demobilized. The former was still an active non-state armed group at 
the time the interviews for this study were conducted. FARC members who joined the 
reintegration program left the group individually – they were, in fact, deserters. As far as ex-
FARC combatants are concerned, the first two sub-sections of part one deal with the reasons 
why they decided to flee the group, and the circumstances that led to it. Concerning ex-AUC 
combatants, I give a brief overview of their perceptions and feelings about demobilization: in 
fact, how they felt about losing both their full-time occupation and status of combatant. Thus, 
this section gives some necessary context to the core analysis about economic reintegration, 
post-war employment and opportunities for recidivism. 
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The second part deals with the dynamics and challenges of reintegration from the 
perspective of employment. It is centered around the experiences and perceptions of ex-
combatants, who overwhelmingly consider the need for meaningful, satisfactory and 
sustainable employment as the key ingredient for reintegration. Societal challenges are also 
considered, including discrimination against them.  
The third and last part of the chapter concerns the greatest challenge for ex-combatants in 
terms of security, i.e. the power and presence of non-state armed groups. This section 
discusses some of the dynamics and drivers of recidivism through a composite analysis of 
individual, structural and organizational factors of recidivism. 
8.1 Dynamics of Demobilization  
WHY DO FARC COMBATANTS QUIT? CIRCUMSTANCES AND REASONS FOR DEMOBILIZATION 
This section addresses the events and circumstances surrounding the demobilization of the 
FARC ex-combatants that I interviewed, and their motivations to take such action. In line 
with the multi-level framework of this research, I divided the main reasons behind ex-
combatants’ decision to flee the FARC into individual-, organizational- and structural-level 
reasons. 
Demobilization due to circumstances. Contrary to the mainstream view which wants ex-
FARC combatants demobilizing because allured by the government-led reintegration 
benefits, the findings from my interviews do not confirm this hypothesis. There is a gross 
simplification regarding the ‘how’ ex-combatants leave the group. As Table 8.1 shows, there 
are a number of different ways how demobilization takes place. Individual demobilization of 
FARC members occurs as a deliberate decision, but it can also be the result of circumstances 
which are beyond the individual’s agency – like a permanent injury, a military capture, or an 
impromptu surrender.  
Still, the relative majority of FARC combatants planned their escape and/or had specific 
motives for pursuing such action – most often a growing dissatisfaction with the 
organization. While lowering ideological motivation due to structural changes in the conflict 
is an important factor that drives many FARC combatants to demobilize, this factor is 
overstated by mainstream media and government sources. Together with the prospect of 
reintegration benefits, public opinion lists the weakened morale (and military capability) of 
the FARC as the only reasons why ex-combatants lay down arms.  
The picture is, in fact, more varied; and more circumstances account for FARC 
demobilization. First, there are those who did not voluntarily demobilize. Three out of 
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eighteen ex-combatants were captured by the army during combat, and were later included 
into the reintegration program. It is the case of Cristina and Enrique, who, after being 
captured, decided to cooperate with military intelligence, in exchange for avoiding 
prosecution and benefitting from the reintegration package. Faustino was only 11 years old 
when he was captured by the army, and, thus, he was put into the children’s authority 
custody. Now, at 18 years old, Faustino has been extended those reintegration benefits to 
support his reinsertion into society. 
TABLE 8.1: HOW FARC COMBATANTS DEMOBILIZE 
Circumstances of Demobilization FARC XCs 
Combatants who were captured and later joined the reintegration program  3 
Combatants who, given pressing circumstances (i.e. during combat), turned 
themselves in, but without premeditation  3 
Combatants permanently injured and unable to keep the role of a combatant 3 
Combatants who demobilized for specific reasons and planned their escape 7 
Unknown 2 
Tot.  18 
Second, there are those who deserted while in combat. This group (three combatants, all of 
them foot soldiers) did not plan ahead to leave the FARC, but rather, they found themselves 
in some unique circumstances which enabled them to flee. This does not mean that they did 
not have outstanding grievances against the FARC – in fact, they all did. However, their 
escape was mostly dictated by some dramatic events in which they found themselves in: they 
decided to surrender rather than being killed or return to camp.  
Legally, combatants who are captured in combat or surrender on the battlefield should not 
be entitled to reintegration benefits, but be prosecuted. In fact, FARC members who are 
captured but who do not have serious pending charges of crime against humanity are 
routinely put into the reintegration program – a practice that inflates the number of 
beneficiaries, contributing to a distorted image of ex-FARC demobilizing due to an 
ideological weakening within the group. 
Both FARC members Carlos and Sergio were in combat when their direct superior was killed, 
giving them the opportunity to surrender to the army. Speaking about their motives, both of 
them revealed their weakening commitment to the FARC and its strategy. Nonetheless, 
neither of the two admitted to have thought about escaping before it actually happened. 
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Subject to intense military pressure, Juan admits of “demobilizing because we spent a year 
with the army on our back, […] playing the cat with the mouse.”181 
I distinguish this group of surrenders who flee in the middle of the battle from those who 
had an actual plan and premeditated intention to leave the FARC. Juan, Carlos and Sergio 
were risking their lives and they took the immediate decision to flee: arguably, instinct, fear 
and adrenaline all played a greater role than for combatants who planned in the medium or 
long term to escape. The distinction between the two groups (i.e. ahead planners vs. in 
combat surrenders) underlines the multiple experiences through which demobilization can 
occur. 
There are also some cases of combatants who were permanently injured, and who were no 
longer fit for war duties. Among the interviewees, it was three of them who were pulled out 
of the FARC due to an injury. Cristiano had been a FARC combatant for 11 years – he was 
recruited at 16 – until he sustained a serious injury in his abdomen. He said that the FARC 
“kicked me out. They gave me 800,000 pesos [USD400]182 and left me without any support. I 
had to come to Villavicencio on my own”, where Cristiano had family members.183 Roberto 
was also injured in combat: unable to effectively be a combatant, nor to work the land, he 
was denied any support by the FARC. This created grievances against the group: he fled to 
Villavicencio and handed himself over to the army. 
Ivan was badly maimed and two of his fellows were left dead when a bomb exploded by 
accident next to him, in 1999. Given his injuries, he had to be evacuated to Bogota for 
medical care, but public authorities did not discover that he was FARC. Ivan admits that the 
FARC supported him and “sent money.” Afterwards, the FARC provided him with a small 
piece of land in a FARC-controlled area of Ariari, which he had to abandon in the face of 
mounting military pressure. After returning to Villavicencio, Ivan was able to join the 
reintegration program in 2010.  
These testimonies highlight the multifaceted practice of demobilization, and add some 
complexity to its understanding and unfolding. The stories of these nine ex-combatants (half 
of the total FARC interviewees) challenge the assumption of ‘how’ demobilization works. 
Instead of exclusively being the product of deliberate decisions (i.e. agency), demobilization 
is uneven and heterogeneous, and often takes place out of war events (‘structure’). In turn, 
also the ways and timing in which ex-combatants join the reintegration program are diverse, 
                                                        
181 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
182 At a 2008 exchange rate – when Cristiano demobilized – of around USD 1 = COP 2,000. 
183 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
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and can take place even after several years – like Ivan, who joined the program more than 10 
years after his accident.  
Demobilization as a result of a deliberate decision. Then, there are those who 
demobilized based on a deliberate choice and plan. Seven out of 18 ex-FARC that I 
interviewed admitted to either have planned their escape in advance, or to have had some 
compelling reason to leave the FARC (Table 8.2). A first order of reasons concerns family ties 
and/or personal feelings that are not related to the FARC, its ideology and strategy. To 
different degrees, personal life (such as having a family, or starting a love affair, or a 
pregnancy) played a role in the demobilization of four combatants. 
For two of them, it was the leading reason. Laia had an affair and fell in love with a fellow 
FARC member. And she got pregnant. This event completely shifted her priorities from the 
FARC – which she had joined almost a decade earlier out of resentment and desperation after 
being a university drop out – to her incoming newborn. She knew that the two roles (mother 
and rebel combatant) were incompatible. It was not allowed to raise children in the camp.  
Usually, pregnant women were either forced to have an abortion, or, at best, they were 
allowed to deliver the baby, but then forced to give him/her up to a family member (if 
available), or to local peasants (Gutierrez Sanin, 2004). After she delivered her son – Laia 
recalls – she immediately understood that she was not going to be able to separate from him. 
Together with her partner, they went through a difficult escape, reached Bogota and 
sometime later surrendered to the military.       
Fernan – a committed FARC rebel who was recruited at 17 years old and spent the next 14 
years in the group – fell in love with a FARC female combatant. She told him that she was 
going to flee, but, despite his devotion for her, he did not follow her. It took him two more 
years to escape and join her again: “I was very much in love with her, and this is the reason 
for my demobilization. […] I planned it; I wanted to do it. I left it [the FARC]”, Fernan says.184 
For two more ex-combatants, family ties were something that they mentioned during the 
interview, but which was not their leading motivation to desert. 
An overarching issue to understand the drivers of FARC demobilization concerns the lack of 
freedom. Here, it is necessary to make some brief considerations about the forced nature of 
membership to the FARC and the lack of freedom (Gutierrez Sanin, 2004). As several ex-
FARC testified (and as it is commonly known), FARC members are not allowed to freely leave 
the group once they joined. It used to be, by all means, a forced membership. There is less 
clarity, instead, about the origin and nature of recruitment: is this always forced or not?  
                                                        
184 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
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As it was highlighted in Chapter 6, there was not a common practice with respect to forced 
recruitment in the FARC. Despite the FARC rules prohibiting forced recruitment, in practice 
this happened. Several testimonies point to the fact that given their progressive involvement 
and knowledge of the group, ex-combatants were forced to fully join as internal members, 
against their will. Giovanni, for example, did not want to go in arms. But he lucidly explains 
the difference between forced recruitment and forced membership. He says that recruitment 
is always voluntary at first, when it is a matter of joining the group: “when you leave, you are 
never forced to leave” and join the group, says Giovanni. Recruitment “turns into ‘forced’ 
only once the recruit is there, in the camp, and unable to quit”, he concludes.185   
TABLE 8.2: WHY FARC COMBATANTS DEMOBILIZE 
Frequency of Factors Identified by Ex-Combatants During Interviews as Drivers for 
Demobilization 
Drivers of Demobilization FARC XCs 
Family ties and personal feelings 4 
Lack of freedom186 2 
Weakened ideology, and widening gap between FARC principles and practice 
on the ground 8 
Incentives from DDR program’s benefits and amnesty 0 
Thus, recruitment may or may not be voluntary, but permanence in the rebel group is always 
forced. According to the ex-FARC combatants that I interviewed, there is disagreement on 
whether forced recruitment takes place or not; but, there is overwhelming agreement on the 
fact that once in the group, combatants are stripped of their personal freedom and are 
prevented from leaving the group. 
There is also a psychological aspect with respect to lack of freedom and taking full 
responsibility of the action of deserting. It is interesting that to my question of “why did you 
decide to leave the FARC?”, many ex-combatants immediately replied that they wanted to 
voluntarily and peacefully leave the group, but knew that there was no such option. This 
seems obvious. All ex-FARC members claim their right to get tired of being in the group, 
which does not necessarily clash with their ideological commitment to the FARC cause. In 
fact, despite mounting disillusionment with the organization – which several ex-FARC shared 
– all of them professed to still be dedicated and committed to the communist ideology.   
                                                        
185 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
186 I included ‘Lack of freedom’ as a standalone factor, even though ‘freedom’ is an overarching issue included in 
all factors for demobilization. Thus, despite the fact that only two ex-combatants specifically mentioned ‘lack of 
freedom’ as a driving factor for demobilization, freedom is intrinsic to and part of any story of demobilization.    
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The common answer they gave (“I fled because I no longer wanted to stay in the group and I 
wanted to be free”) underlines an additional psychological consideration. FARC members 
feel some personal shame for having abandoned and betrayed the group. “It was a very 
difficult decision to take. Because one really thinks about the betrayal; that you leave behind 
brothers, friends, comrades and fellow rebels”, says Muriel, who, in his early forties, had 
spent 30 years in the FARC.187  
By leaving, they not only leave behind their whole life (including friends and comrades, way 
of life), but they also put at high risk those left behind. After surrendering, in fact, all ex-
combatants have to reveal details of their camp and previous location to the military, in 
order to be accepted into the reintegration program. The betrayal is hard to accept for 
individual ex-combatants. Thus, it is safe to state that the decision of pulling out from the 
group is not an easy one to make and to support. Thus, there is some tension between the 
shame that many feel, the ‘blame’ they place on the FARC for not allowing them to leave 
voluntarily, and the acceptance of the full moral consequences of their betrayal.  
As it is underlined in Table 8.2, the most recurring set of factors for demobilization relates to 
the organizational level. They concern the FARC weakened ideology and moral ground, and 
the widened gap between FARC principles and practice. Several ex-FARC combatants blame 
the organization for not practicing what it preaches. “They say, but they do not apply it”, 
Laura says.188 “The guerrilla does not comply with what it preaches”, echoes Giovanni.189 
Carlos, 13 years in the guerrilla, ultimately surrendered to the military while under siege. 
Still, the circumstance of his demobilization combined with his declining revolutionary 
morale accounts for his demobilization. “I was already worn out, tired to keep fighting for 
something that I will never see, the conquest of power. […] One gets demoralized”, he says.190 
There was a growing disconnection and glaring contradictions between the FARC ideology, 
its activities of political mobilization through the peasantry, and the actual FARC practices 
and policies. In fact, the three FARC combatants (Cesar, Muriel, and Jaime) who regularly 
conducted political mobilization (“organization of the masses”, see previous chapter) were 
the ones who had the most articulated views about this disconnection, about the weakening 
of the FARC ideology and its moral standing, and about the consequences of it in terms of the 
organization’s legitimacy.  
Jaime mentions how “drugs trafficking and other heinous practices were incompatible with 
FARC ideology.” Even though he acknowledged FARC’s effort to build infrastructure for local 
                                                        
187 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
188 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
189 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
190 Interview held in November 2013, Villavicencio. 
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population and to support their livelihoods, he lamented a fundamental lack of clarity on the 
part of the FARC. On the one hand, there is a permanent immutable roaring ideological 
propaganda toward the peasantry; on the other hand, there is the reality of growing 
difficulties and mal practices in the organization, including military defeats and loss of 
ground, drugs trafficking, disillusionment and weakening of internal cohesion. Telling one 
thing to the people while the truth laid elsewhere, represented an unbearable weight for 
long time rebels like Cesar and Jaime – who had to put their face with the peasantry. Muriel 
concludes that “big changes took place in the FARC, and one sees that it is going off course, 
loosing the direction, and the rules. Those same rules change”, because the internal cohesion 
become looser and legitimacy weakens.191 
There are also situations of grievances against perceived injustices and favoritism, on a small 
scale. For example, Laura – a proud FARC combatant, deeply committed to the cause – says: 
“I decided to demobilize for issues not related to the organization itself, but rather to the 
context in which I was at the moment. Meaning, the commander who ruled over me.” She 
points to the cowardice of her superior, who would do anything to keep his unit and himself 
clear of battle. Or, the careless treatment he would reserve to foot soldiers. “There were 
things that profoundly upset me”, Laura concludes.192 
Incentives from DDR program. As it is mentioned earlier, among the drivers for 
demobilization, it is often cited that the incentives coming from the state-led Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program played an important role in the decision 
to demobilize for many FARC members. In fact, among my sample of 18 ex-combatants, there 
was no one who stated that the prospect of a reintegration package was a motivation to 
come forward. The prospect of reintegration benefits as a driver for FARC individuals 
deciding to demobilize did not seem to account for demobilization.  
According to the interviewees I spoke to, it actually worked the other way around. In fact, an 
opposite dynamics was at play. To counteract the government propaganda and to dissuade 
combatants from fleeing, the FARC circulated stories of how the army would either make you 
disappear, sell you for organ trafficking, or, at best, send to jail anyone who would 
demobilize. And combatants would not be able to verify such information or even have 
access to it: thus, there was a lot of uncertainty from their part. “In a way, one had the desire 
to leave, but was frightened because one did not know how it would end”, Roberto says.193 
                                                        
191 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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193 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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Counter propaganda worked, because several ex-FARC told me that they were scared to 
surrender to the army. Laia said that she did not want to demobilize “because I am scared, 
because they will take my baby away. […] I just wanted to go home. One leaves and wants to 
see her own family, and stay home.”194 Cristiano says that “I had to join the [reintegration] 
program, but I would have not done it.”195 Together with Laia, also Ivan and Laura 
surrendered to the army sometime after fleeing from the FARC, not immediately; and only 
after hearing from other ex-FARC that the reintegration process was safe. In the case of Ivan, 
as it was mentioned, he joined the program 10 years after his injury that left him 
permanently disabled. 
In conclusion, the higher numbers of FARC demobilization since the inception of the 
reintegration program are the result of a mix of factors. An internal loss of cohesion is 
undisputable, which was triggered by several factors, including: the rise of drugs trafficking 
and the resulting weakening in ideology; the military defeats that the FARC sustained 
starting with the Uribe presidency in 2002; the targeted killing of FARC leadership which 
also caused a decline in morale. Even though no ex-FARC admitted that the reintegration 
program played a role in their demobilization, still, the program was instrumental to give ex-
FARC combatants a legitimate space once they left the group. The second part of this chapter 
deals more deeply with the meaning of reintegration for ex-combatants.   
EX-PARAMILITARIES’ PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOBILIZATION 
The demobilization process of the AUC was of a completely different nature from the FARC 
one. The demise of the paramilitaries was a DDR textbook case, compared to the individual 
desertion program granted to FARC members. As it was seen earlier, the demobilization of 
the AUC was the result of a negotiation and an ensuing agreement between the Uribe 
government and the AUC top leadership. The agreement’s provision established cantonment 
camps for weapons’ collection, the break-up of the organization, the collective 
demobilization of its members, and the preparation of combatants to reenter civil life as 
reintegration beneficiaries.    
At the individual level, ex-AUC combatants lived the demobilization experience in different 
ways, sometimes diametrically opposite. As AUC’s roles and functions were different from 
member to member, so were their demobilization paths. This section briefly highlights the 
perceptions and the initial reactions of the ex-paramilitaries who I interviewed, about how 
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the demobilization unfolded. There are several cases of fear and uncertainty, others of 
refusal and opposition, but also a case of joy and relief. The point here is to underline how 
AUC combatants reacted when they were put out of the job, and what the dynamics of it 
were. The next part addresses the issue of reintegration and the search for new employment. 
“They came one day and [told us] that this was going to end.”196 This is how Alejandro, an ex-
AUC medical worker, recalls the demobilization. The sentence highlights some interesting 
points. First, the rapidity and the immediacy of this occurrence: for many ex-combatants the 
demobilization took place either as a surprise or as an abrupt event (“they came one day…”). 
Second, the definitive nature of demobilization. It is an irreversible project; an event which 
the individual ex-combatant does not have the possibility to influence. 
The most prevalent first reaction and feeling among ex-paramilitaries were of refusal and 
denial. “For us who managed the finances, we never thought that this was going to end. None 
of us put savings on the side, we would spend all we earned. […] So, the initial impact was 
quite a shock”, Ibarbo says.197 For different reasons, other paramilitaries did not want to 
demobilize. Maria Victoria says that she was afraid of the stigma that society would place on 
her, as a demobilized combatant. She hints to the fact that she would have preferred to just 
quit. Radamael has similar reasons, saying that “I lasted more time in the regular army than 
in the paramilitaries. […] I did not want to demobilize. I just wanted to go home.”198 
The lack of information surrounding the process, and the related uncertainty raised 
combatants’ anxiety. “I did not know how this [demobilization] would unfold; I mean, we did 
not know anything. […] There was fear as well, because one could be killed or there could be 
revenges just for the issue of wearing a uniform”, Juan Manuel says.199 As it was mentioned, 
there was a wide spectrum of experiences. Wendy – who was a paramilitary radio operator 
in a remote location in Vichada – welcomed the news of the demobilization. She had not been 
allowed to leave the group, and only allowed to visit her family once a year. Wendy was in 
fact trapped, and when news of the imminent demobilization came, “for me it was a joy, 
because I knew I would go back [home]. […] It was like being born again after so much 
suffering.”200  
There were cases like Camilo, who, instead, as a mid-level commander, did not want to 
demobilize because of the prospect of losing his power position. When raising his concern 
with the commander of his paramilitary group (Cuchillo), Camilo received the following 
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answer: “Man, do you think I am happy to give up 3,500 rifles??” This exchange is revelatory 
about the challenges (and, often cases, the failure) of reintegrating paramilitary mid-level 
commanders in Colombia and elsewhere. There is a growing awareness in the policy and 
academic literature about the importance of being inclusive with and sensitive to 
combatants who held power positions. Thus, there is the need to specifically target such 
group in DDR programs. Given their power, leadership and network, mid-level commanders 
may have the ability to disrupt a DDR process and contribute to violence relapse. They often 
would not settle for the same benefits of foot soldiers, for example (ODDR, 2009). “It was 
tough, and actually very frustrating”, Camilo concludes.201   
Related to this, there is an initial generalized feeling of entitlement among several ex-AUC. 
Somehow, they feel that they rendered a service to Colombian society, and, so, that they 
should be in a somewhat special position, and not be apologetic. Moving from being an illegal 
combatant with a certain degree of power within society, to being a nobody, who, on top of it, 
has to hide his past, is a challenge in psychological terms. “People left here with the mentality 
of still being a paramilitary”, Alejandro says. He points to the difficulty of behaving “like a 
normal citizen: be in line, or deal with a complaint. […] I remember that in a bank if they did 
not attend us quickly, we would catch the security guard, disarm him and tie him up!”202 
8.2 Economic Reintegration: The Employment Factor 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: JOBS HELD AFTER DEMOBILIZATION AND THE SEARCH FOR EMPLOYMENT 
Those ex-FARC members who recently demobilize are held on a temporary basis (between a 
few weeks and three months) in the army-run “Peace House”, before being referred to the 
reintegration program and the civilian authorities. In these facilities, ex-FARC are 
psychologically and practically prepared to re-join society; they get interviewed by the 
military and their file gets processed. As it was previously mentioned, FARC demobilized 
combatants are expected to reveal what they know about the FARC, including most recent 
location of rebel units, military strength etc. in order to access benefits of reintegration. At 
the same time, ex-combatants go through an initial assessment of their capacity and skills to 
initiate their reinsertion in society.  
I had the opportunity to meet and interview four ex-FARC members who were hosted in the 
Peace House. The four of them had only been demobilized for a few weeks. Thus, they were 
able to offer an undigested perspective of their aspirations and expectations about the 
reintegration process. “One comes out [of the FARC] with the expectation to be helped and 
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supported”, introduces Giovanni. “Not that I would want to be helped with money: I would 
not like that. But economically, [I would hope the program can assist me] through the 
provision of a job: something that would allow me to be on my feet and move forward.”203 
What is interesting is that when asked about their immediate plans and aspirations once 
they will be allowed to leave the Peace House, these fresh FARC demobilized all mention 
livelihoods and finding a job as their key priority. For example, the case of Muriel: 43 years 
old, 32 of which were spent in the FARC. I interviewed him four weeks after he escaped the 
FARC. He conveyed all of his worries and fears about being reinserted in society. And he 
mentions livelihoods as his chief concern: “If I go and knock on the door of a firm, they are 
not going to take me. I am a 43-year old with no skills. […] The government should take care 
of us, and Congress should pass a law to support employment generation for demobilized. If 
one wants a piece of land, they should give it to him/her.”204 Muriel is scared about what lies 
ahead for him. Still very attached to the communist ideology of solidarity and equality, this is 
the only time in the interview that he puts his own interests ahead of the collective ones.  
Two more ex-FARC in the Peace House single out the two most important issues for them, 
namely employment and raising a family. Giovanni says: “I will leave here and look for a job 
on my own, to see what I can do in life. I will constantly run from the guerrilla, and I want to 
raise my children. […] If someone gives me a job, I want to be honest.”205 Carlos is more 
specific: “I want to find work as a truck driver and raise a family, since I never had one. 
Nothing more. This is all I want.”206 
Thus, recent demobilized combatants perceive the issue of having a job as an essential 
component and priority of reinsertion and reintegration. Ex-combatants mention jobs as the 
key issue for them in order to move on – together with raising a family. This finding 
somewhat strides with the policy and academic literature on DDR and reintegration. While 
livelihoods is recognized as critical, the potential transformative power of a job for an 
individual who comes out of the traumatic experience of war is underappreciated.  
As it will be discussed, jobs have the potential to steer an ex-combatant’s life toward a 
virtuous path of reintegration and no criminal relapse. Juan Manuel – an ex-AUC – makes the 
point that sustainable employment for ex-combatants is functional to community security 
and it reinforces peace practices. “If society gives us an opportunity to work, trust me when I 
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tell you that everyone will work and will not commit any crime. But if one is pushed away, in 
order to support wife and kids I would do what I need to do.”207 
All ex-combatants hinted at the very first period after demobilization as being a particularly 
difficult one. Coupled with the material challenge of finding livelihoods, ex-combatants 
experience a sense of loss and distress. They go from being members of armed groups, which 
are highly structured organizations, to being members of society with no link to any 
structure. It is common then that ex-combatants face enormous difficulties in re-adapting to 
‘normality’.  
Expressing such feelings of estrangement is a difficult proposition for people – especially if 
these intimate thoughts have to come out in a conversation with an interviewer who is at the 
same time a stranger and a foreigner. Therefore, several ex-combatants were only able to 
convey most of their fears and anxieties on more material grounds, like finding a job. After 
spending 8 years in the FARC, Roberto lamented that “it took me one and half, almost two 
years to find employment in the city [Villavicencio]. It was very hard; […] and complicated. 
Then, with time I managed to find work.”208 Jairo – from the AUC – echoes his colleague: “To 
get where I am today [a professor at University of Meta] I had to suffer a lot: I had lots of 
unmet needs, I suffered hunger. But I made it.”209 These and other words – as it will be 
explained below in more detail – underscore the social rehabilitation that these ex-
combatants have gone through. Their pride of ‘having made it’ is much about their own self 
esteem as it is about reintegration. Both self-esteem and reinsertion go through the act of 
finding and retaining a job.  
Related to this, a challenge to find new work and a recurring concern among ex-combatants – 
both FARC and paramilitaries – is their lack of skills and experience. Like Muriel, Laia is also 
aware of her age and lack of experience. “[While in the Peace House] I dreamed of having an 
occupation, and I wanted to study for it. But, since I was 36 years old, I would think that I 
was too old for it. ‘When would I finish?’, I would ask myself. Who was going to give me a job 
at 40 years old?”, she concluded.210 
As a result of this lack of skills – coupled with structural issues in the economy and labor 
market – most ex-combatants end up working in the informal sector, with no labor rights 
and no sustainability of livelihoods. Unstable working conditions enhance vulnerability and 
hamper the reintegration outcomes of ex-combatants – as it is recognized by the OAS’ 
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Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia in one of its recent monitoring reports 
(MAPP-OAS, 2015).  
To put a remedy to the lack of or insufficient skills, several ex-combatants have focused on 
education and vocational training. The government reintegration program sets up an 
important focus on education and it establishes clear milestones that all combatants have to 
reach in order to complete the reintegration route. Laia was in the process of completing a 
psychology degree at the time when she was offered a job in the Agencia Colombiana para la 
Reintegración (ACR) – the government reintegration agency. Two more ex-FARC females, 
Laura and Cristina were also interested in jumpstarting their education. Laura says: “I 
started the program by only focusing on studying and meeting the program’s requirements, 
including psycho-social support.”211 
From the AUC side, Jairo, who was a head of finance in the organization, rapidly completed a 
5-year university degree in public accounting, followed by a graduate program in finance. 
This is a successful case of reintegration, as Jairo was then hired in the Business and 
Administration school of the University of Meta. “Right now, I am conducting two research 
projects, one on ethics and social responsibility, and a second one on economic development 
in the Eastern Llanos. […] I am teaching six classes in financial management and analysis.”212  
Ibarbo, a former AUC mid-level operative in Villavicencio, has also been able to turn life 
around through his educational achievements. Ibarbo completed an undergraduate  degree 
in marketing and advertising. He is now pursuing a post-graduate program while he works 
full-time in the marketing department for the machinery multinational John Deere. Ibarbo 
reflects on his reintegration process: “I now have my job, my university commitment, my 
son. Thus, it is like I found my own centre of gravity. […] My life has dramatically changed 
with respect to my time in arms. Now I am doing well!”213 As mentioned earlier, self-esteem 
and reinsertion go hand in hand through the provision of employment. 
With respect to the kind of jobs held in the immediate aftermath of demobilization, most 
male ex-combatants point to the inherent job and livelihood insecurity. Most interviewees 
state that they constantly moved between periods of unemployment and irregular work. Odd 
jobs in construction or day labor were the most cited ones – especially among ex-FARC. An 
elder ex-FARC, Raul P., who spent all of his life in the group, admits: “Construction is my 
livelihoods – this is my work. I support myself as a day laborer, working for whoever calls 
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first.”214 Roberto recalls: “My first job was in construction: building a house. […] I was a 
painter, I would fix doors and windows, and work in the actual construction. Whatever was 
needed. I worked there for three months.”215  
Ex-paramilitaries face similar challenges of achieving sustainable livelihoods and 
experiencing job insecurity. Juan Manuel, who had a short stint in the AUC, has lived off of 
jobs in construction since the demobilization in 2006. “Currently, I work in private security”, 
he says, “because in construction they pay little and you have no right to severance pay nor 
anything. I am not earning much in private security either, but I will have my severance pay, I 
do not pay for transport and I live close by. And I have a stable job, instead of working one 
month and then not working for the next two months.”216  
Mauricio, ex-AUC from a higher socio-economic level, also talks about his experience of 
changing job: “Better economic opportunity drove me to change job in the past. I worked for 
seven years in a semi-public health provider, and I was doing fine. But one day I told myself 
that I wanted to look for other opportunities.” Thus, among ex-combatants, there are also 
aspirations of and willingness for career improvement. Mauricio wondered “whether my 
work can have more meaning and depth, focus on other communities, and be a bit more 
visible”. Mauricio found an opportunity to work as a liaison officer with the reintegration 
program (ACR). Like Laia, he works directly with ex-combatants. “I accepted [the job offer] 
right away as the salary is a bit higher and most of all I can do what I like, work for and 
support people. […] I know this reality for having been part of an armed group, and I am 
proud to be working on this effort now”, Mauricio concluded.217  
Roberto – ex-FARC – was able to move on by finding employment with Ecopetrol, first, and 
Pacific Rubiales later – two of the oil multinationals that have contracts of oil production in 
eastern Meta. During my visit to Puerto Gaitan – a remote town in Meta that experienced 
enormous growth and development after oil discovery at the turn of the century – I was able 
to meet with a number of ex-combatants who work in the oil industry and related services. 
Sergio lives in Puerto Gaitan, but does not work in the oil business. “I used to work in a 
hardware store, but now I have a good job. I drive a school bus: I collect children from their 
homes in rural settings, I take them to school and then back home.”218  
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TABLE 8.3: EX-COMBATANTS AND POST-DDR EMPLOYMENT 
Ex-combatant 
(Armed group) Jobs held after demobilization / Path to reintegration 
Cesar (FARC) Farmer 
Mauricio (AUC) Administrative officer in a government-run health provider. Currently, a reintegration officer in the DDR program (ACR) 
Alejandro (AUC) Studied medicine; had to abandon due to costs, and family to maintain. Parents were carpenters. Opened children furniture business 
Jairo (ACCU) Professor of Business and Administration at University of Meta 
Ibarbo (AUC) Obtained university degree; works in sales with auto industry spare parts (John Deere); and advertising freelance agent 
Carlos (FARC) Recently demobilized; held in military-run Peace House 
Walter (FARC) Recently demobilized; held in military-run Peace House 
Giovanni (FARC) Recently demobilized; held in military-run Peace House 
Laia (FARC) English to Spanish translations; Various vocational trainings. Currently, reintegration officer in the DDR program (ACR). Studies psychology 
Roberto (FARC) Occasional jobs in construction; seasonal laborer in oil industry. Currently, full-time occupation in a medical facility and shelter house for poor individuals 
Raul P. (FARC) Occasional jobs in construction 
Laura (FARC) Several jobs in shops (bakery, cafes, pool house, liquor store) 
Maria Victoria 
(AUC) 
Owns a micro enterprise of tamales (street food); studying gastronomy. 
Abandoned the nursing career as too expensive to gain certifications 
Radamael (AUC) Doorman in a private building. With family support, he was able to borrow money to buy a taxi (current) 
Juan Manuel (AUC) Occasional jobs in construction and in private security 
Camilo (AUC) Occasional jobs in construction; escaped to Venezuela due to threats; oil worker. Currently, ornaments workshop 
Jon (AUC) Farmer 
Faustino (ELN) Minor. Completing high school 
Cristina (FARC) Works part-time in a retirement home 
Pablo (AUC) Full-time oil worker 
Wendy (ACMV) Currently, open-ended clerical officer in Puerto Gaitan municipality. Started off with social work 
Sergio (FARC) Occasional jobs in farming, and hardware store. Currently, school bus driver 
Fernan (FARC) Spent 8 months in jail after demobilizing. Occasional jobs (home delivery, receptionist in hotel). Currently, seasonal oil worker; owns small plot of land  
Ignacio (ACMV) Entrepreneur: Transport cargo company 
Cristiano (FARC) Occasional jobs in construction; seeking work in oil service in Puerto Gaitan. Currently, unemployed 
Muriel (FARC) Recently demobilized; held in military-run Peace House 
Jaime (FARC) Occasional jobs as driver, in construction, farming. Currently, street food seller 
Enrique (FARC) Occasional jobs in construction 
Juan (FARC) Minor when demobilized. Completing education. Currently, seller in hardware store 
Marco (AUC) Taxi driver 
Ivan (FARC) Permanently invalid from war-time injury. Cannot work 
These examples show the different nature and types of professional engagements in which 
ex-combatants found themselves in. Alejandro, who spent several years as a medical worker 
in the AUC, promptly joined a medicine training in a private university in Villavicencio as 
soon as his unit was demobilized. After 3 years, he realized though that he was not going to 
be able to study and financially support his wife and child with only a night job. Alejandro 
was forced to abandon his studies then. Given his father’s background as a carpenter, he was 
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able to set up a business of children furniture. Thanks to the reintegration program’s 
business generation scheme for demobilized ex-combatants, Alejandro was then able to 
expand his production and open a retail store as well.  
As far as female ex-combatants are concerned, they did not engage in work in construction. 
For them, job insecurity meant that they often changed jobs in shops, restaurants and in 
entertainment services, like bars and clubs. It also meant that to make ends meet they had to 
perform more than one job at a time. As discussed above, female ex-fighters were also more 
prone to delve into their education requirements and interests. It is the case of Laura, Laia 
and Cristina, from the FARC side.   
Maria Victoria – ex-AUC – owns a food microenterprise, which however does not give her 
enough income. She is also studying gastronomy as part of her education requirements with 
the objective to expand her business. There are also successful cases of reintegration of 
female fighters. Wendy – a radio operator for the paramilitaries – was able to ultimately 
secure a permanent job in the municipality of Puerto Gaitan, to work as an administrative 
support officer. As it would be expected, it took Wendy a few years of irregular work and job 
insecurity to achieve a permanent position. Like Mauricio, Laia managed to secure a job with 
the government reintegration program in Villavicencio, as a liaison with ex-combatants to 
support social programs. 
STRUCTURAL LEVEL: PATHS TO AND CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION; THE IMPACT 
OF JOBS ON REINTEGRATION OUTCOMES 
There is an important point to be made with respect to the role of employment as a factor of 
reintegration. From the interviews that I conducted, it appears that those ex-combatants 
who were able to find a job, constitute a family and feel again as full members of society, are 
the ones who have been able to move on from their mostly tragic past. Reinserted ex-
combatants who have a satisfactory working situation have managed to put the armed 
group’s experience behind them. By talking to successful reintegrated cases like Ibarbo and 
Jairo, I perceived from their story how their emotional engagement to the armed conflict 
belongs to the past. They have been able to put some definitive distance between who they 
are now and their former status of combatants. Jairo and Ibarbo experience their 
commitment to the reintegration program as a necessary step toward reintegration, but in 
their own mind they are already reintegrated.  
In this sense, with respect to other ex-combatants who are still struggling to find their place 
in society, the two ex-AUC do not have pending grievances related to the conflict, nor 
frustration toward the reintegration program. In fact, ex-combatants without a stable job are 
 242
more prone to still experience strong emotional legacy from the conflict – and in some ways 
feel still attached to it and the past they lived through.  
Wendy – a former paramilitary member with a stable job in the municipality of Puerto Gaitan 
– spoke about the parallel process of emotionally feeling reinserted in society and being 
accepted by society. The two go hand in hand: the progressive social acceptance that Wendy 
and others have experienced is inextricably linked to the internal process of ex-combatants 
who distance themselves from their violent past. Many ex-combatants remarked the point 
that employment and jobs can support this process of reinsertion – both in terms of being 
accepted by society and of feeling a productive member of the community – which is one of 
the core arguments of this chapter. Time helps in healing the fracture of the past. 
Progressively, the stigma is less and less manifest toward reinserted individuals like Wendy. 
“I tried to delete my past,” she concludes.219   
All ex-combatants, in fact, mention the issue of discrimination, stigma and need for 
anonymity. Ex-combatants not only tend not to reveal their background in arms due to 
security concerns, but also – perhaps most importantly – due to the widespread lack of trust 
from society. Ex-combatants of all groups are seen with suspicion by members of society and 
public opinion at large, and as a result are vastly stigmatized and individually made 
accountable for the armed conflict. Ex-combatants whose real identity gets revealed in the 
workplace, for example, are often sacked. Employers do not trust them, but are especially 
concerned with the reaction coming from other workers, and potential problems that such a 
situation may create. Stereotypes and widespread negative perceptions in society about ex-
combatants grossly undermine the potential employment of ex-combatants, their absorption 
into the workforce, and, ultimately, their reintegration outcomes (MAPP-OAS, 2015).  
Ex-AUC Camilo mentions that he found a job with one of the oil multinationals in the Puerto 
Gaitan area, but that he was soon sacked after news of his previous affiliation to the AUC 
came to light. Wendy also confirms that this has happened over and over again with the oil 
companies in the area. Camilo has now a decoration and ornamentation workshop, but it is 
unclear whether this allows him and his family to have a decent livelihood. However, his 
negative experience with the oil multinational due to his status of ex-combatant has greatly 
contributed to his negative feelings about the future and his inability to move on. “I am going 
through hard times because I have not been able to find a good job, and I have not had the 
support of anyone. Neither the government, nor anyone at all!”220 Camilo’s story is a further 
example confirming the crucial role of employment in reintegration outcomes. 
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This issue of discrimination against ex-combatants is less evident in conflict-affected 
contexts where political violence has ceased and where the conflict has reached some type of 
resolution. The context of Colombia (at the time of fieldwork in 2013-14) sees instead a 
persistency of violent conflict, multiple actors, and conflating political and criminal agendas. 
All of which is not conducive to a comprehensive reintegration process of ex-combatants at 
both the individual and collective levels. In such context, reconciliation – a necessity to close 
the wounds of war – is hard to implement as there is no buy-in from society. Because the war 
and the violence are ongoing. Winning the acceptance from society is “the greatest 
challenge”, ex-AUC Mauricio – who now works in the reintegration program – says. “We need 
that the community opens up its doors to us, that it takes some ownership of the 
reintegration process itself.”221 Maria Victoria, also an ex-AUC, suffered from discrimination 
in one of the vocational training she used to attend. “People are not prepared for this. They 
are not prepared to accept us”, she concludes.222 
Nonetheless, an important tool for reconciliation concerns social work, which is one of the 
core requirements of the program. As all ex-combatants have to serve some time of social 
work, this aspect has contributed to bridging the gap between ex-combatants and the 
communities. Such programs are, of course, more visible and have a greater impact in terms 
of reconciliation and social acceptance of the demobilized when implemented in small scale 
communities. In large urban spaces, social work programs have struggled to make a 
significant impact and to link to state institutions. Wendy – from Puerto Gaitan – emphasizes 
how, as a result of social work programs, the social attitude toward ex-combatants 
drastically changed. “[The community] appreciated what we did. We painted, cleaned parks 
and public spaces. […] We demonstrated that we are different now, we are not people in 
arms.”223   
There is a (somewhat predictable) dissatisfaction with the reintegration program among 
those ex-combatants (especially from the AUC), who were in a position of power. The lack of 
differentiation and targeting among ex-combatants by the DDR program left the mid-level 
commanders disgruntled. They are the ones who most lost in the demobilization process: 
from being in a position of power (both economically and politically) to having to 
accommodate all needs with basic support from the program. As it is seen in the next section, 
some authors stress the fact that the lack of focus by the DDR program on mid-level 
commanders is at the origin of the recidivism phenomenon. 
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Thus, mid-level ex-AUC’s evaluation of the program is negative. Jon is one of those who 
deems the program useless: “I had to stay in the program because I had to respect the rules 
that were established, rules which the paramilitaries committed to. The program has not 
facilitated at all my reintegration.”224 Camilo – also in a position of power in the AUC – 
stresses the inadequacy of the economic offer from the reintegration program. He mocks the 
business generation scheme that offers a grant of the equivalent of USD1,000 to set up a 
business. “If you do not have a feasible plan of livelihoods and employment for demobilized, 
[the program] will always be a failure! […] The truth is that I regret the decision of having 
demobilized, because the program has not provided me with the guarantees that were 
needed,” Camilo concludes.225 Nonetheless, for others like Radamael, the DDR “program 
helped me. For the psychological part. […] I can now control myself; I think about things, I 
analyse them and then I make a decision.”226   
There is one more important difference between ex-combatants who were rank and file 
members and mid-level commanders. From the perspective of jobs and employment, the 
interviews underline a connection between the role that an ex-combatant had while in the 
armed group, and the subsequent post-demobilization employment path. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, those ex-combatants who were in charge of local finance, who were recruiters, 
and/or were tasked with political mobilization roles, for example, are the ones that after the 
demobilization have been able to secure more profitable jobs in services or the public sector.  
Such consideration chiefly applies to ex-paramilitaries. The mostly egalitarian system of 
roles and tasks in the guerrilla fundamentally prevented the rise of differences among 
combatants. In the paramilitaries, instead, more diversified sets of skills among members 
produced different career paths and roles within the armed group – as it was explored in the 
previous chapter. In turn, variation also produced different paths of post-demobilization 
employment and reintegration. 
Ibarbo confirms this point: “I know a lot of ex-combatants who were rank and file and that 
now they are still like that: like waiting that the tide brings them somewhere. Those who do 
not have the capacity to say ‘Ok, I want to improve my life condition, move forward and earn 
more money’.”227 In contrast, some ex-paramilitaries in a position of power and influence 
while in the armed group – like Jairo and Ibarbo – are the ones that after demobilization 
were able to secure better jobs for themselves: in a university and in the car industry, 
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respectively. Conversely, the rank and files members – like Radamael and Juan Manuel – tend 
to find either odd, irregular and informal work with a low salary. 
8.3 Drivers and Dynamics of Recidivism 
The phenomenon of recidivism in Colombia is a complex one. While recently a number of 
publications have discussed the issue (Kaplan and Nussio, 2016; Themner, 2011; Daly, Paler 
and Samii, 2013; Nussio and Howe, 2013; Nussio, 2016; Daly, 2011), there is still a lack of 
evidence on what drives ex-combatants to re-engage in armed groups’ activities or illegality. 
First of all, a matter of definition. Recidivism may be intended as the antithesis of 
reintegration. If an ex-combatant re-engage in illegality, his/her reintegration path has 
clearly failed. Such dichotomy (i.e. crime=recidivism, no crime=reintegration) fails however 
to qualitatively assess different degrees of reintegration as well as its different 
manifestations. In fact, non-recidivist ex-combatants have not necessarily achieved 
reintegration in a successful manner: there can be ex-combatants who did not re-engage in 
an armed group but who nonetheless are not reintegrated by a number of measurements. 
Therefore, recidivism should be understood as one (extreme) manifestation of failed 
reintegration.   
This section seeks to highlight some of the dynamics and drivers of recidivism, based on the 
interviews with ex-combatants. A set of individual, structural and organizational issues 
determine the outcome of an ex-combatant becoming a recidivist. Some of these issues – 
which are further analysed in this section – include: the specific armed group and the block 
within it; the degree to which the group is involved in drugs trafficking; the origin of the ex-
combatant (rural or urban, paramilitary or guerrilla); the area in which the ex-combatant 
settles; the attitude and behaviour of the ex-combatant (i.e. is he/she vocal, or does he/she 
stay quiet?); and the potential need to supplement an unstable livelihood and/or unsecure 
employment. Thus, there is a whole set of variables related to space, social origin, economic 
condition, security and family background, among others, that determine recidivism. 
The analysis of recidivism complements the post-demobilization employment trajectories. 
As there can be several reasons why some ex-combatants fail to reinsert in society, one of 
them – my argument goes – relates to the lack of employment or an unstable working 
situation. Re-joining an armed group or engaging in criminal activities is partially a 
consequence of this lack of employment opportunity available to ex-combatants. Thus, 
recidivism is here analysed from the perspective of employment. This section addresses the 
question whether there is a connection between lack of job or unstable employment 
condition and recidivism.  
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Experts agree on the fact that non-state armed actors prefer to employ an ex-combatant over 
a new recruit. If armed actors behave like normal employers, then they will prefer to hire 
combatants who have previous work experience on their CV and who come with references. 
Therefore, they would look for former armed groups’ members – who may be DDR 
beneficiaries at this point – rather than first-time recruits. As it is discussed below, non-state 
armed groups use coercion and threats to coopt ex-combatants into their criminal groups. 
According to the ACR, as of early 2016, out of over 58,000 demobilized combatants from 
both paramilitaries and guerrilla, 9,4% of them committed some criminal activity after 
demobilization and are therefore considered recidivist (Observatorio de Paz y Conflicto, 
2016). There is however an issue with how recidivism is measured: the 9,4% figure only 
refers to those who have been sentenced by court, and excludes those who have either been 
captured, are awaiting trial or have been simply charged with a crime. Therefore, given the 
length of judicial processes, the figure provided by the government is likely an 
underestimation of the phenomenon. In addition, it is unclear whether any type of crime 
committed by an ex-combatant automatically qualifies as recidivism, or if the ex-combatant 
has to be specifically charged with illegal armed group’s membership.    
Further constraints to the understanding of recidivism are the methodological and ethical 
issues associated with the study of recidivism. Undoubtedly, there is an objective bias in the 
answers that ex-combatants gave me when prompted questions on the recidivism issue. Re-
engaging in unlawful activities – if detected by authorities – carries the immediate 
termination of the reintegration benefits as well as the suspension of all the legal benefits 
deriving from the status of ex-combatant. The law is particularly harsh with ex-combatants 
who are recidivist. Therefore, risks are significantly high. With this in mind, no ex-combatant 
would feel safe in being honest about recidivism with a researcher who has been introduced 
by the reintegration program itself. As it was discussed in Chapter 3, when asking question 
around recidivism, my strategy was to avoid direct and personal questions. Instead, I would 
ask questions about the dynamics of recidivism, how it works, what the incentives are for ex-
combatants, and what the opportunity and the strategy of armed groups to approach ex-
combatants are. Ultimately, while the risk of bias still holds, I received informative insights 
on the dynamics and drivers of recidivism, which constitute the core of this section. In fact, I 
also triangulated these findings with key informants, in order to strengthen their validity. A 
number of experts that I interviewed both in Bogota and Villavicencio were able to either 
confirm or disprove the findings from the interviews with ex-combatants. 
A final note on the difference between ex-paramilitaries and ex-FARC as far as recidivism is 
concerned. While there is some evidence of ex-FARC being recruited by new criminal armed 
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groups, none of the interviews confirmed this point. Obviously, ex-FARC cannot go back to 
the FARC as they are considered traitors and deserters. Thus, recidivism is a phenomenon 
that chiefly concerns ex-paramilitaries. With the above caveats in mind, some ex-
paramilitaries were open to discuss the subject of who and why would decide to go back in 
arms, and the underlining circumstances and dynamics. On the other hand, ex-FARC were 
not receptive at all in talking about recidivism: not only they predictably denied of being 
approached to join a non-state armed group, but they were agnostic (or silent) about 
recidivism, and refrained from any consideration surrounding it. Thus, the present section is 
built exclusively on the interviews with ex-paramilitaries as well as on insights from key 
informants.        
INDIVIDUAL: LACK OF OPPORTUNITIES 
At the individual level, ex-combatants list the lack of employment as the chief driver of 
recidivism, leading ex-combatants to re-engage in criminal activities or re-join a non-state 
armed group. Ignacio – ex-paramilitary from Puerto Gaitan – admits that he has seen many 
demobilized working in the oil sector. He stressed the importance of holding a job for 
reintegration and crime prevention purposes. “Those ex-combatants that have been sacked 
right now are back into criminal groups.”228 Employment is indeed an important component; 
nonetheless, attributing the rise of recidivism to the failure of employment generation is an 
overstatement. Recidivism is the product of a complex set of issues, as this section 
demonstrates.  
Nonetheless, employment is recognized as the most immediate and direct cause of 
recidivism. Ex-combatants’ testimonies point to the lack of or unsatisfactory employment 
situation as the leading cause of demobilized going back in arms. Alejandro: “As there is no 
job [available], therefore one falls back inside [the armed group]. […] Notwithstanding the 
law which rules that if we commit crimes we get jailed and loose all our benefits, still as 
human beings we are concerned with the present time, and nothing else.”229 Camilo echoes 
this vision: ex-combatants “have to go back [to armed groups] because there is no job 
opportunity here. No opportunity, period.”230 Still, there is no convincing evidence claiming 
that unemployed ex-combatants are more likely to go back to crime than employed ones. 
Whether one holds a job or not becomes a factor only when it is assessed together with other 
drivers and enabling factors for recidivism.  
                                                        
228 Interview held in February 2014, Puerto Gaitan. 
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230 Interview held in February 2014, Villavicencio. 
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Juan Manuel goes back to the issue of societal discrimination against ex-combatants as an 
important driver of recidivism. He recalls what he told one of his manager upon discovering 
his ex-combatant status: “When you fire me because I am a demobilized, you are making a 
mistake; because if you fire me, you are preventing me from having a job. Then, I go 
somewhere else and I still cannot find work and the whole world turns its back at me 
because they know that I am a demobilized. What do I do? I start committing crime! For this 
reason there is so much killing, stealing, massacres. Because there is people who are turned 
back, cannot find work, and so they go back to the groups.”231 Albeit simplistic, this view 
raises the point of how discrimination against ex-combatants contributes to further 
alienating ex-combatants and to pushing them into crime and violence again.  
Some ex-combatants do also recognize the complexity of the transition process which they 
go through. They are less inclined to attribute all the recidivism to lack of employment, but 
instead state that certain individuals have a very hard time to reinsert into society. Jairo says 
that “the process of transition is very difficult. […] The way you are used to earn money, get 
what you need, relate to other individuals in society is very different. And now for ex-
combatants is very very hard. […] I faced enormous difficulties to get where I am [i.e. faculty 
member at university]. Many people are not strong enough: they are offered to go back and 
they accept.”232  
When asked what the profile of the typical ex-combatant who re-engage in armed groups is, 
some ex-combatants, like Jairo, talk about weakness of character of certain individuals. 
Connected to the incapacity of finding employment and reinserting into society, ex-
combatants lack fundamental social skills that favor reinsertion. Juan Manuel explains that 
“there are people who are inept to work, they are weak, they do not want to put an effort. 
And they are the most vulnerable to recidivism. They are people used to wait for easy fixes. 
[…] They fail to be social with people; they do not have the capacity to relate to other people. 
They do not know how to talk, how to ask a favor. […] There are lots of people that have been 
back to armed groups because they do not know any better, they do not know how to look 
for a job.”233 In employment terms, a career transition is sometimes harder than staying in 
the same working environment. 
Family support plays also a critical role in reintegration outcomes and is often mentioned by 
the ex-combatants that I interviewed as an important stabilizer in the post-demobilization 
phase. There is evidence that raising a family and focusing on family ties give ex-combatants 
dis-incentives to break the law: ex-combatants that have family seem to be less prone to 
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recidivism. Jon admits that “during this time [in the AUC] one does not think about anything, 
about danger. […] After children are born, you soften up. You start being more careful and 
value personal security much more than before.”234 Radamael echoes this view: “When I was 
in the military and then the AUC, I never married nor I had children. I decided to raise a 
family after the demobilization.” He is now married and has a 5-year old daughter. “Through 
a family, I started seeing things differently. One avoids dangerous or risky situations. […] 
When someone entices you [through proposing a potential criminal activity], it is about 
having the moral strength to say ‘no, I am not doing this because I have more important 
people to take care of and more important things to do’. […] I have been living with my 
spouse for six years now, and she knows that I do not have anything else going on other than 
my job and my family”, Radamael concludes.235 
In conclusion, these considerations highlight first of all that employment is only an 
immediate cause of recidivism. As Jairo and Juan Manuel state, employment alone is not the 
issue, but it is a more complex interaction involving also the legacy of war, the lack of 
socialization, and poor or absent family ties that many ex-combatants experience. The 
linkages between these factors – together with a context of non-state armed groups’ 
proliferation – produce recidivism.           
STRUCTURAL: ONGOING CONFLICT AND POWER OF NEW ARMED GROUPS VIS-À-VIS THE STATE 
The presence and persistence of non-state armed groups is undoubtedly the enabling factor 
for recidivism. In Colombia, DDR is not part of a post-war stability and security strategy, but 
it takes place amid ongoing violent conflict. It goes without saying that this factor represents 
an obstacle to the final outcome of the DDR program, i.e. reinsertion of ex-combatants into 
society. As it was seen in Chapter 5, the region of Meta – as well as several other conflict-
affected areas – experienced a proliferation of new armed groups in the wake of the 
demobilization of paramilitaries. Such groups are more criminal in nature, and preoccupied 
more with control of illicit trafficking’s routes rather than political goals, as paramilitary 
groups originally were. 
According to some of the ex-paramilitaries that I interviewed, the immediate phase that 
followed the demobilization of paramilitary units was the most intense in terms of recruiting 
ex-combatants. New non-state armed groups were quickly formed to fill the vacuum left by 
the AUC. Radamael says: “It is no secret that at the beginning a lot of those who demobilized 
went back. […] They used to say that who wanted to go back could do so.”236 Juan Manuel 
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admits of having been approached by groups in 2006 following his demobilization. “They 
called me twice while I was in San Martin [a traditional paramilitary stronghold in Meta], 
telling me to show up for a meeting run by the same people. I did not go, I changed my 
number and that was it.”237 Juan Manuel was never approached again, nor was he 
threatened. This personal event may imply that at the very beginning, in an effort to quickly 
re-constitute armed groups, attempts to recruit ex-combatants were done without too much 
follow up nor threats.   
While the dynamics of new groups’ formation was not extensively told by any interviewee, 
ex-combatants did mention that the initial failures of the DDR program were instrumental 
for demobilized to re-join newly formed armed groups. Radamael mentions the initial 
shortcomings of the agency in charge of reintegration (ACR). “At the beginning there was a 
lot of disorganization [within the ACR]. Things did not go very well. [The ACR] did not put a 
lot of attention [to people], as there was not a lot of individual support as there is now. Three 
months could pass without you showing up and no one would say anything. Nowadays you 
behave that way, and you are kicked out of the program and judicially charged. I mean, there 
was not the support that there is now, and there were no tools for ex-combatants’ 
reintegration. […] [Then], one single reintegration officer was responsible for 100 or 200 ex-
combatants. Today there is more support; and more control.”238 
Thus, exploiting the fluid and to a certain extent chaotic phase that followed the 
demobilization, new criminal groups successfully approached several hundred ex-
combatants. Experts speculate that mid-level commanders were the group that was mostly 
affected by new recruitment rather than rank and file members. There is also agreement 
among experts and policy makers themselves that the reintegration program has been 
insufficient in targeting and addressing the specific needs of mid-level members of 
paramilitaries, as it was discussed before. Ibarbo shares this view: “[It is more probable that 
the one who] goes back to crime is the one who once had a position of power, who 
demobilized and is stuck at home. It is more likely that he organizes a group, manages it and 
gains money.”239  
In addition, there is a grey area in which some ex-combatants are with one foot inside 
legality and with one foot outside of it. The chapter on recruitment and mobilization has 
exposed the blurred nature of the boundaries between combatants, ex-combatants and non-
combatants. These categories are not fixed, but there is substantial grey area between them. 
Not all armed group’s members are combatants strictly speaking, but perform a variety of 
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roles. Their level and timing of engagement can also vary: there are different modalities of 
affiliations to armed groups. One expert confirmed that between 2007 and 2010 many ex-
combatants, in fact, were in arms on a part-time basis and at the same time received 
reintegration benefits. As if they had a double life. Juan Manuel says that it is not infrequent 
that this situation occurs. However, he says, “these people are very reserved, they would not 
tell anybody. They could have a real and legitimate job which is only a façade.”240 
Thus, it is plausible that someone works in the legal world but at the same time entertains 
relationships with illegal groups, for example by performing small and occasional tasks (the 
trabajitos, or ‘small jobs’). There could be the case that someone can be a recidivist and a 
DDR beneficiary at the same time: ex-combatants who I interviewed hinted at such 
possibility. The informality of an armed group makes it easier to be involved again in it. In 
such fluid situation, no ex-combatant is put in front of an encompassing life decision where 
he/she consciously signs up for a life in illegality. This happens in a much more subtle, 
informal and automatic way. 
From a structural point of view, it is important also to consider whether recidivism is more 
prevalent in areas and municipalities that are more affected by the presence of non-state 
armed groups. If more armed groups’ activity is associated with higher rate of recidivism, 
this point brings an important implication for reintegration and peacebuilding in Colombia. 
The attainment of reintegration outcomes for ex-combatants and the strengthening of peace 
is, thus, partially dependent on the war context as much as it is dependent on the design and 
implementation of reinsertion programs and strategies. Undoubtedly, the presence of armed 
groups and ongoing violent conflict are important constraints when trying to build peace.      
To sum up, in terms of structural drivers of recidivism, the fact that ex-combatants go back in 
an armed group is more dependent on the context of armed groups’ presence rather than on 
the fault of the reintegration program. There is a context of non-state armed groups which is 
attractive to certain ex-combatants. 
ORGANIZATIONAL: NEW ARMED GROUPS’ RECRUITMENT STRATEGIES 
As it was stated in the Methodology chapter, at the inception of this research journey I 
attended a study tour of reintegration programs organized by the Colombian government. 
During such occasion, I met an ex-AUC – I will call him Dario – who had a successful 
reintegration path, setting up a workshop of doors and windows. He explained how the 
process of re-joining a non-state armed group unfolds in practice. Dario says that armed 
groups do try to re-involve ex-combatants, in a somewhat casual way. They do not come with 
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a formal job offer to be part of the group, in which one is put in the position to be either in or 
stay out of the group. Instead, the approach is much more subtle and – in appearance – 
harder to detect. 
By including both structure and agency, his answer was revealing. Dario referred to an 
informal process of co-optation that involves former peers and cohorts. He said that 
somebody who you know would call you and propose you to do one small job (trabajito), 
such as delivering a threat message, hiding a weapon, or even more simply moving a vehicle 
or transporting some supplies. Once an ex-combatant agrees on performing one or more of 
these, then he/she is again involved in the armed group without necessarily having made a 
well thought or balanced consideration. It all takes place informally, and, in appearance, 
casually.  
The point Dario makes reinforces the ‘grey area’ argument explained above: some ex-
combatants live with a foot in legality and a foot in illegality. Recidivism takes place 
informally, and sometimes even without the full awareness of the ex-combatants. As simple 
as it is, this answer implies that a DDR program does not occur in a social vacuum, nor it 
begins with a clean slate. Instead, DDR takes place in a specific social context where former 
combatants may still retain ties with non-state armed groups, as well as they may still be 
perceived as combatants by the community where they live in. This story also stresses the 
importance of networks and organization, beyond simple economic incentives.  
An additional recurrent practice used by armed groups to pressure ex-combatants concerns 
threats and coercion. These are regular tools utilized to recruit ex-combatants. Several ex-
combatants – mostly from the paramilitaries – admitted of having been threatened to re-join 
the groups. Maria Victoria (ex-AUC) says that her husband – a former paramilitary as well – 
was threatened. “They called and told him ‘We need you, we need you!’.”241 Her husband 
refused, and as a result the sister was threatened and beaten. The whole family had to flee to 
the remote region of Vichada to avoid further threats and violence. Camilo had an even more 
dramatic experience. He fled to Bogota for six months, but was nonetheless discovered, and 
had to flee to Venezuela due to threats to his life. Obviously, threats can be related to other 
issues (for example, revenge), and not only to an opposition to being recruited. It is not 
possible to distinguish here between the different causes of why threats arose. However, 
many ex-paramilitaries stated that either someone who they knew or themselves were 
subject to threats to put pressure on recruitment. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter addressed the critical phase of transition from non-state armed group back to 
civilian life. Through the testimonies of over 30 ex-combatants, it gives a comprehensive 
picture of the challenges and dynamics of demobilization and reintegration from the 
perspective of employment and livelihoods. The chapter is concerned in great deal with the 
perceptions and the stories from ex-combatants of how they manage to gain sustainable 
livelihoods, the challenges of finding employment, and the different pressures that they 
receive from society. On the one hand, ex-combatants have to struggle to be accepted back in 
society, fight discrimination and marginalization on the work place. On the other hand, they 
are constantly wary of the emerging non-state armed groups and the threats coming from 
those. The dynamics of recidivism are the result of a structural context of persistence of 
armed groups and violent conflict in Colombia. 
TABLE 8.4: KEY FINDINGS ON REINTEGRATION AND RECIDIVISM 
 
The present chapter also concludes a 3-phase journey of ex-combatants’ experiences with 
war and peace. Centred around their experience in the armed group – which for most of 
them has profoundly defined their life – the three phases contain the whole employment 
 Individual demobilization of FARC combatants takes place due to multiple circumstances. Less 
than half report of having demobilized due to a deliberate and planned decision to flee the FARC. 
All others left the group as a result of a permanent injury, or because were captured or they 
surrendered while in combat. 
 Ex-paramilitaries and ex-FARC experienced different paths of demobilization and associated 
challenges and perceptions.  
 In the immediate post-demobilization phase, former AUC combatants (especially those in position 
of power) share feelings of frustration and resentment toward the demobilization process, 
including a perception of entitlement. Several others combine a sense of relief and fear, arguing 
that they would have preferred not to go through the reintegration process at all. 
 DDR beneficiaries – whether FARC or AUC – express similar needs in terms of their reintegration 
process. On an individual level, they are almost all primarily concerned with issues of livelihoods 
and employment, stigmatization coming from society, and the need for anonymity due to security 
concerns. 
 Employment is an important component of socio-economic reintegration. Together with the 
‘raising a family’ factor, findings show that holding employment is a decisive factor for ex-
combatants’ perceived and real reintegration and for their own self-esteem. 
 There is a connection between the role that an ex-combatant held in the armed group and the 
position he/she will have in society after the demobilization. Those ex-combatants in a position of 
power and influence while in the armed group are the ones that after demobilization are able to 
secure better jobs for themselves. Conversely, the rank and files members tend to find either odd, 
irregular and informal work or jobs with a low salary.  
 Non-state armed actors prefer to employ a former member (i.e. recidivist) over a new recruit. If 
armed actors behave like normal employers, then they will prefer to hire combatants who have 
previous work experience on their CV and who come with references. Therefore, they would 
rather hire a former armed groups’ member – who may be a DDR beneficiary at this point – than 
a first-time recruit. 
 The process of recidivism takes place somewhat casually, as a result of an informal, and often 
personalized, process of cooptation. 
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history of these ex-combatants: from the time before they entered the armed group and the 
dynamics of recruitment, to the period within the armed group, to the demobilization and 
the reinsertion in society. Ultimately, the three chapters have been an attempt at 
understanding dynamics of violent conflict through the eyes of men and women and the way 
they have experienced life and work. 
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Conclusion 
The dissertation’s intellectual journey started from a policy dilemma – i.e. what accounts for 
successful reintegration of ex-combatants. The initial exploration of this question from a 
policy perspective provided a series of answers, all of which were nonetheless unsatisfactory 
due to the lack of generalizability, complexity and depth. When attempting to understand 
issues around the challenges, priorities and constraints of Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR), a common explanation is that ‘context matters’ and there is need for 
more holistic approaches. This situation begged for an intellectual exercise able to navigate a 
vaster terrain, beyond DDR implementation and its challenges.  
The story of Cesar that opened this dissertation exemplifies the non-linearity and 
ambivalence of a DDR process. Most of all, it highlighted the deeper interaction between DDR 
and Cesar’s experiences with recruitment, membership to, and desertion from the FARC. 
Ultimately, this intellectual process resulted in this research, which accounts for the 
complexity of DDR, its far-reaching implications, its historical role, and its connection to 
inherently structural political issues, like order, authority and power.  
As it is highlighted in the concluding chapter, my research orientation has changed from one 
of finding answers to policy dilemmas to one that seeks to address explanatory questions. 
During the course of the research, the approach shifted from ‘what can be done’ to ‘what can 
be understood’. Such change of approach does not preclude the research from having 
concrete policy implications. Rather, it does not presume that there can be universal 
solutions to the question of ‘what works’.  
With this premise in mind, this conclusion discusses some of the main findings from this 
work. In its synthetic form, it revisits the approach that the research has taken and its 
analytical underpinnings. It then presents the main findings and the answers to the research 
question. The thesis also reflects the potential knowledge contribution, including some 
thoughts about follow up research. Some considerations on policy contribution conclude the 
dissertation. 
WHAT WAS DONE (APPROACH, STRUCTURE, CONTENT)  
This research provided a comprehensive qualitative analysis on the role and implications of 
DDR on the dynamics of war and on the incipient transition from war to peace in the region 
of Meta, Colombia. The thesis addressed the overall research goal of understanding the 
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interaction between the DDR process and war to peace transition. It has done so through the 
use of integrated levels of analysis (individual, organizational, and structural) applied to 
different phases, and through the discussion and adoption of ad hoc analytical frameworks.  
I will briefly recap the approach to the research in order to connect it to the main findings. 
An analytical framework based on non-linearity, and on integration of levels and 
phases. First, the analysis of DDR, a program which typically takes place during the post-war 
phase, required this research to expand the temporal frame of reference beyond post-war 
and to include other key moments. As post-war is inherently part of the dynamics of war and 
peace, the research looked holistically at the theory and practice of transition from war to 
peace. The transition between the two was here intended not as unidirectional nor linear. 
Dynamics of war and peace may overlap. As it was conceptualized, they are in a continuum. 
DDR is part of this continuum, and therefore the full time span of the transition is relevant. 
This represents the first major departure from the policy literature, which is overly 
concerned with the ‘building the peace’ phase that takes place after violence ceases 
(Bourgois, 2001; Cramer, 2006; Duffield, 2000; Muggah (ed.), 2009; Pugh, 2000; Richards, 
2005; Sambanis, 2004; UNDP, 2008; Marc et al., 2013). 
The passage from violence to peace cannot be considered as a clean rupture between the 
two. Rather, the research demonstrates how violence and peace are in an organic 
relationship in which there are perpetual points of continuity between the two. The 
transition from war economies to peace economies, for example, is one characterized by 
strong continuity. This transition involves elites, local population and economic structures, 
all of which do not mechanically experience the end of war and the start of peace, but rather 
experience the economic transition as a process. In a similar fashion, the phases within the 
transition are characterized by a similar lack of clear boundaries. Phases may overlap and/or 
repeat themselves in a non-orderly fashion. Grey areas are the norm, rather than black or 
white situations (Goodhand, 2004; Keen, 2000). 
The non-linearity of the war to peace transition process is at the core of the research’s 
analytical framework. Analytically, the research emphasized different elements and 
moments within the transition. The lifespan of a conflict is disaggregated into three phases 
(pre-, during- and post-conflict), which are analysed both individually and in their 
interaction. Not only the post-war phase is dependent on the previous phases, but also the 
former may last many years, beyond the implementation of DDR and peacebuilding policies. 
Analytically and temporally dissecting the transition is an artificial exercise: as it was 
mentioned, I adopt the continuum framework and phases are not obvious. Nonetheless, such 
division allows one to single out the three stages of a conflict and to assess the organic 
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interaction among them. 
Second, the research conceptually integrates an individual-level analysis of ex-combatants, 
an organizational level of non-state armed groups, and a structural-level analysis. The latter 
is concerned with the macro analysis of war and transition process. The organizational level 
concerns the functioning, behaviours and patterns of non-state armed groups, which is part 
of the emerging literature on rebel governance. The ex-combatants’ process of experiencing 
war and later being demobilized from it cannot be fully understood without considering the 
organizational dynamics of the armed groups to which they belonged during the war. The 
structural war dynamics and the transition to peace provide an analytical framework 
through which the pathway of ex-combatants is contextualized and complexified. Ultimately, 
the integrated framework of the three levels provided a comprehensive analysis of war to 
peace transition and DDR.  
The employment lens. Third, the conceptual model of the research was based on the 
specific lens of employment and labor market of war, through which to look at these 
multiple-level and multiphase complex dynamics. With a relatively narrow focus, this lens 
was analysed against each phase and each level, and was able to capture the links between 
them.  
Employment and the labor market of war represent an innovative approach in conflict and 
peacebuilding literature. Through the employment framework, the research approaches war 
to peace transition in its entirety. Within a coherent analytical framework, the research put 
together issues of conflict onset and mobilization (phase one), membership to armed groups 
and patterns of armed groups’ human resources (phase two), and peacebuilding, 
demobilization and reintegration (phase three). 
At the individual level, the research put under the same framework all the employment 
experiences of ex-combatants, including those before joining the armed group, the period in 
the armed group, and the job experiences during the reintegration phase. A ‘career’ 
examination of ex-combatants represents an important innovation. The general tendency is 
to see post-war employment reintegration as a stand-alone phase. The approach here is to 
consider the interaction between post war and other phases. 
By the same token, the research focused on the experiences of ex-combatants within the 
armed group and on the internal dynamics of armed groups as far as their human resources 
are concerned. Through the testimony of ex-combatants, I was able to compile a profile of 
different ‘professional figures’ within the FARC and the paramilitaries. Ex-combatants 
recollected a variety of job roles that were undertaken and tasks that they performed. Thus, I 
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considered the time spent by an individual in an armed group as gainful employment: one in 
which the ex-combatant is an employee and the armed group is an employer. 
Indeed, the experience in an armed group is a highly specific one (traumatic, from many 
points of view), and not comparable with other ‘work’ experiences. It is often, if not always, a 
break in one’s personal history that entails a clandestine life lived outside of society. While 
this research did not equate an experience in an armed group to any other job, nonetheless, 
there is continuity – in terms of employment – in the life of individuals who join armed 
groups – as there is a continuity in any given career of any individual.  
Data issues. This analytical framework should also be assessed within the data collection 
process, its challenges, constraints and limitations. The focus on employment was not 
predetermined, but resulted from the progression of the fieldwork and from a few initial 
interviews with ex-combatants. Without solicitation,  many ex-combatants (especially 
paramilitaries) referred to their period in arms through an employment lens, as if they had a 
job. The draw of a direct link between employment and armed group’s membership is, 
therefore, the fruit of ex-combatants’ answers and my elaboration of them.  
The adoption of the employment lens also responded to specific methodological challenges. 
In addition to the difficulty of conducting research “in” and “on” conflict (Goodhand, 2000), 
the security situation in Colombia and Meta at the time of fieldwork imposed extreme 
caution. A context of ongoing armed conflict with the FARC and of rising new criminal groups 
from the ashes of demobilized paramilitaries represented an obstacle in reaching out to ex-
combatants in the first place. To circumvent security concerns, I built a convenience sample 
of ex-combatants that were beneficiaries of the government-led DDR program and were 
introduced to me by the government agency (ACR).  
Nonetheless, by interviewing ex-combatants that were somehow affiliated to the 
government meant that potential biases in their answers could materialize. In order to 
mitigate those I had to seek answers that in some ways were neutral and not politicized. For 
example, seeking data and testimonies exclusively on reintegration, its challenges and the 
received benefits, would have almost certainly solicited biased answers due to the fact that 
the government agency was the one facilitating the interviews. Instead, a narrative and 
discussion around ‘employment’ experiences had the advantage of being perceived neutral 
and devoid of risks for the respondent.  
MAIN FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 
State, (dis)order and post-war transitions: A political economy perspective. From a 
structural point of view, the research emphasized the fact that war to peace transition 
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dynamics are better understood through categories of political order arrangements and 
ensuing authority and power. In political economy terms, these variables are the ones that 
are the most critical when assessing a conflict situation and transition. Order, authority and 
power define different levels of relationships and interactions, including between state and 
non-state armed groups, between local population and non-state armed groups, and 
between political and economic factors of transition, among others. Both the literature and 
the case study of Meta highlighted that transition is more about continuities between 
practices of war and peace, rather than an idealized transformation that peacebuilders strive 
to achieve. In other words, through the Meta case study, this research finds that a transition 
from war to peace can only be understood when structural factors are taken fully into 
consideration. In turn, peacebuilding approaches can only be effective when those structural 
factors are acknowledged.  
A far reaching historical outlook underlines the fact that conflictive dynamics date back to 
the chronic marginalization of Meta and the Eastern Llanos from the country’s centre of 
power. The system of governance in place has been centered around what Robinson (2013) 
describes as ‘indirect rule’, which is modeled after the 19th Century European-style system of 
controlling far away colonies. In such system, local elites retained unchecked political, social 
and economic authority, insofar that they did not challenge the centre’s authority. Such 
system is at the origin of past and contemporary conflict dynamics in the region, including 
rise of non-state armed groups. The main tenants of theories from Tilly (1985, 1990), Elias 
(1982) and North et al. (2009), among others, hold when assessing Meta’s historical 
trajectory. 
Specifically, through a historical political economy analysis, the research retrieved the root 
dynamics of conflict onset and mobilization of non-state armed groups in Meta. Rooted in 
processes of colonization of remote areas, the governance arrangement between centre and 
periphery in Colombia has constantly impacted conflict dynamics in Meta. Some of the 
dynamics that are experienced in Meta include a persistent fragmentation of authority. 
During the 20th Century up to now, political, economic and social orders have emanated from 
multiple sources beyond the state, to include, among others: traditional landowning elites 
and rampant settlers striking deals with the centre; a rent-seeking class around the illegal 
drugs industry that rose in the 1980s and challenged traditional powers; the communist-
inspired guerrilla groups controlling peripheral areas for decades; and the proliferation of 
paramilitary and criminal groups from the 1980s onward.  
In Meta, state institutions have traditionally entertained an array of ties with powerful local 
level landowning elites that drove the colonization process. State and elites have entered 
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into dynamics that simultaneously included competition, cooptation, and shared interests. 
Conceivably, local elites pulled in the direction of maintaining or reinforcing autonomy, in 
many cases through informal institutions. State actors have been interested in either 
coopting or defeating them in the attempt to centralize authority. This process, best 
described by Tilly (1985), is not unidirectional, nor the state has had a consistent agenda: at 
times, elites have been contrasted, while at others they have been supported. Thus, the state 
is understood as a multiple level actor: ambivalent in its responses and behavioural patterns.  
The result is that Colombia – with respect to regions like Meta – has experienced a 
fragmented state formation process. At the root of the rebellion cause, there is a highly 
unequal land ownership structure, precisely because the state has not been able to rule and 
mediate local dynamics in regions like Meta. Local elites and local population have been left 
alone to set up order, resulting in unequal arrangements, unbalance of power, and a 
fundamental dispute of legitimacy. (In)security is also a by-product of these botched state 
formation dynamics. A monopoly of violence that was never fully achieved on the part of the 
state has been constantly challenged by the proliferation of non-state armed groups and 
local elites throughout Colombian history. 
DDR implications: The structural level. Seen through this lens, the post-DDR transition in 
Meta and the remobilization of remnants of paramilitary structures and new criminal outfits 
have their source in unstable power arrangements and monopoly of violence, rather than 
being dependent on DDR policy failures. For example, demobilization and reintegration 
outcomes are often put in direct relationship with the policy realm, with little consideration 
for the political underpinnings of DDR. Liberal peacebuilding would imply that the DDR 
program operate under the assumption of a clean slate, whereas the awareness of political 
dynamics is fundamental. An important finding of this research is the following: the 
understanding of post-war dynamics (including factors for successful DDR) is dependent on 
the understanding of – and on the assessment of the relationship with – previous moments 
in war dynamics, i.e. the origins and causes of war, the rise of armed groups and the 
unfolding of war and its conflict dynamics.  
Given the overarching findings at the structural level, DDR is read through a more complex 
lens too. Some authors focused on the implications of demobilization on state formation. The 
way in which DDR is shaped forms integral part of the post-war settlement. DDR has been 
used throughout history as a tool to reinforce the social contract between state and society. 
Since the appearance of nation-states in the 19th Century, the glorification of ex-combatants 
and the example of their sacrifice have strengthened feelings of national belonging, and have 
contributed to upgrading people’s status from subjects to citizens. At times, DDR has been 
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the fundamental link between state and society, in order to build cohesion and national unity 
(Campbell, 2003; Centeno, 2003; Kriger, 2003). 
By the same token, the explanation of the DDR process in Meta is satisfactory only when a 
full picture is provided. The recidivism of ex-combatants and the rise of criminal groups in 
Meta are related to the unstable power arrangements that followed the DDR of the AUC in 
the region, and the progressive weakening of the FARC, among others. Answering the 
questions of how and why some paramilitary factions refused to demobilize and how new 
groups emerged from the ashes of old ones goes through a comprehensive political economy 
analysis that was provided by this research. I have stressed that entrenched local level 
dynamics, the state’s failure to fill the void left by demobilized paramilitary factions, and the 
economic rents from drugs trafficking have all contributed to an uneven outcome following 
the DDR of the AUC. 
Rebel governance and recruitment: The organizational level. A related area of findings 
concerns the ties that non-state armed groups establish with the local population and 
surrounding context. In particular, the formal and informal institutions that result from 
those relationships. Such ties have implications for recruitment patterns, for example, which 
was an important area of focus of this research.  
Mobilization and recruitment are a function of social and territorial control, and of power by 
non-state armed groups. There is a grey area between combatants and civilians in areas 
dominated by armed groups. In Meta, non-state armed groups have had to necessarily 
establish relationships with locals communities, including in the economic, social and 
governance domains. During war and/or control by non-state armed groups, economic, 
social and political activities do not halt, but continue under different forms. 
With respect to recruitment, there is a clear pattern of those ex-combatants (both FARC and 
AUC) who entered in some relationships with armed groups before becoming members of 
the group itself. Individuals live and work in conflict-affected areas where armed groups 
operate, and some individuals are eventually recruited. This dynamic calls for a granular 
understanding of rebel governance, and how armed groups interact with the local context. 
Hence, there is an area of contiguity between non-state armed groups and the local context 
in which they operate. The one who becomes a member of a non-state armed group is often 
someone who, as a non-combatant, has had some prior interaction with the armed group.  
Such contiguity is rarely acknowledged, nor are the full implications of it well understood. In 
fact, non-state armed groups in Meta act as quasi states in areas under their control. And the 
pervasiveness of the social control they exercise permeates the whole social and economic 
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life. By stressing this point, the research underscores the complexity of conflict dynamics and 
the interaction between levels of analysis. To explain the complexity of war, the research 
highlights the links between potential recruits, local populations, armed groups’ strategies, 
and power dynamics. Untangling these links is what gives explanatory power to the war 
dynamics and the transition in Meta. 
Employment, recruitment and FARC-AUC variation. The research has applied an 
employment lens to the transition from war to peace and DDR. This framework is useful 
because it further expands the explanation of mobilization and recruitment patterns in 
conflict-affected areas like Meta. In sum, I argue that the employment and livelihoods 
opportunities provided by non-state armed groups (and, by the same token, the lack of 
opportunities in the legal economy) represent a key incentive for men’s and women’s 
decision to join a group.  
Within the rebel governance and the informal institutions set up by non-state armed groups 
when controlling territory, I focus on the labor market of war, in which armed groups and 
combatants are the principal agents. This ad hoc labor market is constituted by a supply (i.e. 
pool of potential recruits and combatants) and a demand (i.e. non-state armed groups 
seeking members). I argue that employment represents one of the key ties between armed 
groups and local populations. The former needs capable and committed individuals to run its 
military and political operations. The latter is motivated by a matching need. Whether in 
time of war or in time of peace, individuals indiscriminately need to find and secure a job, as 
employment and livelihoods are at the core of human needs and activities. I argue, that, 
among other reasons, individuals join armed groups as part of an employment-seeking 
behaviour. This tendency was more pronounced for paramilitaries than FARC.  
Empirically, the case study on Meta confirms some of these theses, and highlights the key 
differences between the FARC and the paramilitaries with respect to the ties that they 
establish with locals. In particular, I emphasize the variation between the two organizations 
when it comes to recruitment and mobilization. The research showed how the ‘employment’ 
lens provides remarkably different findings depending on the nature of the armed group.  
When analysing guerrilla-controlled rural contexts like Meta, employment often means 
inheriting the family’s livelihoods, which in Meta means landless peasantry in a context of 
social and economic exclusion. The marginalized rural areas of Meta controlled by the FARC 
display contexts where either meager existence as landless peasants or membership in the 
FARC are the only ‘employment’ options (Ferro and Uribe, 2002). In fact, it is the structural 
inequalities around land tenure and those very meager existence as landless peasants that 
drove armed rebellion in the first place. Through such understanding, the individual decision 
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to join an armed group can be viewed to a certain extent as a natural consequence of pre-
existing conditions of poverty, marginalization and lack of options, rather than a complete 
rupture with previous life.  
At the organizational level, the FARC had an elaborate recruitment system in place, which 
was based on cultivating potential recruits through ideology and through providing support 
to marginalized communities. ‘Winning hearts and minds’ has been at the core of FARC 
recruitment strategy. Suffering from permanent state absence, local communities have 
traditionally turned to the FARC for basic services, dispute resolution and access to markets. 
Recruitment represents one (important) component of FARC social control and strategy 
toward its constituency. 
For paramilitaries, the link between recruitment and employment is even more pronounced. 
AUC recruiters operated in areas that were more integrated with the state and the legal 
economy, thus they had access to a larger labor market than the FARC ever did. The AUC 
recruited among the wide informal labor market that characterizes developing countries. In 
particular, they recruited in those grey areas between legality and illegality. What the AUC 
could offer was a proper job in the organization, with a competitive salary and opportunities 
to advance internally and build a career. It is clear how non-state armed groups devise 
standard procedures to recruit men and women in arms and have established career paths 
within their organizations. Albeit differently, both FARC and AUC had an elaborate system of 
human resources. 
At the individual level, paramilitary recruits considered membership in the group as a job 
opportunity. When revealing the story of their recruitment, most ex-paramilitaries told me 
that they had joined paramilitary factions while they were unemployed. With respect to the 
FARC, most ex-AUC entered the organization while on job-seeking. They reported welcoming 
the opportunity to join the paramilitaries because they would be offered a higher salary than 
anything else they could find locally. There was only one case of a recruit who entered the 
AUC motivated by ideological reasons. 
DDR of the FARC and recruitment dynamics. The empirical research unveiled an 
additional finding that puts DDR in relation to recruitment dynamics. The analysis of FARC 
recruitment patterns in the 1990s contributes to the understanding of the factors associated 
with the individual DDR program for guerrilla members from 2003 on. As I have noticed, the 
number of ex-FARC combatants deserting and joining the individual DDR program 
skyrocketed after 2003. There are several reasons why this happened, including: heightened 
political and military pressure under the Uribe government, important military defeats at the 
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hands of the paramilitaries and the regular army, and a decline in ideological and 
organizational cohesion, among others.  
Nonetheless, this research finds a critical direct link between recruitment and 
demobilization patterns in the FARC. Among the reasons why scores of FARC combatants 
abandoned their group, it is worth singling out a qualitative shift in the recruits that the 
FARC was able to attract from the mid-1990s on. The empirical analysis revealed that the 
political and military expansion of the FARC during this decade meant that its recruitment 
had also to be expanded on a significant scale. The FARC had traditionally placed critical 
importance on the ideological aspect, as every recruited combatant had to be first a 
committed Communist militant. Indoctrination was a strong part of recruitment. The result 
was that the FARC had always managed to attract recruits with a strong ideological 
commitment. The FARC military and organizational expansion of the 1990s, instead, forced 
the FARC to somewhat loosen its strict standards, with the result that the ideological 
commitment weakened and/or became somewhat secondary. Thus, if the recruitment 
becomes less strict, it follows that the internal cohesion of the group also weakens. In turn, 
opportunities for desertion increase too. As my interviews showed, several of the more 
recent recruits were much less committed to the FARC cause than the older generation. 
This finding provides further granularity and differentiation between FARC ex-combatants. 
There is an older guard composed of ex-combatants recruited before the mid-1990s who 
remain fundamentally ideological, like Cesar. My research finds that the reintegration of this 
group is more difficult than the reinsertion of those ‘newer’ FARC members, because the 
former tends to be more rigid in its approach to society. To complicate things though, my 
research also finds that the newer FARC ex-combatants are more at risk of recidivism than 
older recruits. By having established weaker bonds to the FARC and its cause of social 
justice, the newer FARC demonstrate fewer reservations in joining other illegal armed 
groups, which include new paramilitaries or criminal groups. 
Employment in war. Moving from recruitment to actual membership to a non-state armed 
group, the employment lens allows exploration of the during war phase from a practical 
standpoint. As much as sui generis the armed group’s experience can be, there is a 
fundamental understanding and perception by the combatant himself to be in an occupation, 
or a job. As it was previously mentioned, ex-paramilitaries in particular refer to their time in 
arms as holding a proper employed position – although they admit it was a poor choice. Ex-
combatants discussed their responsibilities, tasks, and relationship with peers, superiors, 
and subordinates.  
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The empirical research makes clear that violence is only one component of an armed 
organization. In turn, war is understood here beyond the mere display of violence. The 
research showed how non-state armed groups’ members are ‘employed’ in a multitude of job 
functions other than combat itself. The different roles that an ex-combatant held while in the 
armed group – beyond the role of ‘agent of violence’ – is a further sign of the complexity 
when analysing war, peace and transition processes.  
The DDR literature has generally not differentiated between roles performed by ex-
combatants within the armed group. First of all, traditionally, DDR has been applied to rebel 
groups or armed groups with a well defined military structure. In these situations, nearly all 
combatants to be demobilized were at some point individually engaged in fighting activities. 
They were ‘combatants’ in the strict sense of the term, or individuals who carry weapons and 
are engaged in military activities. This is the case of the FARC, which was a highly centralized 
military organization. All FARC members went through the same experience of military 
training and exposure to the battlefield. Despite the homogenous nature of FARC 
combatants, the research shows differences when it comes to functions and roles, as well as 
career advancement. A prominent role within the FARC was the one of political mobilization, 
whereby FARC members would work directly with the peasantry to reinforce the cohesion 
between the group and its main constituency.  
A more marked differentiation characterized jobs in the paramilitaries. The AUC was a 
hybrid organization which simultaneously retained distinct aspects. Paramilitaries were 
concurrently a private militia, a counterinsurgent army or a criminal, quasi-mafia outfit. The 
implication from this hybrid nature is the diversification of individual profiles within the 
paramilitaries. As it is explored in Chapter 7, AUC members were not all involved in combat 
and/or activities connected with the pursuit of violence. Several of them only performed 
logistics roles: from driver to radio operator to medical nurse all the way to performing 
extortions, working on illegal drugs trafficking and other heinous practices. It derives, then, 
that this research’s notion of ‘combatant’ is more comprehensive to include non-combat 
roles. In turn, such expanded notion has implications for reintegration strategies, as well as 
for risk of recidivism. 
Reintegration or recidivism? The research also assessed to what extent practices of 
reintegration are influenced by wartime experiences and previous jobs. At the individual 
level, ex-combatants carry over the skills and experience acquired while in arms into their 
post-war reintegration pathway. The research found that the length of time spent in arms is 
an important but not decisive factor in predicting the reinsertion path of an ex-combatant. 
Intuitively, the longer the time an individual is a member of an armed group, the longer it 
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takes to reintegrate. While this is true, my research expands this assertion to include more 
differentiation with respect to the roles that ex-combatants perform while in arms. The 
findings from the research demonstrate that more time spent in arms does not equal more 
time needed to find a job after demobilization. In other words, the type of role and career 
pattern of ex-combatants have also an effect on the reintegration path. 
Arguably, the disaggregation of both ex-combatants’ roles and of the variables associated 
with ex-combatants’ life cycle (including age, background, level of education, previous 
occupation, age of recruitment, number of years in arms, roles and functions within the 
group etc.) serves the objective of deepening the understanding of war-to-peace transition 
dynamics. Breaking the mantra that ex-combatants are not a discreet category would 
contribute not only to the understanding of non-state armed groups’ internal organizations 
and behaviours, but it would also be functional to the policy level. At a minimum, 
disaggregating ex-combatants’ jobs will create and build awareness about the differences 
among them. Ultimately, knowing more about ex-combatants’ roles in the group and their 
past employment experiences may help to devise more targeted policies and allocate 
resources more efficiently. 
A political economy lens was also able to unveil some of the dynamics of recidivism. The 
factors that drive ex-combatants into being re-recruited by non-state armed groups do not 
only concern the individual level, nor policy failures. In addition, the structural level 
dynamics of emerging new armed groups linked to crime is not fully satisfactory either. In 
line with other findings, what the research asserts is that more often than not there is 
continuity between the war and the post-war phase. Not only do ex-combatants find an 
enabling environment for recidivism, but there are also informal and deep rooted dynamics 
involving local level interests and balance of power. While actors may frequently change, the 
social and economic processes (both legal and illegal) are entrenched and may take a long 
time to shift.  
When asked about recidivism, answers from ex-paramilitaries point to a system in which 
armed groups approach ex-combatants because of their previous experience in arms (the 
employment lens, again). Recruiters know that ex-combatants can be reliable candidates. In 
addition, the risk of recidivism materializes without much warning in a highly informal way. 
Someone you know would ask you to take care of a small task (literally, trabajito in Spanish; 
again, the employment lens), such as moving supplies, or driving a vehicle somewhere. But 
the request comes from an illegal entity, so once you accept you are again tied to and 
involved in illegality.  
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Thus, grey areas are the norm: recidivism takes place informally and sometimes even 
without the full awareness of ex-combatants. Such dynamic implies that a DDR program does 
not occur in a social vacuum, nor does it begin with a clean slate. Instead, DDR takes place in 
a specific social context where former combatants may still retain ties with non-state armed 
groups and they may still be perceived as combatants by the community where they live. 
Narratives of recidivism stress the importance of networks and organization, beyond simple 
economic incentives. 
CONTRIBUTION AND NEXT STEPS  
Knowledge contribution. From a knowledge contribution point of view, this research 
subscribed to a historical political economy approach to the understanding of war-to-peace 
transition and DDR. It emphasized the factual power and order dynamics (at local level), the 
complex interaction between political, economic and social variables, and the continuum 
between war and peace. Simultaneously, the research has also borrowed heavily from the 
recent theorization of the rebel governance literature, which is concerned with the 
understanding of how wartime institutions operate. Insights from this approach contribute 
to both an understanding of war dynamics and how civilians cope in times of war. The 
analysis of the different practices of war economies and their transition into peace 
economies is also part of this approach (Goodhand, 2004).    
Through the review of this literature, a novel methodological approach, a case study on Meta, 
and an empirical study on ex-combatants, the research proposes some points of knowledge 
contribution. These include: 
- Employment and labor market of war lens of analysis to look at multiple phases and 
multiple levels. Phases and levels are analysed both discreetly and in their interaction. This 
approach carries potential avenues for new and follow-up research.  
- Reintegration of ex-combatants is problematized looking at their full life spectrum rather 
than exclusively at the post war phase. Factors of reintegration also depend  on recruitment 
patterns and individual experiences of war dynamics.  
- At the collective level too, there are links between mobilization and recruitment, war 
dynamics, and ensuing DDR and political settlement. The demobilization of armed groups is 
a political matter that follows the whole trajectory of war dynamics, and does not happen in 
a vacuum. 
- Human resources of non-state armed groups fit into the rebel governance literature 
concerned with the internal functioning of armed groups and their ties to the external. Some 
novel insights are provided on how non-state armed groups organize their recruitment, roles 
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and tasks in the group, and career paths. 
Policy contribution from a broader outlook at DDR and transition. In terms of policy 
contribution, the study places itself within academia’s and practitioners’ efforts to improve 
responses and development interventions in conflict-affected countries. There is an 
underlying and unresolved tension between the ambition to set universal standards of 
practice and the reality of working in unique contexts that defy standardization. The 
ambition to devise universal solutions, in this case DDR, to address development problems 
has clashed repeatedly with the practical reality of contextual and structural factors. The 
failure to recognize both complexity and non-economic variables, as well as to understand 
deep contextual factors, has led to poor design and outcomes of peacebuilding programs, for 
example. 
To be universal and provide standardized solutions, development has moved away from 
complexity, to become a ‘bureaucracy’ of development. Albeit relevant, untangling this 
dilemma is beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the origin of the present 
research comes from the ambition (and the frustration) to account for this complexity, to 
contribute in minimal part to untangle the dilemma between policy prescription and the 
very contextual history in which a policy is applied.  
The main policy implication from the study is that in a context like the one in Meta, with 
historically-rooted conflating political, economic and criminal dimensions, DDR policies 
alone may be ineffective in achieving significant outcomes at the macro level. The political 
economy context cannot be overlooked. There should be a recognition of factual balance of 
power relations, and established institutional and economic ties – even when these emanate 
from actors that are deemed illegitimate (Mampilly, 2011).  
In turn, peacebuilding strategies that are designed on paper through the unfolding of 
technically-engineered solutions of economic reconstruction and social recovery may be 
inadequate and/or not successfully applicable when the on-the-ground expertise and 
contextual considerations are downplayed. Usually, for large scale top down post-conflict 
programs and initiatives, a fine-grained analysis of power relationships, historical 
interactions between groups and elites, and rooted conflictive factors are not fully taken into 
consideration. Arguably, improvements and adjustments have been recorded in large 
development agencies in terms of integrating social components and political considerations 
to the devise of programs and strategies.    
The analysis that was conducted for this research clearly demonstrates that DDR has 
implications far beyond the security and development realms that are commonly recognized 
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by development actors. DDR not only contributes to stability and security through 
disbanding armed groups; it not only contributes to transitional justice and reconciliation at 
both national and community levels through devising provisions that bring ex-combatants 
and society at large closer together; and DDR not only provides for the welfare of ex-
combatants through material support to their reinsertion in society. In fact, the research 
showed that DDR has a greater long term role in state formation and strengthening of state 
legitimacy and institutions. Disarming non-state armed groups has concrete political 
implications of national- and local-level bargaining between elites. In the case of Meta, there 
is a critical balance between centre and periphery when assessing DDR. 
DDR enters in a direct relationship with the state’s efforts at consolidating the monopoly of 
violence. In Meta, the DDR of paramilitaries was only partially accompanied by a larger effort 
at expanding the monopoly of violence to peripheral areas, which have traditionally 
experienced alternative forms of order and multiple overlapping authorities. At the time of 
the demobilization of the AUC (2003-06), the conflict with the FARC was still at its height, 
and parts of Meta (i.e. the FARC stronghold of Ariari microregion) were under direct FARC 
domination. Thus, the research does not want to bring the conclusion that the DDR with the 
AUC failed because the state did not expand its monopoly of violence. Far from it. I do 
recognize that the DDR with the AUC was one step toward that direction. The point is that a 
DDR program cannot be made accountable for ongoing overarching war dynamics. If any, the 
failure consisted of setting expectations that were too high from the DDR with paramilitaries. 
More modest goals would have been beneficial.   
In addition, the integration of three levels of analysis and a complementing comprehensive 
outlook at Meta’s historical conflict dynamics provided insights on the conditions for 
sustainable reintegration and on risk factors for recidivism beyond the case of Colombia. The 
research explains that failed individual reintegration and recidivism into armed groups is 
only partially attributable to the provisions of the DDR program. Recidivism is a symptom 
and a natural consequence of either remobilization of existing armed groups or mobilization 
of new ones. In turn, the dynamics and rise of new non-state armed groups in Meta were the 
result of a complex interaction that involves local elites, power arrangements, existing armed 
groups, and economic and strategic interests on the part of the state and other actors 
involved.  
Policy implications from the adoption of an employment lens. Conceptually, 
employment has been analysed here in a broader sense. Employment has not only been 
addressed in terms of a narrow policy level focus on employment generation. More deeply, 
this research addressed the question of what it means for an individual ex-combatant to 
 270
have a peace-time job after having been a member of an armed group.  From this premise, 
the research contributes to the policy realm by exploring the meaning of employment and its 
impact on successful reintegration. After demobilization, the employment factor 
undoubtedly plays an important role in the reintegration process of ex-combatants – 
something that the policy literature acknowledges only to a certain extent.  
Nonetheless, the full impact that the employment dimension can play at the individual level 
is somewhat underappreciated. The interviews that I conducted show that both ex-FARC and 
ex-paramilitaries who hold a job have a stronger perception of themselves as members of 
society – away from the armed group’s experience. Thus, employment is central to the 
individual ex-combatant’s process of reinsertion. In this sense, the transformative power of 
holding a job is not fully recognized. The interviews that I held brought the finding that those 
ex-combatants who were successfully employed overwhelmingly experienced feelings of 
being reintegrated and of having put their past behind, compared to those without 
something they could call a job – either in the legal or illegal economy.  
In turn, employment reintegration policies may be more effective when the role and factors 
for recruitment and the life in the armed group are somewhat understood and acknowledged 
by policy implementers. Reintegration programs may want to consider previous 
employment experiences of ex-combatants when designing employment generation 
programs, for example. 
Future research and future challenges. This set of findings and contributions introduces 
us to discussing some of the research that can follow up from this research. In terms of 
employment, there is scope to more rigorously understand how employment impacts 
individual reintegration; and, in turn, what initiatives can facilitate ex-combatants to secure 
a post-DDR employment. The point is that within the DDR literature and practice, 
employment has always been labeled under the rubric of ‘economic’ reintegration. My 
research has argued that for ex-combatants – as for any individual – employment plays a 
larger role, which involves self-esteem and feeling of holding a place in society. Nonetheless, 
this last statement is not universally valid. The value that individuals place on employment 
differs from society to society and culture to culture,  it is not predetermined. For example, 
some societies could place a higher value on community acceptance rather than being 
employed or not. Thus, there is room for further research on employment, its meaning and 
impact on the overall reintegration of ex-combatants. 
In conclusion, this academic journey has taken me to explore some of the life experiences of 
individuals who went through a complete cycle of war: from recruitment to membership to 
demobilization with the ambitious goal of trying to simultaneously analyse the details and 
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make sense of this individual war to peace transition as a whole process. The complementing 
political economy analysis has given explanatory power of this complex cycle from peace to 
war and back to peace, in an attempt to account for multiple levels of analysis to explain how 
individuals, communities and societies experience war and peace. 
Reflecting on specific follow-up research is also functional to the assessment of the current 
situation in Colombia. Since this research was started and fieldwork was conducted, a 
landmark change has taken place: in September 2016, a comprehensive and final peace 
agreement was signed between the government of Colombia and the FARC. The agreement 
puts an end to the armed conflict between the two and ratifies the end of the FARC as a non-
state armed group. In June 2017, the disarmament of the FARC was completed and the 
critical reinsertion and reintegration phases have started.  
While in numerical terms the most recent demobilization of approximately 7,000 FARC 
members pales when compared to the over 60,000 FARC and AUC-combined demobilized ex-
combatants between 2002 and 2015, the political significance of FARC’s DDR is equally 
important, if not more. The dissertation speaks to the current situation as it portrays the far-
reaching implications of DDR in terms of state formation, and in terms of sustaining the 
transition from war to peace. While peacebuilding discourse and policies in Colombia have 
been around for over a decade in the midst of armed conflict, the peace agreement provides 
the opportunity to step up and complete efforts at supporting the transition toward 
sustainable peace. As this research underlines, an approach that does not neglect nor shy 
away from power relationships, local-level order and the institutions that the FARC have had 
in place for so long, would allow for a realistic understanding versus idealistic policy 
formulas. 
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Annex 1: Profile of 31 Ex-Combatants 
NAME AGE GENDER 
ORIGIN:  
DEPT / 
MUNICIP 
ORIGIN: 
URBAN 
or RURAL 
STATUS / 
CHILDREN 
FATHER'S 
JOB 
DOMESTIC 
ABUSE or 
NEGLECT 
ARMED GROUP 
LOCATION 
(in armed 
group) 
YEARS  
(in armed 
group) 
IDEOLOGY  
YEAR 
OF 
DDR 
EMPLOYED 
(currently) 
(Y/N) 
Cesar 45 M Guaviare Rural Married / Y Peasants N/A FARC Llanos 27 Strong 2010 N/A 
Mauricio 40 M Guaviare  Rural Separated / Y N/A N/A 
AUC - Heroes 
del Guaviare  
Guaviare, 
Meta 2 Medium 2006 Y 
Alejandro 35 M Meta / Granada Rural 
Separated 
/ Y Carpenter N/A 
AUC - Bloque 
Casanare 
Casanare, 
Meta 5  2006 Y 
Jairo 39 M Vaupes / Mitu  Urban Married / Y 
Drugs 
trafficking N/A 
ACCU - Frente 
Guaviare 
Casanare, 
Meta 5 Strong 2003 Y 
Ibarbo 32 M Bogota Urban Single / N 
Services 
(mother) Y 
AUC - Heroes 
del Llano Meta 6 Medium 2006 Y 
Carlos 27 M Tolima Rural Single / N 
Peasants 
(mother) Y FARC 
Antioquia, 
Tolima 14 Medium 2013 N 
Walter 19 M Meta / Mapiripán Rural 
Single 
/ N Peasants N/A FARC Meta 
1 (less 
than 1) Weak 2013 N 
Giovanni 24 M Antioquia / Turbo Urban 
Married 
/ Y N/A N/A FARC Antioquia 3 Medium 2013 N 
Laia 39 F Meta / Villavicencio Urban 
Married 
/ Y N/A Y FARC 
Caqueta, 
Tolima, Valle 
del Cauca 
11 Medium 2010 Y 
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NAME AGE GENDER 
ORIGIN:  
DEPT / 
MUNICIP 
ORIGIN: 
URBAN 
or RURAL 
STATUS / 
CHILDREN 
FATHER'S 
JOB 
DOMESTIC 
ABUSE or 
NEGLECT 
ARMED GROUP 
LOCATION 
(in armed 
group) 
YEARS  
(in armed 
group) 
IDEOLOGY  
YEAR 
OF 
DDR 
EMPLOYED 
(currently) 
(Y/N) 
Roberto 31 M Vichada / Cumaribo Rural 
Single 
/ N Peasants N/A FARC Vichada 8  2007 Y 
Raul P. 48 M Meta / Guamal Rural 
Married 
/ Y Peasants N/A FARC 
Caqueta, 
Cauca, Meta, 
Tolima 
27 Strong 2008 Y 
Laura 28 F 
Meta / San 
Juan de 
Arama 
Rural Single / N 
Peasants 
(mother) Y FARC 
Caqueta, 
Guaviare, 
Meta 
10 Strong 2009 N 
Maria 
Victoria 34 F 
Meta / 
Villavicencio Urban 
Married 
/ Y N/A Y 
AUC - Bloque 
Centauros Casanare 2 Weak 2005 N 
Radamael 34 M Meta / Villavicencio Urban 
Married 
/ Y 
Public 
service N/A 
AUC - 
Autodefensas 
del Carmen 
N/A 1 (less than 1) Weak 2007 Y 
Juan 
Manuel 42 M 
Meta / San 
Martin Rural 
Separated 
/ Y Peasants N/A 
AUC - Bloque 
Centauros 
Casanare, 
Guaviare 1  2006 Y 
Camilo 37 M Meta / Villavicencio Urban 
Married 
/ Y Fisherman N/A 
AUC - Bloque 
Centauros 
Guaviare, 
Meta 4  2006 Y 
Jon 40 M Meta / San Martin Urban 
Married 
/ Y 
Public 
service Y 
AUC - Bloque 
Centauros Meta 8  2006 Y 
Faustino 18 M Nariño / Barbacoas Rural 
Single 
/ N Peasants Y ELN Nariño 4 Weak 2006 N 
Cristina 40 F Meta / La Uribe Rural 
Married 
/ Y Peasants Y FARC 
Cundinamarca
, Meta, Tolima 22 Strong 2003 Y 
Pablo 31 M 
Antioquia 
(Uraba 
Antioquieño) 
N/A Married / Y N/A N/A AUC 
Norte de 
Santander 2 Medium 2006 Y 
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NAME AGE GENDER 
ORIGIN:  
DEPT / 
MUNICIP 
ORIGIN: 
URBAN 
or RURAL 
STATUS / 
CHILDREN 
FATHER'S 
JOB 
DOMESTIC 
ABUSE or 
NEGLECT 
ARMED GROUP 
LOCATION 
(in armed 
group) 
YEARS  
(in armed 
group) 
IDEOLOGY  
YEAR 
OF 
DDR 
EMPLOYED 
(currently) 
(Y/N) 
Wendy 33 F Meta / Puerto Gaitan Both 
Single 
/ Y N/A Y ACMV Vichada 6 Weak 2006 Y 
Sergio 37 M Meta / Puerto Lopez Rural 
Married 
/ Y Peasants N/A FARC Meta 2 Weak 2012 Y 
Fernan 34 M 
Caqueta / San 
Vicente del 
Caguan 
Rural Married / N/A Peasants N/A FARC 
Caqueta, 
Llanos, Huila 14 Strong 2009 Y 
Ignacio 48 M Meta / Puerto Gaitan Rural 
Married 
/ Y Peasants N/A ACMV Meta 4 Weak 2005 Y 
Cristiano 33 M Meta / La Macarena Rural 
Single 
/ N 
Peasants; 
retail  N/A FARC 
Guaviare, 
Meta 11 Medium 2008 N 
Muriel 43 M Cundinamarca / La Vega Rural 
Married 
/ Y Peasants Y FARC 
Cundinamarca
, Huila, Tolima, 
Meta 
32 Strong 2014 N 
Jaime 36 M Meta / Villavicencio Both 
Married 
/ N Peasants Y FARC 
Caquetá, 
Vichada, 
Guaviare 
12 Strong 2009 Y 
Enrique 29 M Tolima Rural Married / Y Peasants N/A FARC 
Guaviare, 
Meta, Tolima 10 Medium 2006 N 
Juan 22 M Meta / Granada Rural 
Married 
/ N N/A Y FARC Meta 3 Weak 2008 Y 
Marco 33 M Meta N/A N/A N/A N/A AUC N/A N/A Medium No Y 
Ivan 47 M Meta (Ariari) Rural Separated / Y N/A N/A FARC Guaviare 16 Weak 2010 N 
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Annex 2: Demographics of Ex-
Combatants’ Sample 
Annex 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the sample of thirty-one ex-combatants. 
These statistics are drawn from data collected in the first part of the interview, which 
included closed questions. Together with demographic statistics, I include disaggregated 
data in terms of armed groups’ membership, number of years in arms, etc. As it is explained 
in Chapter 3, the sample was built with the expectation to be representative of the larger 
population of ex-combatants who are part of the DDR program in Meta. An expectation 
which this research met.  
Interviewees were predominantly males: of the thirty-one interviewees, twenty-six were 
males and only five were women. This uneven balance reflects the male versus female 
variation of the ex-combatant population in Meta, which is 80% male to 20% female. All five 
female interviews were of good quality and rich in content, which offsets the disadvantage 
of having only a limited number of female interviewees. In fact, the average time of the five 
interviews with women (over one hour) is longer than men’s (around fifty minutes).  
Eighteen participants belonged to the leftist guerrilla, including seventeen FARC members 
and one ELN member (divided into fifteen men and three women). Thirteen members of the 
paramilitary are part of the sample (eleven men and two women): ten from the AUC; two 
from the ACMV (a Meta-based paramilitary group which, although was not part of the AUC, 
it collectively demobilized in 2005); and one ex-paramilitary from the ACCU (the 
antecedents of the AUC). This variation mostly mirrors the percentage variation among the 
total 3,035 ex-combatants in Meta (ACR, 2017), which is divided as follows: 62% FARC, 3% 
ELN, and 35% paramilitaries. For convenience, I will speak of either “guerrilla” or 
“FARC/ELN”, or simply “FARC” to include both the FARC ex-combatants and the one ELN 
member. By the same token, under the label ‘paramilitary’ or ‘AUC’ I will include AUC, ACMV 
and ACCU members.     
With respect to age group, twenty-one ex-combatants (68%) were between 26 and 40 years 
old. Six ex-combatants were in the 40-60 age group (19%), while four interviewees were 
between 18 and 25 years old (13%). The percentages for the three age groups among all 
demobilized in Meta are close enough to my sample (65%, 21% and 11%, respectively). The 
five female interviewees were between 28 and 40. The average age is nearly thirty-five 
years old: ex-paramilitaries’ average age is almost thirty-seven, whereas FARC/ELN are 
slightly younger – just over thirty-three years old.  
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Nearly 60% of participants were either married or in a relationship, while one in four was 
single. Of the female participants, three were married/in a relationship and two were single. 
Twenty ex-combatants have children, nine of them do not, and for two participants this 
information is not available. One female participant (the youngest one, of 28 years old) does 
not have children, whereas the other four do. 
In terms of origin, family background, and location while in the armed group, the sample is 
made primarily – but not exclusively – of ex-combatants who come from or served in an 
armed group in Meta and the Eastern Llanos. Thus, they mostly come from a rural 
background. In particular, nineteen participants (over 60%) are from Meta; a percentage 
that goes up to 71% when we include the rest of the Eastern Llanos (Arauca, Casanare, 
Vichada, and Guaviare). The rest of the participants come from different areas of Colombia.  
Nineteen participants (over 60%) state that they grew up in a rural setting; eight of them 
(26%) are from an urban setting (city or large town); two participants were raised in both 
rural and urban; and for two ex-combatants this information is not available. Of the 71% 
from the Llanos (twenty-two participants), with the exception of six of them who grew up 
either in the city of Villavicencio or in the town of San Martin, Meta, all the others come from 
a rural background.  
With respect to the area where ex-combatants in the sample operated while pertaining to 
the guerrilla or the paramilitary, twenty-four out of thirty-one participants (77%) 
mentioned either Meta (sixteen ex-combatants) or another location in the Eastern Llanos 
(mostly Guaviare) as their theater of operation. In addition, half participants (fifteen) stated 
that their family (parents or caregivers) belonged to the peasantry (often chronically 
poor)242. For nine participants the information about family background is not available, 
thus we can assume that the group with peasant origins may be even larger. These are 
important statistics that back the premises of this regional study on Meta, which is a rural 
region with a mainly rural-based conflict and an agricultural economy. 
The number of FARC/ELN that have rural and urban origins is fifteen and two, respectively 
– with one participant growing up in both settings. With respect to paramilitaries, instead, 
most participants are urban-based (six), while four of them were raised rurally, one grew up 
in both settings, and two paramilitaries did not disclose this information. This statistics is in 
                                                        
242 While I did not include indicators of poverty or vulnerability in this statistics profile, interestingly, I built ex-
post an indicator on family abuse and/or neglect from participants’ answers. While talking about family 
background and social origins, unsolicited, twelve participants (39%) admitted the difficult family conditions in 
which they were raised, being either victim of domestic violence, abuse and/or neglect, or growing up without 
one or both parents. It is worth noting that all five female participants in the sample were victim of domestic 
neglect, violence or parental absence. Instead, there is no remarkable differentiation between ex-guerrilla and 
ex-paramilitary members. I will come back later on this – i.e. how instability and/or violence at home may 
contribute to recruitment by armed groups.   
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line with the social origins and location of both groups (Brittain, 2010). On the one hand, the 
mixed nature of paramilitaries and the AUC, which started as a rural reaction to the power 
of the guerrilla, and progressively became powerful in several urban centres. On the other 
hand, the overwhelmingly predominant rural origin and operation of the guerrillas, both 
FARC and ELN, is confirmed by the fact that only two ex-guerrillas out of eighteen come 
from an urban environment. Thus, this statistics strengthens the general validity of the 
sample (FARC are mostly rural-based while paramilitaries have mixed origin), and allows 
for some generalization of the findings from the present research (Gutierrez Sanin, 2008).  
One last parameter to be mentioned concerns the length of time spent in the armed group. 
This is an important point. Since one of the focus of the research is on ‘employment’ within 
the armed group, it was crucial to collect testimonies from armed group’s members who 
had different experiences in terms of amount of time spent in arms.    Thus, my sample 
includes junior, mid-level and senior members of armed groups (in terms of time, not 
necessarily in terms of rank). Thus, on this level, the sample is well balanced – as it is 
represented by the table below. 
TABLE A2.1: LONGEVITY OF EX-COMBATANTS IN NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS 
# of years in arms # of FARC XCs # of AUC XCs 
0-2 2 5 
3-5 3 4 
6-10 3 3 
11-20 6 0 
20 + 4 0 
N/A 0 1 
Tot. 18 13 
There is an important difference here between ex-guerrilla and ex-paramilitary 
participants. The most ‘senior’ ex-paramilitary in the sample spent eight years in arms. For 
ex-paramilitaries the average time in the armed group is less than four years. The ex-
guerrillas have a completely different profile in this respect: average time in the armed 
group is twelve and half years. The ex-FARC with most years in the group spent thirty-two 
years in arms, while twelve of them spent ten or more years in the group. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the FARC as an armed organization started its activities in 1964, 
whereas modern paramilitary formation  only took place in the late 1990s – with AUC 
demobilizing in 2003-2006. The relative short time of the AUC explains first of all the 
difference between the two groups. Second, the higher longevity of guerrilla members is due 
to the permanent condition of a FARC member: once admitted in the group, an individual 
could not quit and leave but membership was for life.  
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Annex 3: List of Interviews 
Interviews with Ex-Combatants 
Date Location Name Affiliation 
December 2012 Villavicencio (café) Cesar  FARC 
November 2013 Villavicencio (ACR office) Mauricio AUC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Alejandro AUC 
 Villavicencio (University) Jairo ACCU 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Ibarbo AUC 
 Villavicencio (‘Peace House’) Carlos FARC 
 Villavicencio (‘Peace House’) Walter FARC 
 Villavicencio (‘Peace House’) Giovanni FARC 
February 2014 Villavicencio (ACR office) Laia FARC 
 Villavicencio (social work site) Roberto FARC 
 Villavicencio (social work site) Raul P. FARC 
 Villavicencio (social work site) Laura FARC 
 Villavicencio (social work site) Maria Victoria AUC 
 Villavicencio (social work site) Radamael AUC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Juan Manuel AUC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Camilo AUC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Jon AUC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Faustino ELN 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Cristina FARC 
 Puerto Gaitan (café) Pablo AUC 
 Puerto Gaitan (local school) Wendy ACMV 
 Puerto Gaitan (local school) Sergio FARC 
 Puerto Gaitan (local school) Fernan FARC 
 Puerto Gaitan (local school) Ignacio ACMV 
 Puerto Gaitan (local school) Cristiano FARC 
 Villavicencio (‘Peace House’) Muriel FARC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Jaime FARC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Enrique FARC 
 Villavicencio (ACR office) Juan FARC 
 Villavicencio (café) Marco AUC 
 Villavicencio (café) Ivan FARC 
 
Interviews with Key Informants 
Date Location Position and Organization 
November 
2013 
Bogota Professor of Politics, University of Rosario 
 Senior Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Senior Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Manager, Organization of American States (MAPP-OEA) 
  Senior Technical Advisor, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
  Assistant Professor, University of Los Andes 
  External Relations, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Coordinator of Projects, INDEPAZ 
  Director, Observatory of Peace and Conflict (formerly ODDR), 
National University of Colombia 
  Professor, University of Externado 
  Program Officer, Consolidation Programs, Govt of Col 
  Assistant Professor, University of Los Andes 
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  Program Officer, Social Prosperity (DPS), Govt of Col 
  Director, Historical Memory Centre 
  DDR Officer, USAID, US Embassy  
  Sr. Consultant, UNDP 
  Sr. Research Fellow, GIGA 
  Sr. Researcher, Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) 
  Security Officer, DAS, Govt of Col  
November 
2013 
Villavicencio Coordinator Economic Development, Consolidation Programs, 
Govt of Col 
 Coordinator Illicit Trafficking, Consolidation Programs, Govt of Col 
  Regional Director, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Reintegration Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Reintegration Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Economic reintegration, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  President of District Council (JAC), Reliquia, Villavicencio 
  Victim’s Office, Municipality of Fuente de Oro 
  Victim’s Office, Municipality of Fuente de Oro 
  Reintegration Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Regional Coordinator, International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) 
  Reintegration Officer, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
February 
2014 
Villavicencio Consultant, Conflict, Development and Human Rights 
 Independent Researcher on Human Rights 
  Program Officer, UN Human Rights 
  Counsel, Reintegration Program (ACR) 
  Regional Coordinator, Social Prosperity (DPS), Govt of Col 
  Professor of History, University of Meta 
  Professor, Observatory of Territory, University of Llanos  
  DDR Officer, Organization of American States (MAPP-OEA) 
  Regional Coordinator, Organization of American States (MAPP-
OEA) 
February 
2014 
Bogota Sr. Researcher, CINEP 
 Professor of Economics, University of Los Andes 
  Sr. Researcher, Nuevo Arco Iris 
  Sr. Researcher, Nuevo Arco Iris 
  Program Coordinator, World Bank 
  Manager, World Bank (retired) 
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